Week 4: Punishment & Reward

Question 1

What is the name of the research of Chen, Pillutla & Yao?

Answer 1

Unintended consequences of cooperation

Question 2

According to Chen et al., What is a possible solution for promoting cooperation in social dilemmas?

Answer 2

A sanction system based on fines:

rewarding cooperators, punishing non-cooperators and monitoring group members

Question 3

What negative consequence could exist when using rewards and punishments to promote cooperation? Explain why this happens (Chen et al,)

Answer 3

Rewards and punishments can undermine the natural tendency to cooperate because they can affect the intrinsic motivation of individuals.

Question 4

Explain The Goal expectation theory of cooperation van Chen et al.,

Answer 4

That individual contribution to the provision of a public good depends on expectations about how much others in the group will contribute. These expectations are influenced by attributions, both external and internal.

Question 5

According to the goal expectation theory of cooperation, how does the presence of extrinsic factors for cooperation influence individuals’ expectations of continued cooperation? (Chen et al.,)

Answer 5

When extrinsic factors are salient, individuals view others as extrinsically motivated and expect less cooperation when these factors are absent.

Question 6

How can moral appeals focus attention on the larger purpose of the group in a social dilemma? (Chen et al.,)

Answer 6

Moral appeals may emphasize, that cooperation is essential for the well-being of the whole group, independent of individual rewards or punishments.

Question 7

According to Chen et al., What was promoted by moral appeals regarding intergroup relationships?

Answer 7

Appeals increased trust in fellow members of the group and makes the internal motivation salient

Question 8

What is the name of the research from Mulder, van Dijk, de Cremer & Wile?

Answer 8

When sanctions fail to increase cooperation

Question 9

How does Mulder et al., defines social dilemma in their research?

Answer 9

Social dilemmas = conflict between personal and collective interests.

Question 10

Name the two characteristics of social dilemma (Mulder et al..,)

Answer 10

1. All individuals attain higher outcomes when everybody furthers the collective interests (cooperation) rather than when everybody furthers their personal interests(defection).
2. It is more profitable for individual group members to defect than to cooperate

Question 11

According to Mulder et al.,, What is the reason why sanctioning systems may increase cooperation?

Answer 11

They make defection less attractive and change the pay off structure of a social dilemma

Question 12

Name the 2 defection motives in cooperation (Mulder et al.,)

Answer 12

Greed: They make defection less attractive
Fear: They create expectations and trust that other group members will refrain from defection to avoid the sanction

Question 13

Mulder et al., added in the three option conditions experiment an alternative option to defecate. What is the observed behavior when a punishment is present in this situation?(Mulder et al.,)

Answer 13

When a punishment is present, it is observed that the frequency of the alternative option increases.

Question 14

What are some possible consequences of expecting non-cooperation from fellow group members? (Mulder et al.,)

Answer 14

1. Reduce the rewards of cooperation;
2. Sucker effect: people do not want to be exploited by others and therefore may decide against cooperation;
3. Activates noncooperative intentions;
4. Reciprocate the behavior they expect in others

Question 15

What is meant by the “sucker effect” in the context of expectations of collaboration?(Mulder et al.,)

Answer 15

Refers to the idea that people do not want to be taken advantage of by others and therefore may decide against cooperation.

Question 16

Flashcard Question: What is the potential impact of sanctioning systems when initial expectations of cooperation are low?

Answer 16

Answer: Sanctioning systems can worsen the situation when initial expectations of cooperation are low.

Question 17

When is the likelihood of sanctions failing to increase cooperation higher?(Mulder et al.,)

Answer 17

When people initially hold noncooperative expectations of others and when a third option is present.

Question 18

Name the title of the research from Mooijman, van Dijk, Ellemers & van Dijk

Answer 18

Why leaders punish: A power perspective

Question 19

Explain the Deterrence motive of punishment and it’s aim? (Mooijman et al.,)

Answer 19

The desire to deter people from engaging in uncooperative, rule-breaking behavior.

Aims to deter future rule-breaking behaviour from all individuals through the instalment and implementation of punishments.

Question 20

Explain the Just-deserts motive and it’s aim? (Mooijman et al.,)

Answer 20

Giving offenders their deserved punishment.

Aims to achieve retributive justice by retroactively and proportionally punishing individual rule breakers

Question 21

How is power associated with the use of deterrence as a punishment motive according to Mooijman et al.,?

Answer 21

Power increases distrust, which in turn leads to greater reliance on deterrence as a punishment motive and an increase in the use of punishments that are suitable as a deterrant

(Public punishment and punishments with a mandatory minimum)

Question 22

According to Mooijmaker et al, how is power associated with distrust?

Answer 22

Because those in power expect that others cannot be trusted to cooperate, because this increases their vulnerability to losing resources and power to others.

Question 23

What is the relationship between power, distrust and deterrence according to Mooijman et al.,?

Answer 23

That more power leads to more distrust and then more deterrence as a motive for punishment.

