Behavioural Economics - Topics 3, 4 & 5 Flashcards

1
Q

Topic 3.1 L - What is expected utility theory?

A

a Normative model of rational choice that has dominated most of economic analysis as the standard theory of choice under uncertainty risk. It is assumed that all reasonable people obey the axioms most of the time. It is worth noting that in several choice problems, it has been observed that preferences systematically violate the axioms.

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2
Q

Topic 3.1 L - What is a prospect (with formula)?

A

A prospect denoted by (x1,p1, … ; xn,pn), is a contract that yields outcome xi with probability pu where p1 + p2 + … + pn = 1.
We omit null outcomes and use (x, p) to denote the prospect (x, p; 0, 1 - p) that yields x with probability p and 0 with probability 1 - p.
A riskless prospect that yields x with certainty is denoted by (x).

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3
Q

Topic 3.1 L - What words are analogous to prospect?

A

Lottery and game.

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4
Q

Topic 3.1 L - Expected Value (EV) of a prospect?

A

The value of each possible outcome * the probability of that outcome.

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5
Q

Topic 3.1 L - What can be deduced about expected values and utilities and the preference of individuals?

A

People seek to maximise expected utility, not expected value.

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6
Q

Topic 3.1 L - Expected Utility formula?

A

E(u) = p1 * o1 + … + Pn * On.

The utility of each outcome multiplied by the probability of each outcome.

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7
Q

Topic 3.1 L - What is the difference between EV and EU?

A

Expected Value is the probability weighted average of the monetary value.
Expected Utility is the probability weighted average of the utility from the potential monetary values.

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8
Q

Topic 3.1 L - How do endowments play into expected utility?

A

Utility will be derived from the current endowment + the utility from the gain or loss. ‘w’ is the current endowment.

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9
Q

Topic 3.1 L - Expected Utility Theory: What are the three tenets that relies on?

A
  1. Expectations.
  2. Asset Integration.
  3. Risk Aversion
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10
Q

Topic 3.1 L - Expected Utility Theory - Expectations?

A

The overall utility of a prospect, denoted by U, is the expected utility of its outcomes.
People choose the risky item which yields a higher expected utility than others.
U(x1; p1; … ; xn; pn) = p1u(x1) + p2u(x2) + … + pnu(xn)

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11
Q

Topic 3.1 L - Expected Utility Theory - Asset Integration?

A

A prospect is acceptable if
the utility resulting from integrating the prospect with
one’s assets exceeds the utility of those assets alone.
(x1; p1; … ; xn; pn) is acceptable at asset position w if
U(w + x1; p1; … ;w + xn, pn) > u(w)

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12
Q

Topic 3.1 L - Expected Utility Theory - Risk Aversion?

A

u is concave (u’’ < 0).

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13
Q

Topic 3.1 L - Risk Aversion?

A

A preference set that results in E(U) < E(V). The degree of risk aversion is represented by the concavity of the utility function of an individual.

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14
Q

Topic 3.1 L - What can be said about someone who is risk neutral?

A

They have a constant marginal utility of wealth, hence , a utility function linear in wealth. Maximising expected value is the same as maximising the expected utility.

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15
Q

Topic 3.1 L - How will marginal utility change for a risk loving person?

A

A risk loving person will have a convex utility function has increasing marginal utility of wealth. Each additional dollar provides greater additional happiness that the dollar before it.

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16
Q

Topic 3.1 L - What can the Expected Utility theory be called? What is some information about this name?

A

The von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility. They characterised the 4 expected utility axioms: completeness, transitivity, continuity and independence.

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17
Q

Topic 3.1 L - Continuity Definition?

A

Very small changes in probabilities do not change the preference ordering between lotteries.

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18
Q

Topic 3.1 L - EUT Independence Definition?

A

If we mix two lotteries with a third one, the preference ordering of the two pictures will not change and is independent of the particular third lottery used.

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19
Q

Topic 3.1 L - What is Independence sometimes called and what is the requirement?

A

The substitution axiom.

Independence requires that pA + (1 - p)C > pB + (1 - p)C

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20
Q

Topic 3.1 L - Who originally described the pattern of violation in EUT in which:
B > A then it should be that D > C
In practice, most people answer B > A and C > D? What principle is violated in particular?

A

The Allais Paradox. It is a model that works on utility. The principle of EUT that is violated is the Expectation Principle.

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21
Q

Topic 3.1 L - Explain the Certainty Effect?

A

AKA the Allais paradox. People overnight outcomes that are considered certain relative to outcomes which are merely probable. This violates EUT.

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22
Q

Topic 3.1 L - What is implied by the reflection effect? Intuitive understanding?

A

Risk aversion in the positive domain and risk seeking in the negative domain.
“Overweighting of certainty” favours risk aversion in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses.
In the positive domain, the certainty effect contributes to a risk averse preference for a sure gain over a larger gain that is merely probable.
In the negative domain, the same effect leads to a risk seeking preference for a loss that is merely probable over a smaller loss that is certain.

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23
Q

Topic 3.1 L - The Asian Disease Example?

A

An example by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) in which the same question was asked to doctors (with statistical knowledge) but from the perspective of the gains in life and the losses of life. One choice has certainty of death/ life and the other had a framing effect of a probability of death/ life. Despite the outcomes being identical, When preventing deaths, the doctors chose the chance of saving deaths(the probability), whereas when framed in terms of how many people will live, the majority changed to picking the certainty option.

