Utilitarianism

Question 1

Outline of PETER SINGER: “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”

Singer’s main argument:

Answer 1

Lack of food & shelter & medicine is bad.

2. If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.

[Later, he says “without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant,” which weakens the requirement placed on us.]

For example, getting wet in order to save a drowning child.

3. It is in our power to prevent this bad thing.
4. We can prevent it without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance.

Conclusion: Therefore, we ought to prevent lack of food & shelter.

5. The only way to prevent lack of food & shelter without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance is to give maximally (or at least very much more than we currently do).

CONCLUSION: Therefore, we ought to give maximally (or at least very much more than we currently do).

Question 2

Outline of PETER SINGER: “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”

Objection re our standards of charity + reply

Answer 2

Objection: Singer’s analysis conflicts with our prevailing standards of charity. (Charity is supererogatory, i.e., beyond duty & beyond what is obligatory.)

Reply: People need to rethink their views about “charity.”

Question 3

Outline of PETER SINGER: “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”

Objection re our standards of charity + reply

Objection: over-demanding + reply

Answer 3

Objection: Singer’s analysis requires us to do a great deal for others.

Reply: Yes, that’s what morality requires. In fact, it’s a very traditional view; it was advocated by Thomas Aquinas!

Question 4

Outline of PETER SINGER: “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”

Objection: short-term solution + reply

Answer 4

Objection: Direct relief just a short-term solution. It simply delays additional problems.

Reply: In that case, we need to give direct relief now and, in addition, promote population control.

Question 5

Outline of PETER SINGER: “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”

Objection: the economy

Answer 5

Objection: Singer’s ideas will hurt the economy.

Reply: But how much MORE can we do until that happens? This does not support the status quo (a mere 1% going to famine relief). Instead, it opens the door to our discussion of how far to increase relief. We should give to the level that does not reduce spending in a consumption-based society (like ours) below the point that would start to decrease what we have available to give. So expecting people to give 1% is far too little, but expecting 25% from everyone would be too much.

Question 6

Outline of PETER SINGER: “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”

Objection: infantilising the vulnerable

Answer 6

closer examination shows there are reasons to question Singer’s moral reasoning. In particular, the use of a small child as a starting point risks infantilising the people it is ostensibly designed to help: the poor themselves. It casts western philanthropists as heroic saviours of the helpless and those living in dire conditions as passive victims of dire circumstances.

An alternative starting point would be to see human beings as capable of shaping and reshaping their own circumstances. People have the ability to transform the world around them for the better, rather then simply lying back helplessly and accepting their fate.

This sense of agency is the main force for eliminating poverty. Perhaps the most striking recent example is China’s widely acknowledged success in lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty from the 1980s onwards. This was achieved by a drive to transform its economy, rather than allowing itself to become the object of western pity.

That is not to say contemporary China is perfect or that its model should be followed slavishly. Only that, through their own efforts, people have often succeeded in lifting themselves out of poverty through economic growth.

This alternative view does not, of course, preclude saving drowning children or even giving aid to those suffering in an emergency. A key problem with Singer’s argument is precisely that it blurs these exceptional circumstances with the everyday business of conquering poverty.

Question 7

Outline of PETER SINGER: “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”

Objection: resentment from rich

Answer 7

His explicit condemnation of those who fail to accept a duty to eschew new clothes or cars for the sake of the poor risks generating resentment. He is essentially trying to guilt-trip westerners into giving up luxuries.

Yet there is not a fixed amount of wealth in the world. It is quite possible — indeed, it has been the norm in recent times — for the world’s poor to have become richer at the same time as the affluent countries have also become wealthier. Those who want to contribute to famine relief or poverty alleviation should be free to do so. But viewing the world’s poor as mere passive recipients of western charity is a temptation that should be resisted.

