Vocab list for Philosophy of Mind

Question 1

Access Consciousness (A-consciousness)

Answer 1

Our ability to use explicitly pieces of information in thinking and reasoning.
Some of the examples are “easy” problems for consciousness:
-the reportability of mental states
-the ability of a system to access its own internal state
-the integration of information by a cognitive system.

Question 2

Algorithm

Answer 2

Some procedure for calculating the value, or output, of a function. A procedure which will take you from that input (argument of the function) to the output (the functions value). An algorithm must have well-defined steps, which are only finite in number.

Question 3

Behaviourism

Answer 3

A physicalist view that mental properties could be identified with behaviour or tendencies to act in ways under certain conditions.

Question 4

Cartesian dualism

Answer 4

The view that the mind and body are two seperate substances: specifically the mind is a thinking and non-extended (i.e. not in space), while the body is non-thinking and extended (i.e. in space).

Question 5

Category-mistake

Answer 5

Category mistakes are made by attributing the same qualities or properties to entities belonging to two different logical types. For example, Descartes advocates the view that mind exists independent of body. Ryle hold that mind and body belong to two different logical types (the body is a thing, while the mind is not a thing); still the notion of existence is attributed to both. This result according to Ryle is a category mistake.

Question 6

Causal completeness of Physics

Answer 6

The principle that if a given event is physical then it is possible to give an entirely physical explanation for it. To put in terms of causality: if a given effect is physical then it is possible to give a maximally-detailed account of its causes in physical terms, without invoking anything non-physical.

Question 7

Cognitively-closed

Answer 7

We are cognitively closed with respect to certain knowledge if the concept-forming procedures at our disposal are inadequate for, or mismatched with, the knowledge in question. McGinn uses the notion of cognitive closure to argue that we are cognitively closed with respect to a principle P that might explain the link between consciousness and the brain, because our concept forming procedures for the physical world are completely inadequate when theorising about consciousness (and vice-versa)

Question 8

Disjunction Problem

Answer 8

A problem for indicator-based semantics (IBS). The disjunction problem is an inability to diagnose misrepresentation. If I have a mental representation of a chicken that is reliably caused by ducks-in the dark, we’d like to say that I’m misrepresenting the ducks as being chickens. According to IBS, because my representation of a chicken is reliably caused by ducks-in the dark, then it is just the case that I’m representing ducks-in the dark: in essence, my representation is “either chicken or duck-in the dark” (The “or” is why it is called the Disjunction problem)

Question 9

Dualism

Answer 9

A theory concerning the fundamental types into which individual substances are to be divided. It asserts that substances are either material or mental, neither type being reducible to the other.

Question 10

Substance Dualism

Answer 10

Hold that minds are unique substance direct from physical substance.

Question 11

Property Dualism

Answer 11

Hold that although there is only physical substance, there are irreducible mental properties.

Question 12

Epiphenomena

Answer 12

Refers to events that are by-products of other events, but do not causally influence the events that gives rise to them. E.g., steam is an epiphenomenon of (some) trains, in that is is a by-product of the train’s running, but it does not causally influence the train, or the trains running at all.

Question 13

Eliminativism

Answer 13

The view that mental states and properties are items posited by a proto-scientific theory (called folk psychology), and therefore the science of the future is likely to conclude that entities such as beliefs, desires, and sensations do not exist. The alternate most often offered is physicalist and the position is often called eliminative physicalism/materialism.

Question 14

Folk Psychology

Answer 14

Our common-sense view of the mind utilized in the prediction and explanation of behaviour. It is characterised by a number of claims, including the existence of internal mental states, such as propositional attitudes and sensations, and the claim that intentional states are often the causes of behaviour.

Question 15

Function

Answer 15

A specification that will take you from an input or set of inputs (the argument for that function) to a output (the value for that function) . Essentially, a function is a way of relating inputs and outputs.

Question 16

Computable function

Answer 16

A function for which there exists an algorithm.

Question 17

Functionalism

Answer 17

The view that the defining feature of mental states is their causal role, in particular, ,mental states with functional roles, which are just identified by their causal connection between various inputs and outputs. Most contemporary functionalists are token identity theorists.

Question 18

Indicator-Based- Semantics (IBS)

Answer 18

an approach to semantics derived from the natural indication relations. According to natural indication relations, X indicates Y if Y reliably causes X. Correspondingly, in IBS, a mental representation represents what it represents in virtue of being reliably caused by the thing it represents: so mental representation X represents Y if Y reliably causes X.

Question 19

Intentionality

Answer 19

The quality of being about, or representing, or something.

Question 20

Intensional

Answer 20

Describes contexts to do with belief, knowledge etc. where substituting co-reffering does not always result in a true sentence.

