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Experimental Economics > 7- Punishment & Cooperation > Flashcards

7- Punishment & Cooperation Flashcards

1
Q

How could results in Nikiforakis et al. (2012) be explored further?

A

replicate in other countries/ cultures

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2
Q

In Nikiforakis and Normann (2008):

Punishment ____ _____ with a damage/cost ratio of at least ___

Punishment ____ ____ with a damage/cost ratio greater than or equal to ____

A

sustains cooperation, 2:1

increases welfare, 3:1

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3
Q

Which paper investigates punishment using sanctions?

A

Fehr and Gächter (2000)

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4
Q

What does VCM stand for?

A

voluntary contribution mechanism

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5
Q

Which paper was published in 2000?

A

Fehr and Gachter

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6
Q

Name 2 things that normative conflict substantially increases. (Nikiforakis et al. (2012))

A

extent of counter punishment

likelihood that a feud erupts

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7
Q

Fehr and Gächter (2000) makes 2 assumptions. What are they?

A

Punishment is not credible since the game is finitely repeated

Punishment itself is a public good prone to free riding

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8
Q

Nikiforakis et al. (2012) finds that individuals favour normative rules that are ___ ___ ___ ___ ___

A

associated with greater personal gains

(low-return players were significantly more likely to believe that high-return players should contribute more than low-return players)

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9
Q

Which paper explores the hypothesis:

‘normative conflict enhances the likelihood of a feud in a public-good experiment’

A

Nikiforakis et al. (2012)

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10
Q

Describe the method used in Nikiforakis and Normann (2008).

A

5 treatments

no punishment + 4 levels of increasing punishment magnitude for same cost

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11
Q

Describe the two stages in Nikiforakis et al. (2012).

Stage 2 differs with each of the 3 treatments- what are they?

A

Stage 1: encryption task- used to make the feeling of unequal earnings more salient and normative conflict more intense

Stage 2: differs with treatment- (no feud, symmetric, asymmetric)

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12
Q

Which paper investigates communication?

A

Bochet et al. (2006)

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13
Q

Describe the design/method in Hopfensitz and Reuben (2009).

A

trust game with infinite rounds of punishment

2 periods

perfect stranger matching

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14
Q

To what extent does Cubitt et al. (2011) find a framing effect on beliefs about contributions?

A

only finds limited evidence

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15
Q

Why is enforcement of a cooperative norm more costly in Hopfensitz and Reuben (2009)?

A

anger triggers retaliatory behaviour by the punished individuals

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16
Q

From Bosman and van Winden (2002):

the probability of destroying income is ___ ___ to the intensity of experienced negative emotions

the probability of destroying income is ____ ____ to the take rate

the responder’s expectation of the take rate has __ ____ ____ on the probability of destroying income but not on ___ ___ ___ ____ ____

A

positively related

positively related

a significant effect

intensity of experienced emotion

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17
Q

Which paper was published in 2006?

A

Bochet et al.

18
Q

Which topic are you studying?

A

Punishment & Cooperation

19
Q

In Bosman and van Winden (2002), the game is followed up by a survey. Name 3 things this asked about.

A

Feelings regarding take rate

expectation of take rate

opinion of fair take rate

20
Q

When was Cubitt et al. published?

A

2011

21
Q

What does Bosman and van Winden (2002) investigate? Using what kind of game? How does this work?

A

Investigates role of expectations

using power-to-take game

Proposer/ responder earns money doing real task, proposer chooses take rate, responder chooses destruction rate (for both payoffs)

22
Q

When was Nikiforakis et al. published?

A

2012

23
Q

Describe 3 results from papers related to Bochet et al. (2006).

A

Making promises is very effective, even better than history

Calling on others’ kindness does not work

Video communication is also effective

24
Q

Contributions are ____ in the Asymmetric than in the No Feud treatment, but earnings are ___ ___ ___ between the two treatments. (Nikiforakis et al. (2012))

A

greater

not significantly different

25
Q

In Hopfensitz and Reuben (2009), what was measured before participants made decisions?

A

emotions

26
Q

In Hopfensitz and Reuben (2009):

second movers cooperate after being punished only if they ____ ____

There is considerable retaliation. Second movers retaliate because they are feel ____ and feel no ____ .

A

feel guilt

anger, guilt

27
Q

From Bosman and van Winden (2002), which emotions are the best predictors of destruction?

A

Anger-like emotions

28
Q

From Hopfensitz and Reuben (2009), what is required for punishment to be effective?

A

Punished subjects should switch to cooperation

Punished subjects should not punish back

29
Q

What does Fehr and Gächter (2000) find regarding

i) effect of punishment on contributions
ii) concentration of punishment

A

Punishment increases contributions (even among strangers)

Punishment is concentrated on low contributors (above avg contributors punish those who contribute below avg)

30
Q

In Cubitt et al. (2011), what is the effect of framing on the anger and guilt functions?

What about the punishment function?

A

anger: no
guilt: no
punishment: no (ceteris paribus)

31
Q

Which social emotion needs to be present for punishment to be an effective deterrent of uncooperative actions? How does it do this?

A

Guilt

Does this by limiting retaliation and therefore motivating cooperative behaviour in the future

32
Q

What effect does normative conflict have on earnings?

How is this reflected in the differences in earnings between different treatments in Nikiforakis et al. (2012)?

A

earnings are lower in the Asymmetric treatment than in the Symmetric treatment, despite similar contribution levels

33
Q

Nikiforakis et al. (2012) finds ___ ___ for the existence of ___ ___ in the experiment

A

strong evidence

normative conflict

34
Q

Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) examines the sensitivity of ____ on ____ .

A

sensitivity of effect of punishment to price changes

35
Q

Describe the 2 treatments in Fehr and Gächter (2000).

A

Standard VCM

VCM with punishment (can punish others with cost to yourself)

36
Q

What are the two stages of the experiment in Cubitt et al. (2011)?

A

1 contribution stage

2 punishment stage

37
Q

When was Bosman and van Winden published?

A

2002

38
Q

What do results from Bochet et al. (2006) suggest about i) face to face communication and ii) communication restrictions

A

Face to face communication dramatically increases cooperation

The effect of communication is eroded as it becomes more restricted

39
Q

Which paper was published in 2008?

A

Nikiforakis and Normann

40
Q

Which paper investigates the effect of social framing on experimental results?

A

Cubitt et al. (2011)

41
Q

Which paper was published in 2009?

A

Hopfensitz and Reuben

Experimental Economics (8 decks)

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