3.2 - Power in the Asia-Pacific

Question 1

National Interest + 4 Elements

Answer 1

Used as an all-embracing concept to justify policy preferences and actions, and includes the goals or objectives of foreign policy

4 Elements:
* Economic prosperity
* Regional relationships
* International standing
* National security

Question 2

Idealism

Answer 2

School of thought in which foreign policy is influenced above all else by moral principle, as opposed to practical and pragmatic considerations

Question 3

Pragmatism

Answer 3

School of thought in which foreign policy is influence above all else by practical and pragmatic considerations, as opposed to moral principles

Question 4

Chinese Dream

Answer 4

• Two One Hundreds – moderately well-off society by 2021 (including a doubling of GDP per capita and 70% urbanisation), and be a fully developed nation by 2049
• 4 key pillars – strong China, civilised China, harmonious China, beautiful China

Question 5

Chinese National Security Interests

Answer 5

• Protection of borders
• Maintaining territorial integrity
• Creation of a socialist harmonious society
• Securing its sovereign territory
• Maintaining CCP rule

Question 6

Chinese Economic Prosperity Interests

Answer 6

• Double GDP per capita by 2021 - moderately well off by 2021
• Creation of socialist harmonious society
• Fully developed by 2049
• Shift from a production economy to a consumer economy
• Urbanisation
• Continued economic growth

Question 7

Chinese Regional Relationships Interests

Answer 7

• Peaceful rise
• Desire to be a regional hegemon
• Friendly relationships
• Power projection in the region

Question 8

Chinese International Standing Interests

Answer 8

• Responsible, great power
• Challenge US dominance as only superpower
• Leader in South - South Development

Question 9

Factors Shaping China’s National Interest

Answer 9

• State formation as a one party state
• Cultural and ethnic identity
• Ideology as ‘communist’
• History, including past humiliations and distrust of Japan
• International relationships, including global anti-China sentiment
• Security issues:
  o Domestic stability from rising middle class and ethnic minorities
  o Economy, due to aging population, income disparity and slowing global growth
  o Environment, with pollution
  o Sovereignty, due to claims in South and East China Seas and Taiwan
  o Global stability, due to Russia and North Korea as allies
  o Dependence on trade - food and fuel

Question 10

Interpretations of National Security

Answer 10

One China:
* Believe that territorial integrity is essential to the national security of China
* Held by CCP
* Therefore, China must defend any threats to sovereignty over disputed territory, without concessions or compromise, leading to increased militarisation

Taiwanese Independence:
* Believe that Taiwan is an independent state
* Held by Democratic Progressive Party of Taiwan
* Rationale – Taiwan has a separate national identity and has been quasi-independent since 1949
* Therefore, China should cease all sovereignty claims and military threats

Rejection of Chinese South China Sea Claims:
* Believe that South China Sea is international waters
* Held by USA, Australia and others
* Rationale – UNCLOS definition of 12nm of state territory and 200nm Exclusive Economic Zone
* Therefore, US Navy carries out freedom of navigation operations

Question 11

Interpretations of Economic Prosperity

Answer 11

Common Prosperity:
* Believe in income redistribution and increased government control over economy
* Held by Xi Jinping
* Rationale – widening income and wealth divide
* Therefore, has led to a greater state role in the economy and increased regulation, taxation and limits to the ability for foreign enterprises to compete

Market Capitalism:
* Believe in greater role of market and private business
* Held by Liu He
* Rationale – private sector contributes to 50% of tax revenue, 60% of GDP, 70% of innovation, and 80% of urban employment; and that state owned enterprises are inefficient
* Therefore, aim to continue opening of economy

Question 12

Interpretations of Regional Relationships

Answer 12

Support North Korea at All Costs:
* Held by left faction of CCP
* Rationale – ideology and geopolitics; prevent isolation of North Korea by USA, South Korea and Japan
* Therefore, China should shield North Korea from international criticism and continue to trade

Abandon North Korea:
* Held by Zhao Lingman
* Rationale – North Korea has become ‘negative equity’ and a ‘liability’ for China, and has prevented China from building positive international relations
* Therefore, China should support sanctions on North Korea

Question 13

Interpretations of International Standing

Answer 13

Hide Strength, Bide Time:
o Involves China seeking a ‘peaceful rise’ and cooperating with the US, as well as becoming an important trade partner
o Traditional view that was held by Deng Xiaoping
o Rationale – enable economic development

