WS1 General Principles Flashcards

1
Q

Burden/standard of proof in criminal cases

A

Woolmington v DPP [1935] – burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove D’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and to disprove any defences which may be raised. Facts: D charged with murder, having killed wife by shooting her. House of Lords held that it was up to the prosecution to prove the D had killed his wife, not for the D to prove it had been an accident. Viscount Sankey:

“Throughout the web of the English criminal law one golden thread is always to be seen, that is the duty if the prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt…”

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2
Q

Exceptions to rule that defendants do not have to prove defences?

A

Some exceptions where D has to prove a defence (e.g. insanity & diminished responsibility). This only has to be on the balance of probabilities, not beyond reasonable doubt.

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3
Q

What is the general rule for liability for omissions? What are the exceptions?

A

There is no liability for failing to act. Exceptions:

a) Special relationship
b) Contractual duty
c) Statutory duty
d) Created a dangerous situation

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4
Q

Special relationship: Family ties (statutory and common law duty)

A

a. Family ties – Statutory duty on parent to act to protect his or her child (s.1(2)(a) Children and Young Persons Act 1933) and R v Gibbins and Proctor (1918) – Ds convicted of murdering a 7-year old child. Child had died of starvation. The first D, Gibbins, was the father. Court said as a parent he had duty to look after child, failed to do so, therefore committed AR of murder – killed human being by omission to feed his child. Second D was not the mother, but had assumed a duty towards the child by choosing to live with the father and by receiving house-keeping money from him;

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5
Q

Blood relation/assumption of responsibility.

A

b. Where D has assumed a responsibility/duty to V (R v Stone & Dobinson [1977] Court of Appeal – where 2 defendants took Stone’s sick sister to live with them. She died, 2 defendants convicted of manslaughter. Court also said there was a duty because Fanny was a blood relation to Stone, because she was living in Stone’s house and because both Ds had assumed a duty to act. Court said “this was not a situation analogous to the drowining stranger. They did make efforts to care.” Lane LJ. Therefore, seems that had they done nothing, they would have escaped liability [HEAVILY CRITICISED DECISION].

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6
Q

R v Ruffell [2003]

A

D who assumed a duty of trying to revive a friend who took drugs, was correctly convicted of manslaughter of that friend when he failed to care for him properly.

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7
Q

R v Smith [1979]

A

D charged with manslaughter. Wife gave birth, child still born, wife said not to get medical help, he didn’t but by the time she changed her mind it was too late. Jury unable to decide and so he walked free. Words of judge suggest if V capable of deciding own fate, the D should be able to be released from any duty to act established by the common law. [Also, indicates husband owes duty to wife. However, only a first instance decision, BE WARY]

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8
Q

Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] - What were the facts and judgement?

A

Tony Bland injured at Hillsborough, persistent vegetative state for 3 years, doctors and parents apply to court to discontinue treatment. Doctor normally owes special duty to patient. On the medical evidence (no evidence of further conscious thought), allowed them to stop treating him.

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9
Q

Why was the decision in Airedale NHS Trust important?

A
  1. House of Lords confirmed doctors must seek court permission before withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment (ALTHOUGH see Frenchay Healthcare NHS Trust v S – permission impractical in some emergency situations.
  2. HoL confirmed if a patient has refused life-saving treatment, not only is doctor released from duty to act but he would be committing a criminal offence of assault if he did act – endorses R v Smith.
  3. Court only concerned with omissions. Doctors still cannot take positive acts for ending patient’s life.
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10
Q

Case which demonstrates criminal liability where failure to comply with CONTRACTUAL DUTY TO ACT?

A

(R v Pittwood – railway crossing gate-keeper failed to close gate and person killed. Manslaughter)

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11
Q

E.g. of Statutory duty to act?

A

a. E.g. as a car driver, you have to stop at red lights, display valid tax disc and stop after involved in accident (Road Traffic Act 1988 s. 170)

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12
Q

Is there a duty to act where the D has created a dangerous situation?

A

4) D has CREATED a DANGEROUS SITUATION, and has not REMOVED the danger created (R v Miller [1983] – squatter smoking and fell asleep, woke and noticed smoking mattress, got up & moved to another room. House caught fire.)

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13
Q

Can the actus reus be involuntary?

A

No. Liability will only accrue where the conduct is willed. Hill v Baxter [1958] – court gave example of swarm of bees. Under these conditions, someone could not be liable for careless driving.

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14
Q

Mens Rea: Direct intent. What is the definition?

