Week 6: Tragedy of the Commons Flashcards

1
Q

Define the tragedy of the commons according to Hardin​

A

A situation where individuals, acting in their own self-interest, overuse and deplete a shared resource, leading to its degradation or destruction, despite knowing that this behavior harms the whole group in the long run.​

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2
Q

What is a common property resource?​

A

A resource that is accessible to everyone (nonexcludable) but whose use reduces the quantity or quality available to others (rival). Examples: fisheries, groundwater, rivers.​

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3
Q

What is meant by “rival” and “nonexcludable”?​

A

Nonexcludable Good: A good that cannot easily exclude potential users (e.g., clean air).​

Rival Good: A good where one person’s use diminishes the availability to others (e.g., fish stocks).​

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4
Q

What could be a common? Give three examples​

A

Groundwater: Aquifers and underground water sources that can be accessed by multiple users, where over-extraction can lead to depletion and reduced water availability.​

​Public Beaches: Coastal areas open to everyone, which can become overcrowded and polluted if not managed properly.​

​Pastureland: Open grazing fields used by herders, where overgrazing can degrade the land and reduce its ability to sustain livestock.​

​Groundwater: Aquifers and underground water sources that can be accessed by multiple users, where over-extraction can lead to depletion and reduced water availability.​

​Public Beaches: Coastal areas open to everyone, which can become overcrowded and polluted if not managed properly.​

​Pastureland: Open grazing fields used by herders, where overgrazing can degrade the land and reduce its ability to sustain livestock.​

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5
Q

Why do individual exploit a common good?​

A

Self-Interest: Each person aims to maximize their own benefit from the resource, such as gaining more fish from a lake or more pasture for their animals, without considering the long-term impact on the resource.​

​Short-Term Gains vs. Long-Term Consequences: People are often driven by immediate rewards, such as profit or increased resources, rather than the long-term health of the common good. They may believe that the resource will not be depleted soon or that others will also exploit it anyway.​

​Lack of Regulation: When there are no rules or restrictions on the use of a common resource, individuals may feel free to use as much as they can, believing that if they don’t take advantage of it, others will.​

​Diffuse Responsibility: In a shared resource, the negative effects of overuse are spread across all users, so individuals may feel that their own contribution to the problem is small and won’t make a significant difference.​

​Fear of Missing Out: Individuals may exploit the resource out of fear that if they don’t use it, others will, leading to a mentality of “use it before others do.”​

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6
Q

How do you calculate the total revenue/total value?​

A

Total revenue (TR) is calculated by multiplying the price at which a product is sold by the quantity of that product sold. The formula for total revenue is:​

Total Revenue (TR)=Price per Unit (P)×Quantity Sold (Q)​

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7
Q

How do you calculate the total cost?​

A

Cost per unit * number of units​

​A unit could be a well, boat, or factory.​

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8
Q

How do you calculate the total net revenue?​

A

Total Net Revenue = Total Revenue – Total Cost​

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9
Q

How do you calculate the marginal revenue per boat, well, company etc.?​

A

Marginal Revenue = Total Revenue / Quantity​

 means the difference between two units of wells/boats/factories etc. ​

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10
Q

How do you calculate the marginal cost per boat, well, company etc.?​

A

Marginal Cost = Total Cost /  Quantity ​

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11
Q

How do you calculate the average revenue per boat, well, company etc.?​

A

Average Revenue = Total Revenue / Quantity​

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12
Q

How do you calculate the net revenue per boat, well, company etc.?​

A

Net Revenue (per boat) = Average Revenue – Marginal Cost​

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13
Q

Explain the concept of constant returns?​

A

constant returns to scale a proportional increase (or decrease) in one or more inputs results in the same proportional increase (or decrease) in output.​

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14
Q

Explain the concept of diminishing returns?​

A

diminishing returns a proportional increase (or decrease) in one or more inputs results in a smaller proportional increase (or decrease) in output.​

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15
Q

Explain the concept of absolutely diminishing returns?​

A

absolutely diminishing returns an increase in one or more inputs results in a decrease in output.​

