Week 1,3: Introduction and Development of the Field Flashcards
Title: Does Social Science inform foreign policy? Evidence from a survey of U.S. national security, trade, and development outcomes
Author(s)?
Avey, Desch, Parajon, Petersen, Powers and Tierney
Avey et. al., 2022
Does Social Science inform foreign policy? Avey et. al., 2022
This reading addresses what main issue?
Contemporary international relations (IR) scholarship is irrelevant to those charged with crafting and executing foreign policy.
Have policymakers taken advantage of this new “golden age” of academic engagement? How do conclusions about the gap change if we look beyond the issue area of national security?
To what extent do security, trade, and development practitioners respond to arguments made by IR scholars?
Does Social Science inform foreign policy? Avey et. al., 2022
What makes this paper different from others?
Their two survey experiments represent, to our knowledge, the first causally identified evidence that policy practitioners will update their views in response to information about the views of IR scholars
Does Social Science inform foreign policy? Avey et. al., 2022
What did the author(s) do to address this issue?
1) Conduct a survey of senior US foreign policy practitioners conducted in late 2017 and early 2018. Our survey included behavioral and attitudinal questions about whether, when, and how respondents view academics and use research in their work for the US government.
2) They included more and lower-ranking policy officials in the executive branch of the US government.
3) embedded a series of experiments in this survey, which allowed us to provide some of the first causally identified answers to outstanding questions in the bridging the gap debate.
4) broadened the conception of engagement to include engagement on social media, blog posts for consumption by policy elites, and IR scholars’ attempts to train future policymakers.
Does Social Science inform foreign policy? Avey et. al., 2022
How did the author(s) address this issue?
Used the Federal Yellow Book to identify individuals employed in one of several dozen offices or agencies with responsibility for creating and/or implementing US trade, national security, or policy development during the administrations of Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama and mailed or emailed a recruitment letter, signed by a prominent former US government official (former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, for the security subsample and former President of the World Bank and former US Trade Representative, Robert Zoellick, for development and trade) to all individuals for whom we secured contact. They asked respondents whether and how social science research is useful to their work, the academic and other sources of information they use in their work, and their opinion on a range of foreign policy issues
Does Social Science inform foreign policy? Avey et. al., 2022
Why did the authors address this issue in this way?
TBD
Does Social Science inform foreign policy? Avey et. al., 2022
What are the implications of this paper and their methodology?
TBD
Does Social Science inform foreign policy? Avey et. al., 2022
What are my critiques?
TBD
Does Social Science inform foreign policy? Avey et. al., 2022
What are the major findings of the paper?
1) Relative to scholarly articles—blog posts, commentary on social media, and TV or radio show reports are less useful to practitioners, 2) relative to a scholarly journal article, many common research outputs that are thought to be more useful to and consumable by policy practitioners (policy briefs, think tank reports, government reports, etc.) are no more or less useful to practitioners
They find that policymakers value academic research—especially scholarly, peer-reviewed articles—more than the conventional wisdom suggests, but security officials differ from their colleagues in other fields in their views on the utility of academic research.
In contrast to debates about the irrelevance of the academy relative to think tanks, practitioners are no more or less likely to view work as useful if it is authored by someone with a primary affiliation at a think tank
Does Social Science inform foreign policy? Avey et. al., 2022
How does this paper contribute the broader literature?
They demonstrate that policymakers seek scholarly expertise, and are responsive to it when experts agree on the effects of a policy proposal. Policymakers are not averse to more technical research methods, even if security practitioners see less utility in these methods than their colleagues in trade or development. Surprisingly, policymakers are more receptive to traditional modes of scholarly publication like books and articles than to blog posts and commentary on social media. We also see signs, however, that academic social science is still not providing what policymakers want, and not just in the security subfield
Title: The end of IR theory?
Author(s)?
Dunne, Hansen, and Wight
Dunne et. al., 2013
End of IR theory? Dunne et. al., 2013
This reading addresses what main issue?
What kind of theoretical pluralism should IR scholars embrace? We offer a particular account of theoretical engagement that is preferable to the alternatives currently being practised: integrative pluralism.
End of IR theory? Dunne et. al., 2013
What makes this paper different from others?
TBD
End of IR theory? Dunne et. al., 2013
What did the author(s) do to address this issue?
TBD
End of IR theory? Dunne et. al., 2013
How did the author(s) address this issue?
