Week 4: Organizational Design and Organizational Culture Flashcards

1
Q

agenda setting

A

setter chooses an alternative policy. voters vote b/w alternative and status quo.

example: zero-based budgeting in US schools 1970s. +: increased deliberation and purged group influence embedded in past budgets.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

focal points example

A

NY, LA, SF game played in class

Culture as selecting equilibria

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

repeated games: trust game

cynical equil.
grim trigger

A

employee: trust, don’t trust.
employer: abuse, don’t abuse

cynical: always don’t trust, always abuse
grim: trust until abused, then never trust

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

subjective performance contract AKA _____. unlike standard contract, subj. perf. contract:

example.

A

relational contract.
doesn’t require third party enforcement

example: principal evaluation of teacher are best predictor of quality. problems: if bonus is big, create incentives for boss to renege. also creates incentives to lobby for better evaluations

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

Type I error

A

reject null hypothesis when it’s true

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

Type II error

A

accept null hypothesis when it’s false

avoiding type II error requires that all components succeed (in rocket launches, any safety unit can cancel launch).

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

strategic redundancy. multiple agents can be less effective than one. So principal should…

A

(1) reward agent performance - through subjective performance evaluation or an explicit contract

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

Median voter theorem:

A

Median voter theorem: one implicit assumption is that the median’s preferred policy is on the agenda, and IF it gets on the agenda it will win out over anything else. This applies when no player has a lot of agenda power.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

Setter Model

A

Setter Model.
If a player does have a lot of agenda power, then, first, a setter chooses a policy. Status quo vs. setter’s policy. The setter model actually described the budget process of some public sector agencies

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

Zero based budgeting

A

Zero based budgeting. School board would set budget, propose to voters after default budget of zero. it was thought that this would increase deliberation. start from the ground up every year. Group C will always try to set budget as high as possible – but to the point where B is indifferent and will agree to C (over 0).

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

Culture as focal point

A

One role of culture may be of providing the focal point for us. A way of understanding what to do with certain situations when we do need to coordinate. E.g. opening a gift while the giver is there or after the giver leaves. no approach is better than the other, what matter is what the agreement is on appropriate behaviors.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

grim trigger

A

grim trigger. i will keep trusting until the first time that you abuse my trust, then for the rest of the time, i will not trust you. so, the employers strategy is I will not abuse the trust until … if delta is sufficiently high, then the boss will continue to not abuse. if hyperbolic discounting, your impatient means you’ll be more likely to abuse.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

cynical equilbrium

A

cynical equilibrium: always don’t trust, always abuse

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

Folk Theorems

A

Folk Theorems: for most games, many equilibria exist. payoffs for all the players have to be better than payoffs from playing the game just once. if anyone deviates, then we punish that player.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

Type I vs Type II error example

Tradeoff - you can do things that avoid Type ___ errors, but you are correspondingly increasingly the probability of Type __ errors.

A

Null hypothesis = presumption of innocence.
Type 1 = convicting the innocent
Type 2 = letting the guilty go free

Space Shuttle Example.
The null hypothesis of NASA is that the space is not safe to launch. (in most judicial systems, the person is NOT guilty until proven otherwise).
Type 1 error = saying that it IS safe to launch when it’s not safe. error of commission. (killed 7 people)
Type 2 error = saying that it’s not safe to launch when it is safe.

Other examples: FDA trials before drugs go to market, checkpoints at airport post 9/11

Tradeoff - you can do things that avoid Type I errors, but you are correspondingly increasingly the probability of Type II errors.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

Pareto efficiency/optimality

A

Pareto efficiency, or Pareto optimality, is a state of allocation of resources in which it is impossible to make any one individual better off without making at least one individual worse off.