Question 21

Intertheoretic Reduction

Answer 21

The notion that the laws, principles, and entities of one theory (the less fundamental theory) can be explained in terms of the laws and entities of another theory (the more fundamental theory) So, for example, the everyday phenomenon of ‘water evaporating’ can be explained in chemical terms ( specifically, it can be explained by the much more wordy description: molecules of H2O being converted into vapour below the boiling temperature of the substance in its liquid form) In this example, our everyday folk idea of water evaporating is being reduced to, or explained in terms of, certain chemical phenomena.

Question 22

Irreducibility

Answer 22

The notion that the laws, principles and entities of one theory cannot be reduced to (i.e. explained in terms of) another, more basic theory. So, according to both the functionalist and the eliminative materialist, folk psychological entities and principles cannot be reduced to neuroscientific entities and principles. For the functionalist, this means that these two levels of explanation are both valid, but are independent of one another; for the eliminative materialist, this means that folk psychology is radically false, and so should be rejected.

Question 23

Knowledge-That

Answer 23

The factual or propositional knowledge. e.g. I know that Paris is the capital of France.

Question 24

Knowledge- How

Answer 24

Being able to do something, a skill, e.g. I know how to ride a bike.

Question 25

Leibniz’s Law (Identity of Indiscernibles)

Answer 25

This is also known as the principle of the identity of indiscernibles (or, the non-identity of discernibles). The basic idea is that, if two things are discernible, they are non-identical; or, if they are not discernible (i.e. indiscernible), then they are identical. More wordily: if two things, A and B, have all their properties in common (so whatever is true of A is true of B, and vice versa, then A and B are identical).

Question 26

Machine Table

Answer 26

A set of instructions (program) which tells a turing machine what to do given that it is in particular state and has received a particular input

Question 27

Mental causation

Answer 27

the idea that mental states are causally efficacious (i.e. they can cause things in the world). One way mental causation can manifest is in the idea of agency - so, that human beings are agents, who can choose to do the things they do, by virtue of their mental states.

Question 28

Materialism

Answer 28

The theory that matter alone exists. It immediately implies a denial of the existence of minds, spirits, divine beings, etc., in so far as these are taken to be non-material. Its current versions, formulated with greater conceptual refinement, are often called PHYSICALISM.

Question 29

Mind-Body problem

Answer 29

The philosophical problem of how the mind is related to the body, and of what properties, functions, and occurrences, should be regarded as, respectively mental or physical. This problem is central to both the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychology.

Question 30

Multiple realizability

Answer 30

A type of property or states is said to be multiply realizable if different instances (tokens) of that property can be brought or realized by different types of physical states. For example, pain can be multiply realized in creatures having very different physical structures. The multiple realizability of mental states and properties is thought to be one of the principal objections to type identity theory.

Question 31

Natural indication relations

Answer 31

instances in nature where some natural phenomena could be taken to represent, or at least indicate, another natural phenomenon. For example, smoke indicating fire is an example of a natural indication relation.

Question 32

Necessary Condition

Answer 32

something that needs to be present for an event to happen, but which by itself is not enough for that event to happen. For example, it is a necessary condition of my car moving forward that the handbrake is off, but by itself is not enough to ensure that my car does indeed move – other conditions also need to be in place (e.g. the car needs to be on an incline, or someone pressing the accelerator, etc.).

Question 33

Phenomenal consciousness (P-consciousness)

Answer 33

the way an experience feels to a subject (this can be considered synonymous with the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness).

Question 34

Panpsychism

Answer 34

The idea that everything is mind

Question 35

Pan-proto-psychism

Answer 35

the idea that everything has some bit of mind, with those bits of mind developing, perhaps over the course of evolution, or in organisms with greater and greater complexity, towards consciousness of the sort that we have (our consciousness could itself be proto, a step towards even more complex, richer forms of consciousness).

Question 36

Physicalism

Answer 36

The view that only physical things and their properties exist; sometimes called materialism.

Question 37

Property

Answer 37

A feature or characteristic of something – a type or category. In philosophy of mind, we speak of mental properties and physical properties.

Question 38

Propositional Attitudes

Answer 38

A subset of mental states that involve an attitude (believing, desiring, hoping, etc.) towards a proposition (a representation of a state of affairs). Examples of propositional attitudes include “I believe it is raining in Cape Town” and “I desire that Fergus live with me.”

Question 39

Qualia

Answer 39

a term used in philosophy to describe the subjective quality of conscious experience. Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, or the redness of an evening sky.

Question 40

Absent qualia objection

Answer 40

An objection to functionalism purporting to show that some physical system might be functionally identical to human beings but lack certain mental properties such as qualia (e.g. in the Chinese Nation Argument, the people gathered in China are supposed to be functionally identical to a human mind, but according to Ned Block, do not collectively constitute a unified mind)

Question 41

Inverted qualia objection

Answer 41

An objection to functionalism purporting to show that some physical system might be functionally identical to human beings but have different mental properties such as qualia (e.g. someone, call them B, might have the identical functional role to another person A, when it comes to seeing blue, but might actually be seeing green)

Question 42

Semantics

Answer 42

properties that are to do with meaning, as opposed to merely grammar or formal properties of words. So, for example, the semantic properties of the word “cat” are that it means a purring, usually four-legged, feline creature.