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24
Q

Topic 3.1 L - What is the Major Difference between Prospect Theory and Expected Utility Theory?

A

Prospect Theory is the reference-dependence with loss aversion. With EUT, we need to know the state of wealth. In Prospect theory, you also need to know the reference state. Kahneman and Tversky introduced prospect theory in 1979.

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25
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Why was prospect theory formalised?

A

To accommodate systematic violations of the standard expected utility theory.

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26
Q

Topic 3.2 L - What is the symbol used for the overall value of an edited prospected, what is it expressed in terms of?

A

V.

It is expressed in terms of two scales, v and π

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27
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Prospect Theory: first scale, v?

A

The first scale, v, assigns to each outcome x a number. v(x), which reflects the subjective value of that outcome. Outcomes are described relative to a reference point, which serves as the zero point of the value scale.

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28
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Prospect Theory: The second scale, π?

A

The second scale, π, associates with each probability p a decision weight π(p), which reflects the impact of p on the overall value of the prospect.

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29
Q

Topic 3.2 L - For prospects of the form (x, p; y, q), when would the prospect be strictly positive?

A

if x,y > 0 and p + q = 1.

So if all outcomes are strictly positive. p+q will always equal 1.

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30
Q

Topic 3.2 L - For prospects of the form (x, p; y, q), when would the prospect be strictly negative?

A

If all outcomes are negative. x,y < 0 and p,q = 1

So if the outcomes are less than 0.

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31
Q

Topic 3.2 L - If (x, p; y, q) is a regular prospect, what will V(x, p; y, q) equal?

A

V(x, p; y, q) = π(p)v(x) + π(q)v(y)

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32
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Prospect Theory - For V(x, p; y, q) = π(p)v(x) + π(q)v(y), what is the difference between V and v

A

V is defined on prospects, while v is defined on outcomes.

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33
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Prospect Theory - For V(x, p; y, q) = π(p)v(x) + π(q)v(y), when will V and v coincide?

A

At V(x,1) or V(y,1)

These are sure prospects.

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34
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Prospect Theory - How does V(x, p; y, q) = π(p)v(x) + π(q)v(y) generalise EUT?

A

It relaxes the expectation principle.

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35
Q

Topic 3.2 L - For Regular Prospects, V is defined on prospects, while v is defined on outcomes. When would the two concede? (formula)

A

V(x,p; y,q)= π(p)v(x) + π(q)v(y)

Where v(0) = 0, π(0) = 0 and π(1) = 1

Known as the general form for regular prospects.

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36
Q

Topic 3.2 L - General Form for Strictly positive and strictly negative prospects: What is the process and explain?

A

These prospects are separated into two components:

  1. The Risk-less Component i.e. the minimum gain or loss which is certain to be obtained or paid.
  2. The Risky Component i.e. the additional gain or loss which is actually at stake.

For example, (400; 0:25; 100; 0:75) is naturally decomposed into a sure gain of 100 and the risky prospect (300, 0.25).

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37
Q

Topic 3.2 L - General Form for Strictly positive and strictly negative prospects: What is the equation for strictly positive and strictly negative prospects? How would you explain this equation? Example?

A

If p + q = 1 and either
a) x > y > 0 [Strictly positive] or
b) x < y < 0 [Strictly Negative], then
V (x,p; y, q) = v(y) + π(p)[v(x) - v(y)]
The decision weight is applied to the value-different [v(x) - v(y)], representing the risky component of the prospect. v(y) is the risk-less component.
V (400, .25; 100; .75) = v(100) + π(.25)[v(400) - v(100)]

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38
Q

Topic 3.2 L - What are the main elements of prospect theory?

A
  1. Reference Points
  2. Diminishing Marginal Sensitivity.
  3. Loss-Aversion
  4. Decision-Weighting.
    These general forms represent all of these.
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39
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Prospect Theory Elements: 1. Reference Points?

A

Changes are measured relative to reference points, serving as a zero point of the value scale (has a 0 value).
The carriers of value are changes in wealth or welfare, rather than final states.
“v” measures the value of deviations from the reference point.
EXTRA: We often assume that the relevant reference point of evaluating gains and losses is the current status of wealth or welfare, but the reference point may be the outcome that you expect or feel entitled to.

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40
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Value Functions in Prospect Theory: What would be the y-axis and x-axis?

A

Y-Axis: Value

X-Axis: Gains/ Losses.

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41
Q

Topic 3.2 L -Prospect Theory Elements: 1. Diminishing Marginal Sensitivity? How would we prove this theory?

A

The value function for changes of wealth is concave above the reference point (v’‘(x) < 0, for x > 0) and convex below the reference point (v’‘(x) > 0, for x <0). This can be proved through the following scenario:
Prospects (6000; .25) <18%> or (4000; .25; 2000; .25) <82%>
vs
Prospects (-6000; .25) <70%> or (-4000; .25;-2000; .25) <30%>
The frequency of responses to a study is show with percentages within <>.
We can see that people tend to take the more risky option with losses and less risky option with gains. This example is meant to show diminishing marginal sensitivity though?

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42
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Prospect Theory Elements: 3. Loss Aversion? What conclusion can we make?