Question 8

Outline of PETER SINGER: “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”

Defence to criticisms of Singer by invoking the vulnerability principle:

Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds

Answer 8

‘rather than vulnerability being a property of only those who fall into the category ‘vulnerable groups’… all human life is characterised by vulnerability, and that specific factors exacerbate the vulnerability of specific individuals. A focus on vulnerability highlights our common humanity and offers grounds for solidarity…’

‘rather than simply drawing attention to our share vulnerabilities to harm, a fuller account of vulnerability can attend to the social practices (i.e. education, health promotion, and access to the range of social services and legal protections) that can promote our well-being and capacities for agency, while reducing vulnerability to need, ill health or exploitation.’

My point: ‘helping others’ has a historical connotation of colonialism, exploitation etc. i.e. ‘white man’s burden’ - in the works of Mill, he writes that certain civilisations are not ‘ripe’ for self-determination, until they have been culturally elevated out of savagery. We can dispense with this connotation by recognising our universal vulnerability, disintegrating borders and an ‘us and them’ mentality - in the form of infrastructure so they can elevate themselves rather than paternalistic teaching!

Question 9

Hampshire on

1. The only unconditional good for utilitarianism
2. twentieth-century decision-making on policies
   welcomes its conception that all considerations are commensurable,
3. Hampshire re calculation of consequences vs human sensitivities

Answer 9

1. satisfactions and all prohibitions are but means to this single end
2. there is
   a single dimension for assessing advantages and disadvantages. There need be no scruples about ravaging or burning a million lives for the sake of ten million. For utilitarianism men not only can but ought to use and exploit each other, as they do other things in nature, to maximize utility.
3. Hampshire urges that it is not simply that the nineteenth-century utilitarians’ hope for a one-dimensional
   calculation of consequences has won out without the growth in human
   sensitivity they also hoped for. One has been at the expense of the other. Once men are encouraged to think the unthinkable, rational calculation of public policies makes for moral callousness and dulls men’s sensitivities.

Question 10

What does Bentham note re the principle of utility?

Answer 10

‘The principle of utility, (I have heard it said) is a dangerous principle; it is dangerous
on certain occasions to consult it.” This is as much as to say, what? that it is not
consonant with utility to consult utility: in short, that it is not consulting it, to
consult it. (introduction to the principles Ch 1)

Question 11

Mill re the dangers of utility

Answer 11

He stresses that there is one domain of morality the
prohibitions of which require strict compliance. There are “certain moral
requirements, which, regarded collectively, stand higher in the scale of social
utility, and are therefore of more paramount obligation, than any others.” (utilitarianism chapter v)

Question 12

Mill’s “utilitarianism” reasons for restricting the employment of utilitarian calculation, at least in interpersonal dealings:

Is this really utilitarian?

Answer 12

“The moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one another (in which we must
never forget to include wrongful interference with each other’s freedom) are more vital to human well-being than any the main element in determining the whole of the social feelings of mankind. It is their observance which alone preserves peace among human beings: If obedience to them were not the rule, and disobedience the exception, every one would see in every
one else an enemy, against whom he must be perpetually guarding himself
by a person’s observance of these that his fitness to exist as one of the fellowship of
human beings is tested and decided” (Utilitarianism Ch V)

While agreeing that Mill gives a sound reason for restricting utilitarian calculation
by the prohibitions he cites, Moore points out that it is not a utilitarian reason.5
Mill’s own words show this. Strict compliance with these rules is simply a
condition of men’s surviving amongst each other in a manner in which they can
achieve anything worthwhile. The reason Mill gives for it is independent of the
utilitarian view of what is intrinsically desirable.

Question 13

Difference between Bentham and Mill re coercion?

Answer 13

Bentham uses utilitarianism chiefly as a principle for determining what rules be maintained by authoritative coercion.

For Mill it is also a principle for determining rules of prudence, and for determining among moral rules those to be maintained by general disapproval and those to be supported by a man’s own conscience.

Question 14

How does Smart differ from Bentham and Mill?

