3.2 - Power in the Asia-Pacific Flashcards
1
Q
National Interest + 4 Elements
A
Used as an all-embracing concept to justify policy preferences and actions, and includes the goals or objectives of foreign policy
4 Elements:
* Economic prosperity
* Regional relationships
* International standing
* National security
2
Q
Idealism
A
School of thought in which foreign policy is influenced above all else by moral principle, as opposed to practical and pragmatic considerations
3
Q
Pragmatism
A
School of thought in which foreign policy is influence above all else by practical and pragmatic considerations, as opposed to moral principles
4
Q
Chinese Dream
A
- Two One Hundreds – moderately well-off society by 2021 (including a doubling of GDP per capita and 70% urbanisation), and be a fully developed nation by 2049
- 4 key pillars – strong China, civilised China, harmonious China, beautiful China
5
Q
Chinese National Security Interests
A
- Protection of borders
- Maintaining territorial integrity
- Creation of a socialist harmonious society
- Securing its sovereign territory
- Maintaining CCP rule
6
Q
Chinese Economic Prosperity Interests
A
- Double GDP per capita by 2021 - moderately well off by 2021
- Creation of socialist harmonious society
- Fully developed by 2049
- Shift from a production economy to a consumer economy
- Urbanisation
- Continued economic growth
7
Q
Chinese Regional Relationships Interests
A
- Peaceful rise
- Desire to be a regional hegemon
- Friendly relationships
- Power projection in the region
8
Q
Chinese International Standing Interests
A
- Responsible, great power
- Challenge US dominance as only superpower
- Leader in South - South Development
9
Q
Factors Shaping China’s National Interest
A
- State formation as a one party state
- Cultural and ethnic identity
- Ideology as ‘communist’
- History, including past humiliations and distrust of Japan
- International relationships, including global anti-China sentiment
- Security issues:
o Domestic stability from rising middle class and ethnic minorities
o Economy, due to aging population, income disparity and slowing global growth
o Environment, with pollution
o Sovereignty, due to claims in South and East China Seas and Taiwan
o Global stability, due to Russia and North Korea as allies
o Dependence on trade - food and fuel
10
Q
Interpretations of National Security
A
One China:
* Believe that territorial integrity is essential to the national security of China
* Held by CCP
* Therefore, China must defend any threats to sovereignty over disputed territory, without concessions or compromise, leading to increased militarisation
Taiwanese Independence:
* Believe that Taiwan is an independent state
* Held by Democratic Progressive Party of Taiwan
* Rationale – Taiwan has a separate national identity and has been quasi-independent since 1949
* Therefore, China should cease all sovereignty claims and military threats
Rejection of Chinese South China Sea Claims:
* Believe that South China Sea is international waters
* Held by USA, Australia and others
* Rationale – UNCLOS definition of 12nm of state territory and 200nm Exclusive Economic Zone
* Therefore, US Navy carries out freedom of navigation operations
11
Q
Interpretations of Economic Prosperity
A
Common Prosperity:
* Believe in income redistribution and increased government control over economy
* Held by Xi Jinping
* Rationale – widening income and wealth divide
* Therefore, has led to a greater state role in the economy and increased regulation, taxation and limits to the ability for foreign enterprises to compete
Market Capitalism:
* Believe in greater role of market and private business
* Held by Liu He
* Rationale – private sector contributes to 50% of tax revenue, 60% of GDP, 70% of innovation, and 80% of urban employment; and that state owned enterprises are inefficient
* Therefore, aim to continue opening of economy
12
Q
Interpretations of Regional Relationships
A
Support North Korea at All Costs:
* Held by left faction of CCP
* Rationale – ideology and geopolitics; prevent isolation of North Korea by USA, South Korea and Japan
* Therefore, China should shield North Korea from international criticism and continue to trade
Abandon North Korea:
* Held by Zhao Lingman
* Rationale – North Korea has become ‘negative equity’ and a ‘liability’ for China, and has prevented China from building positive international relations
* Therefore, China should support sanctions on North Korea
13
Q
Interpretations of International Standing