Question 24

What is the motivation of those in power for predicting distrust in others?(Mooijman et al.,)

Answer 24

Because they expect that others cannot be trusted to cooperate in order to protect their advantageous position.

Question 25

What negative behavior is a consequence of when people strongly distrust each other?(Mooijman et al.,)

Answer 25

When people strongly distrust each other, more uncooperative and rule-breaking behavior is expected to occur.

Question 26

What is the relationship between increasing distrust and the choice of deterrence as a punishment motive? (Mooijman et al.,)

Answer 26

Increasing distrust increases reliance on deterrence as a punishment motive rather than justice or deserved punishment.

Question 27

Explain the statement “power increases reliance” (Mooijman et al.,)

Answer 27

An individual will be more inclined to distrust others and therefore rely more on deterrence as a punishment motive.

Question 28

Name the 2 ways of punishments with deterrence motive of punishment? (Mooijman et al.,)

Answer 28

Public punishment
Punishment with a mandatory minimum

Question 29

According to the results of Mooijman et al.’s study, what was the consequence of increased reliance on deterrence by power?

Answer 29

Power made participants more favorable toward the implementation of punishments that are public or have a mandatory minimum

Question 30

Why is it argued that power undermines trust in others?(Mooijmaker et al.,,)

Answer 30

Because power increases the expectation that others are likely to break the rules, which explains the relationship between power and deterrence.

Question 31

What does the research of Mooijmaker et al., states about the influence of power on punitive motives?

Answer 31

Power affects the reliance on deterrence through a decreased trust in others.

Question 32

What is the name of the research which has been done by Molenmaker, de Kwaadsteniet and van Dijk?

Answer 32

(Un)willingness to punish non-cooperation

Question 33

What is the “do-no-harm” principle? (Molenmaker et al.,)

Answer 33

The “do-no-harm” principle reflects people’s general reluctance to inflict harm on others.

Question 34

What is the reason why people apply the “Do-no-harm principle to their use of sanctions?(Molenmaker et al.,)

Answer 34

because they feel personally responsible for the harm done - people are reluctant to punish to the extent that they feel personally responsible for the harm done.

Question 35

Explain the concept of “diffusion of responsibility”? (Molenmaker et al.,)

Answer 35

Feelings of responsibility are reduced in the presence of others with whom responsibility can be shared.
– individuals in groups are less restrained by a sense of personal responsibility for their actions.

Question 36

How do feelings of personal responsibility influence reluctance to do harm? according to Molenmaker et al.,?

Answer 36

Personal responsibility decreases the reluctance to do harm.

Question 37

When is the reluctance to inflict harm stronger according to Molenmaker et al,?

Answer 37

When people are directly responsible for the anticipated harm and when harmful outcomes result from people’s actions rather than their inactions.

Question 38

What is meant by the self-restraining tendency in punishing non-cooperation, as described by Molenmaker et al.?

Answer 38

The self-limiting tendency to punish non-cooperation stems from a sense of personal responsibility for the harm inflicted.erative and rule-breaking behavior will occur.

Question 39

How does personal responsibility influence willingness to punish according to Molenmaker et al.,?

Answer 39

It affects willingness to punish because people feel internally responsible for the harm they might cause.

Question 40

What 3 determinants does the triangle model of responsibility exist of? (Molenmaker et al.,)

Answer 40

1. Knows what action should be performed
2. Is obligated to perform the anticipated action
3. Has personal control over the anticipated action

Question 41

How is the sense of personal responsibility affected when the 3 determinants decrease in magnitude? (triangle model of responsibility - Molenmaker et al.,)

Answer 41

As the determinants (knowing what action, obligation, personal control) decrease in magnitude, so will the sense of personal responsibility.

Question 42

How does the reluctance to punish non-cooperative behavior differ between individuals who decide alone and those who decide in groups?(Molenmaker et al.,)

Answer 42

Individuals in groups are less reluctant to punish uncooperative behavior, with the relative preference for reward over punishment being especially dominant when individuals decide alone.

Question 43

What did the results show of Molenmaker et al., about the punishment of non-cooperative choice behavior compared to reward for cooperative behavior?(Molenmaker et al.,)

Answer 43

Non-cooperative choice behavior was less often punished than cooperative choice behavior was rewarded, with a stronger effect when participants decided alone.

Question 44

Why in punishment are people not only concerned about the moral “wrongness” of the harm inflicted? (Molenmaker et al.,)

Answer 44

In punishment, people are influenced more by their own role in the harm inflicted than by purely moral aspects.

Question 45

What is an important determinant of willingness to punish non-cooperative behavior according to the results of Molenmaker et al.,?

Answer 45

Personal responsibility appears to be an important determinant of willingness to punish uncooperative behavior.

Question 46

When was non-cooperative behavior more often punished according to the results of Molenmaker et al.,?

Answer 46

Non-cooperative behavior was punished more often when the decision was made jointly.