Answer 14

For Smart utilitarianism is not merely an answer to a different question
from that to which the fathers of utilitarianism applied it. Bentham does not
regard utilitarianism as the only principle for assessing legislation. Nor does Mill
regard it as the only principle for assessing moral rules. Bentham, for example,
appeals also to security, Mill to individuality. They rather regard it as the
supreme principle. Smart does not regard utilitarianism as the supreme principle
in answer to the question to which he applies it. He regards it as the only answer
to it.

Question 15

How does Smart differ from Sidgwick?

Answer 15

Sidgwick finds three divergent ‘methods of ethics’ at least plausible. Smart does not.

Unlike Sidgwick, and like Moore, Smart has no patience with ‘egoistic hedonism’; it cannot be best for a man to do what makes him best off if it makes the world
worse off.

Unlike Sidgwick, and like Moore, Smart has no patience with what
Sidgwick calls ‘intuitionism’- the view that there are evident to common sense a
variety of rules, each of which determines how it is reasonable to behave. It is
best to betray any friend who has long trusted one when such treachery would
have the best outcome. When it makes for more happiness on the whole it is best
for large numbers to be subjected to grinding slavery or torture. It is best to
participate in exterminating all of a certain specification-whether all Jews, all
unwanted foetuses, all capitalists, all murderers- when the world as a whole is
best off when they are eliminated. Any appeal against optimificity Smart
dismisses as superstitious rule-worship.

Like Moore Smart also dismisses any
form of rule-utilitarianism which yields results not equivalent to the
utilitarianism he advocates. Even if it is optimific for a certain rule to obtain, it
is best not to comply with it when to comply is not optimific.

Question 16

William’s Jim example

Answer 16

On a botanical expedition in South America, Jim stumbles into a small town to find
twenty Indians picked out at random lined up to be shot by a firing squad to
deter others from protesting against the government. Pedro, the captain, offers
Jim the privilege of killing one of the Indians, and to spare the others if he accepts. For Smart, the decision for Jim is obvious. If Jim does not kill one of
the Indians someone else will and the results will be considerably worse. For
Smart all that is relevant to Jim’s decision is whether one resulting state of
affairs would be worse than another. Williams urges that this means that it is not
only indifferent who the recipients of harm and benefits are; it is also indifferent
who produces them. One fault he finds with Smart’s solution is that it requires
us to say that Jim is no less responsible for what Pedro does than for what he
does himself (pp. 95, 108). Williams objects that if he refuses, Jim cannot be said
to have made Pedro shoot the twenty. Smart has anticipated this objection in
urging that a man is said to be responsible only for what he may be praised or
condemned for having done. He stresses that what it is best for a man to do is
independent of what it is best for him to be praised for having done (p. 53). He
would doubtless urge that accepting that it would be best for Jim to kill the
Indian does not require us to say that Pedro is not to be condemned for killing
twenty Indians if Jim does not accept his proposal, or that Jim is then as
responsible as Pedro for the killing of the twenty

Question 17

Williams’ 3 main objections to Smart:

(1) setting out Smart’s view of when not to deliberate

Answer 17

Smart explicitly specifies two sorts of occasion on which
not to deliberate (pp. 42ff.).

(a) On occasions in which the time taken deliberating
would prevent a man from acting optimifically, it is better for him to act at once
in accord with a commonsense rule as a rule of thumb, or from a habit
embodying such a rule.

(b) It is also better for him to act without deliberating
whenever spontaneity rather than deliberation would make for an optimific performance. We need not pause over the dialectical questions other writers have raised over when to deliberate whether to deliberate. Suffice it that anyone will recognize that on a certain proportion of occasions on which he acts
spontaneously or by a rule of thumb he will be acting less felicifically than he
would had he deliberated. Smart recommends that someone act spontaneously
or by a rule of thumb on those occasions on which he would be less likely to act
optimifically if he employed utilitarian deliberation. He thus recommends that
men employ utilitarian deliberation on all occasions of acting except those sorts
in which a greater proportion of optimific performances would eventuate from
its avoidance than its employment (p. 127)

Question 18

Williams’ 3 main objections to Smart:

(1) setting out Smart’s view of when not to deliberate
- Williams’ objection:

example (a)

Answer 18

(a) Smart urges that we can well imagine a people whose felicity is maximized through their acting with zest and spontaneity and witnessing such behaviour in one another. Many individual things they did would be more
felicific had they acted otherwise. But they could not act otherwise without destroying the spontaneity which maximized their felicity (p. 129). The point of
this example is that there may be many circumstances in the actual world in which compliance with Smart’s recommendation that men maximize the proportion of their maximally felicific actions would insure that they lived in a manner that diminished their happiness. Under these circumstances Smart’s
second main principle would be incompatible with his first; his first main principle would require rejection of his second.

