Articles questions Flashcards

1
Q

According to Christ et al., bonus contracts are especially preferred in ……….

A

incomplete contract setting

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2
Q

According to Maas and Van Rinsum (2013), employees are more likely to overstate if…

A

this increases monetary payoff of others

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3
Q

According to Maas and Van Rinsum (2013) reporting honesty is higher in the following setting:

A

open information policy

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4
Q

According to Hannan et al. (2013) why does the performance not increase as much in case one has a choice how to allocate their effort?

A

because the RPI leads to distortion in effort allocations

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5
Q

What effect of tangible rewards compared to cash rewards did Kachelmeier et al. (2023) find?

A

resulted in less effort and perrformance, but this effect was more pronounced and only significant in group context

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6
Q

According to kachelmeier et al. (2023) how can the negative effect of a tangible reward on effort be mitigated in group settings?

A

by structuring as a shared experience instead of a reward offered for individual consumption

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7
Q

what is the condition to use shared experiences as rewards?

A

the coworkers should have positive relationships

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8
Q

what is meant by surrogation as stated by choi et al. (2012) ?

A

lack of realisation that measures are merely representations of the strategic construct of interest instead of the construct of interest themselves

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9
Q

In which case is surrogation more prevalent? (choi et al. 2012)

A

when managers are compensated on a single measure of a strategic construct (vs when compensated on multiple measures)

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10
Q

managers are ….. willing to adjust compensation when …. of ….. …… is …. to avoid setting a …..
(Bol et al., 2015)

A

Managers are less willing to adjust when the likelihood of future events is high to avoid setting a precedent

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11
Q

What do Bol et al. find about compensation interdependence and descretionary adjustments?

A

Managers are less willing to adjust when compensation interdependence is high, to avoid demotivating unaffected employees.

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12
Q

Which types of effort do Bol et al. (2015) distinguish? And how do these relate to discretionary adjustments?

A

Conventional and adaptive effort. Conventional effort may increase due to discretionary adjustments while adaptive effort may decrease

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13
Q

Difference in managers’ willingness to make discretionary adjustments across high and low event likelihood is greater when …. …. is low than when it is high. (Bol et al., 2015)

A

compensation interdependence

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14
Q

In bol et al. (2015), what influences managers in high interdependence settings regarding the choice to make descretionary adjustments?

A

the potential demotivating effect their adjustments could have on other employees

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15
Q

What attitude of managaers makes them less likely to make discretionary adjustments? (Bol et al., 2015)

A

appreciating a solely objective performance plan

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16
Q

Which two attitude traits makes managers more likely to make discretionary adjustments (Bol et al. 2015)

A
  • strong believe in the controllability principle.
  • believe that accuracy in compensation is attainable
17
Q

According to Anderson et al. (2017), which two variables significantly affect the buyer manager’s (initial trust)?

A
  • autonomy to select suppliers
  • supplier’s information sharing behaviour
18
Q

Which two variables are influenced by buyer manager’s (initial) trust?

A
  • negatively: spending on monitoring and control
  • positively: investment in collaborative project
19
Q

Which notion regarding trust do Anderson et al. (2017) challenge?

A

The notion that trust arises strictly from experience

20
Q

according to pencle et al. (2023), which two variables are associiated with selecting more sustainable suppliers? And what important notion should be made?

A
  • paradoxical frame
  • evaluation using broad PMS

notion: they are only significantly beneficial if used simultaneously

21
Q

According to Hannan et al. (2012), RPI’s have an influence on effort allocation and performance. What influences this?

A

whether the RPI is public or not. If public, it increases performance only if they do not have a choice how to allocate their effort because there would otherwise be distortion effects

22
Q

According to Kachelmeier te al. (2023), why do tangible group awards impair performance more than individual tangible rewards?

A

performaince is impaired due to uncertainty about how others would perceive the reward

23
Q

According to Kachelmeier et al. (2023), why does framing a tangible group reward as a shared experience mitigate the negative effects

A
  • makes people like it more themselves
  • reduces uncertainty about the others liking it
24
Q

Why does RPI lead to better performance, according to Hannan et al. ?

A

PRI, leads to social comparision, which in turn induces motivation effects, and consequently leads to increased performance

25
Q

In which case can effort distortion be beneficial according to Hannan et al.?

A

When tasks have increasing marginal returns to effort instead of diminishing marginal returns

26
Q

Investigating the effect of compensation on surrogation using archival or field data is challenging because of the difficulty of distinguishing surrogation from ………………..
(Choi et al.)

A

wealth-maximizing behavior

27
Q

Which effect is the source of all statistical significance in the experiment by Bol et al.?

A

the simple effect of low versus high event likelihood in the interdependence absent condition (NB therefore the interaction term likelihood * bonus interdependence is also significant)

28
Q

Which two components of trust are distinguished by Anderson et al.?

A
  • competence trust
  • goodwill trust
29
Q

the association between ………. and competence trust is weaker than that for goodwill trust (Anderson et al.)

A

information sharing behaviour

30
Q

While …. …. reduces spending on controls and increases investment in the collaboration, …. ….. reduces ….. but has no effect on ……………

A

competence trust, goodwill trust, spending on control, investment in the collaboration

31
Q

What economic-psychological reason for prefering bonus contracts is stated by Christ et al. ?

A

loss-aversion; the notion that the disutility experienceed from a loss is greater than the utility experienced from a gain of the same maginitude

32
Q

Which underlying driver makes agents less likely to misreport when this negatively influences peers or this information is openly available to others?

A

disutility experienced from manipulating results to unfair outcomes or violating social norms

33
Q
A