Peace Through Strength - Major Country Diplomacy:
o China should challenge US position as the only superpower, in order to enable Chinese growth
o Held by Xi Jinping
o Rationale – promote national aspirations
o Therefore, China should continue BRI, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and Wolf Warrior Diplomacy

Question 14

China Having Economic Power

Answer 14

• 1st in the world for GDP
• Economic growth = 8.1% (2021), which is the 38th highest in the world
• Budget deficit of 3.8% of GDP, which is 152nd highest in the world
• Public debt is 111th highest in the world
• 1st in the world for exports
• 2nd in the world for imports
• Trade surplus
• Diversity in import partners
• Largest foreign exchange and gold reserves in the world
• Ranked 1st for economic relationships
• Ranked 2nd for economic capability and future resources
• Reliance on China for trade
  o 68% of North Korean imports and exports to China
  o 57% of Mongolian imports and exports to China
  o 36% of Australian imports and exports to China
  o 28% of South Korean imports and exports to China
  o 27% of Japanese imports and exports to China
  o 16% of US imports and exports to China
  o Compared to US – highest is Vietnam with 17% of imports and exports to US

Question 15

China Lacking Economic Power

Answer 15

• 99th in the world for GDP per capita
• Economic growth has been declining over time
• GINI coefficient = 0.38 – Higher than Australia and most of Europe
• Ranked 26th for demographic resources
• Rising public debt
• Unemployment rate = 4.8% (2021)
• 0.6% of population below poverty line

Question 16

China Holding Military Power

Answer 16

• Increased funding: 6.6% (2020); 6.8% (2021); 7.1% (2022); and 7.2% (2023)
• $200bn for weapons development
• 2m active troops – largest army in the world
• PLA Navy is the largest in Asia with >340 ships
• 150 intercontinental ballistic missiles
• Largest air force in Asia

Question 17

China Lacking Military Power

Answer 17

• Chinese military funding is only ¼ of the US’
• 1/3 of troops are conscripts
• China only have 2 aircraft carriers, vs US’s 11
• China have 32 destroyers vs US’s 83
• Ranked 2nd for military capability, after the US
• 3rd largest air force in the world, with 2,800 aircraft

Question 18

China Holding Political Power

Answer 18

• One party state → no credible domestic threat to power and no need to compromise
• Xi Jinping has greatly increased his power through:
  o Removal of Presidential term limits
  o Replacement of Li Keqiang with a Xi supporter
  o Enshrinement of Xi Jinping Thought in the Constitution
• Censorship has allowed the CCP to maintain control of information
• CCP controls all media outlets

Question 19

China Lacking Political Power

Answer 19

• Some growing dissent and protest

Question 20

China Holding Diplomatic Power

Answer 20

• Veto power in UN
• IMF voting power increased from 3.8% in 2010 to 6.2% in 2015
• Member of G20, APEC, WTO and ASEAN
• More diplomatic posts than any other state – 276 posts, which is 3 more than the US
• Ranked 2nd for Diplomatic Influence in Lowy Institute Asia Power Index
  o 1st for diplomatic network
  2nd for multilateral power

Question 21

China Lacking Diplomatic Power

Answer 21

• Ranked 4th in the world for foreign policy
• 13 states still recognise Taiwan

Question 22

China Holding Cultural Power

Answer 22

• 530 Confucius Institutes, which promote Chinese culture and language to university students
• Chinese Central TV has broadcast in English, French, Spanish, Arabic, Russian and Chinese since 2008
• 3rd most international students in the world – 440k, which is a 35% increase since 2012

Question 23

China Lacking Cultural Power

Answer 23

• Ranked 27/30 in Soft Power 30 index

Question 24

Hard Power

Answer 24

• Power exercised through coercion or threatened acts of coercion, to influence the actions of other global actors

Question 25

Soft Power

Answer 25

• Ability to shape actions of other global actors through diplomacy, culture, policies and history
• Use attraction rather than coercion