Question 19

Williams’ 3 main objections to Smart:

(1) setting out Smart’s view of when not to deliberate
- Williams’ objection:

example (b)

Answer 19

Williams also asks us to imagine a fanciful community whose members lived by utilitarian deliberation and where backsliding is checked by their watching through television life on a reservation whose members deliberate in a decidedly non-utilitarian way.

Most of the actions of those on the reservation would be maximally felicific though done by non-utilitarian deliberation and would be maximally felicific because those outside the reservation regarded
them as not felicific (p. 130).

The point of this bit of fantasy is that even in circumstances under which there is more happiness the greater the proportion of maximally felicific actions there is not more happiness because those actions are known to be maximally felicific. There is instead more happiness the greater the proportion of felicific actions because many who perform them do not know that they are such.

So even circumstances under which there would be more
happiness the greater the proportion of maximally felicific actions that are performed provide no ground for Smart’s supposing that when men deliberate the general happiness is more the more they deliberate by reckoning whether what they are doing would be maximally felicific. Williams’ point is analogous to
the old so-called ‘paradox of hedonism’, namely, that it is just not the case that a
man gets more pleasure out of life the more he deliberately seeks it.

Question 20

Williams’ 3 main objections to Smart:

(2) W’s second objection

Answer 20

Although Smart does not
regard a man’s happiness as consisting exclusively of the fulfilment of his wants
and purposes generally, he regards it as consisting largely of this. He cannot be
taken as recommending that no one have any desire or project but that of
maximizing happiness generally. He would acknowledge that this can be only a second-order project for anyone, which it is possible for him to pursue only
because he and others have various other and more basic first-order projects.

What Smart does recommend is that whenever anyone deliberates what to do he
reckon only on what would maximally fulfil his own and others’ projects. This
requires a man to be neutral towards any first-order projects, frustrating only
those of his own and others which are not compatible with maximizing felicity
and implementing those that are compatible. Anyone’s first-order projects will
include not only desires for things that he and others close to him need or want.
Williams points out that they will also include his serious commitments to
long-run objectives, as well as “projects which flow from some more genera disposition towards human conduct and character, such as hatred of injustice, or of cruelty, or of killing” (p. 111). What gives a man’s life its sense for
him are his long-term purposes and commitments.

Compliance with Smart’s recommendation would not merely require a man to occasionally interrupt what
he is doing. It would require that what he do upon any occasion be exclusively
the resultant of everyone’s projects causally related to that occasion. It would
not only require him to continually interrupt what he had started to do on any
occasion and postpone it for a later occasion. Williams charges that it would
require him to abandon all of his purposes which require sustained striving and
all his projects requiring continuous commitment. The fault in this is not simply
that this would be disagreeable to him. It is rather that even though it seeks to
be neutral in regard to what kinds of first-order projects any man has, Smart’s utilitarianism cannot be neutral with respect to any sustained projects, to any that a man is deeply involved with. It requires everyone to abandon the
first-order projects which are most important to him and which give his life a
meaning for him. It requires that on each occasion every man, as an agent, be a
channel between the input of everyone’s projects and the output of the
maximally felicific decision. There is one project to which anyone would still
retain a continuous commitment- maximizing felicity. But since this is a
second-order project, it loses its importance when the first-order projects which
give it its importance are emasculated from it (p. 116).