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16
Q

Why does economic efficiency not work when confronted with common goods?​

A

The forces of free entry and profit maximization at the individual level, which usually work to promote economic efficiency, have exactly the opposite effect in the case of a common property resource. These forces encourage overuse, which ultimately eliminates any profitability in the industry and destroys the natural resource. The economic explanation is that e.g. fishers have free access to a valuable resource—fish stocks. Economic logic tells us that an underpriced resource will be overused, and a resource priced at zero will be squandered.​

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17
Q

What is social efficiency and when does the socially efficient equilibrium occur?​

A

Social efficiency occurs when resources are allocated in a way that maximizes the overall welfare of society. This means that the total benefits to society from the use of resources exceed the total costs associated with those resources.​

​Socially efficient equilibrium occurs when: ​

marginal social cost = marginal social benefit​

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18
Q

When do we achieve net social benefit?​

A

Net social benefit is the difference between the total benefits that society derives from an economic activity and the total costs incurred in that activity. It provides a measure of the overall economic value generated by a project, policy, or resource allocation.​

Net Social Benefit (NSB)=Total Social Benefits (TSB)−Total Social Costs (TSC)​

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19
Q

How do you determine the correct price of a license fee (e.g. fishing license)?​

A

The “correct” license fee is the difference between average revenue and average cost at the efficient level of effort. The license fee effectively moves us from the inefficient open-access equilibrium to the efficient outcome.​

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20
Q

What are the advantages and disadvantages of charging a license fee?​

A

Advantages of Charging a License Fee​

Resource Management: Helps regulate fishing efforts, preventing overfishing and promoting sustainability.​

Revenue Generation: Funds conservation efforts, research, and management programs for fisheries.​

User Accountability: Encourages responsible use of resources by establishing ownership and accountability.​

Data Collection: Provides valuable data on fishing activities and participant numbers for better management decisions.​

Disadvantages of Charging a License Fee​

Access Barriers: May limit access for low-income individuals, reducing participation in fishing.​

Compliance Costs: Increased administrative costs for enforcement and monitoring of licenses.​

Market Distortion: Can lead to unintended consequences if fees are set too high or low, affecting market dynamics.​

Resistance from Stakeholders: Potential pushback from fishers who may view fees as burdensome or unfair.​

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21
Q

What is Ostrom’s perspective on the tragedy of the commons?​

A

Diversity of Solutions: tragedy of the commons is not inevitable. Communities have historically developed effective self-governance systems for managing common-pool resources (CPRs).​

Human Cooperation: Ostrom highlights the capacity for humans to cooperate and create rules that enable sustainable resource management. ​

Empirical Evidence: Her analysis is based on empirical studies of various case studies where local communities have developed their own governance systems. ​

Flexible and Contextual Solutions: Ostrom advocates for flexible, context-specific approaches rather than a one-size-fits-all solution. She stresses the importance of institutional diversity, indicating that different communities may require different strategies based on their specific circumstances and cultural contexts.​

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22
Q

What does Ostrom criticize about Hardin’s work?​

A

Ostrom challenge Hardin’s view, arguing that his perspective oversimplifies the problem by assuming individuals are unable to self-organize and manage common resources sustainably.​

Contrary to Hardin’s pessimistic outlook, Ostrom present evidence that for thousands of years, resource users have developed successful self-governance systems. ​

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23
Q

How does Ostrom characterize Open Pool Resources?​

A

To better understand common-pool resource problems, we must separate concepts related to resource systems and those concerning property rights. We use the term commonpool resources (CPRs) to refer to resource systems regardless of the property rights involved. ​

CPRs include natural and human-constructed resources in which (i) exclusion of beneficiaries through physical and institutional means is especially costly, and (ii) exploitation by one user reduces resource availability for others.​

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24
Q

What types of CPR Users are there according to Ostrom?​

A

Users of a CPR include ​

those who always behave in a narrow, selfinterested way and never cooperate in dilemma situations (free-riders); ​

those who are unwilling to cooperate with others unless assured that they will not be exploited by freeriders; ​

those who are willing to initiate reciprocal cooperation in the hopes that others will return their trust; and ​

perhaps a few genuine altruists who always try to achieve higher returns for a group.​

