AC3.2 Flashcards
impact of environmental design
The built environment can affect the level of crime in 2 ways:
1) by influencing potential offenders - e.g presenting them with opportunities to commit crime
2) By affecting peoples ability to exercise control over their surroundings.
They argue that agencies can ‘design crime out’ by changing the physical layout of an area
what is an indefensible space?
- crime is more likely to occur
- back streets
- belongs to no one
study of high rise flats,, Newman found 55% of crime occurred in public space.
what is a defensible space?
- where there are clear boundaries so it is obvious who has the right to be there.
- Newman argues that defensible spaces have low crime rates because of 4 key features:
1) Territoriality - where the environment encourages a sense of ownership among residents, the feeling that it is their territory and they control it. Certain layouts can tell outsiders that areas are for private use.
e.g: cul-de-sacs project a ‘private’ image and encourage a sense of community.
2) Natural Surveillance - features of buildings, such as easily viewed entrance lobbies and street level windows, allow residents to identify and observe strangers. Cul-de-sacs allow residents to overlook each others homes. High rise blocks often have concealed entrances that allow offenders to come and go unseen.
3) A Safe Image - Building designs should give the impressions of a safe neighbourhood where residents look after each other. A negative image means the area will be stigmatised and targeted by offenders.
4) A safe location - neighbourhoods located in the middle of a wider crime free area are insulated from the outside world by a ‘moat’ of safety.
what is territoriality?
where the environment encourages a sense of ownership among resident, the feeling that it is their territory and they control it.
certain layouts can tell outsiders that areas are for private use. For example, Cul-de-sacs project a private image and encourage a sense of community
what is natural surveillance?
features of buildings such as easily viewed entrance lobbies and street-level windows allow residents to identify and observe strangers.
cul-de-sacs allow residents to overlook each others homes.
high rise blocks often have concealed entrances that allow offenders to come and go unseen.
what is a safe image?
building designs should give the impression of a safe neighbourhood where residents look after each other.
a negative image means the area will be stigmatised and targeted by offenders.
what is a safe location?
neighbourhoods located in the middle of a wider crime free area are insulated from the outside world by a ‘moat’ of safety
how was Newman’s ideas about defensible spaces developed?
they were developed further by an American criminologist, C.R Jeffery, who introduced the approach Known as Crime Prevention through Environmental Design.
Jeffery argued that the built environment can either create or deny opportunities to criminals. This means that by altering the environment, we can reduce crime.
What was Alice Coleman’s approach to CPTED?
She analysed 4,099 blocks of flats in 2 London boroughs.
She concluded that the poor design of many blocks produced higher rates of crime and anti-social behaviour.
There were 3 design features that she found encouraged crime: anonymity, lack of surveillance and easy escape.
She recommended: no more blocks of flats should be built, each existing block should have its own garden or private space so residents would look after it, overhead walkways should be removed because they obstruct surveillance.
These ideas have been influential and have led to attempts to ‘design crime out’.
On the Lisson Green estate in West London, the removal of overhead walkways led to a 50% reduction in crime.
Some police forces now employ architectural liaison officers to ‘build in’ crime prevention features at the design stage of new buildings.
The ‘Secured by Design’ kitemark scheme used by the building industry indicates that a new building meets crime prevention standards. Home Office research found a 30% lower burglary rate in SBD houses.
what are gated lanes?
An example of a CPTED tactic to ‘design crime out’ of an environment.
Gated lanes are lockable gates installed to prevent offenders gaining access to alleyways , such as those at the rear of many older terraced houses.
They are used mainly to prevent burglaries, but may also stop fly-tipping, anti-social behaviour by youths congregating and dog fouling, as well as creating safe play areas for children.
How do gated lanes work?
In a review of 43 studies, Sidebottom et al, found that gates reduced burglary rates. They suggest this is because:
- they provide a physical barrier, thus increasing the effort required to commit a crime.
- Residents taking responsibility for closing the gates increases guardianship and surveillance.
- gates increase residents sense of territoriality
- offenders can no longer use the excuse that they thought it was a public space.
- open alleys may suffer from the ‘broken windows’ theory of disorderly, uncared for space that invites crime. Gating indicates the space is cared for and doesn’t tolerate crime.
- Gating may reduce the rewards for crime. For example, it will be difficult to steal large objects if the offender has to climb over tall gates with the items.
- Cost may be an issue for residents in some areas, although Sidebottom et al found that the average cost was £728 per gate and the average benefit was over twice the cost.
limitations of gated lanes
while they may decrease criminals entering from outside, they don’t work against criminals who live within the gated area.
in areas where neighbours don’t know or trust each other, residents may be less likely to get together to install gates or may not take responsibility for them.
There may be difficulties installing gates if the alley is a public right of way, or if it has several owners all of whom will need to agree. There needs to be a full consultation with residents to win their commitment to the scheme.
gated lanes can restrict access for emergency services and refuse collectors, which can be a problem.
Theories related to CPTED
Like Situational Crime Prevention, CPTED involves ‘target hardening’ by changing the physical environment to make it harder to commit crimes. For example, barriers to prevent vehicle access to a neighbourhood will make getaways harder.
Felson’s routine activity theory - emphasises the importance of a ‘capable guardian’ protecting potential crime targets. In CPTED, a mutual surveillance by neighbours acts as a guardian.
Rational choice theory - CPTED sees offenders acting rationally. For example, if intruders fear they will be challenged by residents, they will be more likely to stay away from the area.
criticisms of CPTED
CPTED focuses on defence from outsiders who come into the area to offend, but does not take into account the people inside the area could commit crime too.
CPTED cannot prevent offences that don’t involve physical intrusion into a neighbourhood, such as cyber crime, fraud, white collar and corporate crimes.
Cul-de-sacs might be defensible spaces but they might not actually be defended. For example, if the residents are all out at work all day, there is no surveillance. This highlights how social factors can interact with environmental factors.
Some housing estates have high crime rates because of councils housing allocation policies, rather than because of how they are designed. Some councils place ‘problem families’ with a history of anti-social behaviour on ‘sink estates’.
An areas reputation rather than its design may cause a high crime rate. If police regard a particular estate as crime-ridden, they will patrol it more, leading to more arrests, a higher recorded crime rate and an even worse reputation.
The Panopticon - prison design used for social control
Foucault argues that in modern society, we are increasingly controlled through self-surveillance. He illustrates this through a description of a prison design known as the Panoptican, meaning ‘all-seeing’.
In the Panopticon, prisoners cells are visible to the guards from a central viewing point such as a watchtower. However, the prisoners cannot see the guards and so they do not know if they are being watched at any given moment. Therefore, not knowing if they are being watched, the prisoners must constantly behave as if they are. In this way, surveillance turns into self-surveillance. The guards have no reason to discipline the prisoners as they discipline themselves.
There are other prison designs such as the American Supermax jails. These are the most secure levels of custody.
The objective is to provide long term, segregated housing for prisoners who represent the highest security risks, including those who pose a threat to national and international security.
A Supermax prison costs 2-3 times more to build and operate than a traditional maximum security prison.
The UK’s biggest prison holds 2,106 prisoners. The accommodation is divided into smaller units for easier management of the inmates.
