Cases Flashcards
Gatto
willful Blindness
- there needs to be a high probability that the facts exist
- deliberate steps to avoid knowledge of those facts
US V. Bowling
If you have a defense supported by law, with some record of E, they JY is entitled to consider it
this is a low bar
State v thompson
if you divorce me i will kill you
- shot 4 times, so much time between shots
- heard screams until dead
-
D argued that he did not have the capacity to reflect and TF, did not run though the though process.
State v. thomposon holding
Yes. For purposes of first-degree murder, premeditation requires proof that D committed the act after a period of reflection. In Arizona, the first-degree and second-degree murder statutes are virtually the same, except that first-degree murder requires premeditation. The Arizona legislature defines premeditation as an intent to kill another, if such intent precedes the killing by any length of time to permit reflection; proof of actual reflection is not required. Actual reflection, however, can occur in the blink of an eye. If the slightest passage of time is the only difference between first-degree and second-degree murder, then the state would be relieved of its burden to prove that the defendant reflected need more.
does premeditation require D to reflect on actions prior to the killing?
Coolen v state
gets drunk at bar, then stabs friend at his house, wife jumps on top to protect.
Yes. CL For first-degree murder, premeditation requires D reflect on actions and the likely consequences prior to the killing.
Premeditation is the fully formed, conscious intent to kill.
Premeditation can be proven by circumstantial evidence. However, if the evidence shows that the killing could have occurred other than by premeditation, the defendant is not guilty of first-degree murder.
In this case, there was conflicting testimony regarding whether Coolen had a premeditative intent to kill John. While Barbara testified that Coolen stabbed John for no reason, Barbara’s son testified that Coolen and John had argued over a can of beer earlier in the evening. Neither individual’s testimony provides sufficient evidence of premeditation.
John’s stab wounds could be indicative of Coolen’s premeditated intent to kill or, conversely, consistent with Coolen’s belief that John was going to attack Coolen first. Because there is insufficient evidence of premeditation, Coolen’s conviction for first-degree murder is reversed and a judgment of second-degree murder is entered.
Coolen v state
FACTS
attack came out of no where
E shows wounds of sudden combat
nature and # of wounds are consistant w. pre-med or with other quick combat
this was homicide w/malice but no aggravating factors
Gilbert v. state
Coolen V. state dissent
premeditation can be shown by C.E., and is a question of fact for the jury.
State v. Doub
- guy who car flew in the air and killed the child.
- D’s action put people in iminent dangerand had a conscious disregard. the circumstances created an extreme indifference towards life:
US v. Williams
Yes. A jury may consider the statements and actions of a homicide victim in determining a defendant’s consciousness of risk.
A victim may never consent to homicide. However, a victim’s statements and actions may be considered to determine whether a defendant perceived a serious risk of injury or death stemming from the defendant’s conduct. This determination of consciousness of risk affects whether a defendant had the requisite mens rea, or criminal intent, for a conviction of murder or manslaughter. If a defendant is found to be conscious of an extreme risk of death or serious injury to a victim, the malice-aforethought element of murder is satisfied and the defendant is guilty of murder. If a defendant is not conscious of the risk, the defendant may be convicted only of manslaughter. Here, Williams’s group had precautions in place to ensure the initiate was a willing participant throughout the duration of a jump-in. Johnson had been asked several times whether he wanted to participate and continue the jump-in. Johnson’s willingness to participate certainly had some effect on Williams’s perception of the jump-in’s risk and its potential for serious harm. Thus, Johnson’s consent to the jump-in is probative of Williams’s criminal intent (as opposed to using consent as an affirmative defense), so the prosecutor’s statement likely misled the jury, causing them to ignore Johnson’s statements in determining Williams’s mens rea. Therefore, Williams’s murder conviction is invalid because a jury may consider a homicide victim’s statements in determining a defendant’s consciousness of risk. Williams’s murder conviction is reversed.
Pouncy
Yes. Voluntary manslaughter is the intentional killing of another that occurs in the heat of passion due to reasonable provocation and before a reasonable time has elapsed for the defendant to regain self-control.
Voluntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of murder. The difference between the two homicide crimes is the element of provocation. The level of provocation necessary to mitigate a killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter requires evidence that the defendant acted out of passion rather than reason. Words alone do not constitute adequate provocation. There must be adequate provocation to such a degree that a reasonable person would lose control. In this case, there is no evidence to support a finding that Pouncey was in such a state of mind that he lost control and acted in the heat of passion. Rather, Pouncey testified at trial that he was not angry or out of control when he retrieved the shotgun and shot Powers. Additionally, there is no evidence of a physical altercation between the two men. To the contrary, the altercation was a verbal quarrel. Finally, Pouncey had a reasonable cooling-off period during which he had the opportunity to regain self-control. Pouncey left the men standing in front of the house, went inside to obtain the shotgun, and returned outside, where he shot Powers. Thus, the evidence produced at trial does not support Pouncey’s claim that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed.
high v. US
about adequate provocation
the jury found that High had been adequately provoked by his suspicion that Gaither had sexual relations with his adult stepsister. However, High and Nevins were not close, they were both adults, and High merely saw Nevins give Gaither a kiss on the cheek. High’s reaction to Gaither was objectively unreasonable because a reasonable person would not resort to extreme violence based on a suspected sexual encounter between a friend and an adult stepsister
State v. Williams
293 native american toothache child case
negligence homicide: we need to look at the causal connection.
1. all the parents know is that child had a toothache
2. the breach of duty from the non-biological father was the fact that he has assumed care of the child.
3. medical care of a child is an implied duty and a parental duty.
4. if this case was CL you would need to proved gross neglignece (here was a statute for ordinary negligence).
5. rpp in similiar cricumstances
6. purly objective standard.
State v. Williams part II
the parents lack of education and other non-RPP factors were not taken into account