A

where D’s primary purpose is to bring about a particular consequence, design or aim

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15
Q

Test for Indirect/oblique Intent?

A

Where an outcome was not D’s main aim, but an unfortunate by-product of his aim. Test for indirect intent (R v Nedrick test, as confirmed and refined by R v Woollin):

i. Was the consequence virtually certain to occur from D’s act?
ii. If yes, did D himself foresee this consequence as virtually certain to occur?

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16
Q

How did the indirect intention test develop before this?

A

Maloney - natural consequence?

Hancock and Shankland - natural and probable consequence?

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17
Q

Problem with Nedrick?

A

Nedrick is Court of Appeal authority. Therefore, could not overrule Maloney or Hancock and Shankland.

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18
Q

R v Woollin [1999] HoL

A

D throws 3 month old son against a hard surface, killing him. D had no direct intent to kill or seriously injure the son. Indirect intent? Lord Steyn approved test in Nedrick – However, he refined it, saying rather than use “infer”, should use “find”. Thus judge should say jury may find an intent to kill or seriously injure if…

House of Lords believed the judge’s direction was unsafe as he used “substantial risk” instead of “virtual certainty”, and so unacceptably widened the scope of mental element required for murder. Substituted for conviction of manslaughter.

19
Q

Test for recklessness.

A

2) RECKLESSNESS: Test for whether D is reckless is the Cunningham test (Byrne J.)(see R v G):
a. Did D FORSEE a risk that that particular type of harm might be done (subjective), and then go on to TAKE IT?

20
Q

Doctrine of transferred malice?

A

R v Latimer: If D has the malice (i.e. intention or recklessness) to commit a crime against one victim/piece of property, this MR can be transferred to the AR he commits against ANOTHER, unintended victim. D was quarrelling with C in a public house. D aimed a blow at C with his belt, but accidentally hit R, who was badly injured. In dismissing appeal again conviction, Lord Coleridge CJ expounded the doctrine of transferred malice.

21
Q

Limit to doctrine of transferred malice?

A

But the doctrine only works if the AR is the SAME TYPE OF CRIME as the D originally intended – R v Pembliton (1874) Facts: had been fighting with people in street, threw a stone which broke a window.

22
Q

When is there no need to show mens rea for a prosecution?

A

Cases of criminal negligence (punished for failing to measure up to the standards of a reasonable person) and strict liability offences.

23
Q

s.3 Road Traffic Act 1988 (Actus Reus)

A

s.3 RTA 1988: Careless and inconsiderate driving

1) AR:
a. Driving
b. A mechanically propelled vehicle
c. On a road or other public place
d. WITHOUT DUE CARE AND ATTENTION OR REASONABLE CONSIDERATION for other road users

24
Q

s.2 Road Traffic Act 1988 (Actus Reus)

A

Dangerous Driving:

1) AR:
a. Driving
b. A mechanically propelled vehicle
c. On a road or other public place
d. DANGEROUSLY

25
Q

Mens Rea for ss.2, 3 Road Traffic Act 1988 offences?

A

None: negligence offence. Driver is assessed against the standards of the reasonable driver – a fixed objective test (McCrone v Riding [1938] – Lord Hewart CJ: “the standard is an objective standard, impersonal and universal…It is in no way related to the degree of proficiency or degree of experience”)

26
Q

s.2A Road Traffic Act 1988

A

Meaning of dangerous driving:

1) D drove in a manner which fell far below what would be expected of a careful and competent driver; and,
It would be obvious to a careful and competent driver that driving in such a way would be dangerous.
Or;
2) The condition of the D’s vehicle is such that it would be obvious to a careful and competent driver that driving it would be dangerous.

27
Q

What are the two cases demonstrating that same sequence of events maintains the requisite coincidence of actus reus and mens rea?

A

R v Le Brun [1991]

Thabo-Meli v R [1954]

28
Q

R v Le Brun [1991]

A

D assaulted his wife then tried to move her. She slipped from his grip and banged her head on the pavement, fracturing her skull and dying. Court of Appeal upheld his conviction. Lord Lane: where the unlawful act of hitting her and the eventual act causing death were part of the SAME SERIES OF EVENTS, the fact there was a lapse in time between the two did not enable the D to escape liability.

29
Q

Thabo-Meli v R [1954]

A

D planned to kill V by hitting over head. Thinking V is dead, B disposes of body by throwing over cliff. V, however, did not die when hit over head but died by exposure some time later. Privy Council rejected arg that AR and MR did not coincide, acts were one series of acts carried out in order to achieve D’s plan.