A
Hide Strength, Bide Time:
o Involves China seeking a ‘peaceful rise’ and cooperating with the US, as well as becoming an important trade partner
o Traditional view that was held by Deng Xiaoping
o Rationale – enable economic development
Peace Through Strength - Major Country Diplomacy:
o China should challenge US position as the only superpower, in order to enable Chinese growth
o Held by Xi Jinping
o Rationale – promote national aspirations
o Therefore, China should continue BRI, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and Wolf Warrior Diplomacy
14
Q
China Having Economic Power
A
- 1st in the world for GDP
- Economic growth = 8.1% (2021), which is the 38th highest in the world
- Budget deficit of 3.8% of GDP, which is 152nd highest in the world
- Public debt is 111th highest in the world
- 1st in the world for exports
- 2nd in the world for imports
- Trade surplus
- Diversity in import partners
- Largest foreign exchange and gold reserves in the world
- Ranked 1st for economic relationships
- Ranked 2nd for economic capability and future resources
- Reliance on China for trade
o 68% of North Korean imports and exports to China
o 57% of Mongolian imports and exports to China
o 36% of Australian imports and exports to China
o 28% of South Korean imports and exports to China
o 27% of Japanese imports and exports to China
o 16% of US imports and exports to China
o Compared to US – highest is Vietnam with 17% of imports and exports to US
15
Q
China Lacking Economic Power
A
- 99th in the world for GDP per capita
- Economic growth has been declining over time
- GINI coefficient = 0.38 – Higher than Australia and most of Europe
- Ranked 26th for demographic resources
- Rising public debt
- Unemployment rate = 4.8% (2021)
- 0.6% of population below poverty line
16
Q
China Holding Military Power
A
- Increased funding: 6.6% (2020); 6.8% (2021); 7.1% (2022); and 7.2% (2023)
- $200bn for weapons development
- 2m active troops – largest army in the world
- PLA Navy is the largest in Asia with >340 ships
- 150 intercontinental ballistic missiles
- Largest air force in Asia
17
Q
China Lacking Military Power
A
- Chinese military funding is only ¼ of the US’
- 1/3 of troops are conscripts
- China only have 2 aircraft carriers, vs US’s 11
- China have 32 destroyers vs US’s 83
- Ranked 2nd for military capability, after the US
- 3rd largest air force in the world, with 2,800 aircraft
18
Q
China Holding Political Power
A
- One party state → no credible domestic threat to power and no need to compromise
- Xi Jinping has greatly increased his power through:
o Removal of Presidential term limits
o Replacement of Li Keqiang with a Xi supporter
o Enshrinement of Xi Jinping Thought in the Constitution - Censorship has allowed the CCP to maintain control of information
- CCP controls all media outlets
19
Q
China Lacking Political Power
A
- Some growing dissent and protest
20
Q
China Holding Diplomatic Power
A
- Veto power in UN
- IMF voting power increased from 3.8% in 2010 to 6.2% in 2015
- Member of G20, APEC, WTO and ASEAN
- More diplomatic posts than any other state – 276 posts, which is 3 more than the US
- Ranked 2nd for Diplomatic Influence in Lowy Institute Asia Power Index
o 1st for diplomatic network
2nd for multilateral power
21
Q
China Lacking Diplomatic Power
A
- Ranked 4th in the world for foreign policy
- 13 states still recognise Taiwan
22
Q
China Holding Cultural Power
A
- 530 Confucius Institutes, which promote Chinese culture and language to university students
- Chinese Central TV has broadcast in English, French, Spanish, Arabic, Russian and Chinese since 2008
- 3rd most international students in the world – 440k, which is a 35% increase since 2012
23
Q
China Lacking Cultural Power
A
- Ranked 27/30 in Soft Power 30 index
24
Q
Hard Power
A
- Power exercised through coercion or threatened acts of coercion, to influence the actions of other global actors
25
Q
Soft Power
A
- Ability to shape actions of other global actors through diplomacy, culture, policies and history
- Use attraction rather than coercion
26
Q
Panda Diplomacy
A
- Form of soft power
- China gives pandas to states which it seeks constructive relations – signifies long term trust
o Often given following trade deals with China - States must accept the One China policy to receive pandas
- 42 pandas in 12 countries (2015) to 70 pandas in 20 countries (2017)
- Heads of state must request a panda
- Names of pandas are always symbolic
