Business History Exam Answers Flashcards
Do examples of German industrial finance through banks and ‘finance capitalism’ demonstrate banks create value for the firms they invest in?
Intro/ Thesis
The creation of the universal banks called “Grossbanken” in the 1850s helped shape the structure of the German financial market, supporting a process of concentration in which the relevant owners were either families, individuals or other companies.
Thesis: Developed with the railway construction and later with the industry, these multipurpose banks helped the new, capital-intensive firms of the 2nd Industrial Revolution achieve economies of scale and scope through its involvement in financing initial investment, as well as monitoring and participating in top-level decision making.
Do examples of German industrial finance through banks and ‘finance capitalism’ demonstrate banks create value for the firms they invest in?
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German industrial enterprises and banks’ huge decision making impact
German industrial enterprises and banks’ huge decision making impact
• According to Chandler, the rise of the railway system and the new institutions that financed them had a much greater impact in Germany than elsewhere. Grossbanken was created as a result of the unprecedented demand for capital from the railway venture in the 1940s.
• These banks were the instruments that made possible the rapid accumulation of capital on a scale vast enough to finance the building of the new continental transportation and communication infrastructure.
• Chandler argues that German firms were much more likely to have made 3-pronged investments than British firms with the support of its bank-based financial system. Thus one can argue that these banks created value in providing enough capital to facilitate growth within the German economy.
• As railroads were taken over by the state, the Grossbanken began to concentrate on financing industrial enterprises, investing in industrial securities and exerting high-level influence through proxy voting.
• Through its simultaneous provision of retail, development and investment banking, firms were able to exploit the cost advantages of scale and scope, acquiring powerful first-mover advantages in many European and world markets.
Do examples of German industrial finance through banks and ‘finance capitalism’ demonstrate banks create value for the firms they invest in?
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How the bank-based system added value through higher monitoring
How the bank-based system added value through higher monitoring
• The representative of the banks sat on the boards of many enterprises, participating in top-level decisions, particularly on resource allocation.
• Wenger and Kaserer outlined the massive impact these banks had on the country’s major corporations highlighting the high levels of influence these banks had over businesses, and still continue to have to this day.
• Through the banks concentrated ownership system, the banks could monitor management more effectively than scattered American stockholders-. Newman
• While giving rise to more pressure on the firm’s managers as the banks were monitoring their decisions, Roe argued this induced managers to maximize firm value through a more efficient allocation of resources.
• It also provided the banks with the opportunity to quickly replace managers whose performance was unsatisfactory, signalling to investors that a company was fundamentally sound
• As a result, greater monitoring made savers more willing to finance production and innovation, further increasing investment capital and firm confidence.
• Other advantages included better internal information flow and the ability to make more credible arrangements with labour than the diffused owners of an American firm.
Do examples of German industrial finance through banks and ‘finance capitalism’ demonstrate banks create value for the firms they invest in?
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Counterargument - how the banks could abuse their power
Counterargument - how the banks could abuse their power
• However, while realising the advantages of close monitoring and participating in top-level decision making, firms could also suffer from the banks ability to exploit their powerful positions in the firms.
• Levine discusses examples of the banks’ rent seeking opportunities that could have adverse effects on the firms’ corporate finance.
• An example of this may be that large equity owners could shift the assets of the firm to higher-risk activities since shareholders benefit on the upside while debt holders share the costs of failure. In Germany, as well as Japan, banks usually had a simultaneous holding of debt and equity, diminishing the incentive to take on more risk.
• Other examples of abusing their managerial power could be paying themselves special dividends and exploiting business relationships to maximize private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders.
• Lastly, concentrated ownership could also have enduring political and macroeconomic implications. Powerful and controlling owners that use pyramidal structures, cross-holdings, and super voting rights to magnify their control could shape public policies in ways that protect them from competition while subsidizing their ventures. This distortion of corporate decisions and national policies could impede economic growth.
Do examples of German industrial finance through banks and ‘finance capitalism’ demonstrate banks create value for the firms they invest in?
Conclusion
- With the challenges of the 2nd industrial revolution, the provision of highly demanded investment capital by the Grossbanken provided German firms with the means to invest in capital-intensive industries.