Question 26

Panda Diplomacy

Answer 26

• Form of soft power
• China gives pandas to states which it seeks constructive relations – signifies long term trust
  o Often given following trade deals with China
• States must accept the One China policy to receive pandas
• 42 pandas in 12 countries (2015) to 70 pandas in 20 countries (2017)
• Heads of state must request a panda
• Names of pandas are always symbolic
• Pandas are given on a loan, with a yearly fee (1m Euros pa. for Germany)
• China are able to recall pandas in the event that another state is seen to threaten or insult China
  o For example, the 2 of the US’s pandas have been recalled due to Trump’s response to COVID 19
• Impacts:
  o Improved international standing and regional relationships
  o Support for One China → national security
  o Many recipients are key trading partners → economic prosperity

Question 27

Wolf Warrior Diplomacy

Answer 27

• Confrontive and combative approach, with loud denouncements of criticism of China
• Has occurred following introduction of an incentive for Chinese diplomats to be active on social media and make controversial interviews
• China has claimed that this is a necessary response to Western diplomats’ social media presence
• Examples:
  o Sweden – China made military and economic sanction threats and threatened a journalist
  o Australia – China digitally created an image with an Australian solider cutting the throat of a child
  o Canada – Fmr Ambassador Lu Shaye labelled Canadian media as ‘Western egotism and white supremacy’
  o 2020 Olympics, where Taiwan was not introduced as Chinese Taipei, and a NBC map did not show China as including Taiwan
• Impacts:
  o Pew Research: 78% of people in Western states have not much or no confidence in China’s leadership to do the right thing
  o Exacerbated tensions with the UK, Canada and Australia
  o Japan and South Korea have sought closer relations with the US
  o The EU has adopted a more sceptical view of China
  o Domestic increase in support for Chinese leadership and nationalism
  o Ultimately, has reduced China’s international standing and regional relationships

Question 28

China’s Goals for Korean Peninsula

Answer 28

• Want to maintain North Korea as a buffer between China and democratic South Korea – SK has 29k US troops stationed there
• Wants to avoid conflict – conflict would lead to China becoming involved
• Want to prevent collapse of NK as this would lead to refugees spilling into China
• Prefer NK to not have nuclear weapons
• Instability in Korea could spill into mainland China and affect domestic population
• Maintain SK as a key trading partner

Question 29

China’s Relationship with North Korea

Answer 29

• China is NK’s:
  o Most important trading partner – 90% of NK’s trade volume
  o Most important ally
  o Main source of food, arms and energy
• Perception in the West that China is vital to addressing NK

Question 30

China’s Use of Diplomacy with North Korea

Answer 30

• Mar 2016 – co-drafted expanded UNSC sanctions
• Mar 2018 – Xi and Kim meet for first time, but unofficially
• May and June 2018 – Xi meets Kim again following Kim’s meetings with Moon and Trump
• June 2019 – Xi’s first visit to NK
• Mar 2021 – pledge to strengthen relationship and claims it is ‘common treasure’
• July 2021 – renew Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance for 20 years

Question 31

China’s Use of Trade with North Korea

Answer 31

• Feb 2017 – ban on coal imports from NK
• Aug 2017 – ban on coal, iron, lead and seafood exports
• Sep 2017 – limit crude oil imports; ban joint ventures, textile and natural gas exports, and NKs working overseas
• Jan 2018 – ban steel exports
• Apr 2020 – discovery that China had increased trade of oil and coal in 2019

Question 32

China’s Relationship with South Korea

Answer 32

• 2004 – China becomes SK’s largest trading partner
• 2014 – Xi visits SK
• Sep 2015 – Park attends military parade at Tiananmen Square
• Dec 2015 – SK signs FTA with China

Question 33

THAAD and South Korea

Answer 33

• A US anti missile system
• Jul 2016 – announced that it would be deployed in SK
• China warned that deployment of THAAD would destroy relationship, as they believed that it would undermine China’s attempts for denuclearisation
• Sep 2016 – Park and Xi agree for a healthy bilateral arrangement
• Mar 2017 – arrival of THAAD → China calls for boycott of SK goods and travel
  o Boycott on tourism - $6.8bn impact on economy
  o Hyundai sales fell 52%
• Oct 2017 – new president Moon announces and agrees to 3 nos:
  o SK will not join US missile defence systems
  o SK will not become a member of a SK – US – Japan alliance
  o Freeze on deployment of THAAD
• Dec 2017 – pledge ‘new era’ of bilateral relations, to ensure peace and security on the Korean peninsula

