Amendments to Fung Yu-lan Part I Flashcards
What does “philosophy” mean to Fung Yu-lan?
For Fung, philosophy is a systematic, reflective thinking on life. However, on p. 13 he says that Chinese philosophy is characterized by its “suggestiveness.” Chinese philosophers, he claims, do not state what they mean in terms simple and clear, but use metaphors and aphorisms in order to suggest a subtle, difficult meaning. Though it is true that Chinese philosophy uses a lot of metaphors and aphorisms, what Fung calls “suggestiveness” seems to be in conflict with his characterization here of philosophy as “systematic thinking on life.” How can something be at once “systematic” yet still “suggestive” and not well articulated? Indeed, Chinese philosophy, like all philosophies, has multiple meanings. In many places, it also offers concepts and arguments, while it prefers the use of metaphors and narratives (parables). (p. 2, 13)
What does the term “thinking on thinking” refer to?
When Fung refers to Aristotle’s view that philosophy is “thinking on thinking,” in order to explain his understanding of philosophy as “reflective thinking,” we should be reminded that the term “thinking on thinking” (νοεσισ νοεσεοσ), in the history of Western philosophy, actually refers to a text from Aristotle that talks about God, not about philosophy as human thinking. God, for Aristotle, is the total self-awareness of thinking, for whom there is no distinction between the thinking subject and the object thought. It is clear that this Aristotelian view is in fact quite different from Fung’s notion of philosophy as “reflective thinking,” which, though interesting, is a human way of thinking, not God’s. (p.2)
How does Fung Yu-lan distinguish between the Daoist religion and Daoist philosophy?
Fung makes a distinction between the Daoist philosophy (daojia 道家) and Daoist religion (daojiao 道教). This distinction is a bit too simplistic in the context of Chinese culture and philosophy. First, the Canon of the religious Daoism includes all Daoist philosophical works. Thus there is a continuity between Daoist religion and Daoist philosophy from which it has emerged. Also, Daoist religious masters call themselves daojia. Fung supports his claim of a separation between Daoist religion and Daoist philosophy by saying that Daoist philosophy teaches one to follow nature, while Daoist religion teaches one to go against nature, and attempts to prolong one’s life as much as possible. However, these two ideas can be reconciled when we realize the search for immortality comes from the philosophical Daoist concept of conserving the wholeness of life and its concept of zhenren (authentic person). The search for immortality is in fact a prolongation of human life in unity with nature, an extension of Huanglao Daoist idea of longevity. Seeking immortality is in fact a continuation of the Daoist ideal of pursuing the wholeness of life and the power of nature itself. (p. 3)
How does Fung Yu-lan distinguish between Buddhist philosophy and Buddhist religion?
The division between Buddhist philosophy (fo hsüeh 佛學 ) and Buddhist religion (fo chiao 佛教) is not as clear-cut as Fung understands. It is sometimes called as fo hsüeh 佛學, sometimes as fo chiao 佛教. In fact, for a Western philosopher such as A.N. Whitehead, Buddhism is more philosophical than religious. (p. 3)
What is Fung Yu-lan’s view on Spinoza’s God?
Fung slightly misunderstands Spinoza’s view on the nature of God. He claims that God, for Spinoza, is identified with the universe. However, this is not quite correct. Spinoza makes a distinction between the natura naturata (“natured nature”—which refers to the modes whose existence is dependent on the attributes of God) and the natura naturans (“naturing nature”—which refers to the attributes not depending on anything else). God’s existence, while necessary, according to Spinoza, is not dependent on anything else, and thus cannot be explained in terms of nature (the universe). Rather, God, as the one substance, is what is “in itself, and is conceived through itself.” (p. 4)
How does Fung Yu-lan characterize the Christian God?
Fung claims that the Christian God is a personality, and so it is not really transcendent (i.e. the love for God is like the love of a son for his father). However, this is not really true in Christianity. We have ethical relationships with other human beings, but our relationship to God is not merely an ethical relationship in the human sense. Rather, it is a relationship with the origin and the creator of all ethical relationships—i.e. with a personal God who is both transcendent to and immanent in the world. Fung interprets the human-God relationship first as a father-son relationship then he says that “the love of God in Christianity is open to question as a super-moral value.” Fung thus commits the fallacy of begging the question (assuming that what is to be proven is true). (p. 4)
What is Fung Yu-lan’s interpretation of the relationship between science and religion?
Fung says that there is conflict between science and religion in the Western world. However, this is not entirely correct. We should say that the modern scientific worldview has emerged from the medieval Christian worldview in many respects; for instance, the idea that the world is in a rational (geometrical) order understandable by human reason. In the case of Christianity, this order is the manifestation of a rational order willed by a transcendent God, whose existence could be proved by the law of causality for St. Thomas, while for modern science, this order is regulated by the laws of nature to be discovered by human reason. (p. 5)
What is wrong with Fung Yu-lan’s claim that Plato thinks the body is the “prison of the soul”?
