5 - Social Preferences & Public Good Games

Question 1

Which paper models based on dislike of differences between my income and the income of others?

Answer 1

Fehr and Schmidt (1999)

Question 2

When was Fischbacher and Gächter published?

Answer 2

2010

Question 3

Which paper looks at whether participants are unconditional or conditional cooperators?

Answer 3

Fischbacher and Gächter (2010)

Question 4

We look at 2 papers by Fehr and Schmidt, when were they published?

Answer 4

2006 (economist effect) and 1999 (dislike differences between my income and the income of others)

Question 5

What does Fehr and Schmidt (2006) and Bolt and Ockenfels (2000) tell us about punishment in public good games?

Answer 5

there are low contributions without punishment and high contributions with punishment

Question 6

Bolt and Ockenfels (2000) models based in dislike of differences between my income and ___?

Answer 6

mean income of others

Question 7

Result: The dislike of disadvantageous inequality is greater than the dislike of advantageous inequality

Answer 7

Fehr and Schmidt (2006)

Question 8

When was Falk et al. published?

Answer 8

2008

Question 9

Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) finds heterogeneity in types. Around how many % of participants were the following?:

conditional cooperators
selfish
‘hump-shape’ contributors
other

Answer 9

55% conditional cooperators
23% selfish
12% ‘hump-shape’ contributors
10% other

Question 10

Does Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) find much unconditional cooperation?

Answer 10

No

Question 11

Which paper was published in 1993?

Answer 11

Ledyard

Question 12

What subject are you studying just now?

Answer 12

Social Preferences & Public Good Games

Question 13

What does Fehr and Schmidt (2006) and Bolt and Ockenfels (2000) tell us about the ultimatum game with competition?

Answer 13

Subjects “accept” more inequity

so the standard prediction prevails

Question 14

Which paper asks ‘Do fair-minded people respond to fair or unfair intentions, or do they respond solely to fair or unfair outcomes?’

Answer 14

Falk et al. (2008)

Question 15

What is the key finding in Falk et al. (2008)?

Which papers’ findings does this contradict?

Answer 15

Intentions matter in terms of both positive and negative reciprocity

Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)

Question 16

Describe the 2 treatments in Falk et al. (2008)

Answer 16

1 intention treatment: player A chooses their initial action

2 non-intention treatment: A doesn’t choose their initial action

Question 17

Which paper uses a version of the Moonlighting game from Abbink et al. (2000)? How many stages do participants go through?

Answer 17

Falk et al. (2008)

2 stages

Question 18

What is investigated in Ledyard (1993)?

Answer 18

Theories in public goods games vs experimental observations

Question 19

What are the two theories that experiments address in Ledyard (1993)?

What do these experiments show?

Answer 19

1 (free rider prediction): individual self-interest at odds with group interest- contribute noting

2 (Sociologic-psychologic prediction): no conflict due to altruism, social norms or group identification

Typically 40%-60% of the group optimal is contributed implying that there is somewhat of a freerider effect.