10 Altruism And Bystander Intervention Flashcards

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1
Q

Kitty 1964 study

A

Kitty, in Queens was attacked, asssualted and murdered. 50 peopl heard her screams but no one called the police.

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2
Q

Latane and Darley theory

A

5 steps to emergency intervention (1970)
0- emergency
1- notice that smth is happening ( if theres a distraction or self concerns there is no path to providing help)
2- interpret event as an emergency ( ambiguity, pluralistic ignorance or a relationship between attacker and victim may inhibit this)
3- take responsibility ( diffusion of responsibility may stop this)
4- decide how to help ( lack of competence stops this)
5- provide help ( obstacle is audience inhibition eg I’ll look like a fool, and if costs exceed rewards)

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3
Q

Latane and darley studies

A

1- 1970= They asked ppnts to complete a questionnaire alone or with 2 others. Smoke filled the room.
Found that if they were alone, 50% left after 2 mins, 75% after 6.
If they were together, 12% left after 2 mins

This shows pluralistic ignorance= we look to others to define ambiguous events

2- 1968. Ppnts were in cubicles with headphones on. The experimenter leaves and one ppnt has an epileptic fit.
If it was just the vuctim and ppnt, 85% helped in under 60 seconds. If victim, ppnt and 2 more, 62% helped under 60secs. If victim, ppnt, and 4 more, 31% gave hlp under 60 secs.
Shows diffusion of responsibility- responsibility is divisible by the number present

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4
Q

What did Bickman and Moriarty find

A

Bickman 1971 found that responsibility is not diffused when co witnesses are clearly not able to help

Moriarty 1975 found that responsibility is not diffused when it’s specifically attached to a bystander. Eg if ur leaving a bag,ask a specific person.

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5
Q

Moderators of the bystander effect

A

Fischer et al did a meta-analytic review and found that overall effect size was d=-.35 for bystander apathy.

Bystander effect is REDUCED when there is clear danger ( no ambiguity, perp is present, solution requires cooperation). Dangerous emergencies are recognised faster as real, so increase arousal, so more help is given.

Bystander effect is INCREASED among females and strangers, in a lab, and if there is a larger number of bystanders.

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6
Q

Case study of a man who helped at a huge cost

A

Joe Delaney saved 2 boys from drowning in a lake in Louisiana in 1983, but drowned himself.

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7
Q

Evolution theories

A

Helping is typically more costly than non-helping, so non helping should be prevalent in subsequent generations.
But we see helping, so two theories to explain it;
Kinship Selection
Reciprocal Altruism

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8
Q

Kin selection theory

A

Hamilton 1963 introduced this idea. It states that the unit of selection is the gene not the individual. Our genes exists in our relatives ( called inclusive fitness), so the coefficient of genetic relatedness should be related to altruism.
The more related someone is to you, the more you would help them.

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9
Q

Hamilton rule

A

C< br
People should only offer help where:

Reproductive succes cost to myself is less than the reproductive benefit to myself x our relatedness.

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10
Q

Evidence for kin selection

A

Sime 1983 found that people searched for family members much more than friends in a fire evacuation.

Borgida et al found that live organ donation was much more common between biological relatives.

Blasi 2022 found that when asked who would use save, partner or child, everyone favours offspring. People only favour partner over cousin.

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11
Q

Limits of kinship theory

A

Kinship is not strictly accurately perceived.
Depends what kind of help is needed; Bursntein 1994 found that the effect of genetic relatedness was much stronger in life or death scenarios, and also more willingness to help healthy relatives over sick, and rich over poor.

We dont only aid kin. Belin et al found that ur more likely to surive in Jewish conc camp if u had more former camp mates in ur new camp.

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12
Q

Reciprocal altruism (RA)

A

By Trivers 1971.
This idea states that there is a delayed ‘payback’ of altruistic acts where the benefit to recipient is high, cost to donor is low, and there is a likelihood that positions will be reversed in the future.

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13
Q

necesary conditions of RA

A

Must be a social species
Stable groups ( so u can meet individual again)
Good face recognition
Good long term memory
Non-cooperation with or punishment of defectors ( people who take help then dont repay it get punished.

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14
Q

Prisoners dilemma/ short term losses

A

Can either confess, if partner doesnt, ur free, if they do, u get prison for 3 years, if neither of u confess, both prison for 1 year.
If you both behave selfishly you get a mutually bad outcome. The game is a ‘non-zero sum’, which means both players can benefit if they choose to cooperate.

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15
Q

Prisoners dilemma for long haul (iterated games)

A

Prisoners dilemma doesnt apply as well irl because we see ppl more than once, so have to look at iterated games

Axelrod studied the Evolution of Cooperation, and ran every algorithm for how to play PD over multiple games. He found the best algorithm was ‘Tit for Tat’; you cooperate on the first move, then subsequently respond in kind.
However, unintended betrayal triggers endless round of defections, so a new algorithm was called Generous Tit for Tat (GT4T). You cooperate on 1st move, subsequently respond in kind, then cooperate on1/3 of defections. ( Nowak and Sigmund). Reciprocity and generosity is best strat.

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16
Q

Frequency dependency for LT Prisoers dilemma

A

GT4T is god overall, but a small number of cheaters can benefit from its generosity.
Hawks vs Dove analogy (defection vs cooperation). The Dove (cooperation) strategy only works if doves are in the majority, if the whole population is hawks, everyone does badly.
Cheating only works if they are minority.
GT4T is a good evolutionary stable strategy.

17
Q

Emotional mediation for RA

A

Trivers stated that humans have evolved to engage in reciprocal exchanges with others, and that complex emotions have developed to help regulate these exchanges. RAT proposes that these emotions include:

  • Anger and dislike: Motivate people to withdraw help from or punish cheaters
    -Gratitude and obligation: Motivate people to reciprocate help they receive
    -Guilt: Occurs when people fail to reciprocate help, and may be a way to avoid punishment
  • Sympathy and empathy: Help people determine how much help a partner needs

Positive mood enhances likelihood of helping behaviour

18
Q

Chino and aureli 2008

A

They did a metanaysis on primate grooming and found that RA exists in primates.
Female primates preferentially groom those that groom them most too.

19
Q

RA in humans

A

Norm of reciprocity ( seen in affiliation topic- couples):
-> P1 rewards/ P1costs should equal P2 rewards/ P2 costs

Also Fehr and Gachter 2002 -Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment.

Altruistic punishment and strong reciprocity ^^

20
Q

RA in humans 2

A

There is the free rider problem in ‘collective action’ eg getting a vaccine has a cost to urself; ache and time etc, but benefits everyone to work well. Or strikes.