A

Pleasure of gaining money is less than the pain of losing money, so symmetrical bets of an equal chance winning 50 an equal chance of the losing 50 are unattractive.

Moreover, there is an aversiveness of symmetry bets when the stake increases [for x>y≥0 , (y, .5; -y, .5) is preferred to (x, .5; -x,.5]

We conclude that v(x) < -v(-x) for x > 0 and
the value function for losses:
v’(x) < v’(-x)
[value is lost at a greater rate than a the same and opposite change in gains]

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43
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Prospect Theory Elements: 3. Loss Aversion - How would you measure the extent of loss aversion and what is the typical gain that would be required to offset the chance of a loss.

A

What is the smallest gain that is needed to balance an equal change to lose, say £100?
The typical answer is £200, but the LOSS AVERSION RATION typically has a range between 1.5 and 2.5

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44
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Prospect Theory Elements: 3. Loss Aversion - What are the implications (2 effects)?

A

The Endowment Effect: The difference between what potential buyers are wiling to pay (WTP) for goods and what potential sellers are willing to accept (WTA) for the same goods.

The Disposition Effect: Investors tend to hold on to stocks that have lost value (relative to their purchase price) too long, while being eager to sell stocks that have risen in price.

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45
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Value Functions: What properties describe the most commonly used value function?

A

v(x) = { x^α. If x ≥ 0
{ -𝛌(-x)^β If x < 0

Where
α: coefficient of diminishing marginal sensitivity for gains.
β: coefficient of DMS for losses.
𝛌: coefficient of loss-aversion
x: gain/loss
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46
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Value Function: Why does an individuals preference to integrate or segregate gains and losses matter?

A

Due to the value function being concave in the domain for gains and convex in the domain for losses, it matters how outcomes are bundled.

Gains and losses can be segregated or Integrated.

Integrated: You have gained a total of £75, translating to v(75) in value terms.

Segregated: You have won £25 and then £50, translating in value terms to v(25) + v(50)

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47
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Value Functions: What would the implications be for the following game:
You buy two lottery tickets at a charity event, and you win £25 on the first and £50 on the second. How does prospect theory differ to the standard theory?
Think of the implications of each and how it each would look on a graph.

A

a) Integrated: You have gained a total of £75, translating to v(75) in value terms.
b) Segregated: You have won £25 and then £50, translating in value terms to v(25) + v(50)

According to standard theory, no matter how you describe the various outcomes, you end up with an additional £75. PT said that BUNDLING MATTERS.

People value two gains more when they are segregated than when they are integrated.

See Brainscape Assistant. 1.

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48
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Prospect Theory 4 - Decision Weighting: How does weighting effect outcome? What is the formula and how does it differ?

A

The value of each outcome is multiple by a decision weight.
V(prospect) = π(p)v(x) + π(q)v(y)
NOT
pv(x) + qv(y)

Decision weights [π(p,q)] measure the impact of events on the desirability of prospects, not merely the perceived likelihood of these events.

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49
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Prospect Theory 4 - Decision Weighting:: When does the perceived likelihood and decision weights value coincide. What is an important distinction between the two?

A

If π(p) = p. If the expectation principle holds.

Decision weights are not probabilities so do not obey probability axioms.

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50
Q

Topic 3.2 L - What are the first 3 main properties of the decision weighting function?

A
  1. π(0) = 0 and π(1)=1
  2. π is an increasing function of p, which means that the value of π increases as the probability increases.
  3. Very low probabilities are generally overweighted, that is, π(p) > p for small p. [but, THIS IS NOT THE SAME AS OVERESTIMATION - overestimation regress to the wrong assessment of the probability of rare events]
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51
Q

Topic 3.2 L - What is fourth main property of the decision weighting function? (function required)

A

Subcertainty
π(p) + π(1-p) < 1 for all p not equal to 1
[so not just for small p]
See Brainscape Assistant 2.

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52
Q

Topic 3.2 L - What are the implications of subcertainty?
Hint:
slope
preferences

A

The slope of π can be viewed as a measure of the sensitivity of preferences to changes in probability.
It shows that preferences are generally less sensitive to variations of probability than the expectation principle would dictate.
It therefore captures peoples attitudes to uncertain events. Namely, that the sum of the weights associated with complementary events is typically less than the weight associated with the certain event. People are limited in their ability to comprehend and evaluate extreme probabilities.

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53
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Recap, what is the difference, in terms of the formula, for EUT and PT?
Graph?

A

EUT sets the EU subject to the probability of the outcome and the utility of achieving it.
PT sets a probability weighting function, and instead of the utility, looks at the value of the potential outcome.
For low probabilities, π(x) < x and for high probability π(x) > x.
See Brainscape Companion 3 for the graph.

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54
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Closing remarks on weighting functions?

A

People are limited in their ability to comprehend and evaluate extreme probabilities.
Highly unlikely events are either ignored or overweighted, and the difference between high probability and certainty is
either neglected or exaggerated.
Consequently, is not well-behaved near the end-points.

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55
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Estimations: Parameters for Prospect Theory - What was the estimated model?

A

See Brainscape Assistant 4.

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56
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Decision Weights: What can be concluded from the proposed theory of Kahneman and Tversky as well as the estimate results for p*?

A

The is a p* such that:

  1. π(p) > p and concave if p < p*
  2. π(p) < p and convex if p > p*

p8* is generally observed to be less than 0.5. People overstate small probability and understate high probabilities.

