ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES SYSTEM RESET GENERAL Flashcards
Guidelines to reset a system:
‐ Set the related normal cockpit control to OFF, or pull the corresponding circuit breaker,
‐ Wait 3 s if a normal cockpit control is used, or 5 s if a circuit breaker is used (unless a different time is
indicated),
‐ Set the related normal cockpit control to ON, or push the corresponding circuit breaker, ‐ Wait 3 s for the end of the reset.
On ground:
Reset ECU (CFM) or EEC (IAE) or EIU
Reset BSCU
Reset ELAC or SEC
Reset ECU (CFM) or EEC (IAE) or EIU only when engine shut down.
Reset BSCU only when aircraft stopped.
Reset ELAC or SEC only when listed in the System Reset Table.
Other Systems not listed in the System Reset Table can be reset following the guidelines described above.
In flight: Do not pull the following circuit breakers:
SFCC
ECU or EEC or EIU.
ELEC EMER CONFIG SUMMARY
CRUISE
MAX SPD : 320 kt
ALTN LAW: PROT LOST
ONLY CAPT PITOT AND AOA HEATED
FUEL: CTR TK USABLE BY GRAVITY: 2 t (4 400 lb) UNUSABLE
FUEL GRAVITY FEEDING
COM: VHF1, HF1 , ATC1, RMP1 only
NAV: ILS1, VOR1, GPS1 (if MMR is installed) only
For Landing Performance assessment, use the performance application of the EFB.
ELEC EMER CONFIG SUMMARY
APPROACH
CAT 2 INOP
MINIMUM RAT SPEED 140 KT SLATS / FLAPS SLOW
FOR LANDING : USE FLAP 3
When L/G down: USE MAN PITCH TRIM (DIRECT LAW)
ELEC EMER CONFIG SUMMARY
LANDING
FLARE: Only 2 spoilers per wing. Direct law
SPOILERS:
NO REVERSER
BRAKING: ALTERNATE without antiskid MAX BRK PR : 1 000 PSI
NO NOSEWHEEL STEERING
ELEC EMER CONFIG SUMMARY
GO-AROUND
When L/G uplocked:
ALTN LAW: PROT LOST
ALL ENG FAIL GLIDING DISTANCE : OPTIMUM RELIGHT SPEED
AT 280 KT: 2 NM / 1000 FT (500 FT/NM) NO WIND
ALL ENG FAIL If engine relight cannot be attempted:
OPTIMUM SPEED:
GLIDING DISTANCE AT GREEN DOT: 2.5 NM / 1000 FT (400 FT/NM) NO WIND
ALL ENG FAIL If ditching anticipated:
MIN RAT SPEED :
140 KT
ENGINE TAILPIPE FIRE CAUTION:
External fire agents can cause severe corrosive damage. Consider the use of external fire agents only if the following procedure does not stop engine tailpipe fire.
LANDING WITH SLATS OR FLAPS JAMMED : OVERSPEED alert, and VLS displayed on the PFD, are computed according to the
actual flaps/slats position
For flight with SLATS or FLAPS extended, fuel consumption
is increased. ___ to obtain the fuel penalty required to reach the destination in the current configuration. Refer to OPS Fuel Penalty Factors/ECAM Alert Table.
Refer to the fuel flow indication. As a guideline, determine the fuel consumption in clean configuration at the same altitude without airspeed limitation (e.g. From ALTERNATE FLIGHT PLANNING tables) and multiply this result by the applicable Fuel Penalty Factor provided in the QRH,
UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION: FLYING TECHNIQUE TO STABILIZE SPEED
Stabilize the altitude. When altitude is stabilized:
‐ If the pitch is above the target pitch, increase the thrust and maintain the altitude. ‐ If the pitch is below the target pitch, decrease the thrust and maintain the altitude.
When the pitch reaches the target pitch, adjust the thrust to keep this target pitch.
UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION: If the BUSS does not react to longitudinal stick input when flying the green area of the speed scale,
the flight crew must disregard the BUSS and use pitch/thrust tables.
UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION: Disregard ___ STATUS message, if displayed on ECAM.
“RISK OF UNDUE STALL WARNING”
UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION: ADR3 and STBY speeds use ___
the data of the same probe.
UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION: If the failure is due to radome destruction, the drag will increase and therefore N1 must be increased by ___. Fuel flow will increase by about___.
5 % & 27 %
WHEEL TIRE DAMAGE SUSPECTED: Performance impact of one burst tire is equivalent to
one brake released.
USE OF THE FUEL PENALTY FACTORS: In case of failure impacting the fuel consumption, the fuel predictions provided by the FMS are no longer reliable except in
One Engine Inoperative OEI condition
USE OF THE FUEL PENALTY FACTORS: Refer to the following tables in order to assess the impact of the failure on the fuel consumption after any ECAM alert that:
‐ Displays the line INCREASED FUEL CONSUMP or FUEL CONSUMPT INCRSD in the STATUS SD
page, or
‐ Displays Flight Control Surfaces in the INOP SYS, or
‐ Impacts the Landing Gears or Landing Gear Doors retraction (when extended).
The Fuel Penalty Factors given in these tables have been calculated taking into account: ‐ The FUEL CRITICAL INOP SYS, and
‐ The aircraft configuration, speed or altitude described in the CONDITIONS column.
FUEL PENALTY FACTORS methodology is the following:
Check the ECAM ALERT table to determine if a Fuel Penalty Factor is applicable depending on the CONDITIONS column, then
‐ Check the INOP SYS table in order to determine if, according to the actual aircraft status, there is a Fuel Penalty Factor applicable depending on the CONDITIONS column
‐ If only one Fuel Penalty Factor (FPF) is applicable:
TRIP FUEL PENALTY = (FOB - EFOB at DEST) x FPF
The FMS fuel predictions must be recomputed to take into account this trip fuel penalty.
‐ If two or more Fuel Penalty Factors (FPF) are applicable:
TRIP FUEL PENALTY = (FOB - EFOB at DEST) x (FPF1 + FPF2 +…)
The FMS fuel predictions must be recomputed to take into account this trip fuel penalty.
HYDRAULIC ARCHITECTURE: LANDING GEAR
SLATS & FLAPS
GREEN
RESERVOIR
HYDRAULIC ARCHITECTURE:
REV ENG 1
NORM BRAKES
GREEN
RESERVOIR
HYDRAULIC ARCHITECTURE:
YAW DAMP 1
RUDDER
STABILIZER
L ELEVATOR
L & R SPLR 1
GREEN
RESERVOIR
HYDRAULIC ARCHITECTURE:
R AIL
R SPLR 5
R SLAT WTB
R FLAP WTB
GREEN
RESERVOIR
HYDRAULIC ARCHITECTURE:
L SLAT WTB
L AIL
SPLR 5
GREEN
RESERVOIR
HYDRAULIC ARCHITECTURE:
ENG 1 PUMP
GREEN
RESERVOIR
HYDRAULIC ARCHITECTURE:
EMER GEN
SLATS
BLUE
RESERVOIR
HYDRAULIC ARCHITECTURE:
RUDDER
FLAPS L & R WTB
SLATS L&R WTB
L& R ELEVATOR
L&R SPOILER 3
L & R AILERON
BLUE
RESERVOIR
HYDRAULIC ARCHITECTURE:
ELEC PUMP
(78L/MIN) (RAT)
BLUE
RESERVOIR
HYDRAULIC ARCHITECTURE:
FLAPS
YELLOW
RESERVOIR
HYDRAULIC ARCHITECTURE:
NWS
ALT/PARK BRAKE
REV ENG 2
YELLOW
RESERVOIR
HYDRAULIC ARCHITECTURE:
YAW DAMP 2
RUDDER
STABILIZER
R ELEVATOR
L & R SPLR 2
R SPLR 4
YELLOW
RESERVOIR
HYDRAULIC ARCHITECTURE:
L FLAP WTB
L SPLR 4
YELLOW
RESERVOIR
HYDRAULIC ARCHITECTURE:
CARGO DOOR
ENG 2 PUMP
ELEC PUMP
HAND PUMP
YELLOW
RESERVOIR
FLIGHT CONTROLS ARCHITECTURE:
SPD-BRK
2-3-4
FLIGHT CONTROLS ARCHITECTURE:
GND-SPLR
1-2-3-4-5
FLIGHT CONTROLS ARCHITECTURE:
ROLL
2-3-4-5 & L/R AIL
REQUIRED EQUIPMENT FOR CAT2 AND CAT3: Flight crews are not expected to check the equipment list before approach. When an ECAM or local caution occurs, the crew should
use the list to confirm the landing capability.