Question 34

China’s Position with Taiwan

Answer 34

• Ideal – reunification
• If this can’t be achieved, then they want to make Taiwan dependant on China so that reunification is more likely and independence is less likely
• Does not want Taiwan to gain independence or international recognition
• Need to maintain trade with Taiwan for semiconductors
• Official position: there is only one China and Taiwan is part of it – therefore Taiwan is a renegade province
• Taiwan is an internal problem for China to resolve
• Under 1992 Consensus, they believe that there is only one China and they control it

Question 35

China - Taiwan Trade Relationship

Answer 35

• China is Taiwan’s #1 export market = $156bn in 2020 (44% of all exports)
• Taiwan is China’s #7 export market
• Taiwan investment into China valued at $188bn from 1991-2020
• Trade relationship not immune to difficulty – eg. ban on 40Mt of pineapples from Taiwan
• 100,000 businesspeople from Taiwan in China
• 2700 investment programs into Taiwan from China
• Taiwanese businesses remain deeply embedded in Chinese economy
• US restrictions on semiconductors → increased China’s reliance on Taiwan
• Economic interdependence → reunification more likely and economic prosperity promoted, and reduces threat of conflict

Question 36

China’s Use of Military in Taiwan

Answer 36

• Deployment of 1600 ballistic missiles and 400k personnel along Taiwan Strait
• Continual developments to military technology and equipment, especially for amphibious operations
• Live-fire drills, mock attacks and landing operations → advertise capabilities and send warning to Taiwan
• 2021 – 950 incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ (double from 2020)
• Near-continuous military operations as a threat to Taiwan
• Claims that military threats are essential for making political progress, and preventing moves toward Taiwanese independence
• Cyberattacks on at least 10 Taiwanese Government agencies
• China held largest ever show of military force following visit from Pelosi
• China maintains option of maritime blockade against Taiwan
• Aims:
  o Beijing attempt to reclaim control over Taiwan
  o Distract from domestic issues, and able to unite Chinese population
  o Psychological warfare – make Taiwan believe that there is no choice other than to join China

Question 37

China’s Use of Diplomacy in Taiwan

Answer 37

• Following election of Tsai, China halted official diplomatic relations with Taiwan = part of isolationist strategy
• 9 states have switched recognition of sovereignty from Taiwan to PRC after 2016 → allowed KMT to challenge DPP
• Taiwanese loss of diplomatic relations → reduce legitimacy and prevent Taiwan from engaging with other nations through trade agreements or cooperation initiatives → increased reliance on China
• China now engaged in multilateral relations with Latin America, such as with CELAC
• China has prevented Taiwan from entering international organisations, such as INTERPOL, WHO and ICAO

Question 38

China’s Use of Aid in Taiwan

Answer 38

• Engaged in chequebook diplomacy to encourage states to switch recognition of sovereignty, including:
  o Offering of airplanes, ferries and funds to Kiribati
  o Promise of assistance in tourism, infrastructure, agriculture and BRI for The Gambia
  o $210m for Sao Tome and Principe
  o $3.1bn and increased trade for Dominican Republic
• Chinese direct investment into Latin America has increased significantly over the last decade – region of strategic important for US
• Taiwan is no longer able to out-bid China on providing resources, technology, weapons and aid

Question 39

US Involvement in Taiwan

Answer 39

• Taiwan’s state as a democracy is critical for US interests
• However, trade with Taiwan is overshadowed by China, with Taiwan being the US’s 10th largest trading partner and China being the US’s largest
• China’s more aggressive foreign policy has forced the US to take a position that is closer to Taiwan
• US have provided military support:
  o 2020 – $5.1bn in arms
  o 2021 – $750m in arms
  o 2022 – developments to improving missile defence
• China have imposed sanctions on Lockheed Martin and other US companies involved in the arms trade with Taiwan
• Biden invited Taiwan to Summit for Democracy; however, were not willing to allow Taiwan to suggest their independence
• China has warned that they could face military conflict with the US over Taiwan
• US delegation visit to Taiwan was denounced by China
• US wish to maintain status quo – no independence for Taiwan, neither forced unification
• Sept 2022 – Biden abandons policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ – now are clear in response of force to China attacks on Taiwan → US gain support from Taiwan

