article globalisation and terrorism

Question 1

author

Answer 1

Fiona B. Adamson

Question 2

conclusion

Answer 2

increased levels of globalisation + emergence of new networks of violence -> fundamental shift in international security environment: internal and external security threaths are increasingly blurred

+ not enough attention to this has been paid to the political implications of this

Question 3

how is globalisation transforming the international security environment?

Answer 3

• stimulating shifts in resources, infrastructure and capacities available to non-state entrepreneurs to engage in political mobilisation transnationally and globally

domestic analogies are useful for thinking about security and stability in an international system that increasingly resembles an imperfectly institutionalised global polity, rather than a system of functionally alike states in anarchy

Question 4

transnational resource bases and constituencies that can be tapped into by non-state political entrepreneurs in the process of political mobilisation

Answer 4

• mobility of people: migration and migration based-based networks
• mobility of capital: tapping into Grey Economy Networks
• mobility of ideas, information and identiteis: emergence of new political categories

Question 5

mobility of people - migration and migration-based

Answer 5

• globalization -> migration and import and export of labour
• economic motive for migration: continuing levels of inequality among states: FDI, declining transport costs, fall Iron Curtain, open borders Soviet bloc, conflicts and violence
• increased connectivity between migrants in new ‘host states’ and ‘home states’ because of technology -> networks = facilitates the process of recruiting/creating for transnational organisational structures

studies of organisations show that one of the strongest predictors of participation in an organisation is one’s location within a given social network (recruitment based on friendship ties, acquaintances, family connections)

Question 6

mobility of capital - tapping into Grey Economy Networks

Answer 6

• illicit capital flows often facilitated by transnational informal economic networks + often intertwined with migration networks
• informal economic networks rely on personal relations between members rather than on organisation structures
• material resource bases are becoming more immportant to non-state opposition groups as source of financing (esp. after end Cold War: US + USSR stopped financing local non-state opposition groups)
• non-state political actors intent on pursuing violent strategies have turned to fundraising in and taxation of activated transnational networks and political constituencies (e.g. diasporas, taxing unreported labour remittances)

many organised crime networks define themselves on the basis of ethnicity or nationality, a form of social capital that can be drawn upon to generate informal transnational economic networks, which in turn are drawn upon by political entrepreneurs

Question 7

mobility of ideas, information, and identities - the emergence of new political categories

Answer 7

• print capitalism vernacular languages, nationally bounded communication infrastructures have played a role in the rise of nationalism and homogeneous national identities
• technology -> people can remain linked to a virtual identity community that transcends any particular geographic locale
• global marketplace of ideas and identities provides resources for non-state political entrepreneurs to create a new identity category
• technology challenges state monopolies over the provision of information and the articulation of national identity

Question 8

Boomerang patterns

Answer 8

process by which activists can bypass the blocked institutions of a state, and directly connect with transnational networks located in other states as a means of pursuing their political goals

(Keck and Sikkink)

local political entrepreneurs attempt to market their political cause abroad

Question 9

globalisation: push or pull?

Answer 9

new resources that arise due to processes of globalisation are pull factors that provide incentives to non-state political entrepreneurs to operate transnationally

Question 10

networks of (only) violence?

Answer 10

no, networks of violence, terror and crime also promote a political agenda, and provide goods and services to marginalized constituencies

strategies of terrorism and violence are often component of an overall agenda that is designed to challenge the status quo

Question 11

terrorism

Answer 11

• seeks to obtain leverage, influence and power to affect political change
• weapon of the weak: deployed to gain media attention, visibility, name recognition internationally

Question 12

violent transnational networks in the 90s (intertwining transnational political mobilisation and violence prior to 9/11)

Answer 12

• the Kosovar nationalist movement: political entrepreneurs bypassed the state and drew on transnational migration networks and grey economy networks in order to construct the movement
• Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey

Question 13

main difference intertwining transnational political mobilisation and violence prior and after 9/11

Answer 13

the level of state response

e.g. Kosovo nationalist movement was prior to 9/11, NATO saw it as self-determination movement to be supported, rather than a terrorist organisation. were it to happen after 9/11, there probably would have been a different approach

Question 14

Kosovo nationalist movement

Answer 14

KLA = Kosovo Liberation Army
LDK = League for a Democratic Kosovo (Ibrahim Rugova), drew upon diaspora networks

