3.2 - Power in the Asia-Pacific Flashcards
National Interest + 4 Elements
Used as an all-embracing concept to justify policy preferences and actions, and includes the goals or objectives of foreign policy
4 Elements:
* Economic prosperity
* Regional relationships
* International standing
* National security
Idealism
School of thought in which foreign policy is influenced above all else by moral principle, as opposed to practical and pragmatic considerations
Pragmatism
School of thought in which foreign policy is influence above all else by practical and pragmatic considerations, as opposed to moral principles
Chinese Dream
- Two One Hundreds – moderately well-off society by 2021 (including a doubling of GDP per capita and 70% urbanisation), and be a fully developed nation by 2049
- 4 key pillars – strong China, civilised China, harmonious China, beautiful China
Chinese National Security Interests
- Protection of borders
- Maintaining territorial integrity
- Creation of a socialist harmonious society
- Securing its sovereign territory
- Maintaining CCP rule
Chinese Economic Prosperity Interests
- Double GDP per capita by 2021 - moderately well off by 2021
- Creation of socialist harmonious society
- Fully developed by 2049
- Shift from a production economy to a consumer economy
- Urbanisation
- Continued economic growth
Chinese Regional Relationships Interests
- Peaceful rise
- Desire to be a regional hegemon
- Friendly relationships
- Power projection in the region
Chinese International Standing Interests
- Responsible, great power
- Challenge US dominance as only superpower
- Leader in South - South Development
Factors Shaping China’s National Interest
- State formation as a one party state
- Cultural and ethnic identity
- Ideology as ‘communist’
- History, including past humiliations and distrust of Japan
- International relationships, including global anti-China sentiment
- Security issues:
o Domestic stability from rising middle class and ethnic minorities
o Economy, due to aging population, income disparity and slowing global growth
o Environment, with pollution
o Sovereignty, due to claims in South and East China Seas and Taiwan
o Global stability, due to Russia and North Korea as allies
o Dependence on trade - food and fuel
Interpretations of National Security
One China:
* Believe that territorial integrity is essential to the national security of China
* Held by CCP
* Therefore, China must defend any threats to sovereignty over disputed territory, without concessions or compromise, leading to increased militarisation
Taiwanese Independence:
* Believe that Taiwan is an independent state
* Held by Democratic Progressive Party of Taiwan
* Rationale – Taiwan has a separate national identity and has been quasi-independent since 1949
* Therefore, China should cease all sovereignty claims and military threats
Rejection of Chinese South China Sea Claims:
* Believe that South China Sea is international waters
* Held by USA, Australia and others
* Rationale – UNCLOS definition of 12nm of state territory and 200nm Exclusive Economic Zone
* Therefore, US Navy carries out freedom of navigation operations
Interpretations of Economic Prosperity
Common Prosperity:
* Believe in income redistribution and increased government control over economy
* Held by Xi Jinping
* Rationale – widening income and wealth divide
* Therefore, has led to a greater state role in the economy and increased regulation, taxation and limits to the ability for foreign enterprises to compete
Market Capitalism:
* Believe in greater role of market and private business
* Held by Liu He
* Rationale – private sector contributes to 50% of tax revenue, 60% of GDP, 70% of innovation, and 80% of urban employment; and that state owned enterprises are inefficient
* Therefore, aim to continue opening of economy
Interpretations of Regional Relationships
Support North Korea at All Costs:
* Held by left faction of CCP
* Rationale – ideology and geopolitics; prevent isolation of North Korea by USA, South Korea and Japan
* Therefore, China should shield North Korea from international criticism and continue to trade
Abandon North Korea:
* Held by Zhao Lingman
* Rationale – North Korea has become ‘negative equity’ and a ‘liability’ for China, and has prevented China from building positive international relations
* Therefore, China should support sanctions on North Korea
Interpretations of International Standing
