Africa Flashcards
What are we referring to, when we speak of (demographic change in) “Africa”?
Mostly referring to Sub-Saharan Africa
- 2nd largest/2nd most populous continent BUT Sub-Saharan Africa account for most of the population on the continent (1.1/1.3 billions - expected to double by 2050) + 40/50 countries with the highest TFR (all greater than 4 in 2008)
- Also, youngest continent: More than 40% of the population in sub Saharan countries is younger than 15 years old –> no concern of aging population
How did fertility develop in Africa?
In 1980 fertility started to decline but still on high level (from a TFR of 6+ children in 1980 to still 4+ children in 2020)
How does African fertility differ from other LDCs?
- Started fertility transition later (ca. 1995 vs 1975 in other LDCs)
- Started fertility transition from lower levels of socio-economic development (i.e. GDP per capita, education, etc.)
- Slower pace of fertility decline at time of transition onset in Africa (mainly resulting from slower pace of development GDP, education)
–> association between level of development/fertility but also pace of development/fertility - Consequently, Remaining at higher level of TFR than other less-developed countries
In search of an “Africa effect”:
Even when controlling for socio-economic development, fertility in Africa appears to be systematically higher than elsewhere:
1) Wanted children index - happy with a lot of children
2) There is an unmet need for contraception, but also places where there no such need but nonetheless high children rate
African fertility: later, earlier, slower, higher
Later: Delay in African fertility decline is largely in accord with conventional demographic theories (DTT) predicting that transitions occur later if socioeconomic development is delayed.
Earlier: Level of development at time of onset of fertility transitions was lower in Africa than in other LDCs. That is, the African transitions occurred earlier than they would have if Africa had followed the non-African relationship between fertility and development (not along DTT, but diffusion theory).
Slower: Pace of fertility decline at the time of transition onsets in Africa was slower than in other LDCs => pace of improvement in development indicators at the time of African onsets was also slower (conventional demographic theory).
Higher: At a given level of development Africa’s fertility is higher, contraceptive use is lower, and desired family size is higher than in other LDCs (“Africa effect”). Higher fertility preferences explain lower prevalence of contraception and
higher actual fertility => sustained pronatalist nature of many African societies (resistance to fertility decline and family planning programs)!
-> still needs to be explained theoretically
Mortality in (sub-saharan) Africa?
1) Child mortality
- Lacks behind SD goals, even tho it has substantially declined it remains on relatively high levels, especially children < 5 years
- Mainly due to factors (safe drinking water. nutrition) that can relatively easy be made sth about
Mortality in (sub-saharan) Africa?
2) Adult & Maternal mortality:
Also, adult & maternal mortality: no catching up can be seen
- Big factor: HIV/AIDS epidemic complete stagnation in LE from 1980-2000s
- BUT HIV doesn’t explain such a persistent gap: WASh-factors there can be sth made about, demographic change is no fate, but sth that can be done
Covid-19 & Africa?
So many so young, so not too much damage,
BUT, critically ill patients with COVID-19 in Africa are at higher risk of death than those elsewhere! (severe due to overall terrible infrastructure)
“Failure to cooperate globally and to act decisively in Africa will translate into sustained transmission and pose a risk to all […]: only victory in Africa can end the pandemic everywhere.”
How is the (sub-sahran) African population going to develop?
Exponential population growth
- Urbanization: Most significant expected change in population structure over these 35 years will be the urban–rural balance. The urban population is expected to expand three-fold while the rural population more modest
- Age Structure: Because the fertility decline in Africa has been so slow, the dominant demographic force for the next 35 years will be continued growth in numbers of births & young people BUT growth in adult population will outstrip that of younger age groups
BUT changes in age structure will be less pronounced. The population aged under 20 years will shrink from 53 to 43 %, the over-65s will grow from 3 to 5 %, and the share in the prime working ages will expand from 43 to 52 %
Graphically, Pyramid –> chubby Pyramid (similar to advanced societies)
Challanges from population change
1) YDP (problem & solution)
People under 15 = YDR
- need to be catered to (education, jobs, etc.) –> so much higher than in the rest of the world + even nowadays not declining substantially
- BUT as education increases (expected to double by 2050) = more educated women + investing in children’s education makes having kids more costly fewer children expected
Challanges from population change
2) OADR
- not so much of a problem NOW (compared to western societies) but do not be naïve, in longer term perspective, population aging might be important challenge to come for African population, aged 60 or older expected to double by mid-century
- So far, there’s only limited health care coverage for older people and, over the continent as a whole, fewer than 10% of older people can claim a – generally low! – pension
-> At present, older Africans are supported primarily through private solidarity, but families may no longer be able to meet the specific needs of their elders without public assistance and support.
-> Action must be taken now
Challanges from population change
3) General pressure points:
- health and education services
- the need to secure food for a population doubling in size
- the danger that rapid urbanization will outstrip efforts to improve living conditions
- the challenges of employment and productivity for an adult population that will be 2.5 times larger in 2050 than today
- the prospect of mass migration within the region (intra-regional migration)
➢ “None of these implications represents insuperable barriers to progress but, considered together, they underscore the magnitude of the task ahead. Success will depend above all on political will and sound governance.
How is African migration changing?
- Given 1) rising intercontinental moves, 2) projected massive population expansion, and 3) no indication of declining conflict, the pressures on Europe of African migration will surely increase substantially
- Especially problematic: Sahel region (Chad, Mali, and Niger), combines population are projected to grow from around 50 mio (2015) to close to 150 mio by mid-century. All three countries have fragile governments and problems of internal security, face periodic food shortages, and are extremely vulnerable to climate change (Potts, Henderson, and Campbell 2013)
- -> Predictable response: emigration. A small number of individuals will have the means to emigrate to Europe, but the majority will cross adjacent borders, to Nigeria for instance.
- So, Bulk = inter-African migration but true that will also go to also to Europe (France, UK for colonial reasons) —> pressure on Europe will increase BUT could also be an opportunity (can have immense mutual benefits if it is well-governed. Host country policies governing migrants’ access to labor markets and their ease of integration into local communities will determine how quickly these positive migration impacts can be realized)
Take home messages: Africa
➢ (Sub-Saharan) Africa is heterogeneous, in many ways unique
– and it’s HUGE (with a population expected to double in size
within the next 30 years, then accounting for almost a quarter
of the global total)!
➢ “What happens in Africa between now and mid-century will
have both regional and global implications.” (Cleland & Machiyama
2017: 264)
Will there be challanges of internal African migration?
DEPENDS
- When a common culture and language unite both migrants and the host community, as with Fulani speakers in Northern Nigeria and adjacent countries, the prospects are good
- when this source of cohesion and solidarity is lacking, they are potentially alarming, maybe even violence provoking