• dense transnational social networks connected Kosovo with diaspora networks in Western Europe
• LDK funded grey economy sector in Kosovo + education + cultural activities
• activists in diaspora launched political lobying campaign in the countries they were in
• KLA raised money from diaspora through ‘Homeland Calling’ fund + allegedly sale of narcotics through transnational networks of organised crime
• violence, some claim is directly linked to international pull factors (e.g. to incite Serbian retaliation to gain attention and sympathy)

Question 15

Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey

Answer 15

• expression of Kurdish language, identity and politics were banned in Turkey -> some migrated + became promotors of Kurdish identity and language
• PKK (Abdullah Ocalan) undertook armed conflict in southeastern Turkey from Syria
• exiles in countries in Europe created a transnational structure with local cells (PKK political wing counterpart) -> operated legally in most of Europe with cultural, social and political organisations + covert underground structure
• violent armed strategy within Turkey + peaceful/legal cultural and political things
• raised money within immigrant communities

Question 16

international political landscape + violent networks in the 90s century in short

Answer 16

combination of political entrepreneurs operating trasnsnationally, activating members of the diaspora as a source of revenue and political support and drawing on transnational grey economy networks to fund armed struggles in their ‘home countries’

= long distance nationalism

Question 17

long distance nationalism?

Answer 17

the political entrepreneur positioned in the First World can send money and guns, circulate propaganda, build intercontinental computer information circuits
= incalculable consequences in the zones of their ultimate destinations

by 2000 recognized it had a big influence
- WB: existence of significant diaspora -> higher probability of violent conflicts (correlation)

still: not only nationalism to mobilize transnational networks, also religion e.g.

Question 18

4 areas in which the security challenges posed by violent transnational networks challenge mainstream paradigms of international security

Answer 18

• transnational networks of violence and the blurring of internal and external security
• transnational political mobilisation and state institutional responses: less distinction between internal and external security institutions
• violent transnational networks and the emergence of weak states as security threats
• transnational mobilisation and the domestication of the global security environment

Question 19

transnational networks of violence and the blurring of internal and external security

Answer 19

assumptions traditional IR: main threats are other states + internally mobilising to project military power externally

• doesn’t work with transnational networks of violence: both internal and external threat

Question 20

transnational political mobilisation and state institutional responses: less distinction between internal and external security institutions

Answer 20

non-state actor security threats -> state security institutions under pressure to undertake new functional tasks that blur the functional differentiation

e.g.
- militaries undertake more actions that resemble civilian policing operations
- domestic police units increasingly engaged in multilateral operations
- police adopts military technologies + plays an increasing role in security

Question 21

violent transnational networks and the emergence of weak states as security threats

Answer 21

traditional state-centric balance-of-power security paradigms: threat comes from strong states

state weakness becomes seen as an international security issue because it provides institutional incentives for transnational political mobilisation (there are no national poltiical channels for entrepreneurs) and for the use of force (weak states are more anarchic)

Question 22

transnational mobilisation and the domestication of the global security environment

Answer 22

politics at the level of the international system increasingly resembles aspects of domestic politics

effect of globalization on international security resembles domestic challenges in weakly institutionalised states

• transnational activities of non-state actors = global civil society
• embryotic forms of global governance: interaction between non-state transnational networks and international institutions (new patterns of authority)

*some see conflict US and Al-Qaeda as insurgency or civil war on a global scale

Question 23

how can globalisation increase levels of stability in the international system?

Answer 23

increased mobility of people, capital and goods, and ideas and information -> political entrepreneurs engage in transnational political mobilisation + build social movemens -> can contribute to the emergence of a global civil society defined by cross-cutting cleavages and interests

Question 24

what is the main argument of the article?
- lecture

Answer 24

globalization transforms the international security environment by providing transnational resources for non-state actors

Question 25

objectives of the article
+ main argument

Answer 25

objectives:
- examination of non-state political entrepreneurs under changing conditions of globalization
- as an example of how the overall effects of globalization are challenging traditional notions of national security

Question 26

what is the difference between political and religious organizations?

Answer 26

the groups can be distinguished on the basis of the grievances they formulate
……………..

Question 27

what incentives does globalization generate for transnational political mobilization?

Answer 27

migrant communities, transnational economic flows and the circulation of ideas create resources that transnational groups can use

1. migrant communities are connected by transnational cival networks that can be activated by political entrepreneurs during processes of political

Question 28

what is the relation between transnational political mobilization and transnational violence?

Answer 28

transnational political violence and transnational political mobilization should be seen as part of a continuum

they are often intermingled

Question 29

What are the key policy challenges for the future according to Adamson? Policy actors should…;

Answer 29

transpose the factors of domestic stability to the international realm

Question 30

conclusions

Answer 30

• …