Week 2 Flashcards

1
Q

deny and confess?

A

cooperate and defect

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2
Q

what is a dominant strategy?

A

it is a strategy where, regardless of the chosen strategy of the other player, one’s best response strategy is constant

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3
Q

what is a dominated strategy?

A

one where, regardless of the belief about the other player’s strategy, it is never the best response

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4
Q

minimax method?

A
  • applies to zero and constant sum games only

- choose the lowest number in each row and highest in each column. equilibrium is where min = max

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5
Q

beliefs in a zero-sum game?

A

each player believes that their opponent will choose the action that yields the worst consequence for them, for each action taken. each player would choose the least-bad outcome.

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6
Q

which payoffs do players want in a minimax game?

A

P1 wants highest = maximin

P2 wants lowest = minimax

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7
Q

game of pure coordination?

A

best (equal) payoffs when they both choose the same outcome&raquo_space; they just need to coordinate on the same action, doesn’t matter which&raquo_space; their expectations must converge on the focal point

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8
Q

assurance game?

A
  • two NEs, one better than the other
  • each must have enough certainty that the other is choosing the appropriate action so that they can both rec the best payoff
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9
Q

battle of the sexes?

A
  • two NEs, but the players have different preferences
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10
Q

features of a chicken game?

A
  • each player has a tough and weak strategy
  • two pure strategy NEs
  • each player strictly prefers the equilibrium where their opponent chooses their weak strategy = they choose opposing strategies
  • payoffs when players are tough are bad for both
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11
Q

successive elimination?

A

eliminate ANY dominated strategies, does not have to be dominated by all other strategies, only one

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