Question 40

China’s Use of Diplomacy in Japan

Answer 40

• Nov 2014 – Xi and Abe meet → 4 point agreement to improve diplomatic and security ties
• April 2018 – first high level talks in 8 years
• Wolf Warrior approach following Japanese and US condemnation of China’s activities in South China Sea, Taiwan, Xinjiang and Hong Kong

Question 41

China’s Use of Trade in Japan

Answer 41

• China is Japan’s largest trading partner; Japan is China’s 2nd largest trading partner
• 2019 - $2.6bn of business deals, currency swap deal

Question 42

China’s Use of Aid in Japan

Answer 42

• Japan provided China with 3m face masks and $6.3m in funds
• China responded by donating 12.5k RATs

Question 43

China’s Use of Military in Japan

Answer 43

• China allowed coast guard vessels to use weapons and manage foreign vessels → increased activity in Senkaku Islands
• Increased militarisation in Taiwan and support for Russia → declining Japanese support (Dec 2021) and increased military spending – National Security Strategy
  o Largest military build up since WWII
  o Security deals with UK, India and Italy
  o 2022 spending doubled by 2027

Question 44

China’s Use of Military in South China Sea

Answer 44

• 2013 – Island building campaign begins
• 2016 – Deployment of surface to air missiles
• 2018 – Beginning of monthly military drills, with up to 40 vessels; aircraft carrier deployed; nuclear strike capable bombers
• 2020 – Chinese Coast Guard sinks Vietnamese fishing boat; new administrative districts for South China Sea islands
• 2021 – Three days of military exercises conducted in Sea; 200 vessels moored at Whitsun Reef, Philippines
• 2022 – anti ship and anti aircraft missile systems installed; laser and jamming equipment installed; grey zone tactics – intercepted Australian plane and forced US plane to take evasive measures

Question 45

China’s Use of Diplomacy in South China Sea

Answer 45

• Oct 2016 – New Filipino President, Duterte, visits China and announces separation from US and realignment with China  signing of $13.5bn in China to Philippine investment deals and Duterte calls for all US soldiers to leave within 2 years
• Nov 2016 – Malaysian PM Razak visits China and agrees for naval cooperation
• Dec 2016 – Duterte announces that result from UNCLOS in favour of Philippines would be set aside as he does not want to impose on China
• Apr 2017 – Duterte cancels visit to island in South China Sea, in line with advice from China
• May 2017 – ASEAN drops mention of South China Sea
• 2018 – Xi visits Philippines and calls for freedom of navigation over South China Sea in line with International Law
• Apr 2019 – Duterte warns that he would send troops on a ‘suicide mission’ if China continues to send ships
• Feb 2020 – Duterte announces that he will end US access to the Philippines for military purposes in 6 months
• Sep 2020 – Duterte reaffirms support to UNCLOS decision
• May 2021 – Duterte threatens to ignore UNCLOS decision
• Aug 2021 – Duterte cancels his ending of US military access
• Jun 2022 – New Philippines President Marcos takes a much stronger stance against China and strengthens ties with US, Japan and Australia
• Mar 2023 – expanded US access to Philippine military bases

Question 46

US Response to South China Sea

Answer 46

• Apr 2014 – signing of 10 year deal with Philippine military → join training and access to bases
• Oct 2015 – beginning of US freedom of navigation campaigns
• Mar 2018 – introduction of aircraft carrier; US – Japan joint exercises
• Sept 2018 – UK joins freedom of navigation campaigns; near miss between US and Chinese vessels
• Nov 2019 – US condemn China at ASEAN summit
• Jul 2020 – Australia rejects China’s maritime claims
• Aug 2020 – US place sanctions on 24 Chinese businesses involved in artificial island building campaign

Question 47

Aid

Answer 47

Economic, technological or military assistance given by one state to another for purposes of relief and rehabilitation, economic stabilisation or for mutual defence

Question 48

China’s Use of Aid in Asia-Pacific
(General)

Answer 48

• Provided $1.6bn in aid between 2013-18
• 3rd largest donor in A-P, behind Australia and US, but have overtaken Japan
• China has recently dropped behind New Zealand
• 80% of aid provided in the form of concessional loans, vs 20% as grants
• 42% of aid to transport projects → provides opportunity for Chinese construction firms to gain a foothold in the region
• Have provided scholarships and human resources training
• However, China spends 20% of what it promises – committed to $5bn in 2017 but only spent $200m
• China has been accused of building useless projects and creating debt trap diplomacy → reduce China’s international standing
• Aid has been broadly welcomed by recipients