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57
Q
Topic 3.2 L - Summary of EUT and PT?
Hint:
Basis Objects
Risk Aversion
Loss aversion
Probability Estimation
Problem Descriptions
A

EUT:

  1. The basic objects of preferenences are states of wealth (including non-monetary resources like health care).
  2. The utility function is risk averse everywhere.
  3. Loss aversion cannot be defined as EUT does not identifiy a status quo.
  4. People evaluate probabilities linearly.
  5. Problem descriptions have no effect as long as the problem is logically the same.

PT:

  1. The basic objects of preferences are changes from a neutral reference point (gains and losses)
  2. The value function is risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses.
  3. The value function implies loss aversion.
  4. People evaluate probabilities nonlinearly.
  5. Problem descriptions can change the reference level; hence the definition of gains and losses can change.
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58
Q

Topic 3.2 L - PT: Probabilistic Insurance?

A

Two Options:
A) Pay a premium for full coverage.
B) Pay half a premium for coverage on half the days of a year.
Normative theory would suggest that, due to a concave utility function, most people reject B.
P to P/2 is a smaller loss than p/2 to 0 (the certainty effect)
Framing an insurance premium as giving full protection against specific risks makes it more attractive.

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59
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Two Effects highlighted by deal or no deal? Application to EUT?

A

Break Even Effect: Risk aversion seems to decrease after earlier expectations have been shattered by opening high-value briefcases. (similar to horse racers betting on long shots before they go home to break even.
House-Money Effect: Risk aversion decreases after earlier expectations have been surpassed by opening low-value briefcases. Forecasts that investors are more prone to buy higher risk stocks after a profitable trade.
EUT does not predict this as preferences are assumed to be constant, irrespective of the auth travelled before arriving at the problem.

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60
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Define the Break Even Effect.

A

Risk aversion seems to decrease after earlier expectations have been shattered by opening high-value briefcases. (similar to horse racers betting on long shots before they go home to break even.

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61
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Define the House Money effect.

A

House-Money Effect: Risk aversion decreases after earlier expectations have been surpassed by opening low-value briefcases. Forecasts that investors are more prone to buy higher risk stocks after a profitable trade.

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62
Q

Topic 3.2 L - How can the House Money Effect and the Break Even Effect be explained?

A

By a reference-dependent value function.

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63
Q

Topic 3.2 L - SUMMARY - Prospect theory says that understanding human behaviour requires: (3)

A
  1. Separation of prospects into positive and negative.
  2. Relative to a status quo, rather than considering absolute values.
  3. Consideration of decision weights rather than just probabilities.
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64
Q

Topic 3.2 L - What are the blindspots of utility theory?
3

Hint

Emotional Responses.
Disappointment
Regret.

A
  1. People described by PT are guided by Emotional responses to gains and losses rather than long term prospects of wealth and utility.
  2. PT cannot deal with disappointment. Failing to win when the chances of winning are high is far more disappointing than failing to win when the chances of winning are low.
  3. PT cannot deal with regret.
    If given the option of potentially winning £1m or taking £50 for sure vs potentially winning £1m or taking £150,000 for sure, the latter case will lead to far more regret.
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65
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Define the Endowment Effect.

A

The Endowment Effect: The difference between what potential buyers are wiling to pay (WTP) for goods and what potential sellers are willing to accept (WTA) for the same goods.

66
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Define the Disposition Effect.

A

The Disposition Effect: Investors tend to hold on to stocks that have lost value (relative to their purchase price) too long, while being eager to sell stocks that have risen in price.

67
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Extra

A

*

68
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Extra

A

*

69
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Extra

A

*

70
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Extra

A

*

71
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Extra

A

*

72
Q

Topic 3.2 L - Extra

A

*

73
Q

Topic 4 - Intertemporal choices relates to:

A

the decisions involving trade-offs between costs and benefits occurring in different time periods.

74
Q

Topic 4 - What does DUM stand for and who was it developed by?

A

The Discounted Utility Model which was developed by Samuelson in 1937.

75
Q

Topic 4 - What was the DUM accepted for?

A

A valid normative standard for public policies (such as cost benefit analysis) and as a descriptively accurate representation of actual behaviour in analysing inter temporal choices.

76
Q

Topic 4 - What is the basic premise of the DUM?

A

That people prefer money sooner than later.

77
Q

Topic 4 - DUM: How do we denote utility streams and describe the utility at time 0 and t.

A

u = < u0, u1, u2, … ut >

Where ut is the utility at time t.

uo is the utility at time 0, so today.

78
Q

Topic 4 - DUM: How would you represent the utility of stream u = < u0, u1, u2, … ut > for the point of view of t = 0? Define the delta symbol.

Hint: reduce equation in size.

A

U^0(u) = u0 + 𝛿u1 + 𝛿^2u2 + … + 𝛿^t ut.
= Σ𝛿^t ut for all t ≥ 0.
where 𝛿 is the discount factor and 0 < 𝛿 < 1

79
Q

Topic 4 - DUM: 𝛿?

A

𝛿 is the discount factor and 0 < 𝛿 < 1
𝛿 = (1 / 1 + ρ),
ρ is the individuals pure rate of time preference or discount rate.

80
Q

Topic 4 - What is another name for the DUM model?

A

The exponential discounting model.