REQUIRED EQUIPMENT FOR CAT2 AND CAT3:
Failure of ___ are not monitored for landing capability.
antiskid and/or nosewheel steering mechanical parts
REQUIRED EQUIPMENT FOR CAT2 AND CAT3:
The DH will be displayed on the FMA, and the ′′Hundred Above′′ and ′′Minimum′′ auto callouts will be announced, provided that
the DH value has been entered on the MCDU.
COST INDEX FOR LONG RANGE CRUISE SPEED:
ALL ENGINES
For a quick determination of the CI (LRC) use:
40 kg/min in the FMGC, for aircraft in metric units.
OEB : OPERATIONS ENGINEERING BULLETINS : SPEEDBRAKE LIMITATION IN APPROACH WITH
GWCG ABOVE 35% OR IN OVERWEIGHT LANDING
ROOT CAUSE:
When speedbrakes are extended and up to 50 s after full retraction of the speedbrakes, the autopilot (AP) has more authority in pitch for go-around.
SPEEDBRAKE LIMITATION IN APPROACH
WITH GWCG ABOVE 35% OR IN
OVERWEIGHT LANDING EXPLANATION
OPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCE
During approach, with flaps extended, and associated with a significant aft CG or in overweight landing
if conditions, if TOGA is applied (in case of go-around or reactive windshear) with the AP engaged and the
above speedbrakes conditions, excessive pitch attitude may occur.
OPERATIONS ENGINEERING BULLETINS:
ENG 1(2) SYSTEM FAULT
ROOT CAUSE:
The ENG 1(2) SYSTEM FAULT ECAM alert can be triggered due to:
‐ Active Clearance Control (ACC) valve fault, or
‐ High Pressure Compressor (HPC) bleed valve fault.
In flight, it is not possible to identify if the ENG 1(2) SYSTEM FAULT ECAM alert is due to an ACC valve fault or an HPC bleed valve fault.
An HPC bleed valve can only fail open during an engine relight.
An ACC valve may fail at any time during the flight but it does not result in any engine deterioration or aircraft operation impact.
ENG 1(2) SYSTEM FAULT - EXPLANATION
OPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCE
The ENG 1(2) SYSTEM FAULT ECAM procedure leads the flight crew to reduce thrust lever to idle level on the affected engine.
OPERATIONS ENGINEERING BULLETINS
GENERAL DESCRIPTION
The flight crew must disregard the ECAM procedure and/or STATUS of the ECAM alerts listed in the
“ECAM ENTRY” field and must apply the QRH’s OEB procedure instead.
WHAT IS AN OEB?
A Temporary Procedure
An Operations Engineering Bulletin (OEB) is a temporary procedure published for flight crews, which must be applied in specific conditions to ensure the safe and efficient operation of the aircraft. An OEB is applicable until a permanent corrective solution is installed on the aircraft.
Two Types of OEB
There are two types of OEB:
Red OEB: Safety related OEB where non-compliance may have a significant impact on the safe operations of the aircraft
White OEB: Non-compliance may have a significant impact on the efficient operations of the aircraft (e.g. diversions or delays)