- Pandas are given on a loan, with a yearly fee (1m Euros pa. for Germany)
- China are able to recall pandas in the event that another state is seen to threaten or insult China
o For example, the 2 of the US’s pandas have been recalled due to Trump’s response to COVID 19 - Impacts:
o Improved international standing and regional relationships
o Support for One China → national security
o Many recipients are key trading partners → economic prosperity
27
Q
Wolf Warrior Diplomacy
A
- Confrontive and combative approach, with loud denouncements of criticism of China
- Has occurred following introduction of an incentive for Chinese diplomats to be active on social media and make controversial interviews
- China has claimed that this is a necessary response to Western diplomats’ social media presence
- Examples:
o Sweden – China made military and economic sanction threats and threatened a journalist
o Australia – China digitally created an image with an Australian solider cutting the throat of a child
o Canada – Fmr Ambassador Lu Shaye labelled Canadian media as ‘Western egotism and white supremacy’
o 2020 Olympics, where Taiwan was not introduced as Chinese Taipei, and a NBC map did not show China as including Taiwan - Impacts:
o Pew Research: 78% of people in Western states have not much or no confidence in China’s leadership to do the right thing
o Exacerbated tensions with the UK, Canada and Australia
o Japan and South Korea have sought closer relations with the US
o The EU has adopted a more sceptical view of China
o Domestic increase in support for Chinese leadership and nationalism
o Ultimately, has reduced China’s international standing and regional relationships
28
Q
China’s Goals for Korean Peninsula
A
- Want to maintain North Korea as a buffer between China and democratic South Korea – SK has 29k US troops stationed there
- Wants to avoid conflict – conflict would lead to China becoming involved
- Want to prevent collapse of NK as this would lead to refugees spilling into China
- Prefer NK to not have nuclear weapons
- Instability in Korea could spill into mainland China and affect domestic population
- Maintain SK as a key trading partner
29
Q
China’s Relationship with North Korea
A
- China is NK’s:
o Most important trading partner – 90% of NK’s trade volume
o Most important ally
o Main source of food, arms and energy - Perception in the West that China is vital to addressing NK
30
Q
China’s Use of Diplomacy with North Korea
A
- Mar 2016 – co-drafted expanded UNSC sanctions
- Mar 2018 – Xi and Kim meet for first time, but unofficially
- May and June 2018 – Xi meets Kim again following Kim’s meetings with Moon and Trump
- June 2019 – Xi’s first visit to NK
- Mar 2021 – pledge to strengthen relationship and claims it is ‘common treasure’
- July 2021 – renew Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance for 20 years
31
Q
China’s Use of Trade with North Korea
A
- Feb 2017 – ban on coal imports from NK
- Aug 2017 – ban on coal, iron, lead and seafood exports
- Sep 2017 – limit crude oil imports; ban joint ventures, textile and natural gas exports, and NKs working overseas
- Jan 2018 – ban steel exports
- Apr 2020 – discovery that China had increased trade of oil and coal in 2019
32
Q
China’s Relationship with South Korea
A
- 2004 – China becomes SK’s largest trading partner
- 2014 – Xi visits SK
- Sep 2015 – Park attends military parade at Tiananmen Square
- Dec 2015 – SK signs FTA with China
33
Q
THAAD and South Korea
A
- A US anti missile system
- Jul 2016 – announced that it would be deployed in SK
- China warned that deployment of THAAD would destroy relationship, as they believed that it would undermine China’s attempts for denuclearisation
- Sep 2016 – Park and Xi agree for a healthy bilateral arrangement
- Mar 2017 – arrival of THAAD → China calls for boycott of SK goods and travel
o Boycott on tourism - $6.8bn impact on economy
o Hyundai sales fell 52% - Oct 2017 – new president Moon announces and agrees to 3 nos:
o SK will not join US missile defence systems
o SK will not become a member of a SK – US – Japan alliance
o Freeze on deployment of THAAD - Dec 2017 – pledge ‘new era’ of bilateral relations, to ensure peace and security on the Korean peninsula
34
Q
China’s Position with Taiwan
A
- Ideal – reunification
- If this can’t be achieved, then they want to make Taiwan dependant on China so that reunification is more likely and independence is less likely
- Does not want Taiwan to gain independence or international recognition