Question 49

China’s Use of Aid in Vanuatu

Answer 49

• $243m of aid given
• 84% of Chinese aid given as concessional loans
• 73% of Chinse aid given for transport projects
• China is the 2nd largest donor to Vanuatu, behind Australia
• Chinese aid has paid for a new parliamentary building, a new PM’s office, a major sports stadium, a new finance and foreign ministry building and a new convention centre
• Vanuatu’s debt is expected to rise from 33% of GDP to 60%, with half of it being owed to China
• Concern exists that a new wharf being funded by China will end up being used as a military base, due to the current lack of capacity constraints for shipping – this has been rejected by both China and Vanuatu

Question 50

Belt and Road Initiative

Answer 50

• Announced at the end of 2013; expected to be completed by 2049
• Involves 138 states, accounting for 40% of the world’s GDP and 63% of its population
• Approx. 1600 projects, equal to $1.5tr infrastructure project to connect China’s less developed border regions to neighbouring countries
• Connects China to Europe through Central Asia via land
• Connects China to South East Asia, Africa and Europe via sea
• Funding provided through loans
• Written into the Constitution in 2017
• Shift of focus after 2020 – toward a ‘health’, ‘green’ and ‘digital’ Silk Road

Question 51

Reasons for Introduction of Belt and Road Initiative

Answer 51

• Economic:
  o Overproduction (especially in the steel industry, which raised production 300m tonnes between 2008-15) due to stimulus following GFC → needed to find new markets to sell
  o Stimulus → increased public debt and reduced profits
  o Xi laid off 1.8m workers in coal and steel industries due to overproduction
  o Aims to relocate low end manufacturing to other less developed countries → supports goal of creating a high-tech economy
• Domestic Dissent:
  o Inequality between eastern seaboard and inland regions – Shanghai x5 wealthier than Gansu
  o Want to integrate inland regions into economy to increase their role – share of GDP only increased 1.6% from 2000-10 with large injections of money
  o Belief that poverty → militancy so higher economic activity would reduce the terrorist threat
• Geostrategic:
  o Desire for China to centre themselves in regional relationships
  o BRI used as a tool to counter the Pivot to Asia
  o China aims to make states economically dependant on it

Question 52

Effectiveness of Belt and Road Initiative

Effectiveness + Ineffectiveness

Answer 52

• Effectiveness of BRI limited due to:
  o Lack of trust between China and BRI states
  o 2/3rds of BRI states have credit ratings below investable grade
  o Some Chinese banks are concerned about the feasibility of projects and rising debt levels
• However, the BRI has been successful:
  o Increase in Chinese companies in Forbes 500 from 10 in 200 to 119 in 2019, which is now only 2 less than the USA
  o Has led to Philippines and Cambodia reassessing their ties with the USA

Question 53

Attempts to Increase Soft Power

Answer 53

• Student exchanges – China is now the top destination, with 440k students from 205 states (2016)
• Expansion of Confucius Institutes – 541 in the world
  o However, these have been seen as propaganda due to not discussing topics including Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan
  o These have also been involved in intelligence gathering and military research
• Expansion of media reach – Xinhua has 170 foreign bureaus and CGTV broadcasts in 6 languages
• 16% of all scholarships to African students are from Chinese government → 80k African students in China (2018) from only 2k in 2003
• Forum on China – Africa Cooperation is one of the largest meetings of African leaders and showcases China’s development model
• 58 radio stations in 35 countries covertly broadcast Chinese Radio International content
• China Daily published in >30 respected foreign publications → invested $20.8m in USA since 2017
• China Public Diplomacy Association ais to train 500 Latin American and 1000 African journalists by 2050
• CUSEF have taken 127 US journalists to China

Question 54

Effectiveness of Soft Power

Answer 54

• Most unfavourable views of China ever in USA, Canada, Germany and South Korea
• Unfavourable views of China in UK have doubled since 2013 to 63%, and in Australia from 35% to 78%
• Increased views that positive economic ties with the USA are more important than with China:
  o 27% (2015) → 59% (2021) in Australia
  o 70% (2015) → 81% (2021) in Japan
  o 39% (2015) → 75% (2021) in South Korea
• 80% in New Zealand and 78% in Australia prefer to promote human rights over economic ties with China