Agency and Partnership Flashcards
What are the three agency issues that can be on the bar exam and the first question that I need to ask myself if faced with an agency question?
- Is the principal liable for the TORTS of the alleged agent?
- Is the principle liable for the CONTRACTS of the alleged agent?
- What duties does the agent owe to the principal?
If the issue is whether the principal will be vicariously liable (respondeat superior) for the torts of the agent, what is the two-part test?
Principal will be liable for torts committed by its agent if:
- There’s a principal-agent relationship and
- The tort was committed by the agent within the scope of that relationship.
If the issue is whether the principal will be vicariously liable (respondeat superior) for the torts of the agent, when is there a principal-agent relationship?
ABC
A principal-agent relationship requires:
- Assent: there’s a voluntary agreement (formal or informal) between the principal who has capacity and the agent.
- Benefit: agent’s conduct must be for principal’s benefit
- Control: principal must have the right to control the agent by having the power to supervise the manner of the agent’s performance.
If the issue is whether the principal will be vicariously liable (respondeat superior) for the torts of a sub-agent, what’s the rule for sub-agents when determining whether there’s a principal-agent relationship ?
Principal will be liable for a sub-agent’s torts only if there’s assent, benefit, and control between the principal and the sub-agent. Usually, the principal won’t have assented to the sub-agent’s help and won’t have the right to control the sub-agent. Therefore, there’s no vicarious liability for a sub-agent’s tort.
If the issue is whether the principal will be vicariously liable (respondeat superior) for the torts of an agent that the principal borrows from another principal, what’s the rule for determining whether there’s a principal-agent relationship?
Principal will be liable for a borrowed agent’s torts only if there’s assent, benefit, and control between the borrowing principal and the borrowed agent tortfeasor. Although the borrowing principal often assents to and benefits from the borrowed agent, the borrowing principal won’t have the right to control the borrowed agent (rather the original principal does). Therefore, there’s no vicarious liability for a borrowed agent’s tort.
If the issue is whether the principal will be vicariously liable (respondeat superior) for the torts of the agent, when is there a principal-IC relationship rather than a principal-agent relationship?
There’s no right to control an IC because there’s no power to supervise the manner of its performance. Therefore, the general rule is that the principal isn’t VL for the IC’s torts unless the activity of the IC is either
(1) ultra-hazardous or inherently dangerous or
(2) the principal is estopped from disclaiming an P-A relationship because the P has held the IC out with an appearance of agency.
If the issue is whether the principal will be vicariously liable (respondeat superior) for the torts of the agent, what three factors must we weigh to determine whether the agent is acting within the scope of the principal-agent relationship?
- Was the conduct “of the kind” agent was hired to perform? If A’s conduct was within the job description, A’s conduct was likely within the scope.
- Did the tort occur “on the job?” If the conduct was a new and independent journey, it’s considered a frolic and therefore outside of the scope. If the conduct was a mere departure from the assigned task, it’s considered a detour and therefore within the scope.
- Did the agent intend to benefit the principal? If agent, even in part, intended to benefit the P, A’s conduct is likely still inside the scope.
If the issue is whether the principal will be vicariously liable (respondeat superior) for the torts of the agent, can an A’s intentional torts ever be within the scope of the principal-agent relationship?
Yes, while P is generally never liable for the intentional torts of its agent, P will be liable if:
- P authorized A to commit the intentional tort;
- the intentional tort was natural from the nature of the employment; or
- A was motivated by the desire to serve P.
If the issue is whether the principal will be liable for the contracts of the agent, what’s the overall general rule?
P is generally liable for the authorized contracts of its agent.
If the issue is whether the principal will be liable for the contracts of the agent, what are the four types of authority?
- Express authority
- Implied authority
- Apparent authority
- Ratification
In determining whether the principal will be liable for the contracts of the agent, what is actual express authority?
P used words, which are narrowly construed, to express authority to agent, even if oral or in private.
In determining whether the principal will be liable for the contracts of the agent, can actual express authority be made orally or in private?
Yes, unless the contract itself must be in writing. If the contract itself must be in writing, such as a land K or other SOF contract, then the authority must also be in writing.
In determining whether the principal will be liable for the contracts of the agent, how can actual express authority be revoked?
- By a unilateral act of either the principal or the agent; or
- Death or incapacity of the P, unless P gives A durable power of attorney with conspicuous survival language.
In determining whether the principal will be liable for the contracts of the agent, what is actual implied authority?
Authority which the P gives the A through conduct or circumstances. There’s IA to do all tasks:
- which are NECESSARY to accomplish an expressly authorized task.
- which are CUSTOMARILY performed by persons with the A’s title and authority.
- which the A believes to have been authorized to do based upon PRIOR acquiescence by P
In determining whether the principal will be liable for the contracts of the agent, what is apparent authority?
Authority derived from
(1) P “cloaking” A with the appearance of authority, and
(2) a 3d party reasonably relies on appearance of authority.