- Need to maintain trade with Taiwan for semiconductors
- Official position: there is only one China and Taiwan is part of it – therefore Taiwan is a renegade province
- Taiwan is an internal problem for China to resolve
- Under 1992 Consensus, they believe that there is only one China and they control it
35
Q
China - Taiwan Trade Relationship
A
- China is Taiwan’s #1 export market = $156bn in 2020 (44% of all exports)
- Taiwan is China’s #7 export market
- Taiwan investment into China valued at $188bn from 1991-2020
- Trade relationship not immune to difficulty – eg. ban on 40Mt of pineapples from Taiwan
- 100,000 businesspeople from Taiwan in China
- 2700 investment programs into Taiwan from China
- Taiwanese businesses remain deeply embedded in Chinese economy
- US restrictions on semiconductors → increased China’s reliance on Taiwan
- Economic interdependence → reunification more likely and economic prosperity promoted, and reduces threat of conflict
36
Q
China’s Use of Military in Taiwan
A
- Deployment of 1600 ballistic missiles and 400k personnel along Taiwan Strait
- Continual developments to military technology and equipment, especially for amphibious operations
- Live-fire drills, mock attacks and landing operations → advertise capabilities and send warning to Taiwan
- 2021 – 950 incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ (double from 2020)
- Near-continuous military operations as a threat to Taiwan
- Claims that military threats are essential for making political progress, and preventing moves toward Taiwanese independence
- Cyberattacks on at least 10 Taiwanese Government agencies
- China held largest ever show of military force following visit from Pelosi
- China maintains option of maritime blockade against Taiwan
- Aims:
o Beijing attempt to reclaim control over Taiwan
o Distract from domestic issues, and able to unite Chinese population
o Psychological warfare – make Taiwan believe that there is no choice other than to join China
37
Q
China’s Use of Diplomacy in Taiwan
A
- Following election of Tsai, China halted official diplomatic relations with Taiwan = part of isolationist strategy
- 9 states have switched recognition of sovereignty from Taiwan to PRC after 2016 → allowed KMT to challenge DPP
- Taiwanese loss of diplomatic relations → reduce legitimacy and prevent Taiwan from engaging with other nations through trade agreements or cooperation initiatives → increased reliance on China
- China now engaged in multilateral relations with Latin America, such as with CELAC
- China has prevented Taiwan from entering international organisations, such as INTERPOL, WHO and ICAO
38
Q
China’s Use of Aid in Taiwan
A
- Engaged in chequebook diplomacy to encourage states to switch recognition of sovereignty, including:
o Offering of airplanes, ferries and funds to Kiribati
o Promise of assistance in tourism, infrastructure, agriculture and BRI for The Gambia
o $210m for Sao Tome and Principe
o $3.1bn and increased trade for Dominican Republic - Chinese direct investment into Latin America has increased significantly over the last decade – region of strategic important for US
- Taiwan is no longer able to out-bid China on providing resources, technology, weapons and aid
39
Q
US Involvement in Taiwan
A
- Taiwan’s state as a democracy is critical for US interests
- However, trade with Taiwan is overshadowed by China, with Taiwan being the US’s 10th largest trading partner and China being the US’s largest
- China’s more aggressive foreign policy has forced the US to take a position that is closer to Taiwan
- US have provided military support:
o 2020 – $5.1bn in arms
o 2021 – $750m in arms
o 2022 – developments to improving missile defence - China have imposed sanctions on Lockheed Martin and other US companies involved in the arms trade with Taiwan
- Biden invited Taiwan to Summit for Democracy; however, were not willing to allow Taiwan to suggest their independence
- China has warned that they could face military conflict with the US over Taiwan
- US delegation visit to Taiwan was denounced by China
- US wish to maintain status quo – no independence for Taiwan, neither forced unification
- Sept 2022 – Biden abandons policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ – now are clear in response of force to China attacks on Taiwan → US gain support from Taiwan
40
Q
China’s Use of Diplomacy in Japan
A
- Nov 2014 – Xi and Abe meet → 4 point agreement to improve diplomatic and security ties
