9.1 Multiagent decision making and Games in Normal Form

Question 1

Multiagent decision making:

Group of agents ___ within an ___ and make simultaneous

Answer 1

coexist
Environment
Decisions

Question 2

Game theory:

Mathematical study of ___ among ___, ___ agents

Answer 2

Interactions
Independent
Self-interested

Question 3

The dominant theory for modeling agent’s interests is ___

Answer 3

Utility theory

Question 4

In Game Theory, the success of an agent depends on the

___ of ___

Answer 4

Decisions

All other agents

Question 5

Assumptions of Game Theory:

• Participant agents are ___
• Agents reason ___ (they take into account the other agent’s decision)

Answer 5

Rational

Strategically

Question 6

Normal-form games (rr s´Static game or Strategic game):

• Each agent chooses a ___ and then receives a ___ that depends on the ___
• The joint action is the ___ of the game
• Although payoffs are common knowledge, an agent does not know the ___
• A game’s solution is a ___ of the outcome using the assumptions that all agents are ___ and ___

Answer 6

Single action
Payoff 
Joint action
Outcome 
Actions of the other agents
Prediction 
Rational and strategic

Question 7

In game theory, we assume that a rational agent will never choose a ___

Answer 7

Suboptimal action

Question 8

Z is a suboptimal action (or strictly dominated action) in relation to Y if the ___ of Y is always ___ independently of the ___ of the other agents

Answer 8

Utility
Higher
Actions

Question 9

Solution Concepts:

The problem of ___ about games and identifying certain ___ of ___

Answer 9

Reasoning

Subsets of outcomes

Question 10

The iterated ___ of ___ actions is a ___ solution concept for games

Answer 10

Elimination
Strictly dominated
First

Question 11

Drawbacks of iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions:
- Each step requires a further assumption about what the agents
know about each other’s ___
- Very imprecise prediciton about the play of the game, for instance, if no actions are eliminated then ___

Answer 11

Rationality

Anything could happen

Question 12

Nash equilibrium:

Joint ___ from where no agent can ___ improve his ___. Hence no agent has ___ to deviate

Answer 12

Action
Unilaterally
Payoff
Incentive

Question 13

In a Nash equilibrium, each agent’s actions is an

___ response to the other agents’ ___

Answer 13

Optimal

Actions

Question 14

The cost of Nash equilibrium is ___ in the number of agents

Answer 14

Exponencial

Question 15

If iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions eliminates all but a single joint action Z, then this joint action is the unique ___ of the game

Answer 15

Nash equilibrium

Question 16

Nash equilibrium is a \_\_\_ solution concept than iterated elimination of strictly dominated
actions. Hence, it produces more accurate \_\_\_ in a \_\_\_ class of games

Answer 16

Stronger
Predictions
Wider

Question 17

Nash equilibrium is a ___ from where no

agent can unilaterally improve his ___. Hence, no agent has any incentive to ___

Answer 17

Joint action
Payoff
Deviate

Question 18

In a Nash equilibrium, each agent’s actions is an

___ to the other agents’ actions

Answer 18

Optimal response

Question 19

If IESDA eliminates all but a single joint action a, then this joint action is the unique ___ of the game

Answer 19

NE (Nash equilibrium)

Question 20

Since IESDA frequently does not eliminate all but a single joint action, we say that the NE is a ___ solution concept

Answer 20

Stronger

Question 21

TRAIN EXERCISES

Answer 21

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