TBD
End of IR theory? Dunne et. al., 2013
Why did the authors address this issue in this way?
TBD
End of IR theory? Dunne et. al., 2013
What are the implications of this paper and their methodology?
TBD
End of IR theory? Dunne et. al., 2013
What are my critiques?
TBD
End of IR theory? Dunne et. al., 2013
What are the major findings of the paper?
TBD
End of IR theory? Dunne et. al., 2013
How does this paper contribute the broader literature?
TBD
Title: Rationalist Explanations for War
a. Author(s)?
James D. Fearon
Fearon, 1995
Rationalist Explanations for War, Fearon, 1995
This reading addresses what main issue?
War is costly and yet it still persist. There are three camps of arguments concerining war 1) People and state leaders are always irrational 2) Leaders enact war because they enjoy the benefits but dont actually incur the costs (soldiers and citizens do) 3) Rational leaders who consider the risks and costs of war still fight
Rationalist Explanations for War, Fearon, 1995
What makes this paper different from others?
Existing rationalist arguments don’t adequately explain what prevents leaders from reaching ex-ante (prewar) bargains that would avoid the costs and risks of fighting. That is, other arguments give reasons as to why armed conflict might appear an attractive option to a rational leader, but Fearon shows why states are unable to locate an alternative outcome that both would prefer to a fight.
Rationalist Explanations for War, Fearon, 1995
What did the author(s) do to address this issue?
Fearon proposes that the reason why actors go to war is due to 1) private information about relative capabilites or resolve and incentives to misrepresent such information to gain a better deal which is not just a matter or miscalculation due to poor info but rather of specific strategic dynamics that result form asymmetric info and incentives to dissemble 2) commitment problems make rational states unable to arrange a settlement that both would prefer because one or the other has an incentive to renege on the terms 3) issue indivisibilities meaning that some issues by their very nature cannot be split
Rationalist Explanations for War, Fearon, 1995
How did the author(s) address this issue?
The framwork of the rationalist argument is predicated on the question: What presents states in a dispute from reaching an ex ante agreement that avoids the costs they know will be paid ex post if they go to war. He uses a standard bargaining model where there are two actors who have specific preferences over a set of issues. These issues can be thought of on a spectrum from 0 to 1 where actor A prefers issues closer to 1 and B preferes issues closer to 0. That is actor B’s favorite outcome is if the bargain falls on zero and actor A prefers it falls on 1. So if we have a spectrum and x is some outcome that obtains, and B’s favorite outcome is 0 and A’s favorite outcome is 1, B’s value for outcome x will be 1-x and A’s will be x. On this spectrum, A and B can fight with some positive probability p, but there is a cost of war that happens when you choose war (c). So A’s value of war is p-cA and B’s value of war is then p+cB.
So the next logical step is to assign some utiility to this range of outcomes. To do this, we know that if these two states fight that A will win with some positive probabillity and B will win with some positive probability. We can assume some negotiated settlement x exists for A and B on our spectrum from 0 to 1. So from there you can construct A’s expected utility and B’s expected utility (x) which is the probability that A wins + the probability that A loses - some positive cost for fighting the war. The same thing can be represented for B. So B’s utiltiy will simply be 1 - their positive proability - some positive cost C. So given this set up, we can see that from A’s value of some outcome x is the range from 0 to x and B’s value for an outcome x is from x to 1. So given these assumptions, it’s easy to see that there will always exist some subset of our set where player A’s utility is greater than their probabilty of winning minus the cost for war and the same goes for B.
The key to this is that there is some positive cost C that both parties are incurring. This allows for there to exist an interval where negotiatied settlements can occur between (p-cA, p+cB) where p-cA and p+cB are reservation levels.
This ex ante bargaining range derives from the fact that war is inefficient ex post, and the assumptions needed to make this hold are that 1) rational states should know there is some true probability p that one state would win a military contest and this is an agreement they would prefer to a fight 2) states are risk averse or risk neutral over issues 3) there is a continuous range of settlements exists meaning that any disputes are perfectly indivisible that is there is always a feasible bargain between states’ reservation levels.
Rationalist Explanations for War, Fearon, 1995
Why did the authors address this issue in this way?
It was imporant to ansser this question using a game theory model becuase it allows fearon to first specify the causal mechanisms that explain war before identifying factors that lead the mechanism to produce an outcome in a specific setting. That is it is important first to understand the causal logic of what is going on in these games. What this allows fearon to do is then argue that showing a factor can occasion an unresolvable commitment or information problem.