Question 21

Williams’ 3 main objections to Smart:

(3) W’s third objection

Answer 21

Williams’ third chief objection to Smart uses the example of Jim. Smart might argue that since it would obviously be maximally felicific for Jim to
kill the Indian it would be irrational for him and squeamish self-indulgence on
his part to let his repugnance affect his decision. Smart could argue in this way if
he held that any first-order projects having reference to other people’s projects
be ignored. But Smart does not want to abandon recommending maximizing the
happiness of all, replacing it with that of fulfilling only straightforward egoistic
projects of each. If the project he recommends is to be neutral with respect to
first-order projects, Smart must hold that reckoning must be given to any
first-order projects, however unreasonable they may be on utilitarian grounds.

This means that the qualms of ‘rule-worshippers’ are not to be ignored. This
means, Williams urges, that even though the presence of a small racial minority
within a certain society is harmless or even beneficial to it, Smart’s utilitarian
calculation would require a man to take part in rooting out that minority if the
prejudices of the majority made the presence of the minority uncomfortable to
it (p. 105). This would also. seem to mean that Jim is to give weight not only to
the distress of the Indians but also to Pedro’s frustrations and to his own repugnance

One fault Williams finds with this is that if Jim is convinced that it is wrong on the whole for him to kill the Indian, the repugnance he then has is not
felt by him to be one of many dissatisfactions and satisfactions to be reckoned
with in reaching an overall decision (p. 103). It is repugnant to him because it
goes against his overall conviction. To Smart’s utilitarian Jim’s conviction is
mistaken. It is repugnant to the utilitarian that Jim do what will have the
outcome of twenty Indians being killed. It is repugnant to Jim to shoot one. He cannot accept the utilitarian’s prescription without abandoning his own moral
conviction. Jim’s repugnance is not a first-order dissatisfaction. It is part of his
overall assessment (p. 118). His is one second-order assessment against another.
If Smart’s utilitarian is to overcome the impasse, he has to convince Jim that his
repugnance is unfounded. He cannot then treat Jim’s repugnance with
neutrality. He cannot treat ill-founded attitudes with neutrality. He proposes to
show a certain attitude ill-founded if it makes for less satisfaction on the whole.
In doing this he has to be prepared to discount any satisfactions or
dissatisfactions to which the attitude leads as themselves ill-founded. So he has
to make out that a certain attitude is ill-founded in some other way than by
showing that it makes for less satisfaction on the whole. Smart’s utilitarian then
ceases to be a utilitarian.

Question 22

the upshot of Williams’ second chief objection to Smart is the same as
that argued by Hodgson and Warnock

Answer 22

achieving felicity would be severely impaired if everyone employed only utilitarian deliberation.

But their reasons differ from his: D. H. Hodgson, Consequences of Utilitarianism, Chap. II; G. J. Warnock, The Object of
Morality, Chap. II

Hodgson contends that:

(1) if men employed only such deliberation no one could count on others telling the truth or fulfilling a promise;
(2) secondly, that because of this felicity would be seriously imperiled.

Mackie accepts the first contention but rejects the second. He successfully shows that if we suppose
they made no mistakes and were equally fully informed, all would reach the
same decisions through their deliberations; and their awareness that others were
deliberating in this manner would enable them to count on how others will act,
assuring the benefits dependent upon this. Mackie urges, however, that his
argument against the objections of Hodgson and Warnock to exclusively
utilitarian deliberation affords no support for recommending it, since the suppositions on which it rests are wildly fantastic. He thinks the objection to it
lies in disagreement among men as to what constitutes happiness and the
likelihood of mistakes.

Like Hodgson, Warnock and Mackie, Williams argues that
to the degree that the conception of it is coherent, the exclusive employment of
utilitarian deliberation would lead men to act in a far from felicific manner. The point
of his second chief objection is that Smart’s recommendation would require all men to abandon very largely their projects and interests, the fulfilment of which constitutes their happiness.

Question 23

Is Williams’ critique of Smart a complete refutation of utilitarianism?

