5: Some fundamentals about Democratic Decision-making Flashcards
Arrow’s theorem
under no circumstances is there a group preference ordering that could sensibly be called the public interest
Arrow’s theorem is not telling us things always go wrong but there is no guarantee that things go well
in a specific framework, it is impossible to find a social welfare function which simultaneously satisfies all conditions: universal domain, independence of irrelative alternatives, non-dictatorship, transitivity and unanimity
institutional trilemma between stable outcomes, universal admissibility and non-dictatorship
shows that even when individuals are rational, a group might not be
conditions of Arrow’s theorem: universal domain
aggregation rule has to satisfy normative criteria for all possible collections of alternatives and rational individual preferences
voting must account for all individual preferences
all choices are equal - violated with unbalanced choices
conditions of Arrow’s theorem: independence of irrelevant alternatives
kind of basic coherence/consistency
one should not be able to manipulate social preference by introducing new alternatives
e.g. IIA is violated if an election’s winning candidate would have won if the losing candidate was taken out
conditions of Arrow’s theorem: non-dictatorship
wishes of multiple voters should be taken into consideration
conditions of Arrow’s theorem: unanimity
if every individual in society prefers X to Y, then social preference should be X to Y
basic standard of aggregation rule to represent views of individuals in society
conditions of Arrow’s theorem: transitivity
if X is preferred to Y, and Y is preferred to Z, then X is preferred to Z
4 functions of elections
- aggregate and represent voters’ conflicting preferences - use vote as a means to come to a decision
- aggregate dispersed information about the correct political decisions
- different pieces of information as to how to effectively put into place policy changes to achieve a particular goal - address an adverse selection problem by allowing the citizens to select the most competent individuals for public office
- provide a mechanism to control moral hazard, by holding elected officials accountable to the citizens
Borda count aggregation
give each preference a number of points
e.g. max number of points for the alternative you like the most, that -1 for the next best alternative, etc.
median voter theorem
50% of the population below that voter and 50% of the population above them
in some ways, can be the ‘deciding’ vote in an election