Hide Strength, Bide Time:
o Involves China seeking a ‘peaceful rise’ and cooperating with the US, as well as becoming an important trade partner
o Traditional view that was held by Deng Xiaoping
o Rationale – enable economic development
Peace Through Strength - Major Country Diplomacy:
o China should challenge US position as the only superpower, in order to enable Chinese growth
o Held by Xi Jinping
o Rationale – promote national aspirations
o Therefore, China should continue BRI, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and Wolf Warrior Diplomacy
China Having Economic Power
- 1st in the world for GDP
- Economic growth = 8.1% (2021), which is the 38th highest in the world
- Budget deficit of 3.8% of GDP, which is 152nd highest in the world
- Public debt is 111th highest in the world
- 1st in the world for exports
- 2nd in the world for imports
- Trade surplus
- Diversity in import partners
- Largest foreign exchange and gold reserves in the world
- Ranked 1st for economic relationships
- Ranked 2nd for economic capability and future resources
- Reliance on China for trade
o 68% of North Korean imports and exports to China
o 57% of Mongolian imports and exports to China
o 36% of Australian imports and exports to China
o 28% of South Korean imports and exports to China
o 27% of Japanese imports and exports to China
o 16% of US imports and exports to China
o Compared to US – highest is Vietnam with 17% of imports and exports to US
China Lacking Economic Power
- 99th in the world for GDP per capita
- Economic growth has been declining over time
- GINI coefficient = 0.38 – Higher than Australia and most of Europe
- Ranked 26th for demographic resources
- Rising public debt
- Unemployment rate = 4.8% (2021)
- 0.6% of population below poverty line
China Holding Military Power
- Increased funding: 6.6% (2020); 6.8% (2021); 7.1% (2022); and 7.2% (2023)
- $200bn for weapons development
- 2m active troops – largest army in the world
- PLA Navy is the largest in Asia with >340 ships
- 150 intercontinental ballistic missiles
- Largest air force in Asia
China Lacking Military Power
- Chinese military funding is only ¼ of the US’
- 1/3 of troops are conscripts
- China only have 2 aircraft carriers, vs US’s 11
- China have 32 destroyers vs US’s 83
- Ranked 2nd for military capability, after the US
- 3rd largest air force in the world, with 2,800 aircraft
China Holding Political Power
- One party state → no credible domestic threat to power and no need to compromise
- Xi Jinping has greatly increased his power through:
o Removal of Presidential term limits
o Replacement of Li Keqiang with a Xi supporter
o Enshrinement of Xi Jinping Thought in the Constitution - Censorship has allowed the CCP to maintain control of information
- CCP controls all media outlets
China Lacking Political Power
- Some growing dissent and protest
China Holding Diplomatic Power
- Veto power in UN
- IMF voting power increased from 3.8% in 2010 to 6.2% in 2015
- Member of G20, APEC, WTO and ASEAN
- More diplomatic posts than any other state – 276 posts, which is 3 more than the US
- Ranked 2nd for Diplomatic Influence in Lowy Institute Asia Power Index
o 1st for diplomatic network
2nd for multilateral power
China Lacking Diplomatic Power
- Ranked 4th in the world for foreign policy
- 13 states still recognise Taiwan
China Holding Cultural Power
- 530 Confucius Institutes, which promote Chinese culture and language to university students
- Chinese Central TV has broadcast in English, French, Spanish, Arabic, Russian and Chinese since 2008
- 3rd most international students in the world – 440k, which is a 35% increase since 2012
China Lacking Cultural Power
- Ranked 27/30 in Soft Power 30 index
Hard Power
- Power exercised through coercion or threatened acts of coercion, to influence the actions of other global actors
Soft Power
- Ability to shape actions of other global actors through diplomacy, culture, policies and history
- Use attraction rather than coercion
Panda Diplomacy
- Form of soft power
- China gives pandas to states which it seeks constructive relations – signifies long term trust
o Often given following trade deals with China - States must accept the One China policy to receive pandas
- 42 pandas in 12 countries (2015) to 70 pandas in 20 countries (2017)
- Heads of state must request a panda
- Names of pandas are always symbolic
- Pandas are given on a loan, with a yearly fee (1m Euros pa. for Germany)