81
Q

Topic 4 - DUM: What are the implication if 𝛿 is:

a) Close to one;
b) Close to 0.

A

If 𝛿 is

a) close to 1, the person exhibits patience, as she doesn’t discount their further very much.
b) close to 0, the person exhibits impatience, so discounts their future very heavily.

82
Q

Topic 4 - DUM: how would one establish an individuals discount factor, 𝛿 ? An example has been provided.

A

We set an amount that could be received today and ask an individual what amount would make them indifferent between the amount now and a time in the future.

Suppose at t = 0, you are indifferent between utility streams:
a = <2> b = <0, 6>.
U^0(a) = U^0(b), so
2 = 0 + 6𝛿 
𝛿  = 1/3

This assumes that b is at b is the utility at t = 0 and b is the utility at t = 1.

83
Q

Topic 4 - What is the more sophisticated version of the DUM called?

A

The General DUM.

84
Q

Topic 4 - General DUM: what is the consumption profile notation?

A

Consumption profile: c(t), c(t+1), …, C(T)

85
Q

Topic 4 - General DUM: Define notationally an individuals inter-temporal utility function from the perspective of t.

A

U^t(c(t),…,c(T)) = ΣD(k) u(c(t+k))
From k=0 (bottom of the sigma) to T - t (top of the sigma).
c(t+k) means c subscript t + k.

86
Q

Topic 4 - General DUM: Define D(k) notationally and how it is interpreted?

A

D(k) = 𝛿^k = ( 1 / (1 + ρ) )^k
It is interpreted as the person’s discount function: the relative weight that she attached, in period t, to her well-being in period t + k.

87
Q

Topic 4 - General DUM: how is u(c`t+k) often interpreted?

A

As the person’s cardinal instantaneous utility function: her well-being in period t + k.

88
Q

Topic 4 - General DUM: What does ρ represent?

A

An individuals pure rate of time preference AKA discount rate.
It reflects the collective effects of the psychological motives.

89
Q

Topic 4 - General DUM: How could we represent notationally the discount factor and discount rate in terms of each other?

A
Discount Rate = ρ = (1 - 𝛿) / 𝛿
Roe is Rate (the percentage in decimal form.
Discount Factor = 𝛿 = 1 / (1 + ρ)
Delta is factor.
0 < 𝛿 < 1
90
Q

Topic 4 - DUM: What are some potential implications in life if your discount factor is low that would not necessarily be irrational?

A
  1. Spend more money;
  2. Procrastinate;
  3. Do drugs
    Gratification is preferred in the shorter time horizon.
91
Q

Topic 4 - DUM: What is Gary Becker’s theory of rational addiction?

A

That, given a very low discount factor, heavy drug abuse, for example, can be perfectly rational.

92
Q

Topic 4 - What is the main requirement of DUM?

A

That one discount factor/ rate is consistently applied.

93
Q

Topic 4 - Foundations of DUM: What are the 6 Assumptions?

A
  1. Integration of new alternatives with existing plans.
  2. Consumption Independence.
  3. Stationary Instantaneous Utility
  4. Independence of discounting from consumption.
  5. Constant Discounting
  6. Diminishing Marginal Utility and Positive Time Preferences.
94
Q

Topic 4 - Foundations of DUM: 1. Integration of new alternatives with existing plans explanation?

A

A person exaltations evaluates new alternatives by integrating them wit hone’s existing plans.

95
Q

Topic 4 - Foundations of DUM: 2. Consumption Independence explanation?

A

A persons well-being in period t + k is independent of her consumption in any other period.

96
Q

Topic 4 - Foundations of DUM: 3. Stationary Instantaneous Utility explanation?

A

The cardinal instantaneous utility function u(ct) is constant over time.

Where ct has a subscript case t.

97
Q

Topic 4 - Foundations of DUM: 4. Independence of discounting from consumption explanation?

A

All forms of consumption, costs and benefits, are discounted at the same rate.

This is central to the notion of unitary time preference and enabling us to discount between objects, not just between the object being delayed

98
Q

Topic 4 - Foundations of DUM: Constant Discounting explanation? What does it imply?

A

Implies time-consistency.
At any period of time people use the same discount rate for all future periods.
Delaying two dated outcomes by a common amount should not change preferences between the outcomes.

99
Q

Topic 4 - Foundations of DUM: 6. Diminishing Marginal Utility and Positive Time Preferences explanation?

A

Diminishing marginal utility: The instantaneous utility function u(ct) is concave.
Leads to consumption being spread over time.

Positive time preference: discount rate ρ is positive. Motivates people to concentrate consumption in the present.

100
Q

Topic 4 - What are the violations of DU seen empirically?

A
  1. ρ (discount rates) are not constant, but decline over time.
  2. Discount rates vary across different types of inter-temporal choices: gains are discounted more than losses, small amounts more Thant large amounts, sequences of multiple outcomes are discounted differently than outcomes considered singly.
101
Q

Topic 4 - DUM: Evidence against a constant ρ and its name? How did Thaler show this?

A

Short Term Impatience:
Thaler showed that the discount rate over longer horizons is lower than the discount rate over shorter time horizons.
Subjects asked how much they would be required to received in 1 month, 1 year and 10 years to forfeit $10 today. The annualised results shoes that the annual discount rate fell as time increased.
This is known as HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING.