- April 2018 – first high level talks in 8 years
- Wolf Warrior approach following Japanese and US condemnation of China’s activities in South China Sea, Taiwan, Xinjiang and Hong Kong
41
Q
China’s Use of Trade in Japan
A
- China is Japan’s largest trading partner; Japan is China’s 2nd largest trading partner
- 2019 - $2.6bn of business deals, currency swap deal
42
Q
China’s Use of Aid in Japan
A
- Japan provided China with 3m face masks and $6.3m in funds
- China responded by donating 12.5k RATs
43
Q
China’s Use of Military in Japan
A
- China allowed coast guard vessels to use weapons and manage foreign vessels → increased activity in Senkaku Islands
- Increased militarisation in Taiwan and support for Russia → declining Japanese support (Dec 2021) and increased military spending – National Security Strategy
o Largest military build up since WWII
o Security deals with UK, India and Italy
o 2022 spending doubled by 2027
44
Q
China’s Use of Military in South China Sea
A
- 2013 – Island building campaign begins
- 2016 – Deployment of surface to air missiles
- 2018 – Beginning of monthly military drills, with up to 40 vessels; aircraft carrier deployed; nuclear strike capable bombers
- 2020 – Chinese Coast Guard sinks Vietnamese fishing boat; new administrative districts for South China Sea islands
- 2021 – Three days of military exercises conducted in Sea; 200 vessels moored at Whitsun Reef, Philippines
- 2022 – anti ship and anti aircraft missile systems installed; laser and jamming equipment installed; grey zone tactics – intercepted Australian plane and forced US plane to take evasive measures
45
Q
China’s Use of Diplomacy in South China Sea
A
- Oct 2016 – New Filipino President, Duterte, visits China and announces separation from US and realignment with China signing of $13.5bn in China to Philippine investment deals and Duterte calls for all US soldiers to leave within 2 years
- Nov 2016 – Malaysian PM Razak visits China and agrees for naval cooperation
- Dec 2016 – Duterte announces that result from UNCLOS in favour of Philippines would be set aside as he does not want to impose on China
- Apr 2017 – Duterte cancels visit to island in South China Sea, in line with advice from China
- May 2017 – ASEAN drops mention of South China Sea
- 2018 – Xi visits Philippines and calls for freedom of navigation over South China Sea in line with International Law
- Apr 2019 – Duterte warns that he would send troops on a ‘suicide mission’ if China continues to send ships
- Feb 2020 – Duterte announces that he will end US access to the Philippines for military purposes in 6 months
- Sep 2020 – Duterte reaffirms support to UNCLOS decision
- May 2021 – Duterte threatens to ignore UNCLOS decision
- Aug 2021 – Duterte cancels his ending of US military access
- Jun 2022 – New Philippines President Marcos takes a much stronger stance against China and strengthens ties with US, Japan and Australia
- Mar 2023 – expanded US access to Philippine military bases
46
Q
US Response to South China Sea
A
- Apr 2014 – signing of 10 year deal with Philippine military → join training and access to bases
- Oct 2015 – beginning of US freedom of navigation campaigns
- Mar 2018 – introduction of aircraft carrier; US – Japan joint exercises
- Sept 2018 – UK joins freedom of navigation campaigns; near miss between US and Chinese vessels
- Nov 2019 – US condemn China at ASEAN summit
- Jul 2020 – Australia rejects China’s maritime claims
- Aug 2020 – US place sanctions on 24 Chinese businesses involved in artificial island building campaign
47
Q
Aid
A
Economic, technological or military assistance given by one state to another for purposes of relief and rehabilitation, economic stabilisation or for mutual defence
48
Q
China’s Use of Aid in Asia-Pacific
(General)
A
- Provided $1.6bn in aid between 2013-18
- 3rd largest donor in A-P, behind Australia and US, but have overtaken Japan
- China has recently dropped behind New Zealand
- 80% of aid provided in the form of concessional loans, vs 20% as grants
- 42% of aid to transport projects → provides opportunity for Chinese construction firms to gain a foothold in the region
- Have provided scholarships and human resources training
- However, China spends 20% of what it promises – committed to $5bn in 2017 but only spent $200m
- China has been accused of building useless projects and creating debt trap diplomacy → reduce China’s international standing
- Aid has been broadly welcomed by recipients
49
Q
China’s Use of Aid in Vanuatu