- China are able to recall pandas in the event that another state is seen to threaten or insult China
o For example, the 2 of the US’s pandas have been recalled due to Trump’s response to COVID 19 - Impacts:
o Improved international standing and regional relationships
o Support for One China → national security
o Many recipients are key trading partners → economic prosperity
Wolf Warrior Diplomacy
- Confrontive and combative approach, with loud denouncements of criticism of China
- Has occurred following introduction of an incentive for Chinese diplomats to be active on social media and make controversial interviews
- China has claimed that this is a necessary response to Western diplomats’ social media presence
- Examples:
o Sweden – China made military and economic sanction threats and threatened a journalist
o Australia – China digitally created an image with an Australian solider cutting the throat of a child
o Canada – Fmr Ambassador Lu Shaye labelled Canadian media as ‘Western egotism and white supremacy’
o 2020 Olympics, where Taiwan was not introduced as Chinese Taipei, and a NBC map did not show China as including Taiwan - Impacts:
o Pew Research: 78% of people in Western states have not much or no confidence in China’s leadership to do the right thing
o Exacerbated tensions with the UK, Canada and Australia
o Japan and South Korea have sought closer relations with the US
o The EU has adopted a more sceptical view of China
o Domestic increase in support for Chinese leadership and nationalism
o Ultimately, has reduced China’s international standing and regional relationships
China’s Goals for Korean Peninsula
- Want to maintain North Korea as a buffer between China and democratic South Korea – SK has 29k US troops stationed there
- Wants to avoid conflict – conflict would lead to China becoming involved
- Want to prevent collapse of NK as this would lead to refugees spilling into China
- Prefer NK to not have nuclear weapons
- Instability in Korea could spill into mainland China and affect domestic population
- Maintain SK as a key trading partner
China’s Relationship with North Korea
- China is NK’s:
o Most important trading partner – 90% of NK’s trade volume
o Most important ally
o Main source of food, arms and energy - Perception in the West that China is vital to addressing NK
China’s Use of Diplomacy with North Korea
- Mar 2016 – co-drafted expanded UNSC sanctions
- Mar 2018 – Xi and Kim meet for first time, but unofficially
- May and June 2018 – Xi meets Kim again following Kim’s meetings with Moon and Trump
- June 2019 – Xi’s first visit to NK
- Mar 2021 – pledge to strengthen relationship and claims it is ‘common treasure’
- July 2021 – renew Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance for 20 years
China’s Use of Trade with North Korea
- Feb 2017 – ban on coal imports from NK
- Aug 2017 – ban on coal, iron, lead and seafood exports
- Sep 2017 – limit crude oil imports; ban joint ventures, textile and natural gas exports, and NKs working overseas
- Jan 2018 – ban steel exports
- Apr 2020 – discovery that China had increased trade of oil and coal in 2019
China’s Relationship with South Korea
- 2004 – China becomes SK’s largest trading partner
- 2014 – Xi visits SK
- Sep 2015 – Park attends military parade at Tiananmen Square
- Dec 2015 – SK signs FTA with China
THAAD and South Korea
- A US anti missile system
- Jul 2016 – announced that it would be deployed in SK
- China warned that deployment of THAAD would destroy relationship, as they believed that it would undermine China’s attempts for denuclearisation
- Sep 2016 – Park and Xi agree for a healthy bilateral arrangement
- Mar 2017 – arrival of THAAD → China calls for boycott of SK goods and travel
o Boycott on tourism - $6.8bn impact on economy
o Hyundai sales fell 52% - Oct 2017 – new president Moon announces and agrees to 3 nos:
o SK will not join US missile defence systems
o SK will not become a member of a SK – US – Japan alliance
o Freeze on deployment of THAAD - Dec 2017 – pledge ‘new era’ of bilateral relations, to ensure peace and security on the Korean peninsula
China’s Position with Taiwan
- Ideal – reunification
- If this can’t be achieved, then they want to make Taiwan dependant on China so that reunification is more likely and independence is less likely
- Does not want Taiwan to gain independence or international recognition
- Need to maintain trade with Taiwan for semiconductors
