Art 36 PI

Question 1

Art. 36.

Answer 1

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Question 2

“Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage

Answer 2

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties,
   to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.”

Question 3

purpose of including such provision

Answer 3

to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal

Question 4

No Precise Definition of “Psychological Incapacity”

Answer 4

“The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon
Law.”

Question 5

“psychological incapacity”

Answer 5

should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.

Question 6

three basic requirements of “psychological incapacity

Answer 6

: (a) gravity - grave or serious that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage
(b) juridical antecedents - must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage
(c) incurability - medically or clinically permanent or incurable - such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of profession or employment in a job

Question 7

LEOUEL SANTOS vs CA

Answer 7

Facts: Leouel First Lieutenant in Philippine Army married Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos on 20 September 1986. they started to “quarrel” over a number of other things about living independently. On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United States of America to work as a nurse. Seven months after her departure, Julia called up Leouel for the first time and promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail. Leouel filed a complaint for “Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code” respondent Julia, in her answer denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the failed to communicate and inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.

Held:
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

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Question 8

Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA

Answer 8

FACTS:

On 22 May 1988, plaintiff and the defendant got married. Although they slept in the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, no sexual intercourse took place. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations. She was found healthy, normal and still a virgin. Her husband’s examination was kept confidential.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual, and that the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man. The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

The defendant claims that should the marriage be annulled, it is his wife’s fault. He claims no defect on his part, as he was found not to be impotent, and any differences between the two of them can still be reconciled. He admitted that they have not had intercourse since their marriage until their separation because his wife avoided him. He added that his wife filed this case against him because she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewellery of his mother, and, that the defendant, will consummate their marriage.

The trial court declared the marriage void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

W/N petitioner is psychologically incapacitated?

RULING:

Yes. Senseless and protracted refusal to consummate the marriage is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Court clearly demonstrates an ‘utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage’ within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. However, neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. But the fact remains that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.

One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfil the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

The petition is DENIED.

Question 9

REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA G.R. NO. 108763

Answer 9

FACTS:

Roridel Molina and Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14, 1985. A son, Andre Molina was born out of their marriage in 1986. However, a year after their marriage, Roridel alleged that her husband Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and a father. Reynaldo, as claimed was spending more time with his friends, depending on his parents for aid and assistance, and was dishonest with his wife regarding their finances. He even lost his job and abandon his family. Thus, due to his immaturity and actions that lead to their frequent quarrels, their relationship was estranged and resulted to the filing of this case to declare the marriage null and void on ground of psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage of Reynaldo and Roridel shall be declared null and void on ground of psychological incapacity.

RULING:

No. The court ruled that psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental nor physical incapacity. The law intended to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The condition must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage and must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.

In this case, there is no clear showing that the defect spoken of is an incapacity, but instead is likely to appear as ‘difficulty’, if not outright ‘refusal’ or ‘neglect’ in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. Their problem shows no gravity, neither juridical antecedence nor its incurability.

This case introduced the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code: (Molina Doctrine-as it is called today)

Question 10

Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages” Molina Doctrine

Answer 10

which took effect on 15 March 2003.
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:

    a. Medically or clinically identified;
   
    b. Alleged in the complaint;
   
    c. Sufficiently proven by experts; and
   
    d. Clearly explained in the decision.

3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the “time of the celebration” of the marriage.
4. The incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically incurable.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our Courts.
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State.

Question 11

Marcos vs. Marcos

Answer 11

Facts
Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which was however reversed by CA.

Issues
Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity.

Held
Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of the petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurabilty and for her failure to observe the guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and Molina.

Question 12

Leonilo Antonio vs. Marie Ivonne F. Reyes

Answer 12

FACTS:

Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment, and other events or things. She even did not reveal bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to her husband as the adopted child of their family. They were separated in August 1991 and after an attempt at reconciliation, he finally left her for good in November 1991. in 1993, Petitioner then filed a petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their marriage null and void.

HELD:

Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner aside from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondent’s fantastic ability to invent, and fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes’ psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identified which was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of the respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of a relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes’ case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain unchanged.

Hence, the court concludes that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Question 13

Essential Marital Obligations

Answer 13

“To procreate children based on the universal principle
that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.”

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.

Art. 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70.

Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their unemancipated children on wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians.

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.

Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.

Question 14

No Award of Moral Damages in Psychological Incapacity

Answer 14

since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.

Question 15

Distinguish From Divorce and Legal Separation

Answer 15

Psychological Incapacity is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code. Hence, the marriage is void ab initio.
In divorce, all the requisites of a valid marriage are present. The authorized causes or grounds for the termination of the marital bond occur only after the celebration of the marriage. Similarly, in legal separation, the marriage is valid and the grounds for legal separation occur only after the celebration of the marriage.
In legal separation, however, the marital bond is not broken.

Question 16

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE v. ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE,

Answer 16

Facts:
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and the respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.

The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its decision declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. On review, the appellate court reversed and set aside the trial’s court ruling. It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent, for the clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in the Molina case needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before the SC the instant petition for review on certiorari. He posited that the trial court declared the marriage void, not only because of respondent’s psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties’ psychological incapacity. He also pointed out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine respondent.

Issue:
Whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null and void?

Held:
Yes, the marriage between the parties is null and void. While petition for review for certiorari was granted. The decision of the CA was reversed and set aside, and the decision of the trial court was reinstated. Both parties afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage is, thus, declared null and void. For the fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations.The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.

In dissolving the marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining that sacred bond. Let it be noted that in Art. 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning.

Question 17

AURELIO V. AURELIO

Answer 17

FACTS: Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988. They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.

Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with their respective essential marital obligations.In addition, respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time of the marriage ceremony.Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition. Petitioner principally argued that the petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

The RTC issued an Order denying petitioner’s motion. In denying petitioner’s motion, the RTC ruled that respondent’s petition for declaration of nullity of marriage complied with the requirements of the Molina doctrine, and whether or not the allegations are meritorious would depend upon the proofs presented by both parties during trial.

The CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held that respondent’s complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage when scrutinized in juxtaposition with Article 36 of the Family Code and the Molina doctrine revealed the existence of a sufficient cause of action.

ISSUE: Is the declaration of nullity of marriage valid under art. 36 of the Family Code?

HELD: Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the allegations contained in respondent’s petition are insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Specifically, petitioner contends that the petition failed to comply with three of the Molina guidelines, namely: that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be alleged in the complaint; that such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; and that the non-complied marital obligation must be stated in the petition.
First, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist clinically identified the same as the root causes.

Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.

Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondent’s allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that “the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.”

Given the allegations in respondent’s petition for nullity of marriage, this Court rules that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss. By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. DENIED.

Question 18

Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano

Answer 18

In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.”

FACTS: Lolita and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan in October 1986. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child. They were married with MTC of Bacoor, Cavite. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child. Hence, she filed for a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. RTC declared their marriage null and void because he failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. CA affirmed RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE: W/N abandonment by one spouse tantamount to psychological incapacity

HELD: Mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.

Question 19

Buenaventura vs. Court of Appeals,

Answer 19

FACTS:

This case was instituted by Petitioner Noel Buenaventura where he stated that he and his wife, Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura, were both psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The lower court found that petitioner was merely under heavy parental pressure to marry, and deceived Private Respondent Isabel Singh to marry. Buenaventura was unable to relate to his wife, as a husband, and their son, Javy, as a father. Moreso, he had no inclination to make the marriage work such that in times of trouble, he’d rather choose to leave his family than reconcile with his wife.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not, based on the findings of the lower court, the marriage between Buenaventura and Singh may be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, due to the psychological incapacity of the petitioner.
Whether or not the award of moral damages to the aggrieved spouse is proper in such cases.

RULING:

Yes. The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Psychological incapacity has been defined, as no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Based on the above definition of psychological incapacity, by declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet wilfully concealed the same.