Answer 23

his critique applies only to utilitarians who share Smart’s two main principles and the objections he makes apply only to Smart’s second main
principle, recommending exclusively utilitarian deliberation. I find in him none
against Smart’s first principle, namely, that anyone does what is best only if
what he does is maximally felicific.

Question 24

Assessment of Smart’s second principle

the natural impossibility of it

Answer 24

He recommends that when
he deliberates what he will do, everyone on every occasion deliberate only on
what will maximize felicity.

To comply with this recommendation a mechanic
trying to repair an automobile would have to cease thinking whether he could do
so by replacing the spark plugs. A woman cooking a pie would have to cease
thinking when to remove it from the oven. A carpenter trying to fit in a new
door would have to cease thinking what length to cut it or where to insert
screws. In all walks of life people would have to give up thinking out how to
carry out the project in which they are currently engaged and think only how
they may maximize happiness.

But, men cannot avoid setting themselves various ends and engaging in activities to
achieve them. A man also cannot avoid pondering how to achieve the objective with which he is for the time being occupied. The impossibility of fulfilling Smart’s recommendation is a natural impossibility.

Question 25

J Rawls ‘theory of justice’

How does Rawls define utility?

How are the appropriate terms of cooperation setled?

Answer 25

classical form as defining the good as the satisfaction of desire or as the satisfaction of rational desire

whatever in the circumstances will achieve the greatest sum of satisfaction of the rational desires of individuals

Question 26

J Rawls ‘theory of justice’

Does he think utilitarianism is attractive at first?

Answer 26

It is impossible to deny the initial plausibility and attractiveness of this conception

Question 27

J Rawls ‘theory of justice’

What is the striking feature of the utilitarian view of justice?

Answer 27

it does not matter, except indirectly, how this sum of satisfactions is distributed among individuals any more than it matters, except indirectly, how one man distributes his satisfactions over time. The correct distribution in either case is that which yields the maximum fulfilment. Society must allocate its means of satisfaction whatever these are, rights and duties, opportunities and privileges, and various forms of wealth, so as to achieve this maximum if it can. But in itself no distribution of satisfaction is better than another except that the more equal distribution is to be preferred to break ties.

Question 28

J Rawls ‘theory of justice’

what common precepts of justice may contradict the utilitarian contention?

how does U explain them?

Answer 28

those which concern the protection of liberties and rights, or which express the claims of desert

the explanation of these precepts and of their seemingly stringent character is that they are those precepts which experience shows should be strictly respected and de-parted from only under exceptional circumstances if the sum of advantages is to be maximized

Yet, as with all other precepts, those of justice are derivative from the one end of attaining the greatest balance of satis-faction. Thus there is no reason in principle why the greater gains of some should not compensate for the lesser losses of others; or more importantly, why the violation of the liberty of a few might not be made right by the greater good shared by many. It simply happens that under most conditions, at least in a reasonably advanced stage of civilization, the greatest sum of advantages is not attained in this way. No doubt the strictness of common sense precepts of justice has a certain usefulness in limiting men’s propensities to injustice and to socially injurious actions, but the utilitarian believes that to affirm this strictness as a first principle of morals is a mistake. For just as it is rational for one man to maximize the fulfillment of his system of desires, it is right for a society to maximize the net balance of satisfaction taken over all of its members

Question 29

J Rawls ‘theory of justice’

What is the most natural way of arriving at utilitarianism?

Answer 29

to adopt for society as a whole the principle of rational choice for one man. Once this is recognized, the place of the impartial spectator and the emphasis on sympathy in the history of utilitarian thought is readily understood. For it is by the conception of the impartial spectator and the use of sympathetic identification in guiding our imagination that the principle for one man is applied to society. It is this spectator who is conceived as carrying out the required organization of the desires of all persons into one coherent system of desire; it is by this construction that many persons are fused into one.Endowed with ideal powers of sympathy and imagination, the impartial spectator is the perfectly rational individual who identifies with and experiences the desires of others as if these desires were his own. In this way he ascertains the intensity of these desires and assigns them their appropriate weight in the one system of desire the satisfaction of which the ideal legislator then tries to maximize by adjusting the rules of the social system.