30
Q

AR for simple criminal damage

A

s.1(1) Criminal Damage Act 1971:

AR:

1) Destroys or damages:
a. Roe v Kingerlee [1986]: Common sense approach – consider whether there has been any expense in restoration; a matter of fact and degree.
b. Hardman v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary [1986]: damage need not be extensive. (drawings on pavement made by using soluble chalks amounted to criminal damage as the local authority incurred expense in cleaning it up).

2) Property:
a. S.10(1) CDA: Anything tangible, real or personal. Inc. Money, property

3) Belonging to another:
a. s.10(2) CDA: property will belong to another if that person has custody/control/a proprietary right/interest/a charge on it.
b. R v Smith: D not liable if honestly believed property belonged to himself.

31
Q

MR for simple criminal damage

A

1) Intention or Recklessness to destroy/damage property
a. Either direct (Maloney) or indirect intent (Nedrick/Woollin) (see above)
b. Recklessness (Cunningham) (see above)

2) D KNOWS or is RECKLESS as to whether the property belongs to another

32
Q

Destroy or damage definitions?

A

Damage or destruction may be obvious. However:

a. Roe v Kingerlee [1986]: Common sense approach – consider whether there has been any expense in restoration; a matter of fact and degree.
b. Hardman v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary [1986]: damage need not be extensive. (drawings on pavement made by using soluble chalks amounted to criminal damage as the local authority incurred expense in cleaning it up).

33
Q

What constitutes property?

A

S.10(1) CDA: Anything tangible, real or personal. Inc. Money (s.10(1)(a)), property (s.10(1)(b))

34
Q

Belonging to another?

A

a. s.10(2) CDA: property will belong to another if that person has (a) custody/control/ (b) a proprietary right/interest/ (c) a charge on it.
b. R v Smith: D not liable if honestly believed property belonged to himself. (He had damaged fixtures at a property believing they belonged to him)

35
Q

Actus Reus of Aggravated Criminal Damage (s.1(2) CDA 1971)

A

1) Destroys or damages (as above)

2) Property (as above – but – property can belong to D)

36
Q

Mens Rea of Aggravated Criminal Damage (s.1(2)(a) and (b) CDA 1971)

A

1) Intention or Recklessness to destroy/damage property
2) Intention or Recklessness as to ENDANGERING LIFE OF ANOTHER (by the damage)
a. R v Dudley: life doesn’t actually have to be endangered
b. R v Steer: the endangerment to life must be from the damage/destruction itself (e.g. if drive car into café, danger to life must be from broken glass etc., NOT from the driving)

37
Q

R v Dudley [1989]

A

a. R v Dudley [1989] Court of Appeal: life doesn’t actually have to be endangered. Facts: D set fire to a house by throwing fire bomb into the property. Fire quickly extinguished, but Court upheld s.1(2) conviction, saying mens rea must be considered at the time the D did the act which caused the damage.

37
Q

R v Steer [1988]

A

the endangerment to life must be from the damage/destruction itself (e.g. if drive car into café, danger to life must be from broken glass etc., NOT from the driving)

38
Q

Can lawful excuse be used as a valid defence to aggravated criminal damage?

A

NO (s.5(1)). See WS2 for other defences that may apply (e.g. self-defence/prevention of crime)

38
Q

Arson

A

Simple arson: same as simple criminal damage – but for AR, insert “by fire” after destroys/damages. Aggravated arson: same as aggravated criminal damage – but for AR insert “by fire” after destroys/damages.

Simple arson: s.1(3) and s.1(1)
Aggravated arson: s.1(3) and s.1(2)

39
Q

R v Dudley [1989]

A

a. R v Dudley [1989] Court of Appeal: life doesn’t actually have to be endangered. Facts: D set fire to a house by throwing fire bomb into the property. Fire quickly extinguished, but Court upheld s.1(2) conviction, saying mens rea must be considered at the time the D did the act which caused the damage.

40
Q

R v Steer [1988]

A

the endangerment to life must be from the damage/destruction itself (e.g. if drive car into café, danger to life must be from broken glass etc., NOT from the driving)

41
Q

Arson

A

Simple arson: same as simple criminal damage – but for AR, insert “by fire” after destroys/damages. Aggravated arson: same as aggravated criminal damage – but for AR insert “by fire” after destroys/damages.

Simple arson: s.1(3) and s.1(1)
Aggravated arson: s.1(3) and s.1(2)