Question 20

ROSANNA L. TAN-ANDAL vs. MARIO VICTOR M. ANDAL
G.R. No. 196359 May 11, 2021

Answer 20

Leonen, J.:
FACTS:
Mario Andal and Rosanna Tan-Andal were childhood friends. They lost contact with each other for 17 years. Mario had worked in Switzerland, Germany, and Italy before returning to the Philippines in April 1995. The parties reconnected and eventually became a couple. Mario left for Italy in July 1995. Barely two (2) months after he had left, he had quit his job and stayed in the country.
Mario and Rosanna married on 16 December 1995 at the Saints Peter and Paul Parish in Poblacion, Makati City. On 27 July 1996, Rosanna gave birth to Ma. Samantha, the only child of the parties. The family lived in a duplex in Parañaque City, with Rosanna’s parents living in the other half of the duplex.
According to Rosanna, Mario exhibited odd behaviors prior their wedding and during their marriage. Mario had difficulty in managing his finances. Rosanna taught him to run Design and Construction Matrix, the construction firm she had set up before she married. However, Mario continued with his “emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, irritability, and psychological imbalance.” He made numerous cash advances and purchases using supplementary credit card, which resulted to the family’s financial losses and the closure of Design and Construction Matrix. He would leave their house for several days without informing Rosanna of his whereabouts. Once he returned home, he would refuse to go out and would sleep for days. Mario was also “hyper-active” late at night.
Mario allegedly did not assist Rosanna when she gave birth to their child, Ma. Samantha. He left her in the hospital, knowing that she could not move until the effects of the spinal anesthesia had worn off. He only returned to the hospital later that evening to sleep. When Rosanna and Ma. Samantha were discharged from the hospital, Mario showed symptoms of paranoia. He thought everyone was out to attack him and, at times, would hide Ma. Samantha from those he thought were out to hurt them. Further, during the times when Ma. Samantha was sick, Mario would instead ignore the ill child.
Rosanna petitioned the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) to voluntarily commit Mario for drug rehabilitation at the National Bureau of Investigation Treatment and Rehabilitation Center, and, eventually, at the Seagulls Flight Foundation. Mario remained confined there until 24 December 2000, when the rehabilitation center released Mario without completing his rehabilitation program. Rosanna wrote the trial court as to Mario’s premature release from the rehabilitation center. Since Mario’s release, Rosanna and Mario had been separated and had not lived together. Mario also failed to give support to Rosanna and Ma. Samantha.
These events, according to Rosanna, showed Mario’s psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations to her. Rosanna contended that Mario’s drug use was the manifestation of a grave personality disorder “deeply rooted within Mario’s adaptive system.” She prayed that the trial court nullify their marriage and that she be declared the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land donated to her by her aunt as well as the duplex built on it.
To prove Mario’s psychological incapacity, Rosanna presented Dr. Garcia, a physician-psychiatrist, as expert witness. Dr. Garcia found Rosanna “psychologically capacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.” As for Mario, Dr. Garcia diagnosed him with narcissistic antisocial personality disorder and substance abuse disorder with psychotic features. Mario’s narcissistic antisocial personality disorder, which Dr. Garcia found to be grave, with juridical antecedence, and incurable, allegedly rendered Mario psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations to Rosanna. Dr. Garcia testified that Mario’s personality disorder was grave and “deeply rooted” in his character. Dr. Garcia added that persons suffering from personality disorders are “impermeable to any form of psychiatric therapeutic modality” because of “the presence of denial and cognizance on the basic pathology of the person suffering from the disorder.”
Mario contended that it was Rosanna who was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. He prayed that the trial court nullify his marriage to Rosanna due to her psychological incapacity, and that the properties they had acquired during their cohabitation be divided equally between them. He also prayed that the custody of Ma. Samantha be awarded to him.
The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage on the ground of Mario’s psychological incapacity. It awarded the custody of Ma. Samantha to Rosanna, with Mario having visitation rights. As to the Parañaque duplex, the trial court declared Rosanna as its sole and absolute owner, including the parcel of land on which it was built.
The Court of Appeals (“CA”) reversed the ruling of the lower court and declared the parties’ marriage to be valid and subsisting. It found Dr. Garcia’s psychiatric evaluation of Mario to be “unscientific and unreliable” since she diagnosed Mario without interviewing him. It ruled that Dr. Garcia “was working on pure suppositions and second-hand information fed to her by one side.”
Before the Supreme Court, Rosanna argued that psychological incapacity need not be grounded on psychological illness, as this is allegedly more consistent with psychological incapacity being a “liberal ground” for nullifying marriages. She cited cases where the Supreme Court held that competent evidence, not necessarily expert opinion, may establish psychological incapacity, and that what matters is the totality of the evidence presented. Rosanna added that psychological incapacity is incurable, but not necessarily in a medical or clinical sense. For her, incurability is manifested by ingrained behavior manifested during the marriage by the psychologically incapacitated spouse.
ISSUE:
Does psychological incapacity need to be medically or clinically identified?
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that psychological incapacity need not be medically or clinically proven. In effect, the Court modified the doctrine enunciated in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina (“Molina”). Considering the inconsistencies with which the doctrine laid down in Molina has been applied, the Court took a more comprehensive but nuanced approach regarding the proper interpretation and application of said doctrine.
Under the second guideline in Molina, the root cause of psychological incapacity must be a) medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts, and d) clearly explained in the decision. In Santos vs. Court of Appeals (“Santos”), the Court defined psychological incapacity as a mental (not physical) incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations. It involves the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. In the past, however, the Court has been inconsistent in requiring expert evidence in psychological incapacity cases. In light of said inconsistencies, the Court now categorically abandons the second Molina guideline. Now, psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion. There must, however, be proof of the durable or enduring aspects of a person’s personality which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. Such personality structure must make it impossible for him or her to understand and comply with their marital obligations. The proof required for this need not be given by an expert. Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify on behaviors that they have consistently observed from the incapacitated spouse.
With regard to the juridical antecedence requirement of the psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, the incapacity must be characterised as incurable. However, the Court acknowledges that psychological incapacity, not being an illness in a medical sense, is not something to be cured. As such, the third Molina guideline is amended to mean incurability in a legal sense, not a medical sense, Particularly, this means that the incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple’s respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage.
Considering the foregoing, the Court found Mario psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations. Rosanna was able to discharge the burden of proof required to nullify her marriage to Mario. Clear and convincing evidence of his incapacity was shown through testimonies on Mario’s personality and how it formed primarily through his childhood and adult experiences well before he married Rosanna. Dr. Garcia was also able to recount how Mario developed traits exhibiting chronic irresponsibility, impulsiveness, lack of remorse, lack of empath, and a sense of entitlement, behaviours which manifest his inherent psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations.
While drug addiction is a ground for legal separation, it will not prevent the court from voiding a marriage so long as it can be proven that the drug abuse is a manifestation of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage. Here, the totality of evidence presented by Rosanna clearly and convincingly proved that Mario’s drug abuse was of sufficient durability that antedates the marriage. His persistent failure to rehabilitate, even bringing his child into a room where he did drugs, indicates a level of dysfunctionality that shows utter disregard of his obligations not only to his wife, but also to his child.
His failure to render mutual help and support was also clearly proven by his consistent failure to find gainful employment and even driving to bankruptcy the construction firm founded by Rosanna by siphoning its funds for his drug abuse.