Question 30

J Rawls ‘theory of justice’

What is the nature of the decision made by legislator akin to?

What is this view of social cooperation a consequence of?

What does utilitarianism not take seriously then?

Answer 30

materially different from that of an entrepreneur deciding how to maximize his profit by producing this or that commodity, or that of a consumer deciding how to maximize his satisfaction by the purchase of this or that collection of goods. In each case there is a single person whose system of desires determines the best allocation of limited means. The correct decision is essentially a question of efficient administration.

This view of social cooperation is the consequence of extending to society the principle of choice for one man, and then, to make this extension work, conflating all persons into one through the imaginative acts of the impartial sympathetic spectator.

Utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons.

Question 31

J Rawls ‘theory of justice’
Some related contrasts

liberty vs desirability for aggregate welfare

what does justice deny?

how does utilitarian justify justice?

Answer 31

It has seemed to many philosophers, and it appears to be supported by the convictions of common sense, that we distinguish as a matter of principle between the claims of liberty and right on the one hand and the desirability of increasing aggregate social welfare on the other; and that we give acertain priority, if not absolute weight, to the former.

denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. The reasoning which balances the gains and losses of different persons as if they were one person is excluded.Therefore in a just society the basic liberties are taken for granted and the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests

common sense precepts of justice and notions of natural right have but a subordinate validity as secondary rules; they arise from the fact that under the conditions of civilized society there is great social utility in following them for the most part and in permitting violations only under exceptional circumstances.

Question 32

The Debate over Utilitarianism

Quote from Mill re happiness

Answer 32

The creed which accepts . . . the Greatest Happiness
Principle . . . holds that actions are right . . . as they tend to promote
happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.
John Stuart Mill, UTILITARIANISM (1861)

Question 33

The Debate over Utilitarianism

Quote from Nietzche re happiness

Answer 33

Man does not strive after happiness; only the Englishman does that.
Friedrich Nietzsche, TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS (1889)

Question 34

The Debate over Utilitarianism

Classical version of utilitarianism

Answer 34

Classical Utilitarianism can be summed up in three propositions:

(a) The morality of an action depends solely on the consequences of the action; nothing else matters.
(b) An action’s consequences matter only insofar as they involve the greater or lesser happiness of individuals.

(c) In the assessment of
consequences, each individual’s happiness gets “equal consideration.” This means that equal amounts of happiness always
count equally; nobody’s well-being matters more just because he is rich, let’s say, or powerful, or handsome. Morally, everyone counts the same. According to Classical Utilitarianism, an
action is right if it produces the greatest overall balance of happiness over unhappiness.

Question 35

The Debate over Utilitarianism

Main philosophers for development of utilitarianism

Answer 35

Classical Utilitarianism was developed and defended by
three of the greatest philosophers in 19th-century England:
Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), John Stuart Mill (1806–1873),
and Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900).

Question 36

The Debate over Utilitarianism

Is Pleasure All That Matters?

What is good?

Answer 36

The question What things are good? is different from the question What actions are right?

and Utilitarianism answers the second question by reference to the first. Right actions are the ones
that produce the most good.

But what is good?

The utilitarian
reply is: happiness. As Mill puts it, “The utilitarian doctrine is
that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an
end; all other things being only desirable as means to that end.”

Question 37

The Debate over Utilitarianism

Is Pleasure All That Matters?

What is happiness?

Answer 37

According to the classical utilitarians, happiness is pleasure. Utilitarians understand “pleasure”
broadly, to include all mental states that feel good. A sense of accomplishment, a delicious taste, and the heightened awareness that comes at the climax of a suspenseful movie are all
examples of pleasure. The thesis that pleasure is the one ultimate good—and pain the one ultimate evil—has been known
since antiquity as Hedonism. The idea that things are good or bad because of how they make us feel has always had a following in philosophy. Yet a little reflection seems to reveal flaws in this theory.

Question 38

The Debate over Utilitarianism

Is Pleasure All That Matters?