While true from the Pythagorean origin of Platonism, this does not mean that for Plato, the soul can be separated from body in this life. Rather, according to Plato, the relationship between soul and body is somehow like the relationship between a captain and his ship. The captain is a captain only if he is with his ship. In other words, body and soul are inseparable in this life, and the soul serves as the guidance of body, according to Plato. (p. 6)
What is wrong with Fung Yu-lan’s description of the Buddhist and Daoist goal?
Fung is not entirely correct in claiming that for the Buddhist and the Daoist, the goal of philosophy and life is to prepare ourselves for death—i.e. to escape this world. Rather, both Daoism and Buddhism emphasise that we need to see how we form a whole with the world, and they implore us to seek an authentic life (Daoism) or an enlightened life (Buddhism) in this world, rather than a life in which we are misled by the belittled self (Daoism, more specifically Zhuangzi) and delusions or illusions of the world (Buddhism). Thus it is not correct to say that Buddhism and Daoism are purely other-worldly philosophies. (p. 6)
How is Fung Yu-lan too dualistic about life and death?
Fung is much too dualistic about this-worldly and other-worldly philosophies, or about life and death. He claims that Confucius is only interested in the daily functions of human relations—i.e., “with man’s present life, but not his life in a world to come.” However, for Confucius, it is through understanding this life that we can understand death. There is no duality here. (p. 7)
How is Fung Yu-lan inaccurate in his depiction of the Daoist sage?
Fung claims that for the Daoist, the ideal of human life is to achieve identification of the sage with the whole of nature. We should be careful that this is not a form of “ontological identification/unification.” It is not the case that being a sage is the same as the universe (Heaven) or Dao, since the sage, like all humans, eventually dies, whereas Dao never perishes. Rather, the identification in question is a spiritual identification—that, only in the Dao, and at the heart of heaven and earth, can human beings find the ultimate spiritual and creative resources accessible to them through a process of spiritual identification. Man is able to unite with Heaven, this does not mean man is Heaven. (p. 21)
What is wrong with Fung Yu-lan’s description of the development of mathematics in Greece and China?
According to Fung, the Greeks, being primarily sailors and merchants, developed mathematics and mathematical reasoning, while the Chinese, being farmers, did not. Furthermore, Fung claims that, as a result of their mathematical interest, the Greeks emphasised epistemological problems while the Chinese did not. However, we should make it clear that being merchants or farmers does not explain the existence or non-existence of mathematics. The claim that the Chinese did not develop mathematics is false. They did develop a high level of mathematical skill, and they used mathematics in pragmatic manner, for instance, in measuring or calculating things, rather than developing abstract mathematical ideas and managing mathematical structures to organize theoretical propositions. However, this is different from the claim that the Greeks differ from the Chinese because they had developed mathematics. For the Chinese, mathematics is used for calculation; however, it does not serve as a means for organizing theoretical discourse. (p. 25-6)
What is the problem with Fung Yu-lan’s claim that Chinese philosophy emerged from the agrarian lifestyle?
Fung claims that Chinese philosophy is unique in that it manifests the unique socio-economic structure of Chinese life, which is primarily based on farming. But how come farmers in other countries do not produce philosophy? How do farmers have the time and possibility to become philosophers? It seems unhelpful to refer to the farmer’s life in order to explain the origin of Chinese philosophy. (p. 25-6)
Is it correct to say that the Chinese did not develop epistemology?
It is not correct to say that the Chinese did not develop epistemology (a theory about the nature and validity of knowledge). Rather, the Chinese always connected epistemology with praxis: they were interested in the pragmatic significance of knowledge, not in abstractly theorizing about knowledge. (p. 25-6)
What is Fung’s description of the philosophical schools lacking?
Fung’s discussion of the origin of the Chinese philosophical schools is a sociological explanation, not a philosophical explanation. Also it is an inadequate explanation because it presupposes a division of knowledge among the various social groups (knights, historians, etc.) which did not exist in ancient China when Chinese philosophy emerged. Furthermore, it is difficult to see why we should attribute the emergence of Chinese philosophy to social disintegration alone. Many societies go through chaotic social upheaval without developing any philosophy. We should thus look to the emergence of the philosophical mindset, rather than to sociological explanations. Also we should notice that among what Confucius has taught, archery and charioteering must have been the arts of knights rather than literati. Also, it’s not correct to say that Daoists came from hermits, though some of them might have deep connections with hermits and some lived like hermits. However, Fung’s explanation here is contrary to the legend according to which Lao Tzu served in the Royal Archives of Zhou, and because of this fact he had access to those sources concerning ancient cosmology. Also the fact that the knights, as the lowest noble class in ancient China, served both as warrior and literati and should have been very well versed in different kind of rituals. Fung says that the Mohists came from the knights, then it’s hard to explain why the Mohists were against the Rites when the knights frequently practiced the rituals. (p. 37)
