11 Digital Economics Flashcards

1
Q

Comment on the costs of digital goods

A

Digital goods are costly to produce but cheap to reproduce.

  • > low marginal costs
  • > high fixed costs
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2
Q

draw the curves of marginal costs over quantity of digital and non-digital goods

What are the sales strategies/philosophies for the two types?

A

see p.12
non-digital good: convex curve with a minimum -> OPP
-> learning effects let the marginal costs drop in the beginning
- > limited resources will make marginal costs increase again
- >”sell up to an optimal point of production”

digital goods

  • only the first copy has very high MC
  • MC of additional copies is negligible (maybe slightly increasing because of software maintenance)
  • > “sell as much as you can”
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3
Q

name the formula for marginal costs

A

MC(y) = [c(y + dy) - c(y) ] / dy

dy: delta y
c: variable costs

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4
Q

What happens in a market for digital goods with perfect competition?

A
  • prices are zero or almost zero
  • no-one would make any profit
  • the high fixed costs/initial costs won’t get balanced out
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5
Q

what alternative market structure is possible in a market for digital goods?

A

Combination of high sunk costs and economies of scale often lead to the emergence of quasi-monopolies:

  • Quasi-monopoly based on cost leadership
  • Quasi-monopoly based on product leadership (incl. first mover advantage)
  • Quasi-monopoly based on lock-in effect (switching costs for users) and network externalities (every user benefits from more users)
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6
Q

what difference does it make for providers if they are the monopolist?

A
  • monopolists can set the price
  • > maximize producer surplus (higher price)
  • price differentiation/ flexibles prices to meet different willingness to pay and therefore maximize their profit
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7
Q

compare shortly static and flexible pricing

A

static:

  • homogeneous homo oeconomicus
  • every customer has the same utility function

flexible:

  • heterogeneous homo oeconomicus
  • exploit differences in customers utility functions
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8
Q

Describe the three degrees of flexible pricing and give examples

A

1° personal pricing

  • each customer receives a personal price, depending his willingness to pay
  • > max revenue for the provider assuming we know the exact willingness to pay for every customer
  • > might be seen unfair
    e. g.: personal interest rate for loan

2° Versioning and Bundling

  • different versions of products and services
  • different bundles of products
    e. g.: Software packages like MS Office

3° Group pricing

  • price depends on your customer group
  • > student tickets, family price, …
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9
Q

How does “self-selection” work in the case of degree 2 flexible pricing?

A
  • absence of knowledge about willingness to pay
  • create different versions (high-end to low-end) or bundles and try to gain knowledge about willingness to pay by self-selection
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10
Q

What’s the best strategy in the presence of heterogeneous customers?

A

mixed bundeling

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11
Q

what strategies do exist when bundling complementary goods?

A

integrate: set price yourself

collaborate: set price together and share revenue

negotiate: I‘ll cut mine, you cut yours

nurture: work with them to lower cost

commercialize (kommerzialisieren): make their industry more competitive

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12
Q

Explain what the lock-in effect is and how it works

A
  • customers are to some degree forced to stay with a product/ service provider
  • investments in complementary products or services make switching less attractive (investments in training or new hardware)
  • > high switching costs
  • Incompatibility is a barrier for competitors or customers - > reason for switching costs
  • switching costs are especially high in markets with low competition

Examples:

from SAP to Oracle

from AppleOS to Microsoft

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13
Q

Explain sellers strategy to drive a lock-in effect

A

Seller strategies
Investment in customer base
->E.g. promotion and education to establish a standard
Design products so that customers want to invest in your technology again
->E.g.loyalty programs or gratification for good feedback
Leverage on selling complementary products to the installed base
->E.g.establish digital ecosystem

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14
Q

Under which conditions is a lock-in effect likely to appear?

A

non-competitive markets where a ‘unique’ product is highly valuable for the customer.

providers have a high market power
-> sellers market

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15
Q

Explain buyers strategy to avoid a lock-in effect

A

Buyers strategy

Bargain hard before you buy and think ahead
-> E.g. in terms of updates, resources, service costs
Minimize switching costs
->E.g. by insisting on standard formats, convenient APIs, etc.
If feasible diversify and don’t depend on a single provider
-> E.g. use substitutional programs and keep up knowledge

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16
Q

When does a good create network effects?

A

demand for a good must be linked to how many other people have bought it
-> consumption of one person directly affects the utility of another user

Generally: more users -> higher utility for every single user

17
Q

In which industries do network effects normally occur?

Name examples

A

network industries: common in IT-based services

-> eBay, Facebook, WhatsApp, SAP, Bitcoin

18
Q

what’s the difference between demand side and supply side economies of scale

A

supply side: average costs decrease with scale
-> AC of producing 200 car parts is higher than for 20000

demand side: average revenue (demand) increases with scale
-> more people are willing to join a club if there are 500 friends of them already inside then just 5

19
Q

What’s the mentality of markets with network effects?

A

“Winner takes it all”

20
Q

Explain the network effect and it’s market dynamics

  • draw a graph
  • explain the different equilibriums
A

see p.39

  • willingness to pay p, over network size n
  • the demand curve is a concave curve peaking at n*
  • supply is a constant curve with p(n) = p = constant
  • nn* large network
  • demand (willingness to pay) > supply (price) => network grows and vice versa
  • A is a stable low-level equilibrium –nobody is consuming or even participating in the network
  • B is an unstable equilibrium –if the critical network size at B is exceeded, the network is strongly growing, if not it will shrink again and go back to A
  • C is a stable high-level equilibrium –many participants take part in the network