9b. Signaling in the Labor Market Flashcards

1
Q

What is the problem of asymmetric information in the labor market?

A
  • Prospective employees may have less information about working conditions than firms do.
  • Firms may have less information about potential employees’ abilities than the workers do
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2
Q

What is the “education as a signal” model?

A
  • Employers want to hire capable workers but cannot tell if a potential employee has high or low ability
  • Going to college and graduate takes effort/ costly
  • Two type of students: high-ability and low-ability
    –> Studying takes less effort to the high-ability student

So, if high-ability people are more likely to go to college than low-ability people, schooling signals that ability to employers

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3
Q

What are some extreme assumptions of the “education as a signal” model?

A
  • Graduating from an appropriate school serves only as a signal of ability
  • Schooling provides no training that is useful to firms
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4
Q

How is the share of high and low ability workers expressed?

A
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5
Q

How is the output of high and low ability workers expressed?

A
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6
Q

What are the two potential situations (equilibria)?

A
  • Pooling equilibrium
  • Separating equilibrium
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7
Q

What is the “pooling equilibrium”?

A

No students go to school, employer offers to pay all employees

0wh (percentage of high-value workers multiplied by high wage)
(1-0)
wL (percentage of low-value workers multiplied by low wage)
-> essentially the expected value calculation!

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8
Q

What is the “separating equilibrium”?

A

High ability students graduate and low ability students do not go to school, employer offers Wh to high ability and WL to low ability workers.

So.. school is a SIGNAL of ability, so employers can tell between the ability levels

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9
Q

What is the necessary condition for the separating equilibrium?

A

It must be the case that the high-ability person chooses to get a degree, so the difference between the wages must be GREATER than the cost to attend a school “c”

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10
Q

What is the necessary condition for the pooling equilibrium?

A

be the case that it does NOT pay for the high-ability person to get a degree

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11
Q

How can the pooling equilibrium be rearranged?

A
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12
Q

When is ONLY the pooling equilibrium possible?

A
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13
Q

When is ONLY the separating equilibrium possible?

A
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14
Q

When are BOTH equilibrium possible?

A
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15
Q

If c = $15,000, Wh = $40,000, and WL = $20,000, for what values of theta is pooling an equilibrium?

A
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