A
- $243m of aid given
- 84% of Chinese aid given as concessional loans
- 73% of Chinse aid given for transport projects
- China is the 2nd largest donor to Vanuatu, behind Australia
- Chinese aid has paid for a new parliamentary building, a new PM’s office, a major sports stadium, a new finance and foreign ministry building and a new convention centre
- Vanuatu’s debt is expected to rise from 33% of GDP to 60%, with half of it being owed to China
- Concern exists that a new wharf being funded by China will end up being used as a military base, due to the current lack of capacity constraints for shipping – this has been rejected by both China and Vanuatu
50
Q
Belt and Road Initiative
A
- Announced at the end of 2013; expected to be completed by 2049
- Involves 138 states, accounting for 40% of the world’s GDP and 63% of its population
- Approx. 1600 projects, equal to $1.5tr infrastructure project to connect China’s less developed border regions to neighbouring countries
- Connects China to Europe through Central Asia via land
- Connects China to South East Asia, Africa and Europe via sea
- Funding provided through loans
- Written into the Constitution in 2017
- Shift of focus after 2020 – toward a ‘health’, ‘green’ and ‘digital’ Silk Road
51
Q
Reasons for Introduction of Belt and Road Initiative
A
- Economic:
o Overproduction (especially in the steel industry, which raised production 300m tonnes between 2008-15) due to stimulus following GFC → needed to find new markets to sell
o Stimulus → increased public debt and reduced profits
o Xi laid off 1.8m workers in coal and steel industries due to overproduction
o Aims to relocate low end manufacturing to other less developed countries → supports goal of creating a high-tech economy - Domestic Dissent:
o Inequality between eastern seaboard and inland regions – Shanghai x5 wealthier than Gansu
o Want to integrate inland regions into economy to increase their role – share of GDP only increased 1.6% from 2000-10 with large injections of money
o Belief that poverty → militancy so higher economic activity would reduce the terrorist threat - Geostrategic:
o Desire for China to centre themselves in regional relationships
o BRI used as a tool to counter the Pivot to Asia
o China aims to make states economically dependant on it
52
Q
Effectiveness of Belt and Road Initiative
Effectiveness + Ineffectiveness
A
- Effectiveness of BRI limited due to:
o Lack of trust between China and BRI states
o 2/3rds of BRI states have credit ratings below investable grade
o Some Chinese banks are concerned about the feasibility of projects and rising debt levels - However, the BRI has been successful:
o Increase in Chinese companies in Forbes 500 from 10 in 200 to 119 in 2019, which is now only 2 less than the USA
o Has led to Philippines and Cambodia reassessing their ties with the USA
53
Q
Attempts to Increase Soft Power
A
- Student exchanges – China is now the top destination, with 440k students from 205 states (2016)
- Expansion of Confucius Institutes – 541 in the world
o However, these have been seen as propaganda due to not discussing topics including Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan
o These have also been involved in intelligence gathering and military research - Expansion of media reach – Xinhua has 170 foreign bureaus and CGTV broadcasts in 6 languages
- 16% of all scholarships to African students are from Chinese government → 80k African students in China (2018) from only 2k in 2003
- Forum on China – Africa Cooperation is one of the largest meetings of African leaders and showcases China’s development model
- 58 radio stations in 35 countries covertly broadcast Chinese Radio International content
- China Daily published in >30 respected foreign publications → invested $20.8m in USA since 2017
- China Public Diplomacy Association ais to train 500 Latin American and 1000 African journalists by 2050
- CUSEF have taken 127 US journalists to China
54
Q
Effectiveness of Soft Power
A
- Most unfavourable views of China ever in USA, Canada, Germany and South Korea
- Unfavourable views of China in UK have doubled since 2013 to 63%, and in Australia from 35% to 78%
- Increased views that positive economic ties with the USA are more important than with China:
o 27% (2015) → 59% (2021) in Australia
o 70% (2015) → 81% (2021) in Japan
o 39% (2015) → 75% (2021) in South Korea - 80% in New Zealand and 78% in Australia prefer to promote human rights over economic ties with China
