Week 5- The acquisition of beneficial interests in the family home Flashcards
What is the effect of a severance when an express declaration of the proceeds of sale is to be held on trust as joint tenants, following Goodman v Gallant?
How does an express declaration of trust operate in conjunction with potential constructive or resulting trusts?
Where a conveyance into joint names contains an express declaration that the parties are to hold the proceeds of sale on trust for themselves as joint tenants, then on severance a tenancy in common in equal shares is created, and the declaration is conclusive of the position
Furthermore, the doctrine of resulting implied or constructive trusts could not be invoked where there was an express declaration which comprehensively declared what were the beneficial interests in the property or its proceeds of sale since such a declaration was exhaustive and conclusive of the position unless and until the conveyance was set aside or rectified. D was therefore entitled to a half share of the beneficial interest in the property.
Facts and significance of Lloyds Bank v Rosset regarding the common intention constructive trust and how this works in conjunction with actual occupation overriding interest?
Firstly, the date for determining whether one has an overriding interest in the face of a charge over property is the date at which the charge was created. Thus, in the absence of the common intention constructive trust, the wife had no beneficial interest in the home when the husband secretly granted the charge over the house- therefore, she had no overriding interest capable of postponing the charge of the bank.
There was no common intention capable of forming a mere equity in favour of the wife which could crystallise into an overriding interests as per s70(g) of LOPA 1925. no inference to this effect could be drawn from her help with renovation.
What does Oxley v Hiscock say about an application under s14 of TLATA regarding respective beneficial interests in the family home, in the absence of any express discussion over parties respective interests.
In proceedings under the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 s.14, where there was no evidence of any discussion between the parties as to the extent of their respective beneficial interests in the proceeds of sale of a property, the court had to have regard to the whole course of dealing between them in relation to the property and decide what would be a fair share for each of them*
What sort of things will the courts have regard to when determining the respective interests in the family home, under the common intention constructive trust, known as the “whole course of dealing” (when no express declaration of respective interests could be adduced)?
And, in that context, “the whole course of dealing between them in relation to the property” includes the arrangements which they make from time to time in order to meet the outgoings (for example, mortgage contributions, council tax and utilities, repairs, insurance and housekeeping) which have to be met if they are to live in the property as their home.**
What is the main significance of Stack v Dowden, other than being fucking retarded?
Why is Lady Hale so wrong?
That where property is conveyed into joint names, the onus is on the person seeking to show that the respective interests in the family home are other than equal/ 50%. This is so, in the absence of any explicit declaration of trust, such as that found in Goodman v Gallant.
She says that, as a result of all the possible considerations regarding the context of marriage in co-habitees, she believes it will be very unlikely that the presumption be displaced because the legal interests and beneficial interests are very likely to always align. She considers that this common intention may change but in very limited circumstances.
What factors will the courts take into consideration when looking to depart from the common intention constructive trust presumption of beneficial interest equality?
Not only financial contributions in a variety of different contexts eg mortgages, loans, renovations, but also the purpose for which the home was bought, the personalities and relationship of the parties too.
What is the presumption where property is conveyed into one name despite co-habitees?
He who wants to claim a beneficial interest in the property must prove that any interest in the property exists at all.
How does Jones v Kernott qualify the decision in Stack v Dowden regarding the rebuttal of the CITC presumption?
Where there is evidence to rebut the presumption but the evidence is not conclusive of the respective shares, it is down to the courts to impute a fair apportionment of the respective beneficial interests in the property.
What were the facts of Jones v Kernott and what was the decision?
Facts- The parties purchased the property in joint names, shared house expenses for over eight years, before the defendant moved out. The appellant appealed against a decision that the house was owned in joint and equal shares, and a 90% 10% split in their favour was ruled, before K appealed to the court of appeal to.
Significance- the appeal was allowed, and the starting point was that a rebuttable presumption held that the beneficial property coincided with the legal estate, subject to any evidence to the contrary (ie express declaration of trust in favour of co-habitants, but more likely in this case it may be contributions in unequal proportions). The court had to ascertain the common intention of the parties in light of the whole course of conduct.
