11: Groups and Interests

Question 1

why studying the effects of lobbying is difficult

Answer 1

lobbying is the attempt by organised interest groups to influence the decisions of public officials (government, legislator, regulatory agencies)

to fully study the causal effect of the interest group on the policy chosen, we need information about the policy chosen without lobbying (we cannot always observe this since lobbying always takes place), the policy actually chosen and what the interest group really wants/demands from politicians (you sometimes ask for more than what you want in bargaining so this is difficult to observe and varies between interest groups)

even if you have data on the policy chosen and on the policy chosen without lobbying - cannot necessarily conclude that the impact of the policy resulted from lobbying (if the interest group and politicians simply agree that it’s the right policy, it’s not lobbying that motivates the politician)

multiple channels of political influence (e.g. swing state)

endogenous selection into the lobbying process (whether interest groups believe that their lobbying can be impactful since if they do not, they are likely not to lobby)

Question 2

idea that there is so little money in politics is the right question

Answer 2

idea of how important money is compared to votes or information

reasonable question to ask since a prominent perspective on lobbying is that lobbies buy politicians

Question 3

why is there so little money in politics?

Answer 3

Tullock’s paradox - we expect much more money in politics since the main idea is that essentially, interest groups are able to give money to politicians by bribing them and this to some extent influences policy

typically, the people who give money are the people who do not have much influence who want to gain power

the most powerful do not have to show off their power as much as you think to exert influence

essentially, votes are not directly and automatically tied to money, and votes are a bigger means on politicians than money

Question 4

informational lobbying (paper by Hirsch et al.)

Answer 4

argument that a lobbyist’s value drives from their ability to selectively screen clients brought to a politician, thereby earning the politician’s trust and preferential treatment for his clients

presence of lobbying contact is more likely for lobbyists that are more ideologically aligned with politicians

typically, politicians have little time and do not want to meet with interest groups so the lobbyist who knows the ideology of the politician can find what interest groups will be interesting for the politician to talk to

if you’re tightly connected in ideology, you bring fewer clients but they have higher value

lobbyist provides politician with someone they really want to talk to