Video Module 24: Propositional Representations

Question 1

propositional representations

Answer 1

those which are amodal and non-linguistic—not tied to a sensory modality, and not necessarily described with words, but described with non-linguistic symbols
- frames
- semantic networks
- property lists
- schema: sets of expectations for what would be present and what would occur in a scene that do not necessarily have to be mental pictures
- Propositional representations propose that we do not store visual information as images, but rather as a series of amodal propositions

Question 2

What does propositional theory propose about how we perform mental rotation?

Answer 2

Propositional theory says that we perform mental rotation by using elaborate structural descriptions of objects in our mind, and specifying angles of rotation in our mind
- Does not challenge the idea that mental rotation is proportional to angle of rotation: Propositional theory says that it takes longer to mentally rotate objects because we must perform more operations

Question 3

What does propositional theory propose about how we perform mental scanning?

Answer 3

In propositional theory, we perform mental scanning by running through a chain of relationships between areas

Question 4

What evidence does Reed & Johnsen (1975) provide for propositional theory?

Answer 4

Reed & Johnsen (1975) conducted a study in which they showed participants two unique geometrical shapes and asked them to remember them. They then asked participants questions about the features of those shapes, asking what shapes were included within the ones they need to recall.
- Participants only succeeded 55% of the time at identifying all of the shapes that were part of the original image
- Suggests that visual images often lack sufficient details for direct comparisons of part-whole relationships; if mental imagery was exactly like viewing a picture, then participants would succeed at a higher rate.
—Mental images are not always functionally equivalent to pictures
—Perhaps we don’t truly store pictures

Question 4

What does our ability to reimagine ambiguous figures say about propositional theory?

Answer 4

We are not always able to reimagine ambiguous images from memory
- A study by Chambers & Reisberg (1985) had participants look at and remember an ambiguous figure with two interpretations: a rabbit or a duck. They asked participants to then form a mental image of that figure and try to imagine the other interpretation
—Participants were unable to do this task
—If mental imagery were exactly like looking at a picture, then participants would be able to pass this task
—Participants were only able to see the other interpretation when they redrew the figure from memory
—Suggests we may store mental images as a series of suggestions or propositions; a propositional code may override the imaginal code in some situations

Question 4

Slezak figures

Answer 4

ambiguous figures developed by Slezak (1995) which look like one of two animals depending on how they’re rotated
- In a study using these figures, Slezak had participants memorise these figures and asked them to perform a mental rotation on them by 90°.
—Slezak found that none of the participants could identify the new animal produced by the mental rotation, thus suggesting that mental images may be bound to a structural interpretation in our minds

Question 4

perceptual reference frame

Answer 4

the frame which we use to view an object
- researchers Reisberg & Chambers (1991) found that participants could sometimes reimagine and correctly recognize a shape by changing their perceptual reference frame for how they pictured the shape

Question 5

What effects do verbal labels have on our ability to represent images mentally? (Carmichael, Hogan, and Walters, 1932)

Answer 5

The verbal labels we attach to mental images can change which features we recall about the image, or how we recall the features of an image
- Carmichael, Hogan, and Walters (1932) did a study in which they asked participants to remember two shapes, giving them one of two labels for both shapes (e.g. sun or ship’s wheel; hourglass or table)
—Asked participants to redraw shapes from memory and found that their drawings were distorted to match the labels that they were given for the shapes
—The fact that the stimulus was drawn differently is not the point; it is that the redrawings matched the labels that participants were given earlier
—images may be stored propositionally because verbal labels can influence our interpretation of visual stimuli

Question 6

How are our cognitive maps affected by our conceptual knowledge of geography?

Answer 6

In order to explore cognitive maps, we typically use our general knowledge of where things are located to make guesses about where specific locations are
—Relative locations of small regions is determined by a conceptualization of larger regions