What 5 principles were expounded in Jones v Kernott when working out the extent of the CITC in a family home?
Five principles apply:
(1) The starting point where a family home is bought in joint names is that they own the property as joint tenants in law and equity;
(2) That presumption can be displaced by evidence that their common intention was, in fact, different either when the property was purchased or later;
(3) Common intention is to be objectively inferred from the conduct and dealings of the parties;
(4) Where it is clear they had a different intention at the outset or changed their original intentions, but it is not possible to infer an actual intention as to the respective shares, then the Court is entitled to impute an intention that each is entitled to the share which the Court considers fair having regard to the whole course of dealing between them in relation to the property;
(5) Each case will turn on its own facts; financial contributions are relevant but there are many other factors which may enable the Court to decide what shares were intended or fair.
What was the outcome of Jones v Kernott?
In this case the County Court Judge found that the intentions had changed after separation and it was a logical inference that the parties intended Mr Kernott’s interest to crystallise in 1995 when they took the property off the market and cashed in an insurance policy to allow Mr Kernott to purchase a property of his own. The calculations of their shares as at 1995 produced a result so close to the 10% awarded by the County Court Judge that it was wrong for an appellate Court to interfere.
What was required before a non-legal owner was to be granted any beneficial interest in Lloyds v Rosset, and what did Abbott v Abbott have to say about this, following Stack v Dowden?
PAYMENT BY THE PARTY WHO WAS NOT LEGAL OWNER WAS REQUIRED BEFORE SUCH AN INFERENCE WAS TO BE DRAWN
Abbott v Abbott, following Stack v Dowden and Jones v Kernott, the law had sinced moved on from there, and the whole course of conduct and contextual relationship-related factors were to be taken into consideration, not merely purchase contribution.
Facts and significance of Abbott v Abbott?
The trial judge was correct to order a 50-50 split, and the gift of the husbands mother was not, the court believed, intended to be a gift merely to the son so as to shift the relative purchase price contribution in his favour.
Significance- Appeal allowed in part- the CA was wrong to interfere with the trial judge’s finding that the interests were 50-50. The law had moved on since Rosset, and it was no longer applicable to this type of situation. Thus, the facts and situation altogether lead to the conclusion that the house was to be owned in equity in equal shares.
How do Lloyds Bank v Rosset and Oxley v Hiscock begin to split the acquisition and quantification stages of imputing a common intention constructive trust?
Lloyds Bank is perhaps less successful at making this split because it still expounds a requirement that purchase price be contributed before a beneficial interest be granted to a non-legal owner, but it nevertheless shows that acquisition of a family home, conveyed into one name, is not conclusive of the final position.
Oxley v Hiscock, as supported by Stack v Dowden, shows that the onus falls upon the party wishing to claim a beneficial interest to rebut the presumption against them, but that, where no express agreement as to apportionment is present, the courts must have regards to the whole circumstances when deciding on a fair apportionment of beneficial interests.
What issue does Geary v Ranine highlight regarding varying beneficial interests from legal interests in the commercial context?
The presumption of sole beneficial interest in property registered in sole name difficult to rebut where property was bought for investment purposes.
Facts- G and R were in a relationship, R purchased a guest house, got a manager to run it, but they failed, and R ran the business himself. Upon being unable to run it alone, G was drafted in to help, involved in all the business. No wages were paid, G asked for money when she needed. Geary brought a claim for an interest in the guest house. She claimed she either had a business Partnership (as defined under the Partnership Act 1890) or a constructive trust as defined by case law.
Significance- The court of appeal dismissed her appeal, and that the legal title was solely in R’s name. The presumption of equal beneficial shares did not apply here, and the burden of establishing a constructive trust was on G. The relevant question was whether there was a common intention for G to have a beneficial interest in the property, applying Jones v Kernott, which must be determined objectively by the parties conduct.