- Official position: there is only one China and Taiwan is part of it – therefore Taiwan is a renegade province
- Taiwan is an internal problem for China to resolve
- Under 1992 Consensus, they believe that there is only one China and they control it
China - Taiwan Trade Relationship
- China is Taiwan’s #1 export market = $156bn in 2020 (44% of all exports)
- Taiwan is China’s #7 export market
- Taiwan investment into China valued at $188bn from 1991-2020
- Trade relationship not immune to difficulty – eg. ban on 40Mt of pineapples from Taiwan
- 100,000 businesspeople from Taiwan in China
- 2700 investment programs into Taiwan from China
- Taiwanese businesses remain deeply embedded in Chinese economy
- US restrictions on semiconductors → increased China’s reliance on Taiwan
- Economic interdependence → reunification more likely and economic prosperity promoted, and reduces threat of conflict
China’s Use of Military in Taiwan
- Deployment of 1600 ballistic missiles and 400k personnel along Taiwan Strait
- Continual developments to military technology and equipment, especially for amphibious operations
- Live-fire drills, mock attacks and landing operations → advertise capabilities and send warning to Taiwan
- 2021 – 950 incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ (double from 2020)
- Near-continuous military operations as a threat to Taiwan
- Claims that military threats are essential for making political progress, and preventing moves toward Taiwanese independence
- Cyberattacks on at least 10 Taiwanese Government agencies
- China held largest ever show of military force following visit from Pelosi
- China maintains option of maritime blockade against Taiwan
- Aims:
o Beijing attempt to reclaim control over Taiwan
o Distract from domestic issues, and able to unite Chinese population
o Psychological warfare – make Taiwan believe that there is no choice other than to join China
China’s Use of Diplomacy in Taiwan
- Following election of Tsai, China halted official diplomatic relations with Taiwan = part of isolationist strategy
- 9 states have switched recognition of sovereignty from Taiwan to PRC after 2016 → allowed KMT to challenge DPP
- Taiwanese loss of diplomatic relations → reduce legitimacy and prevent Taiwan from engaging with other nations through trade agreements or cooperation initiatives → increased reliance on China
- China now engaged in multilateral relations with Latin America, such as with CELAC
- China has prevented Taiwan from entering international organisations, such as INTERPOL, WHO and ICAO
China’s Use of Aid in Taiwan
- Engaged in chequebook diplomacy to encourage states to switch recognition of sovereignty, including:
o Offering of airplanes, ferries and funds to Kiribati
o Promise of assistance in tourism, infrastructure, agriculture and BRI for The Gambia
o $210m for Sao Tome and Principe
o $3.1bn and increased trade for Dominican Republic - Chinese direct investment into Latin America has increased significantly over the last decade – region of strategic important for US
- Taiwan is no longer able to out-bid China on providing resources, technology, weapons and aid
US Involvement in Taiwan
- Taiwan’s state as a democracy is critical for US interests
- However, trade with Taiwan is overshadowed by China, with Taiwan being the US’s 10th largest trading partner and China being the US’s largest
- China’s more aggressive foreign policy has forced the US to take a position that is closer to Taiwan
- US have provided military support:
o 2020 – $5.1bn in arms
o 2021 – $750m in arms
o 2022 – developments to improving missile defence - China have imposed sanctions on Lockheed Martin and other US companies involved in the arms trade with Taiwan
- Biden invited Taiwan to Summit for Democracy; however, were not willing to allow Taiwan to suggest their independence
- China has warned that they could face military conflict with the US over Taiwan
- US delegation visit to Taiwan was denounced by China
- US wish to maintain status quo – no independence for Taiwan, neither forced unification
- Sept 2022 – Biden abandons policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ – now are clear in response of force to China attacks on Taiwan → US gain support from Taiwan
China’s Use of Diplomacy in Japan
- Nov 2014 – Xi and Abe meet → 4 point agreement to improve diplomatic and security ties
- April 2018 – first high level talks in 8 years
