w 8 computational advertising/ sponsered search auctions Flashcards

1
Q

how do google and advertisers strike a deal between balencing google profit and advertiser budget/utitliy?

A

they use different payment methods depending on their needs

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2
Q

what is pay-per-1000 impressions (PPM)

A

an impression is when the ad is displayed

pay for every 1000 impressions

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3
Q

what is pay per click

A

only pay when click

most common

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4
Q

pay per conversion

A

only pay when actualy purchase is made

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5
Q

why use auctions for online advertising pricing

A

there are a lot of advertisers and the value of an impression varies depending on advertiser.

having these difference prices helps increase profit

so auctions are a price discovery mechanism

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6
Q

what are some things that you need to consider in a multiple item auction

A

multiple item auction is more complex than single item

items can be identicle, substitute, complemented

some bidders may only want one thing and some can take whatever

it takes n x 2^m numbers to specify bidders values

there are (n + 1) ^m allocations

n = bidders and m = items

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7
Q

when is an allocation efficent

A

if the items are allocated to bidders who value them the most

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8
Q

what is the vcg mechanism Vickrey-Clarke-Groves

A

the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
makes people tell the truth about how much they want something

maxmizing total value

payments based on external impact

each player reports their valuation

auctioneer chooses the most effecient allocation

winner pays the ‘harm’ they caused to others

ie A values item at 100$
B values item at 80$

A gets the item but pays 80$

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9
Q

watch a video on vcg applied to an example

A
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10
Q

what are the pros of vcg

A

maximizes social welface (efficent)

truthful

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11
Q

what are the cons of vcg

A

sometimes impractiable/ intractable

if there are n bidders and m items then you would need to calcuate 2^m combinations for item preferences

finding (n+1) ^m allocations is also difficult

so its expensive

search enginners doing use it bc its expensive and confusing

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12
Q

what auction model does google use

A

click through rate

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13
Q

what is click through rate

A

the probability that someone will click on ur ad based on how many people it was shown too

clicks/ total impressions

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14
Q

how does google find click through rate

A

historic click frequency and secrete formula

quality of landing page

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15
Q

how does generalized second price auction work

A

each bidder says their bid amount

then each bid is ranked based on bid amount and sometimes quality

the bidder then pays the next highest amount bid from their own
ie
a pays b’s $ and b pays c’s $

determin position by quality * bid

it is not a truthful bid and agents change their strategy based on others bids

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16
Q

what is a pure nash equilbrium of gsp

A

for any bidder in the bid profile, there is no incentive to bid higher ot lower

17
Q

how does forward-looking behavior impact nash equailibirums in computaitonal advertsing auctions

A

nash equiabiubrium might not be stable when bidders are farsighted

18
Q

if gsp is worse than vcg why is it still here

A

it is simpler, effect on large market
cheaper, vcg generates less revenue

19
Q

how do advertisers bugets impact revenue optimisation

A

if you ignore the budget and always assign items to the highest bidder then it will only be 1/2 competitive

if you follow balanced algorithm and award the item to the bidder who has the highest unspent budget then it will be 3/4 competitive

the best competitive ratio is the factor revealing lp algorithm