- This was especially significant as Germany started to dominate these industries, marking a significant time in Business History; the loss of British leadership in the global manufacturing industry.
- Nevertheless, although these banks created the necessary investment capital, decision making powers and efficient monitoring for the firms to be able to increase investment, the bank-based system also came with its disadvantages.
- Levine also concluded that countries with better functioning banks and markets grow faster, but the degree to which a country is bank-based or market-based does not matter much. Different governance systems ‘fit’ different technologies. (This last point can be avoided)
- Discuss the role of Zaibatsu business groupings in Japanese industrial development during the Meiji period.
Into/ Thesis.
• The Zaibatsu refers to a ‘financial group’ of firms controlled by a family and typically organized around a bank with specialized sales, marketing and distribution companies to service the manufacturing firms in the group (Amatori and Colli)
• Zaibatsu played a role in the Meiji restoration of 1868, which opened up japan to foreign technology and produced a remarkable spurt of industrial expansion and technological change
• Key features of Zaibatsu business groupings, including diversified holdings, internal financing, family wealth and ownership, access to natural resources and a skilled labour force resulted in a significant leap in the industrial expansion of the Meiji period from (Tang).
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Thesis: Their strong cultural values, government divestment and internal financing, and their extensive degree of diversification and collusion between firms and their subsidiaries all provided the basis for a successful industrial economy (Amatori and Colli). However, it is important to recognise that there were other factors which complemented Zaibatsu, and therefore also played a role in Meiji industrial development.
- Discuss the role of Zaibatsu business groupings in Japanese industrial development during the Meiji period.
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Role as an alternative to state leadership and internal financing
- Role as an alternative to state leadership and internal financing
• Japanese banking system provided a much more expansive form of financial commitment. Major zaibatsu were built around banks that channelled funds to constituent firms (Jones and Zeitlin)
• Business groupings offer an alternative means of coordinating activities to the State, whose role is subject to various types of government failure.
• Diversified holdings allowed them to spread risk, as well as internal financing of investments
• Tang believes that Zaibatsu’s ability to finance investments internally, autonomy to invest without shareholder interference, and lower risk-aversion from having diversified holdings were great contributors to Zaibatsu’s success in being first entrants in new industries relative to independent firms
• By channeling profits from older industries into new lines of activity like electrical machinery manufacturing, the zaibatsu form of organization generated scale economies in finance, trade and manufacturing, drastically reducing information-gathering and transactions costs
• With tunneling coordinating growth across industries, business groups provide an alternative to a state-orchestrated big push (Morck and Nakamura). Morck and Nakamura see a key role of the Zaibatsu in what they call the “tunnelling’: transferring wealth from one group firm to another
• Their resulting privileged position allowed them, for example, to buy ‘pilot plants’ as Government disengaged from involvement in the process of industrial modernisation (Amatori and Colli)
• Thus, through a variety of mechanisms Morck and Nakamura see the Zaibatsu as substituting for ‘failing state leadership’
- Discuss the role of Zaibatsu business groupings in Japanese industrial development during the Meiji period.
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Extensive degree of diversification, and cooperation between firms and their subsidiaries:
Extensive degree of diversification, and cooperation between firms and their subsidiaries:
• The typical zaibatsu was diversified into various related sectors, with many concentrated in finance, shipping and international trade
• Growth was often through unrelated diversification (i.e. businesses with no necessary technological or market relationships to each other, a process pioneered by Mitsui who operated as a holding company)
• By WWI, zaibatsu had already become highly integrated and diversified conglomerates with interests in many unconnected industrial sectors (Wilson). This allowed zaibatsu to be successful in coordinating of complementary investment activities, something which the government failed in doing. This was crucial for Zaibatsu to be able to achieve the ‘big-push’, unlike the government.
• Zaibatsu ventured abroad, establishing many subsidiaries in Asia especially. This created the basis for what became in the late-20th century a flood of Japanese multinational investments, supporting how Japan’s growth during this period was very much investment-led, not export-led.
• While trading/banking arms of these organisations were central features of both strategy and structure, industrial operations were managed along highly functional and sophisticated lines
• Merger activity featured prominently in this process of concentration → high level of cooperation and collusion among Japanese firms (Morck and Nakamura)
- Discuss the role of Zaibatsu business groupings in Japanese industrial development during the Meiji period.