- Wolf Warrior approach following Japanese and US condemnation of China’s activities in South China Sea, Taiwan, Xinjiang and Hong Kong
China’s Use of Trade in Japan
- China is Japan’s largest trading partner; Japan is China’s 2nd largest trading partner
- 2019 - $2.6bn of business deals, currency swap deal
China’s Use of Aid in Japan
- Japan provided China with 3m face masks and $6.3m in funds
- China responded by donating 12.5k RATs
China’s Use of Military in Japan
- China allowed coast guard vessels to use weapons and manage foreign vessels → increased activity in Senkaku Islands
- Increased militarisation in Taiwan and support for Russia → declining Japanese support (Dec 2021) and increased military spending – National Security Strategy
o Largest military build up since WWII
o Security deals with UK, India and Italy
o 2022 spending doubled by 2027
China’s Use of Military in South China Sea
- 2013 – Island building campaign begins
- 2016 – Deployment of surface to air missiles
- 2018 – Beginning of monthly military drills, with up to 40 vessels; aircraft carrier deployed; nuclear strike capable bombers
- 2020 – Chinese Coast Guard sinks Vietnamese fishing boat; new administrative districts for South China Sea islands
- 2021 – Three days of military exercises conducted in Sea; 200 vessels moored at Whitsun Reef, Philippines
- 2022 – anti ship and anti aircraft missile systems installed; laser and jamming equipment installed; grey zone tactics – intercepted Australian plane and forced US plane to take evasive measures
China’s Use of Diplomacy in South China Sea
- Oct 2016 – New Filipino President, Duterte, visits China and announces separation from US and realignment with China signing of $13.5bn in China to Philippine investment deals and Duterte calls for all US soldiers to leave within 2 years
- Nov 2016 – Malaysian PM Razak visits China and agrees for naval cooperation
- Dec 2016 – Duterte announces that result from UNCLOS in favour of Philippines would be set aside as he does not want to impose on China
- Apr 2017 – Duterte cancels visit to island in South China Sea, in line with advice from China
- May 2017 – ASEAN drops mention of South China Sea
- 2018 – Xi visits Philippines and calls for freedom of navigation over South China Sea in line with International Law
- Apr 2019 – Duterte warns that he would send troops on a ‘suicide mission’ if China continues to send ships
- Feb 2020 – Duterte announces that he will end US access to the Philippines for military purposes in 6 months
- Sep 2020 – Duterte reaffirms support to UNCLOS decision
- May 2021 – Duterte threatens to ignore UNCLOS decision
- Aug 2021 – Duterte cancels his ending of US military access
- Jun 2022 – New Philippines President Marcos takes a much stronger stance against China and strengthens ties with US, Japan and Australia
- Mar 2023 – expanded US access to Philippine military bases
US Response to South China Sea
- Apr 2014 – signing of 10 year deal with Philippine military → join training and access to bases
- Oct 2015 – beginning of US freedom of navigation campaigns
- Mar 2018 – introduction of aircraft carrier; US – Japan joint exercises
- Sept 2018 – UK joins freedom of navigation campaigns; near miss between US and Chinese vessels
- Nov 2019 – US condemn China at ASEAN summit
- Jul 2020 – Australia rejects China’s maritime claims
- Aug 2020 – US place sanctions on 24 Chinese businesses involved in artificial island building campaign
Aid
Economic, technological or military assistance given by one state to another for purposes of relief and rehabilitation, economic stabilisation or for mutual defence
China’s Use of Aid in Asia-Pacific
(General)
- Provided $1.6bn in aid between 2013-18
- 3rd largest donor in A-P, behind Australia and US, but have overtaken Japan
- China has recently dropped behind New Zealand
- 80% of aid provided in the form of concessional loans, vs 20% as grants
- 42% of aid to transport projects → provides opportunity for Chinese construction firms to gain a foothold in the region
- Have provided scholarships and human resources training
- However, China spends 20% of what it promises – committed to $5bn in 2017 but only spent $200m
- China has been accused of building useless projects and creating debt trap diplomacy → reduce China’s international standing
- Aid has been broadly welcomed by recipients
China’s Use of Aid in Vanuatu
- $243m of aid given