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25
Q

What rule do norms play according to Ostrom?​

A

Encouraging Cooperative Behavior​

Building Trust and Reducing Uncertainty​

Facilitating Rule Compliance​

Sanctioning Free Riders​

Maintaining Long-Term Orientation​

26
Q

What are Ostrom’s 8 rules for managing the commons?​

A

Commons need to have clearly defined boundaries.​

Rules should fit local circumstances.​

Participatory decision-making is vital.​

Commons must be monitored.​

Sanctions for those who abuse the commons should be graduated.​

Conflict resolution should be easily accessible.​

Commons need the right to organise.​

Commons work best when nested within larger networks.​

27
Q

What are the challenges of managing Common Pool Resources according to Ostrom?​

A

Scaling-Up: Managing global resources involves coordinating efforts across billions of people, making it harder to establish, agree upon, and enforce rules. Local and national efforts can be beneficial but sometimes complicate broader coordination.​

​Cultural Diversity: While economic globalization is accompanied by cultural diversification, which can preserve local management practices, it also creates challenges in finding common ground. This is further complicated by economic disparities between industrialized (north) and less-developed (south) regions.​

Complexity of Interlinked CPRs: The interconnections between global issues, like biodiversity conservation and climate change, create challenges. As global interdependence grows, understanding and addressing these intertwined problems becomes more difficult, making it harder to find fair and effective solutions.​

​Accelerating Change: Rapid changes in population, economy, and technology are pushing the world past environmental thresholds quickly, leaving little time to adapt and learn from past experiences.​

​Need for Unanimous Agreement: Effective global resource management often relies on voluntary treaties, where some nations can delay agreements for special concessions. This slows down the process and complicates policy-making.​

28
Q

What type of evidence do Hardin and Ostrom give for their research?​

A

Hardin: Based on theoretical models and a deterministic outlook.​

​Ostrom: Based on theoretical models and a deterministic outlook. ​

29
Q

Compare Hardin’s and Ostrom’s perspective on the tragedy of the commons.​

A

Nature of Human Behavior: Hardin views humans as primarily self-interested and prone to overexploitation, while Ostrom acknowledges self-interest but emphasizes the potential for cooperation and collective action.​

Inevitability vs. Possibility: Hardin believes the tragedy is inevitable without external control, whereas Ostrom argues that communities can effectively self-organize to manage common resources sustainably.​

​Proposed Solutions: Hardin suggests privatization or government control, while Ostrom advocates for locally-developed governance structures and rules tailored to specific community needs. ​

30
Q

How do Hardin and Ostrom view human nature?​

A

Hardin: Assumes individuals are rational, self-interested maximizers.​

​Ostrom: Acknowledges self-interest but emphasizes capacity for cooperation and reciprocity.​

31
Q

How do Hardin and Ostrom view the role of self-organization?​

A

Hardin is skeptical of self-organization, viewing it as a pathway to resource depletion unless controlled externally.​

Ostrom views self-organization as a viable and often successful strategy for managing commons, backed by empirical examples and specific governance principles.​

32
Q

What solutions do Hardin and Ostrom propose for the tragedy of the commons?​

A

Hardin​

Privatization: Converting common resources into private property can create incentives for individuals to manage resources sustainably.​

Centralized Control: Alternatively, he argues for government intervention to regulate and control the use of commons, effectively enforcing limits on exploitation.​

​Ostrom:

Local Governance: Encourage communities to develop their own rules and management systems tailored to specific resources.​

Defined Boundaries: Establish clear boundaries for resource access to prevent overexploitation.​

Collective Decision-Making: Involve users in decision-making processes to enhance compliance and investment in sustainable practices.​

Monitoring: Implement mechanisms for monitoring resource use to ensure adherence to rules.​

Sanctioning Mechanisms: Create systems for enforcing rules and imposing penalties for violations.​

Conflict Resolution: Establish processes for resolving disputes among users to maintain cooperation and trust.​

33
Q

What are possible solutions to the tragedy of the commons?​

A

Establishing Property Rights​
- State Property​
- Communal Property​
- Privatization​

Command & Control​
- Prohibition of extracting resources e.g. fishing ban​
- Restrict how many days in a season resource can be extracted​
- Establish conservation areas​

Market-based Solutions​
- Quotas​
- Licenses​
- Individual tradable quotas​

Norms​

34
Q

What are the advantages and disadvantages of privatization to solve the tragedy of the commons?​

