Week 2

Question 1

WMD

Answer 1

Weapons of mass destruction

Question 2

What is the nuclear weapons arms race?

Answer 2

A form of security dilemma

Question 3

Nuclear Deterrence

Answer 3

Mutual destruction, possions alone is enough of a threat

Question 4

Component nr 1 of effective nuclear deterrence

Answer 4

Credible commitment (Ex: China & India refuse to be the first one to use them)

Question 5

Component nr 2 of effective nuclear deterrence

Answer 5

Second strike capabilities: ability to retaliate when under attack

Question 6

Challenges to nuclear deterrence

Answer 6

1. Aging arsenal has to be maintained
2. Technological advances challenge cappabilly of second strike
3. Credibility of extended deterrence (us promise of helping allies, in vain as trump more national minded = countries might start creating nuclear weapons on their own.

Question 7

Institutions & Nuclear weapons

Answer 7

Exist since 1945, not only for use but also for testing + sharing information surrounding other countries use of nuclear weapons. Downfall: are other countries honest (uncertainty)

Question 8

Consequences used by countries not complying to nuclear weapon rules

Answer 8

• Economic sanctions for non-compliance

Question 9

Side effect of institutions for nuclear weapons

Answer 9

Creates focal point for domestic and transnational activism

Question 10

Institutional explanation for democratic peace

Answer 10

Democratic institutions make it more difficult to go to war (leaders have to be accountable (constrains them) = fear of voter punishment

Question 11

Normative explanations for democratic peace

Answer 11

democracies see other democracies as a liberal and so act on the presumption that they are peaceful + democracy creates incentive to work together

Question 12

Criticism of the liberal democratic peace theory

Answer 12

1. What is a democracy 2. Not always supported by evidence: democratic leaders not always punished for dumb wars + Information regarding national security is confedential, regardless of whether attackers are democratic or autocratic, they do not appear to be able to keep their attacks secret; attacks achieve surprise because defenders are poor at evaluating in- formation.

Question 13

Public constraint mechanism

Answer 13

Public has an aversion of war (costs money, in inconvenient for daily life

Question 14

Group constraint mechanism

Answer 14

Democratic leaders are accountable to the public and therefore won’t choose war, especially with other democracies, because the public won’t support it.

Question 15

Slow mobilisation

Answer 15

Democracy slows processes of war down because it needs consensus, persuade the public

Question 16

Surprise attack mechanism

Answer 16

Democracies no chance of suprise attack because of slow mobilisation

Question 17

Information mechanism

Answer 17

Democratic leaders accountable to their citizens, war = unpopular = more incentive for solution

Question 18

Rosatto article

Answer 18

Why democratic peace theory is bullshit

Question 19

Tannenwald article

Answer 19

3. Normative Constraints on Nuclear Use

The “nuclear taboo” is a normative belief stigmatizing nuclear use, not just deterrence + universal taboo by elites and ordinary people

It helps explain nuclear non-use even in cases where retaliation was unlikely (e.g., Korea, Vietnam, Gulf War).

Over time, norms have become institutionalized through treaties, public opinion, and elite discourse.

Question 20

Daryl G article

Answer 20

Technological advancements (e.g., improved accuracy, remote sensing, AI) threaten the survivability of nuclear arsenals.

Counterforce capabilities (targeting enemy nuclear forces) are more feasible now, undermining mutual assured destruction (MAD).