- 84% of Chinese aid given as concessional loans
- 73% of Chinse aid given for transport projects
- China is the 2nd largest donor to Vanuatu, behind Australia
- Chinese aid has paid for a new parliamentary building, a new PM’s office, a major sports stadium, a new finance and foreign ministry building and a new convention centre
- Vanuatu’s debt is expected to rise from 33% of GDP to 60%, with half of it being owed to China
- Concern exists that a new wharf being funded by China will end up being used as a military base, due to the current lack of capacity constraints for shipping – this has been rejected by both China and Vanuatu
Belt and Road Initiative
- Announced at the end of 2013; expected to be completed by 2049
- Involves 138 states, accounting for 40% of the world’s GDP and 63% of its population
- Approx. 1600 projects, equal to $1.5tr infrastructure project to connect China’s less developed border regions to neighbouring countries
- Connects China to Europe through Central Asia via land
- Connects China to South East Asia, Africa and Europe via sea
- Funding provided through loans
- Written into the Constitution in 2017
- Shift of focus after 2020 – toward a ‘health’, ‘green’ and ‘digital’ Silk Road
Reasons for Introduction of Belt and Road Initiative
- Economic:
o Overproduction (especially in the steel industry, which raised production 300m tonnes between 2008-15) due to stimulus following GFC → needed to find new markets to sell
o Stimulus → increased public debt and reduced profits
o Xi laid off 1.8m workers in coal and steel industries due to overproduction
o Aims to relocate low end manufacturing to other less developed countries → supports goal of creating a high-tech economy - Domestic Dissent:
o Inequality between eastern seaboard and inland regions – Shanghai x5 wealthier than Gansu
o Want to integrate inland regions into economy to increase their role – share of GDP only increased 1.6% from 2000-10 with large injections of money
o Belief that poverty → militancy so higher economic activity would reduce the terrorist threat - Geostrategic:
o Desire for China to centre themselves in regional relationships
o BRI used as a tool to counter the Pivot to Asia
o China aims to make states economically dependant on it
Effectiveness of Belt and Road Initiative
Effectiveness + Ineffectiveness
- Effectiveness of BRI limited due to:
o Lack of trust between China and BRI states
o 2/3rds of BRI states have credit ratings below investable grade
o Some Chinese banks are concerned about the feasibility of projects and rising debt levels - However, the BRI has been successful:
o Increase in Chinese companies in Forbes 500 from 10 in 200 to 119 in 2019, which is now only 2 less than the USA
o Has led to Philippines and Cambodia reassessing their ties with the USA
Attempts to Increase Soft Power
- Student exchanges – China is now the top destination, with 440k students from 205 states (2016)
- Expansion of Confucius Institutes – 541 in the world
o However, these have been seen as propaganda due to not discussing topics including Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan
o These have also been involved in intelligence gathering and military research - Expansion of media reach – Xinhua has 170 foreign bureaus and CGTV broadcasts in 6 languages
- 16% of all scholarships to African students are from Chinese government → 80k African students in China (2018) from only 2k in 2003
- Forum on China – Africa Cooperation is one of the largest meetings of African leaders and showcases China’s development model
- 58 radio stations in 35 countries covertly broadcast Chinese Radio International content
- China Daily published in >30 respected foreign publications → invested $20.8m in USA since 2017
- China Public Diplomacy Association ais to train 500 Latin American and 1000 African journalists by 2050
- CUSEF have taken 127 US journalists to China
Effectiveness of Soft Power
- Most unfavourable views of China ever in USA, Canada, Germany and South Korea
- Unfavourable views of China in UK have doubled since 2013 to 63%, and in Australia from 35% to 78%
- Increased views that positive economic ties with the USA are more important than with China:
o 27% (2015) → 59% (2021) in Australia
o 70% (2015) → 81% (2021) in Japan
o 39% (2015) → 75% (2021) in South Korea - 80% in New Zealand and 78% in Australia prefer to promote human rights over economic ties with China