A

Advantages​
- Excludability​
- Regulation of use​
- Incentive for using resource sustainably​
- Clear accountability​

​Disadvantages:
- Some resources cannot be privatized e.g. biodiversity or atmosphere​
- Hard to enforce private ownership of vast property like lake, forest etc.​
- Exclusion of Communities and Inequity​

35
Q

What are the advantages and disadvantages of Quotas to solve the tragedy of the commons?​

A

Advantages​
- Conserving resource​
- Economic stability​

​Disadvantages:
- Difficulty in Setting Accurate Quotas​
- Difficult to enforce​
- Initial economic disruption​
- Potential for High Administrative Costs​

36
Q

What are the advantages and disadvantages of ITQs to solve the tragedy of the commons?​

A

Advantages​
- Provides Economic Flexibility​
- Incentivizes Long-term Sustainability​

Disadvantages:
- Risk of Quota Concentration​
- High Initial Costs for Implementation​
- Challenges with Quota Setting​
- Social and Cultural Disruptions​

37
Q

What are the advantages and disadvantages of norms to solve the tragedy of the commons?​

A

Advantages​
- Low Cost and Flexibility​
- Strong Social Pressure and Community Enforcement​
- Adaptability to Local Conditions​
- Empowerment and Community Ownership​
- Can Complement Formal Regulations​

Disadvantages:
- Dependence on Social Cohesion and Community Size​
- Lack of Formal Enforcement Mechanisms​
- Vulnerability to External Pressures​
- Potential for Exclusion or Inequity​

38
Q

What are the four types of property rights according to Feeny?​

A

open access​

private property​

communal property​

state property​

39
Q

What Feeny say about the characteristics of Common Property Resources?​

A

Common-property resources share two important characteristics:​

Excludability: difficulty in preventing access​

Subtractability: use by one user affects availability for others​

40
Q

Why is exclusion and use regulation important?​

A

Exclusion and use regulation are crucial in managing common-property resources because they address the fundamental challenges posed by the nature of these resources: their excludability and subtractability​

41
Q

Define open access. Give an example. ​

A

Open access occurs when a resource lacks well-defined property rights or ownership. This means that anyone can use the resource without needing permission or facing restrictions.​

​Common examples include oceans, the atmosphere, and certain fisheries or rangelands where there are no mechanisms in place to limit who can extract the resource or how much they can take. ​

42
Q

Is exclusion successful in open access?​

A

Lack of Exclusion:​

Exclusion refers to the ability to control access to a resource, typically by preventing unauthorized users from exploiting it.​

In open access regimes, there is no exclusion—no authority or group has the right or ability to limit who uses the resource. Because of this, anyone who has the ability to use or extract the resource can do so freely.​

This lack of exclusion can lead the “tragedy of the commons.​

43
Q

Is use regulation successful in open access?​

A

Absence of Use Regulation:​

In an open access system, there are no formal regulations governing how the resource is used. There might be no restrictions on the quantity or timing of extraction, nor any rules that coordinate usage among different users.​

44
Q

What are the consequences of having open access to a resource?​

A

The combination of lack of exclusion and absence of use regulation leads to a situation where the resource is vulnerable to overuse and degradation.​

Since no user can be excluded, and there are no rules to moderate use, each individual has an incentive to extract as much as possible before others do. This often results in a race to exploit the resource, leading to its rapid depletion.​

Classic examples include the depletion of fish stocks in unregulated oceans, deforestation on open-access land, and overgrazing on communal rangelands that have lost traditional management systems. ​

45
Q

Define communal property. Give examples​

A

In a communal property system, a resource is owned and managed by an identifiable community or group. The rights to use the resource are shared among community members, and decisions about how the resource is used are made collectively.​

This type of property regime is common in traditional societies and rural areas where communities manage resources like forests, fisheries, grazing lands, or water systems. ​

An example could be a communal garden, a shared well in a village or a shared fishing pond.​

46
Q

Is exclusion successful for communal property?​

A

In communal property regimes, the community excludes outsiders from using the resource. The right to access and use the resource is limited to members of the community.​

The community itself decides who belongs to the group and who is allowed to access the resource, effectively preventing unauthorized users from exploiting it.​