102
Q

Topic 4 - Evidence against DUM: Hyperbolic Discounting modelling?

A

See Brainscape Assistant 9.

We replace the discount factor D(k) with a new term, basically swapping ρ to ρ

103
Q
Topic 4 - The Discount Rate:
1. Postpone Receipt
2. Postpone Payment
3. Expedite Receipt 
4. Expedite Payment implications?
Short Term Impatience?
A

Short Term Impatience - The discount factor is greater (rate lower) the longer one has to wait.

104
Q
Topic 4 - The Discount Rate: 
1. Postpone Receipt
2. Postpone Payment
3. Expedite Receipt 
4. Expedite Payment implications?
Absolute Magnitude Effect?
A

Absolute Magnitude Effect - The larger the sum of money, the larger the estimated discount factor, suggesting people are more patient for larger amounts.

105
Q
Topic 4 - The Discount Rate: 
1. Postpone Receipt
2. Postpone Payment
3. Expedite Receipt 
4. Expedite Payment implications?
Gain Loss Asymmetry?
A

Gain Loss Asymmetry - The estimated discount factor is smaller for gains than losses (so people would prefer to receive money more quickly and pay it more slowly)

106
Q
Topic 4 - The Discount Rate: 
1. Postpone Receipt
2. Postpone Payment
3. Expedite Receipt 
4. Expedite Payment implications?
Delay-speed-up asymmetry?
A

Delay-speed-up asymmetry - The estimated discount factor is higher to postpone payment than to expedite payment, and higher to expedite receipt than postpone receipt. (one prefers to receive sooner and pay later).

107
Q

Topic 4 - What is the intuitive understanding of the discount rate (time to receive/ pay money)?

A

The higher the discount rate, the more time one is willing to wait before paying or receiving money (the lower the discount factor, roe). The higher the factor, the lower the payment one would have to receive in order to delay receipt or payment.

108
Q
Topic 4 - The Discount Rate: 
1. Postpone Receipt
2. Postpone Payment
3. Expedite Receipt 
4. Expedite Payment implications?
OVERALL IMPLICATIONS?
A

The discount factor changes depending on context, contradicting the DUM, which states that the discount factor is independent of consumption type and constant over time.
The appropriate discount factor should therefore be thought about for each particular situation.

109
Q

Topic 4 - The Utility of Sequences Implications? Set out scenario as well (visiting and aunt you don’t like and visiting friends on two visits to a place)? Lowenstein and Prelec (1993).

Hint: Relate to exponential discounting.

A

When the two trips are close together, most people opted to visit the aunt first. When the two trips were further apart, most people decided to visit the friend first (only slightly though).
Implications: This shows a PREFERENCE FOR AN IMPROVING SEQUENCE, which goes against what exponential discounting would predict. With a discount factor < 1, ED would predict that the individual would visit the friend first because they are impatient for higher utility.
Impatience becomes apparent as the gap becomes bigger though and the results revert back to those expected by EDM.

110
Q

Topic 4 - What can the Quasi Hyperbolic Discounting model be used to explain? What is another name for this model?

A

Reversals in time utility preference.
Preferences between two delayed rewards can reverse in favour of the more proximate reward as the time to both rewards diminishes. Q-Hyperbolic discounting can explain preference reversal if the β value is sufficiently low.
AKA the Beta-delta function.

111
Q

Topic 4 - Define notionally the Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting Function.

A

Brainscape Assistant 10.

112
Q

Topic 4 - Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting Function: β meaning and understanding if

a) β = 1
b) β < 1

A

β is the present bias.

a) If β = 1, an individual who discounts the future quasi-hyperbolically will behave the same as an individual who discounts the future exponentially.
b) If β < 1, all outcomes beyond the present time are discounted more than under exponential discounting.

113
Q

Topic 4 - What were the outcomes of the Marshmallow test?

A

Children at age 4 who could resist a marshmallow for 15 minutes would receive two marshmallows. The results showed that those who resisted showed higher intelligence, confidence and self reliance as teenager. They also had higher educational attainment and lower bmi as adults.
A recent study with a sample population ten times larger refuted this evidence, suggesting that economic background rather than willpower explained the results.

114
Q

Topic 4 - *

A

Continued from 35 onwards after Topic 5.

115
Q

Topic 4 - SPACE FOR EXTRA

A

SPACE FOR EXTRA NOTES

116
Q

Topic 4 - SPACE FOR EXTRA

A

SPACE FOR EXTRA NOTES

117
Q

Topic 4 - SPACE FOR EXTRA

A

SPACE FOR EXTRA NOTES

118
Q

Topic 4 - SPACE FOR EXTRA

A

SPACE FOR EXTRA NOTES

119
Q

Topic 4 - SPACE FOR EXTRA

A

SPACE FOR EXTRA NOTES

120
Q

Topic 4 - SPACE FOR EXTRA

A

SPACE FOR EXTRA NOTES

121
Q

Topic 4 - SPACE FOR EXTRA

A

SPACE FOR EXTRA NOTES

122
Q

Topic 4 - SPACE FOR EXTRA

A

SPACE FOR EXTRA NOTES

123
Q

Topic 4 - SPACE FOR EXTRA

A

SPACE FOR EXTRA NOTES

124
Q

Topic 4 - SPACE FOR EXTRA

A

SPACE FOR EXTRA NOTES

125
Q

Topic 4 - SPACE FOR EXTRA

A

SPACE FOR EXTRA NOTES

126
Q

Topic 4 - SPACE FOR EXTRA

A

SPACE FOR EXTRA NOTES

127
Q

Topic 4 - SPACE FOR EXTRA

A

SPACE FOR EXTRA NOTES

128
Q

Topic 5 - Homoeconomus?