Question 43

Syntax

Answer 43

concepts that are to do with the formal properties of words, such as their grammatical structure or type, or how they are spelt. So, for example, the syntactic properties of the word “cat” are that it has three letters, is a noun, etc.

Question 44

Sufficient condition

Answer 44

a condition that, by itself, is enough to ensure that another event happens. For example, it is a sufficient condition

Question 45

Supervenience

Answer 45

the notion that one group of phenomena - in our case, mental states - are dependent on, or realised by, another group of phenomena (in our case, physical states), without being identical to the latter. So, mental states are dependent on, or realised by, physical states, without being the same thing as physical states (i.e. type-identical).

Question 46

Subvening state

Answer 46

The underlying state or phenomena that gives rise to, or realises, the supervening phenomena. In this course, the subvening states are physical (typically, brain) states.

Question 47

Supervening state

Answer 47

The state or phenomena that supervenes on, or is realised/given rise to, by the subvening state. In this course, the supervening states are mental states.

Question 48

Strong AI

Answer 48

The idea that that implementing a programme is by itself sufficient for thinking, where ‘thinking’ here means the sort of thinking we take humans to be doing. In other words, an appropriately programmed computer literally has cognitive states and that the programs thereby explains (in virtue of instantiating) human cognition.

Question 49

Teleological

Answer 49

Broadly anything that has to do with goals, aims or purposes.

Question 50

Teleo-functions (proper functions)

Answer 50

Also known as proper functions, teleo-functions are purposes or goals that a particular entity or activity has evolved to achieve. For example, the proper function of a heart is to pump blood around the body.

Question 51

Relational Proper functions

Answer 51

Functions that have evolved to relate one thing to another (e.g. a chameleon changing its colour is a relational proper function because it involves relating the colour of the chameleon’s skin to colours in its environment)

Question 52

Derived Proper functions

Answer 52

Proper functions that work in novel contexts (e.g. a chameleon changing its colour to a colour it, and all other chameleons, have never encountered before) by virtue of being derived from more general proper functions (e.g. the more general function of a chameleon camouflaging itself).

Question 53

Teleosemantics

Answer 53

An approach to semantics or meaning that relies on the idea that certain brain states (the ones associated with mental representations) were selected in the process of our evolutionary history for representing the world, or tracking our environment. This allows us to make sense of misrepresentation: for example, if my mental representation “chicken” is activated by a duck-in-the-dark, then it (my mental representation) is not performing its proper function, because it (or its corresponding brain state) has been selected by natural selection for the purpose of only being activated by chickens. So, because it is being activated by something else, it is not fulfilling its proper function - and so, is misrepresenting

Question 54

Token

Answer 54

A particular instance of a category, or type. For example, “hang-over” is a certain type or kind of thing, but there are various instances or tokens of being hung-over (for example, if I am hung over two Saturdays in a row, these are two separate tokens, or instances, of the broader type of being hung-over).

Question 55

Turing machine

Answer 55

An abstract description of a machine that manipulates symbols on a strip of tape according to a table of rules, called a Machine Table. A Turing Machine is capable of implementing any computable function

Question 56

Universal Turing machine

Answer 56

A Turing Machine that, by virtue of being fed input coding the machine tables of other Turing Machines, can mimic the programme of those Machines itself. As a consequence of this, a Universal Turing Machine can execute any computable function (or, to put it another way: any function a normal Turing Machine can execute, a Universal Turing Machine can execute).

Question 57

Type

Answer 57

A type is a kind, or category. For example, if I am hung-over two Saturdays in a row, these are both instances of the same, single type of state – namely, being hung-over.

Question 58

Type identity theory

Answer 58

The view that mental states and brain states are identical, in that whenever there is a certain type of mental state, there will be a corresponding type of brain state.

Question 59

Type identity theory (physicalist view)

Answer 59

Holds that mental states types are reducible to or identical with types of brain states.

Question 60

Weak AI

Answer 60

The idea that computers are useful in studying the mind only insofar as they provide powerful tools e.g. in formulating and testing hypotheses in a rigorous and precise fashion. Weak AI does not presume that computation itself is sufficient for cognition. See Strong AI above for an alternative position

Question 61

A priori (before, prior to)

Answer 61

Refer to knowledge gained independently of experience e.g. logical or conceptual knowledge.

Question 62

Prima Facie

Answer 62

Literally, “at face value” /obviously/seemingly

Question 63

Mutatis Mutandis

Answer 63

Used when comparing two or more things to say that, although changes will be necessary in order to take account of different situations, the basic point remains the same e.g. “This pattern has been repeated, mutatis mutandis, across different cities all around the world.

Question 64

Ceteris Paribus

Answer 64

“All other things being equal.” This means that something will occur as a result of something else most of the time, if nothing else changes.