7- Punishment & Cooperation Flashcards
How could results in Nikiforakis et al. (2012) be explored further?
replicate in other countries/ cultures
In Nikiforakis and Normann (2008):
Punishment ____ _____ with a damage/cost ratio of at least ___
Punishment ____ ____ with a damage/cost ratio greater than or equal to ____
sustains cooperation, 2:1
increases welfare, 3:1
Which paper investigates punishment using sanctions?
Fehr and Gächter (2000)
What does VCM stand for?
voluntary contribution mechanism
Which paper was published in 2000?
Fehr and Gachter
Name 2 things that normative conflict substantially increases. (Nikiforakis et al. (2012))
extent of counter punishment
likelihood that a feud erupts
Fehr and Gächter (2000) makes 2 assumptions. What are they?
Punishment is not credible since the game is finitely repeated
Punishment itself is a public good prone to free riding
Nikiforakis et al. (2012) finds that individuals favour normative rules that are ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
associated with greater personal gains
(low-return players were significantly more likely to believe that high-return players should contribute more than low-return players)
Which paper explores the hypothesis:
‘normative conflict enhances the likelihood of a feud in a public-good experiment’
Nikiforakis et al. (2012)
Describe the method used in Nikiforakis and Normann (2008).
5 treatments
no punishment + 4 levels of increasing punishment magnitude for same cost
Describe the two stages in Nikiforakis et al. (2012).
Stage 2 differs with each of the 3 treatments- what are they?
Stage 1: encryption task- used to make the feeling of unequal earnings more salient and normative conflict more intense
Stage 2: differs with treatment- (no feud, symmetric, asymmetric)
Which paper investigates communication?
Bochet et al. (2006)
Describe the design/method in Hopfensitz and Reuben (2009).
trust game with infinite rounds of punishment
2 periods
perfect stranger matching
To what extent does Cubitt et al. (2011) find a framing effect on beliefs about contributions?
only finds limited evidence
Why is enforcement of a cooperative norm more costly in Hopfensitz and Reuben (2009)?
anger triggers retaliatory behaviour by the punished individuals
From Bosman and van Winden (2002):
the probability of destroying income is ___ ___ to the intensity of experienced negative emotions
the probability of destroying income is ____ ____ to the take rate
the responder’s expectation of the take rate has __ ____ ____ on the probability of destroying income but not on ___ ___ ___ ____ ____
positively related
positively related
a significant effect
intensity of experienced emotion
Which paper was published in 2006?
Bochet et al.
Which topic are you studying?
Punishment & Cooperation
In Bosman and van Winden (2002), the game is followed up by a survey. Name 3 things this asked about.
Feelings regarding take rate
expectation of take rate
opinion of fair take rate
When was Cubitt et al. published?
2011
What does Bosman and van Winden (2002) investigate? Using what kind of game? How does this work?
Investigates role of expectations
using power-to-take game
Proposer/ responder earns money doing real task, proposer chooses take rate, responder chooses destruction rate (for both payoffs)
When was Nikiforakis et al. published?
2012
Describe 3 results from papers related to Bochet et al. (2006).
Making promises is very effective, even better than history
Calling on others’ kindness does not work
Video communication is also effective
Contributions are ____ in the Asymmetric than in the No Feud treatment, but earnings are ___ ___ ___ between the two treatments. (Nikiforakis et al. (2012))
greater
not significantly different
