Applied Welfare, Externalities, And Public Goods Flashcards

1
Q

What is normative individualism?

A

Normative statements about society based on statements about individual welfare.

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2
Q

How can we measure the effect of a price change from p0 to p1 on the consumer’s welfare if the consumer has fixed income.

A

If we know the utility function we can compute changes in indirect utility (to obtain indirect utility put the demand functions into the utility function):
u(x(p1, m)) - u(x(p0, m)) = v (p1, m) - v(p0, m)

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3
Q

What is a money-metric measure of welfare?

A

constructed using the expenditure function

min𝒙 𝒑 βˆ™ 𝒙 subject to 𝑒 𝒙 β‰₯ 𝑒^-
⟹ 𝑒 𝒑, 𝑒^- = 𝒑 βˆ™ π’™βˆ— = π‘š

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3
Q

What is the compensating variation

A

The Compensating Variation (CV) is the amount of money that must be taken from the consumer, given that a price change happens, to ensure they reach the old utility:
𝑉 (New Prices, π‘š βˆ’ 𝐢𝑉)= 𝑉 (Old Prices, m)

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3
Q

What is the equivalent variation

A

The Equivalent Variation (EV) is the change in income at the old prices that would give the same utility as with the new prices:
𝑉 New Prices, π‘š = 𝑉(Old Prices,π‘š + 𝐸𝑉)

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4
Q

What is the deadweight loss in a quasi-linear model

A

DWL = (x*-xt) - t / 2

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5
Q

What is the net present value (NPV)

A

the stream of net benefits discounted for the future

NPV = βˆ‘(Bt-Ct)/((1+r)^t)
If NPV>0 the project should be undertaken

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6
Q

What is the equation for social discount rate r (Ramsey formula)

A

π‘Ÿ = 𝜌 + πœ‚π‘”

𝜌 is pure rate of time preference
πœ‚ is elasticity of marginal utility of consumption
𝑔 is rate of consumption growth

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7
Q

What is an externality?

A

An externality is present when an action of one agent directly affects the utility or production possibilities of other agents.

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8
Q

Different types of goods

A

Private goods: excludable and rival
Commons goods: non-excludable and rival
Club goods: excludable and non-rival
Public goods: nonexcludable and non-rival

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9
Q

What happens when there is a public good which different agents can pay for?

A

Only the consumer with largest marginal benefit pays!
In game-theoretic terms the Nash equilibrium is {0, π‘₯𝐡
βˆ— }
Pareto-efficient provision π‘₯βˆ— is where total demand = supply, so there is underprovision in equilibrium

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10
Q

What is the Samuelson rule?

A

The sum of the marginal utilities should equal marginal cost

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11
Q

What is Lindahl pricing?

A

Each consumer reports their
marginal utility function, 𝑒𝑖
β€²(π‘₯). Assume truth-telling

The government adds the marginal utilities, choosing π‘₯βˆ— (with βˆ‘π‘– 𝑒′ (π‘₯βˆ—) = 𝑐) and sets the unit tax for 𝑖 equal to their marginal utility at the optimum: 𝑑𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖′(π‘₯βˆ—)

By construction total tax revenue equals the cost of the public good: 𝑑𝐴 + 𝑑𝐡 = 𝑒𝐴′(π‘₯βˆ—) + 𝑒𝐡′(π‘₯βˆ—) = 𝑐

Lindahl taxation requires that
agents tell the truth about
marginal utilities

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12
Q

How can people be incentivized to tell the truth?

A

Clarke-Groves mechanism:

The government considers providing a public good. Three agents: 1, 2, 3
* If the good is not provided each net value is 0
* Net values (= gross value minus share of cost) if the good is provided are
𝑣1, 𝑣2, 𝑣3.
* Each agent reports their net value for the good: π‘Ÿ1, π‘Ÿ2, π‘Ÿ3
* The good is provided if βˆ‘π‘–=1
3 π‘Ÿπ‘– > 0, is not provided if this sum is negative, and a coin is tossed if the sum is zero.

  • If the good is provided, each agent receives a payment equal to the sum of the reported net values of the other agents: 𝑝𝑖 = βˆ‘π‘—β‰ π‘– π‘Ÿπ‘—
  • If the good is not provided each payment is zero.
  • With truth-telling each person’s utility, with the payment, equals total welfare: 𝑣1+ 𝑣2+𝑣3 if provided, 0 if not
  • If the good is provided the government must pay out
    2(𝑣1+ 𝑣2+𝑣3) > 0

Lying can’t raise agents utility, and could reduce it

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13
Q

What is the Clarke tax?

A

Clarke proposed an additional tax of 𝑑𝑖 = max {βˆ‘π‘—β‰ π‘– π‘Ÿπ‘— , 0}

An agent pays money to the government if and only if they are pivotal. The tax net of the payment is 𝑑𝑖 βˆ’ 𝑝𝑖 β‰₯ 0

If π‘Ÿπ‘– + βˆ‘π‘—β‰ π‘– π‘Ÿπ‘— > 0 and βˆ‘π‘—β‰ π‘– π‘Ÿπ‘— < 0, 𝑑𝑖 βˆ’ 𝑝𝑖 = βˆ’π‘π‘– = βˆ’ βˆ‘π‘—β‰ π‘– π‘Ÿπ‘— > 0
If π‘Ÿπ‘– + βˆ‘π‘—β‰ π‘– π‘Ÿπ‘— < 0 and βˆ‘π‘—β‰ π‘– π‘Ÿπ‘— > 0, 𝑑𝑖 βˆ’ 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖 = βˆ‘π‘—β‰ π‘– π‘Ÿπ‘— > 0

If 𝑖 is pivotal then 𝑑𝑖 βˆ’ 𝑝𝑖 equals their effect on all others’ welfare

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14
Q

What is Coase theorem?

A

Irrespective of the allocation of property rights, (as long as rights are clearly specified and are enforced) frictionless bargaining produces an efficient outcome in presence of externalities.

15
Q

What does a Pigouvian tax do?

A

Pigouvian taxes do not create inefficiency, instead they ensure efficiency.

To achieve the Pareto-efficient outcome, set the Pigouvian tax equal to the marginal external cost at the optimum:
π‘‘βˆ— = 𝐿′ (π‘₯βˆ—)

16
Q

Taxes vs cap-and-trade

A

Fixing a price
- Set the Pigouvian tax π‘‘βˆ—, equal to marginal external cost
- Induces the optimal quantity π‘₯βˆ—
- Pareto-efficient

Fixing a quantity
- Allocate the optimal cap at π‘₯βˆ— as permits and allow trade
- Permit price will be marginal external cost
- Pareto-efficient