Rationalist Explanations for War, Fearon, 1995
What are the major findings of the paper?
Fearon has two major finding: 1) based off of the fact that states are a) risk averse or risk neutral, b) there exists some ability for one state to win the war with positive probability p and c) there is a continuous range of settlements, there should always be a bargaining range where negotated agreements can take place and rationally led states would prefer to war. 2) Fearon also shows that given all this there are two main reasons why rationally led states are sometimes still unable to find an agreement and this is due to a) states have private information about resolve or capability and incetives to misrepresent these and b) states’ are not able to actually uphold a deal in certain circumstances
Rationalist Explanations for War, Fearon, 1995
What are the implications of this paper and their methodology?
Fearon’s finding imply that 1) there is some issue that is divisible between (0 and 1), 2) that actors are risk neutral or risk averse or 3) that there is some positive probability p that exists that a state will win the war
Rationalist Explanations for War, Fearon, 1995
How does this paper contribute the broader literature?
This paper contributes to the literature an explanation for why given having a negotiated bargaining range that two actors would still go to war. Up to now, most of the literature would have suggested that not seeing eye to eye is the main issue, but fearon shows that this is not necessarily the case, and that you can have that barigaining range and due to incentives to misrepreset resolve and capabilities, and private information war can still persist.
That is, the cause of war is not just lack of info but it is the thing that prevents this information from being discolosed.
What this argument does is that it shows that incnetives to misrepresent and private info arent simply background conditions to be taken for granted in this calculation.
For both sides to rationally believe they will win and it have nothing to do with the actors being irrational, it must be that it has to do with their own private information about the strength of their military and what makes these states not want to share this information is that they might not want to appear as the aggressor or they would not want to make themselves seem more vulnerable militarily
Rationalist Explanations for War, Fearon, 1995
What are my critiques? What does a world without their contribution look like?
TBD
1) Title: The strategic setting of choices: signaling, commitment, and negotiation in international poltiics
Author(s)?
James D. Morrow
Morrow 1999
The strategic setting of choices, Morrow 1999
This reading addresses what main issue?
Morrow’s whole thing is about understanding strategic interaction as it relates to signaling, commitment, and bargaining and he focuses on these three problems becuase they come up over and over again in international realtions.
The idea is that states are typically wary of one another because a growth in one’s pwer makes another less secure. That incongruency causes some distrust between these states and as such creates uncertainty between actors. If these actors’ motives are unknown, they need to find some way to credibly commit to peace so that other actos will trust them. But when you’re baragining everyone wants to be better off (or get the best deal) so this creates an additional issue.
So he proceeds to discuss how uncertainty about the motivation of others means you have to think 1) are parties able to signal to one another about their motivations? 2) can the parties credibly commit to each other when they dont know their precise motivations? 3) How can the parties negotiate differneces when they are uncertain about what deal the other will find acceptable?
The strategic setting of choices, Morrow 1999
What makes this paper different from others?
Morrows analysis provides a framework for understanding dynamic itneractions and the use of game treet to understand strategic interactions.
Assessing a problem like this first raises the question of credibilty - that is how do we get around the issue of cheap talk? an actor can promist to take an action in the future but will they be able to commit to that promise?
Credibility arises with regard to perfection - a strategy is perfect if every move is in the moving player’s interst when they must make the move given all future moves in the game if a promise satisfies the test of perfection then it is credible.
Uncertaintly arises with games of incomplete information. This is where at least one player posesses private information
Noncooperative game theory links perfection with incomplete info so that you can analyze credibilty in the face of uncertainty — the securlity dilemma occurs bc of uncertainty confounded with a problem of creidbilty
The strategic setting of choices, Morrow 1999
What did the author(s) do to address this issue?
Morrow breaks down the three main components of noncooperative game theory in international realtions.