This ability to exclude others is crucial for preventing overexploitation by outside users, helping to preserve the resource for the benefit of the community members. ​

47
Q

Is regulation of use successful for communal property?​

A

In communal property systems, communities often develop customary rules and local regulations that dictate how much of the resource each member can use, when they can use it, and under what conditions.​

Examples of such regulations include rotational grazing on communal pasturelands, fishing quotas in community-managed coastal areas, and seasonal harvesting rules in communal forests.​

These rules are often adapted to local ecological conditions and social norms, making them effective in managing resources sustainably. ​

48
Q

Give examples of successful communal property management of resources. ​

A

Japanese Coastal Fisheries: Communities in Japan have long managed coastal fishing areas through communal property arrangements, with legally recognized exclusive fishing rights and community-developed rules for sustainable harvesting.​

Maine Lobster Fisheries: Lobster fishing territories in Maine are often managed by local communities through informal rules that regulate who can fish where, helping to prevent overfishing.​

Water Users’ Associations: In parts of India, village water users’ associations manage irrigation systems, regulating water allocation to ensure fair distribution among farmers. ​

49
Q

What are the challenges of managing communal property?​

A

While communal property can be effective, it faces challenges such as pressure from external forces, population growth, or economic changes that can strain the community’s ability to manage the resource.​

Breakdowns can occur when the community loses the ability to exclude outsiders or enforce its regulations, often due to external interventions like state appropriation or market integration.​

Scale is also a challenge—communal management is generally more effective for resources that are local or have clear boundaries, whereas larger-scale resources may require coordination with other communities or external entities. ​

50
Q

Define state property. Give examples. ​

A

Under a state property regime, the government or a specific state institution holds the ownership rights to a resource.​

The state acts as the central authority that manages and makes decisions regarding access, allocation, and the conditions for resource use.​

Examples of state property include national parks, government-managed forests, public waterways, and mineral resources. ​

51
Q

Is exclusion successful for state property?​

A

The state has the authority to exclude unauthorized users by setting rules for who can access the resource and under what conditions. For instance, permits or licenses may be required to fish in state-managed waters or to harvest timber from state-owned forests.​

The state can set boundaries around protected areas, such as national parks, and restrict entry to preserve the resource. This ability to control access can help protect resources from overuse or unauthorized exploitation. ​

52
Q

Is regulation of use successful for state property?

A

In a state property regime, the government has the responsibility to develop and enforce regulations that specify how resources are used. This might include setting quotas, limiting the timing and methods of extraction, or regulating activities like fishing, logging, and grazing.​

Use regulations are designed to ensure sustainable resource use by controlling the rate and methods of exploitation. For example, a government might impose catch limits on fish to prevent overfishing or set rules about logging to ensure reforestation. ​

53
Q

What are the challenges of managing state property?​

A

Enforcement Issues: Effective exclusion and use regulation depend on the government’s capacity to enforce rules. In many cases, especially in less-developed regions, the state may lack the resources or personnel to monitor and enforce regulations effectively.​

Bureaucratic Complexity: State management can lead to over-regulation or cumbersome administrative processes, which may discourage compliance or result in inefficiencies. For example, complicated permit processes can be hard to enforce, leading to illegal activities or noncompliance.​

Political Influence: The effectiveness of state property management can be affected by political considerations. Sometimes, regulations may favor certain groups or interests, leading to unequal access or overexploitation due to political pressures rather than ecological needs. ​

54
Q

What are the advantages of State Property?​

A

Centralized Coordination: The state can provide a coordinated approach to resource management, ensuring that policies are aligned with broader national interests, such as conservation or economic development.​

Public Interest Focus: State management can ensure that resources are used in ways that benefit the public at large, rather than individual interests. For example, forests might be protected for their ecological value, even if it means restricting logging.​

Protection of Large-Scale Resources: For resources that extend beyond local community boundaries, such as large forests, rivers, or wildlife populations, state property can provide the necessary oversight and management to prevent overuse across a wider area. ​

55
Q

Define Private Property. Give examples. ​

A

Private property rights give an individual or a defined group exclusive control over a resource. This can include land, water, fisheries, forests, or other valuable assets.​

The rights to a private property resource usually include the ability to sell, lease, or transfer these rights to others, making them transferable. ​

