11.1 Multiagent decision making and Games in Extensive Form

Question 1

Normal-form games:

• Do not incorporate any notion of ___ or ___
• Assume agents select their actions ___

Answer 1

• Sequence or time

- Simultaneously

Question 2

Extensive-form games:

- Have explicit ___

Answer 2

• Temporal structure

Question 3

Perfect-information games in extensive form:

• A tree in the sense of ___ theory
• Each node represents the ___ of an agent
• Each edge represents an ___ of an agent
• The leaves represent a final ___

Answer 3

• Graph
• Choice
• Action
• Outcome (payoffs/utility)

Question 4

A pure strategy for an agent in a perfect-information game is a complete specification of which ___ to take at ___ belonging to that agent

Answer 4

Deterministic action

Every node

Question 5

Every Subgame-perfect equilibrium is also a ___
Although not every ___ is a Subgame-perfect equilibrium
Also, every perfect-information extensive-form game has at least one ___

Answer 5

Nash equilibrium
Nash equilibrium
Subgame-perfect equilibrium

Question 6

Backward induction
Procedure to compute the ___
Also known by ___

Answer 6

Subgame-perfect equilibrium

Minimax algorithm

Question 7

Backward induction process:
1- Identify the ___ in the “___” subgame trees
2- Consider that these ___ will ___
3- Back up and consider ___

Answer 7

1- Equilibria / “bottom-most”
2- Equilibria / be played
3- Increasingly larger trees

Question 8

Backward induction EXERCISES

Answer 8

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