A

Assumed to be both rational and self-interested.

129
Q

Topic 5 - How would we say that the utility of one person depends on the utility of another (e.g. giving to charity)?

A

There are Social or Other-regarding preferences.

130
Q

Topic 5 - What games present evidence for social preferences? (3)

A
  1. Dictator game
  2. Ultimatum game
  3. Linear good game.
131
Q

Topic 5 - What alternative model is used to represent inequality aversion?

A

The Fehr-Schmidt Model of Inequality aversion.

132
Q

Topic 5 - The Dictator Game - Explain the game.

Players
Scenario
Final

A
  1. The dictator game involves two people, the PROPOSER and RECEIVER.
  2. The proposer receives £10 and is asked how much he would like to give to the receiver.
  3. The game ends (one shot game)
133
Q

Topic 5 - The Dictator Game - What is the outcome and how does this compare with the standard model?
How does the result change when we have a single-blind treatment and double blind treatment?

A

We would expect under a self interested individual to take all the money. We find that the majority give more than 0.
In the single-blind treatment (researcher sees amount), we can argue that the participant may wish to appear as nice to the researcher, so gives some money.
In the double blind treatment, the researchers also do not know the amount given.
People give a similar amount in the double blind.

134
Q

Topic 5 - The Ultimatum Game - Explain the game.

Participants
Scenario
When the game is accepted

A

We would expect the receiver to accept any amount as it increases their income. We see that a large number of offers are rejected that are below the 50% split. (40% rejects when the plot is 60/40)

135
Q

Topic 5 - The Ultimatum Game - - Results?

Typical Results
What are the results robust to
When does it vary.

A

Typical Results
No offers above .5 and at the average offer around .4. Few offers below 0.2

What are the results robust to?
Higher stakes and experience

When does it vary?
Age and Culture.

136
Q

Topic 5 - Linear Public Good Game - Explain the Game.

A

We ave 4 people who are each given some money. They are asked how much they wish to donate to a group project.
Any money contributed is increased 1.6x, and then split..
Pareto efficient outcome: everyone to contribute.
A person interested only in their own materials payoff would not contribute to the group project, and the Nash Equilibrium is for no-one to donate anything.

137
Q

Topic 5 - The Ultimatum Game - Results?

Typical Results
What are the results robust to
When does it vary.

A

Typical Results
No offers above .5 and at the average offer around .4. Few offers below 0.2

What are the results robust to?
Higher stakes and experience

When does it vary?
Age and Culture.

138
Q

Topic 5 - Linear Public Good Game - Explain the Game.

Participants
Scenario
Rounds
Pareto Efficient
Nash Equilibrium
A

We have 4 people who are each given some money. They are asked how much they wish to donate to a group project.
Any money contributed is increased 1.6x, and then split..
Pareto efficient outcome: everyone to contribute.
The game is played multiple times.
A person interested only in their own materials payoff would not contribute to the group project, and the Nash Equilibrium is for no-one to donate anything.

139
Q

Topic 5 - Linear Public Good Game - Observations

Punishment vs no punishment
Common Participants vs no partner.
Conclusion.

A

Partner Games (the same people for 10 rounds) and punishment both lead to people donating more money as the game goes on.

Stranger (4 randomly matched people) games and no punishment lead to less money being donated as the game goes on.

Giving and taking is conditional on others’ behaviour: reciprocity.

140
Q

Topic 5 - Linear Public Good Game WITH PUNISHMENT - Explain the game.

A

Each person can pay an amount to punish another player in the second stage. No person who maximises their own martierial payoff should ever punish, but they do.

141
Q

Topic 5 - Can we have transitive and complete preferences for people donating to charity etc?

A

Yes, if they derive more utility/ satisfaction from being kind to having money.

142
Q

Topic 5 - What are the four non-standard preferences ( possible assumptions that could be applied to those that donate to charity)?

A

Inequity Aversion: A preference for equal payoffs.

Reciprocity: A preference from repaying kindest with kindness and meanness with meanness.

Altruism: Caring for others’ payoff or utility.

Preferences for social approval: A preference to be liked by others.

143
Q

Topic 5 - Fehr-Schmidt Model of inequality aversion - What do we assume?

A

That there are a fraction of people who are also motivated by fairness considerations.

144
Q

Topic 5 - How would we model inequality aversion - overview?

A

The Fehr-Schmidt Model of Inequality aversion.
An inequality averse person get disutility from earning more or less than other people.
So, aswell as assuming that some people are self interested, we also assume some people are motivated by fairness.