Question 21

ALMELOR VERSUS RTC/LEONIDA ALMELOR

Answer 21

FACTS:

On 29 January 1989, Manuel and Leonida Almelor got married. They are both medical practitioners – an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively.
After 11 years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC to annul their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Leonlda stated that they first met at SLH as med student clerks and they became sweethearts and after three years, they got married. At first, Manuel was kind and gentle but in private life, Leonilda described him as harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. These are the cause of their frequent fights as couple.
Respondent also alleged her husband that the latter has deep affection for his mother and added her woes for his husband’s concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her suspicions were proven by incidents where in she caught her husband kissing a male friend. At that point, she took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children.
Leonida also presented a psychologist who proved that Mauel has psychological incapacity.
On his part, Petitioner invokes that although he and Leonida had petty arguments, he maintained that their marriage is harmonious. He countered that the true cause of respondent’s hostility against him was their professional rivalry.
He also bellied all the allegations against him.
The RTC, in its disposition, granted the petition for annulment, however, not on the ground of Art 36 but on Art 45 of the FC.
The CA likewise affirmed the decision of the RTC.
In this present case, Manuel argued that erred in its decision annulling the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
RULING:

Concealment of homosexuality, not homosexuality per se, is the proper ground to annul marriage.
Citing RP v. Molina, the Court said “indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect or failure in the performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to establish psychological incapacity.
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage.
Even assuming that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear – a marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, such as concealment of homosexuality.
Homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that serves as a valid ground to annul a marriage.
It is something the respondent failed to prove.