Signaling - a way to consider the problem of unknown motivation. An actor can signal their type to another actor which depends on the assumption that a certain type takes a certain action. Different types can pool or separate that is one type has to do somehting another type if unlikely to do so that the observing party can respond accordingly. To spearate types you can incur a cost (costly signaling) which shows that one type is willing to incur specific costs whikle another type is not. ex. audience costs can allow actors to separate their types and convince others of their mostivation
Commitment - this is the idea that you make a promist that others dont beleive you can carry out in the future. For the other actor to believe your promise they need to be able to know your motivation (read your signal) however this isnt the only issue that arises. If your incentives change over time, this is a commitment problem. Insitutions can help with this commitment problem (changing incentives) by making it difficult for leaders or states to renege on commitments by making it more painful for the leader than carrying out the commiment
Bargaining - the idea of bargaining is that a solution is offered for a problem and you and another actor don’t agree on the ranking of the solutions based off of what you’d prefer. This can be thought of in terms of reservation levels whereby, to strike a negotiation, actors reservation levels have to be equal to their outside options. but since neither one knows the others reservation level and thus what deals are seen as acceptable. so negotiations can fail when there is no zone of agreement or when one side breaks off negotiations. This means that signaling is critical to bargaining since an actor’s reservation level determines its type since offers and responses to offers are signals about an actor’s reservation level.
The strategic setting of choices, Morrow 1999
How did the author(s) address this issue?
By walking through the strategic considerations of signaling, commitment, and bargaining in international relations. He does this with many anecdotal examples from international relations
The strategic setting of choices, Morrow 1999
Why did the authors address this issue in this way?
So the idea is by not simply focusing on the priciples of game theory and listing maxims drawn from those priciples, if we consider individual cases, commitment, signaling and bargaining problems arise very frequently. So we can understand the strategic dimensions of meny cases by understanding these issues in the abstract.
The strategic setting of choices, Morrow 1999
What are the major findings of the paper?
Basically the take-away from this paper is that understanding international realtions requires that you understand (abstractly) the ideas of signaling, commitment and bargaining. Strategic problems will always occur in the domestic and international settings so simple two-level (2x2) games (i.e. prisoner’s dilemma, principal agent models) are not enough to characterize these settings, though they are useful for domestic politics. To understand international relations is to understand strategic choice and noncooperative games and how insitutions can serve as ways to stabalize these games.
The strategic setting of choices, Morrow 1999
What are the implications of this paper and their methodology?
This paper provides a useful start for understanding many question in international relations as they arise. By understanding baragaining, signaling, and commitment issues, as they pertain to noncooperative games and strategic choice it provides researchers with a lens though which they can understand new problems that arise. So central questions about alliances, the role of military strategy and bargainin gduring wars etc. are all things that can use a stratgic approach to help resolve.
The strategic setting of choices, Morrow 1999
How does this paper contribute the broader literature?
This paper extends ordinary game theory and its principles and maxims to consider strategic choice and noncooperative games in the abstract. so as to provide an overview of how having a solid understanding of strategic choice can help us answer some of the most pressing questions we have about international relations.
The strategic setting of choices, Morrow 1999
What are my critiques? What does a world without their contribution look like?
TBD
Title: War as a commitment problem
Author(s)?
Robert Powell
or Powell 2006
Title: War as a commitment problem
Author(s)?
Robert Powell
or Powell 2006
War as a commitment problem, Powell 2006
This reading addresses what main issue?
The idea is that In our attempt to understand war, the exisiting work usually frames war as a result of a bargaining breakdown stemming from asymmetric information, issue indivisibilities, or commitmnet problems but the issue is that these specific frames are limited especially when it comes to trying to understand protracted conflicts. It is also the case that history is misrepresented when assessing contexts from this lens.
War as a commitment problem, Powell 2006
What makes this paper different from others?
Powell makes the case that we’ve just been thinking about these strategic setting incorrectly especially when it comes to bargaining indivisibilities. That is bargaining indivisibilities should be though of as commitment problems. The idea behind this is that when you go to war, you end up actually destroying some of the resources that you’d like to have. So what happens is that going to war leads to a pareto-inferiror outcome. But we need to ask ourselves why these states cant seem to find some pareto effecient outcomes before fighting even starts. This is what powell introduces as the inefficiency puzzle of war. So to understand why prolong conflict occurs and to give accurate credence to history, powell says we might think about wars as an efficiency issue.
War as a commitment problem, Powell 2006
What did the author(s) do to address this issue?
So address the issue of understanding prolonged wars powell basically approaches the question in the context of complete-information games where that are no informational probelms. And he uses the complete-information account to be able to abstract away from the informaional problems so that we can take a closer look at bargaining indivisibiliteis. What this will show us is that bargaining indivisibilites arent some distinct solution to this issue of war and that they should really be seen as is a commimtment isseu.