145
Q

**Topic 5 - Lay out the Fehr-Schmidt Model of inequality aversion. What are the symbols used and their implications.

A

** Brainscape Note ***
β: Advantageous Inequality - Associated with the disutility received when receiving more than others.
αi: Disadvantageous Inequality - Associated with the disutility received when receiving less than others. This is always higher than β as people are more averse to others having more than having more themselves.
β ≤ αi - αi can be greater than 1.
0 ≤ β < 1
(one will never throw away income to avoid advantageous inequality).
αi has no upper limit.
x = (xi, xj) - Payoff of Individuals

146
Q

**Topic 5 - Lay out the Fehr-Schmidt Model of inequality aversion. What are the symbols used and their implications.

A
**** Brainscape Note ***
β: Advantageous Inequality - Associated with the disutility received when receiving more than others.
αi: Disadvantageous Inequality -  Associated with the disutility received when receiving less than others. This is always higher than β as people are more averse to others having more than having more themselves.
β < αi
0 ≤ β < 1 
αi has no upper limit.
x = (xi, xj) - Payoff of Individuals
Agent does not like to be better
147
Q

Topic 5 - Ultimatum Game with inequality averse preferences (analysed with the Fehr Schmidt Model of Inequality Aversion with one player who is inequality aversion) - Notation?

A

A offers a share of s to B.

If B accepts, A received 1 - s of X.

So s is a proportion of X.

So
Reject: (xA,xB) = (0,0)
Accept: (xA, xB) = ((1-sX, sX)

148
Q

Topic 5 - Fehr Schmidt Model Ultimatum Game (Inequity Averse Responder) - Expected Responses?

a) When A offers > 0.5
b) When A offers s = 0.5
c) When A offers s < 0.5

A

a) Higher income difference than reject, and more income for both than reject, so B accepts.
b) (0.5X, 0.5X) - Same income difference as reject and more income than reject so B accepts.
c) There is no upper bound to α, so B may reject and throw money away to avoid disadvantageous inequity. Further brainscape card to follow.

149
Q

Topic 5 - What is required to apply the Fehr Schmidt model in the case of inequity aversion?

A

Two scenarios with at least one player being inequity averse.
We evaluate it from the

150
Q

Topic 5 - Fehr Schmidt Model Ultimatum Game (Inequity Averse Responder) - What is the condition that would lead to B rejecting an offer with s < 0.5?

A

If UB(accept) < U*(B)(reject)

UB(accept) = sX - αB[(1-s)X - sX]

U*(B)(reject) = 0
Therefore, reject if

s < αB / (1 + 2αB)

151
Q

Topic 5 - Fehr Schmidt Model Ultimatum Game (Inequity Averse Proposer) -

Will A offers s = 0.5

A

Both self interested, so B will accept, with both receiving the max payoff of 0.5X

152
Q

Topic 5 - Fehr Schmidt Model Ultimatum Game (Inequity Averse Proposer) -
Will A offers s > 0.5

A

If B accepts, less income to A than s = 0.5. Utility gained by giving money will never be equal to that of keeping the money for oneself.

153
Q

Topic 5 - Fehr Schmidt Model Ultimatum Game (Inequity Averse Proposer) -

Will A offers s < 0.5

A

If B accepts, the lower s, the higher income for A, but the more inequity. So we have to find which is more important.

154
Q

Topic 5 - Fehr Schmidt Model Ultimatum Game (Inequity Averse Proposer) - Given the equation for the utility of A:
X[s(2βA - 1) +1 - βA)],

A

UA is increasing in s when βA > 0.5 (Since then 2βA - 1 > 0)

UA is decreasing in s when βA < 0.5 (Since then 2βA - 1 < 0)

In the dictator game:
s= 0.5 if βA > 0.5 (or as close as possible as we have ruled out s = 0.5

s= 0 if βA < 0.5

Indifferent between any offer s ε [0, 0.5] if βA = 0.5

155
Q

Topic 5 - Fehr Schmidt Model Ultimatum Game (Inequity Averse Proposer and Inequity Averse Responder) - If the proposer knows the preference s of the responder, what will he offer?

A

s = 0.5 if βA > 0.5

s ε [αB / (1 + 2αB), 0.5]
if βA = 0.5

s = αB / (1 + 2αB) if βA < 0.5

156
Q

Topic 5 - Fehr Schmidt Model Ultimatum Game (Self Interested Proposer and Inequity Averse Responder) - Will the outcome be different to the one in which we had a Inequity Averse Proposer and Inequity Averse Responder

A

No.

Proposer will always pick the highest s that the responder will accept.

Therefore there is no different between the behaviour of self interested and inequity averse preferences.

157
Q

Topic 5 - Fehr Schmidt Model Ultimatum Game (Self Interested Proposer) - What if the proposer does not know the responder’s type?

A

It is always better for the responder to portray that they are inequity averse, as this will alter the behaviour of the proposer, who will maximise given given the lowest s they have to offer.

The existence of inequity-averse types can make self-interested types behave as if they were inequity-averse too.

158
Q

Topic 5 - Linear Public Good Game with and without punishment - Results?

A

Contributions fall over time without punishment. This suggest that giving to others does not come unconditionally.

With punishment, contributions increase over time.

159
Q

Topic 5 - Linear Public Good Game with and without punishment - Results?

A

Contributions fall over time without punishment. This suggest that giving to others does not come unconditionally.

With punishment, contributions increase over time.

160
Q

Topic 3.1 L - Define the Completeness Axiom.

A

Completeness assumes that an individual has well defined preferences and can always decide between any two alternatives

161
Q

Topic 3.1 L - Define the Transitivity Axiom.

A

A preference ordering is transitive if, for any three outcomes A, B, and C, a preference for A over B and a preference for B over C implies a preference for A over C.