Cases Flashcards
INS v. Chadha
Legislative veto unconstitutional b/c it didn’t comply with Article I (bicameralism, presentment). Only legislative acts (alter legal rights, duties, and relations of persons) subject to Article I.
United States v. Fla. East Coast Railway
Hearing can mean any number of things, but a hearing used to elicit facts for a legislative-type judgment, for prospective application only, rather than adjudicating a particular set of disputed facts, is less likely to impute formal rulemaking.
Vermont Yankee v. NRDC (1978)
Agencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in the exercise of their discretion, but courts may not impose them absent constitutional constraints/extremely compelling circumstances.
Universal Camera Corp v. NLRB (1951)
The substantial evidence test applies to evidence in the whole record on both sides (even evidence contradicting agency’s decision).
NLRB v. Hearst (1944)
When reviewing mixed questions of fact and law, an agency’s factual findings must have “warrant in the record,” while its explanation for its decision must have a “reasonable basis in the law” i.e. further the agency’s enabling statute.
SEC v. Chenery I (1943)
When an agency has not provided an adequate explanation (a+c), even if the court can discern an adequate explanation from the record, the court should remand the case back to the agency.
SEC v. Chenery II (1947)
Agencies can use adjudication to create new policy retroactively if the unfairness of retroactivity on ∆ is outweighed by the benefit to the public/statutory goals.
In this case, it was officers of a utility trading stock while the utility was being restructured. They weren’t breaking any laws, but the SEC recognized that what they were doing (insider trading) was sus. Rather than just let it slide and make a rule, SEC ordered them to sell all their shares [order=adjudication!], holding they had a fiduciary duty to the company.
Chevron v. NRDC
When an agency is interpreting its enabling statute*, (1) Court reviews the enabling statute to determine whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If intent is clear, that’s the end.(2) If intent is not clear, then the agency’s interpretation is upheld if it is permissible or reasonable (arbitrary and capricious).
Applies to legislative rulemaking and some other weird scenarios (whether formal adjudication/rulemaking is required, for example).
Skidmore v. Swift (1944)
Rulings, interpretations, and opinions of an agency, while not controlling on courts, constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts may look to for guidance. Weight depends on the thoroughness, validity, consistency of interpretation.
United States v. Mead
Administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision [agency non-legislative rules] qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.
Usually requires formal administrative procedure intended to foster fairness and deliberation; precedential value.
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand (Auer)
An agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is controlling unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.
Kisor limits: 1) Regulation ambiguous? 2) Agency reading must be reasonable. 3) Court must judge the “character” of agency interpretation. 4) Must be agency’s “authoritative” position. 5) Must invoke agency’s expertise. 6) Must be fair.
Ctzns to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe
In reviewing agency decision Courts:
1) Determine whether agency acted within the scope of its authority.
2) Arbitrary and capricious: “Substantial inquiry . . . probing, in-depth review”: Court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.
3) Determine whether the agency followed the necessary procedural requirements.
Goldberg v. Kelly
Termination of welfare benefits implicates due process and all of the requirements of formal adjudication. Abandonment of rights/privileges distinction. Limited to its facts.
Chrysler Corp v. Brown
FIOA exemptions are discretionary—not mandatory bars to disclosure.
Mathews v. Eldridge
In determining whether due process requires a pre-deprivation hearing, courts must consider:
1) Interests of the party facing deprivation
2) Gov’t interests
3) Risk of erroneous deprivation/value of additional procedures
HBO v. FCC
Once a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is issued, agency/employees involved in decisionmaking should refuse to engage in ex parte contacts w/ interested parties. If they do happen, such comms must be docketed. Overruled by Sierra Club but still followed by agencies.
Heckler v. Chaney
An agency’s decision not to pursue enforcement action is not reviewable by a court. Committed to agency discretion.
Abbot Labs v. Gardiner
1) 1APA creates a presumption of reviewability. Judical review is only precluded when there is “clear and convincing evidence” of contrary legislative intent. Just b/c Congress excluded procedures for pre-enforcement review of regulations from an enabling statute doesn’t preclude review.
2) Ripeness: Where the legal issue presented is fit for judicial resolution (purely legal, final agency action), and where a regulation requires an immediate and significant change in the plaintiff’s conduct with serious penalties for noncompliance, immediate judicial review under APA is available.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
Standing requires injury in fact (concrete and particularized, actual and imminent), causation (fairly traceable) , and redressability (likely, not speculative).
West Virginia v. EPA
In major questions cases, there must be a clear congressional authorization of authority, not merely a plausible textual basis.
MQD applies when an agency’s authority:
1) Would represent a radical or fundamental change to a statutory scheme.
2) Would greatly expand breadth of agency authority compared to what it asserted in the past.
3) Would have economic or political significance.
4) Extraordinary cases.?
United States v. Arthrex
Only principal officers may issue a final decision binding on the executive branch. Inferior officers’ decisions must be reviewable by a principal officer.
Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB
An inferior officer cannot be insulated from removal (only fireable for cause) by a principal officer if the principal officer is insulated from removal by the President.
Seila Law v. CFPC
An independent agency cannot be led by a single director wielding significant power that is only terminable for cause. Only exception to Prez’s plenary removal power of principal officers is quasi-legislative/quasi-judicial bodies (humphreys) and inferior officers w/ limited jurisdiction (morrison)