Examples are private agricultural land, private forests, private cattle herds.​

56
Q

Is exclusion successful for private property?​

A

Exclusion is one of the defining features of private property. The owner has the legal authority to prevent others from accessing or using the resource.​

This right to exclude means that the property owner can control who uses the resource and under what conditions.​

For example, a person who owns a piece of land can decide who can enter, cultivate, or harvest resources from that land. If the land is privately owned, others cannot use it without the owner’s permission. ​

57
Q

Is regulation of use successful for private property?​

A

The property owner has the incentive to manage the resource efficiently, as they directly benefit from its productivity and value.​

For instance, a private forest owner may decide to cut down trees at a sustainable rate to maintain the forest’s long-term productivity and economic value.​

Use regulation is guided by the owner’s goals, whether they focus on maximizing profit, maintaining the resource, or using it for personal enjoyment. ​

58
Q

What are the advantages of private property?​

A

The right to exclude others and regulate use creates an incentive for the property owner to consider the long-term value of the resource.​

When the resource’s future productivity or value directly benefits the owner, they are more likely to invest in sustainable practices (e.g., planting trees after harvesting, implementing soil conservation techniques, or limiting resource extraction to sustainable levels).​

However, these incentives depend on the owner’s goals and time horizon. For example, an owner may choose to exhaust a resource quickly if short-term profits are prioritized over long-term sustainability. ​

59
Q

What are the challenges of private property?​

A

Short-Term Profit Motives: Owners might prioritize short-term gains over long-term sustainability if they believe future profits are uncertain or if there are higher returns available from other investments. For example, it may be economically rational for a private owner to deplete a slow-growing species like whales or redwoods rather than wait for them to regenerate.​

Enforcement Costs: Maintaining exclusion can be costly, especially if the property is large or remote, requiring investment in fencing, security, or monitoring to prevent unauthorized access.​

Externalities: Private owners may not fully account for the environmental impacts their resource use has on others. For example, pollution from privately owned factories can affect neighboring communities. ​

60
Q

What is Feeny’s conclusion towards Hardin’s research?​

A

Feeny concludes that Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” is insightful but overly simplistic. He critiques Hardin’s assumptions of inevitable overexploitation under open access, highlighting that communal management can be effective with proper rules and social norms. Feeny calls for a broader theory that considers institutional and cultural factors, showing that sustainable management is possible under private, state, or communal regimes.​

61
Q

Do you think that ‘the tragedy of the commons’ offers a good explanation for unsustainability? Can you give a few examples?​

A

yes I think the tragedy of the commons offers a good explanation for some aspects of unsustainability.​

it shows that individual act in their own short term interest and ruin long term sustainability for nature and ultimately for themselves, their descendants and community- examples:​
- overfishing of oceans​
- deforestation especially in amazon​
- air pollution especially in urban areas like mumbay ​
- groundwater depletion especially in california for almond farming- however, the tragedy does not always take place. ​

There are many examples of effective management of commons without leading to unsustainability- examples: ​
- grazing management in alps​
- community forest management in Nepal​
- water management in huerta of Valencia​

the tragedy of the commons is not sufficient to explain unsustainability in all its facets. it leaves out how unusustainability can occur when property rights are clearly defined - examples: ​
- sealing of land with private housing​
- use of pesticides and herbicides​

it also assumes that people are rational und knowing. Unsustainability also occurs because of lack of knowledge and irrational behavior​

62
Q

Is climate change a tragedy of the commons? If yes: what is needed for successful management?​

A

Yes, important aspects of climate change are a tragedy of the commons- atmosphere/oceans/rivers/biodiversity etc. are a common and is treated terribly​

different measures could be implemented to avoid the tragedy​

privatization is unrealistic​

a ITQ system is the beast option like the trade with carbon certificates -​

advantage: government control how much pollution is entering earth systems, can lower the level bit by bit​

disadvantage: hard to implement on global level, hard to implement for each sector (how would it work for biodiversity?)​

norms & trust​

advantage: public shaming has worked before e.g. FFF​

disadvantage: unrealistic that it works effectively on global or even international level- ​

prohibition of certain practices​

advantage: has worked in the past, could follow after ITQ system​

disadvantage: lobby is strong, cant ban everything because industry would collapse​