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Other factors contributing to Meiji industrial development (counterargument)
- Other factors contributing to Meiji industrial development (counterargument):
• To attribute all industrial development to the Zaibatsu would be ignorant though, as there was a large amount that assisted in Zaibatsu’s ability to push forward change
• Japan had in place an efficient system of education based on thousands of primary schools scattered throughout the country, this assisting in producing the high levels of technical skills that characterised Japan’s primary sector (Amatori and Colli)
• Additionally, domestic investment in industry and infrastructure drove Japanese output. Investment in infrastructure by both private and public sectors, along with the government serving as a coordinating agent among the various sectors, resulted in an infrastructure basis that could support the industrial development.
• Furthermore, Tang argued that the role of Zaibatsu in Meiji development, though very important, is often overstated. Out of the 144 new industries in the Meiji Period, only 17 were started by the Zaibatsu (Tang).
• Tang claimed that Zaibatsu had few opportunities to capitalize on inter-industry scale economies since their enterprises were mostly unrelated, thus limiting their ability to share resources and technologies.
• Moreover, these conglomerates had many interests in commerce (eg. transport, trade), which he argued were not subject to significant scale economies.
• Though diversification was an advantage, the extent to which Zaibatsu diversified may have actually had a negative consequence. Tang believes that increased organisational complexity arising from excessive diversification may have also weakened the desire for continued innovation, and offset any benefits from further diversification
- Discuss the role of Zaibatsu business groupings in Japanese industrial development during the Meiji period. Conclusion
- Zaibatsu were at the heart of industrial activity during the Meiji period of 1868 to 1912, and held significant influence over national and foreign policies
- Zaibatsu were extremely efficient and their strategies were suitable to Japan’s rapidly expanding industrial economy (Amatori and Colli)
- Being highly integrated and diversified conglomerates, as well as their ability to generate scale economies in prominent sectors such as finance, trade and manufacturing, thus reducing information-gathering and transaction costs, created a solid foundation for a strong industry
- Zaibatsu achievements include a number of firsts in Japan, including the first modern steel ship, the first insurance company, and the first multidivisional (M-form) corporation (Tang)
- However, as discussed above, it is important to recognise that Zaibatsu were not the only driving force in industrial development.
- Other complementary factors, such as Japan’s education system, and heavy investments by both the private and public sector, created a supportive environment for Zaibatsu to driving industrial development.
- Finally, it has been argued that Zaibatsu’s significance in Meiji development is at times overstated, thus overshadowing the other factors that contributed to Meiji industrial development.
- Outline the major differences in ownership patterns of big business among advanced capitalist economies. Has family control of business been a good or bad thing based on the case studies in this module?
Intro
- Throughout the Industrial Revolutions there has been a large amount of change in the ownership of companies with some countries being more suited to a family ownership approach more than others, be that due to the ability for owners to pass on their company or the competition surrounding firms.
- In capitalist economies, we have recently witnessed a variety of entities, ranging from networks and multidivisional corporations, down to family firms and individual entrepreneurs.
- Influential features such as the imperative role of the financial system, state intervention and even influences from marker-cum-technological environments (Wilson) will shape the strategy and structures of the firms, inevitably determining the success of enterprise, which as we will see, has led to the success of family firms in dominating industries today.
- Outline the major differences in ownership patterns of big business among advanced capitalist economies. Has family control of business been a good or bad thing based on the case studies in this module?
Para 2
Ownership Patterns
- Variety of firm structures that make up individual markets. Previously, (Chandler) emphasized the diffused ownership ‘managerial’ corporation, as the most efficient vehicle for the development of ‘big’ business in sectors where scale and scope economies are important
- US: 80% widely held, adopting M-Form organisational structures, such as global giants such as IBM. 20% family run, but still very important i.e. Mars accounts for 1/3 of Fortune 500. La Porta. .
- Mitsui Group and together control 12.1 percent of both capital and votes in Toyota. It is a Japanese ‘networked’ skills base, where an explicit part of its strategic plan is to exploit being a network – Elgar. Lead manufacturer shares investment plans and with little fear of opportunism.
- However, there is still a great importance of the family firm, across multiple nations.
- Outline the major differences in ownership patterns of big business among advanced capitalist economies. Has family control of business been a good or bad thing based on the case studies in this module?
Para 1
Family Firms
Family Firms:
- Prior to the 1890s merger waves, it was a common failure of British firms to prioritise a steady flow of profits for established families, with high pay-out ratios as there was an unwillingness to retain corporate earnings for investment purposes, compared to their American counterparts. It has been attributed by Chandler that Britain’s rapid decline when compared to its counterparts was due to a primary pursuit of ‘personal capitalism’. Although there was sometimes a failure between ownership and control, it would be arrogant of us to view family firms as a failure, as supported by Pollard, family businesses represented a predictable response to instability, uncertainty and poor property rights, ultimately leading to the creation of some of the most successful big businesses to date.
- Outline the major differences in ownership patterns of big business among advanced capitalist economies. Has family control of business been a good or bad thing based on the case studies in this module?
Para 3
Cadburys
Cadbury’s
- Until 1940, the owners managed and the managers owned – Chandler. This unfortunately put a limitation on the company, as it meant that there was no separation between the Boards of Directors and managers.
- Was pre-Chandlerian, with the board representing management functions rather than strategic functions, operating on a day-to-day task as opposed to long term strategy.
- No divorce between ownership and control – Chairman and 5/7 Board members were Cadbury’s. This was a common feature in the UK. Even if firms were listed on the stock exchange, it was likely that the owners would have large percentages of shares to influence voting rights.
- Was unsuccessful, until merger with Fry’s to make the British Cocoa and Chocolate company. Preferred overseas operations as opposed to rationalisation movements like Standard Oil i.e larger factories or vertical integration. Just wanted to boost sales under combined label. Amatori and Colli – merging processes gave a more superior outcome to the combined sum on initial parts.
- Scale and Scope – Allowed both families to retain control and typified the frequently, rather looser outcomes from mergers.
- Outline the major differences in ownership patterns of big business among advanced capitalist economies. Has family control of business been a good or bad thing based on the case studies in this module?
Para 4
Zaibatsu
Zaibatsu
- Zaibatsu relied on decentralized production structures to successfully manage hundreds of companies and thousands of employees
- Unlike US corporations at the time, these Japanese businesses expanded by creating new subsidiaries (sometimes in entirely new fields so the zaibatsu could grow through internal expansion, vertical integration, and diversification)
- Family is an ‘ownership-related’ concept, and the understanding of the family and it’s objectives is crucial to the comprehension of the family firm – Cliff.
- In Japan, social values and attitudes to the family are different from anywhere else, and is not defined solely by biological terms. They believe that family is defined as those who contribute to the economic welfare of the group, allowing Zaibatsu family groupings to expand, but employ salaried managers that are ‘adopted family’ – Morikawa.
- Main objective: Protect and expand the wealth of the family lead by capable individuals, rather than to bequeath the wealth to only blood-related family members – Chen. This therefore proves that family firms do not strive solely for short-term solutions: they are able to adapt to current and future situations too.
- ‘Where the objectives of family firms are united, close networks of trust have the advantage of providing a combination of incentives, including effective monitoring and loyalty to protect the family wealth – Pollak.
- Outline the major differences in ownership patterns of big business among advanced capitalist economies. Has family control of business been a good or bad thing based on the case studies in this module?
Conclusion
Conclusion:
- Although there are a variety of industry leaders in capitalist economies that are organisationally more advanced, for example by basing strategy around decentralised decision making, family firms have shown they are also able to adopt such strategies (Mars)
- Although it was thought that firms would be limited by finance, motivation, and succession there has been sufficient proof through the above case studies, that family firms have no limits to resources or growth when under the correct supervision.
- Our main criticism of family firms has been based upon the idea that personal capitalism limits financial and capital resources.
- Despite this, if the firm has the ability to differentiate ownership and control, the efficient properties of a family firm outweigh the disadvantages greatly.
- Ultimately, the market-cum-technological and institutional environments in each country were primarily responsible for fashioning the techniques, strategies and structures of the indigenous firms within it.
- Chandler often understates the degree to which family firms have persisted and still make up a substantial number of companies bot in the US and across the world.