Flaws in the view that hedonism is all that matters (2 examples)

Answer 38

Consider these two examples:

• You think someone is your friend, but he ridicules you behind your back. No one tells you, so you never know. Is this unfortunate for you? Hedonists would have to say it is not, because you are never caused any pain.
Yet we believe that there is something bad going on. You are being mistreated, even though you are unaware of it and
suffer no unhappiness.

• A promising young pianist’s hands are injured in a car accident so that she can no longer play. Why is this bad for her?
Hedonists would say it is bad because it causes her pain and eliminates a source of joy for her. But suppose she finds something else that she enjoys just as much—
suppose, for example, she gets as much pleasure from
watching hockey on TV as she once got from playing the piano. Why is her accident now a tragedy? The hedonist can only say that she will feel frustrated and upset whenever she thinks of what might have been, and that is her
misfortune. But this explanation gets things backward. It is not as though, by feeling upset, she has turned a
neutral situation into a bad one. On the contrary, the bad situation is what made her unhappy. She might
have become a great pianist, and now she will not. We cannot eliminate the tragedy by getting her to cheer up
and watch hockey

Question 39

The Debate over Utilitarianism

Is Pleasure All That Matters?

Key argument against hedonism

Answer 39

We value things other than pleasure. For example, we value artistic creativity and friendship. These things make us happy, but that’s
not the only reason we value them. It seems like a misfortune to
lose them, even if there is no loss of happiness

Question 40

The Debate over Utilitarianism

Is Pleasure All That Matters?

What has Moore argued?

Answer 40

compiled short lists of things to be regarded as valuable in themselves.

Moore suggested that there are three obvious intrinsic goods—pleasure, friendship, and aesthetic enjoyment—and
so right actions are those actions that increase the world’s supply
of these things.

Question 41

The Debate over Utilitarianism

Are Consequences All That Matter?

Answer 41

To determine whether an action is right, utilitarians believe
that we should look at what will happen as a result of doing it. This
idea is central to the theory. If things other than consequences
are important in determining what is right, then Utilitarianism
is incorrect.

Question 42

The Debate over Utilitarianism

Are Consequences All That Matter?

• rebuttal 1: justice
  H. J. McCloskey’s scenario

Answer 42

In 1965, writing in the racially charged climate of the American civil rights movement, H. J. McCloskey asks us to consider the following case:

Suppose a utilitarian were visiting an area in which there was racial strife, and that, during his visit, a Negro rapes a white woman, and that race riots occur as a result of the crime. . . . Suppose too that our utilitarian is in the
area of the crime when it is committed such that his testimony would bring about the conviction of [whomever he accuses]. If he knows that a quick arrest will stop the riots
and lynchings, surely, as a utilitarian, he must conclude that he has a duty to bear false witness in order to bring about the punishment of an innocent person.’

Question 43

The Debate over Utilitarianism

Are Consequences All That Matter?

• rebuttal 1: justice

Answer 43

it is incompatible with the ideal of justice. Justice
requires that we treat people fairly, according to the merits of their particular situations. In McCloskey’s example, Utilitarianism requires that we treat someone unfairly. Therefore, Utilitarianism cannot be right.

Question 44

The Debate over Utilitarianism

Are Consequences All That Matter?

• rebuttal 2: rights
  example from US Court of Appeals York v. Story (1963),

Answer 44

In October, 1958, appellant [Ms. Angelynn York] went to
the police department of Chino for the purpose of filing charges in connection with an assault upon her. Appellee Ron Story, an officer of that police department, then
acting under color of his authority as such, advised appellant that it was necessary to take photographs of her. Story
then took appellant to a room in the police station, locked the door, and directed her to undress, which she did.
Story then directed appellant to assume various indecent
positions, and photographed her in those positions. These
photographs were not made for any lawful or legitimate purpose.

Appellant objected to undressing. She stated to Story that there was no need to take photographs of her in the
nude, or in the positions she was directed to take, because
the bruises would not show in any photograph. . . .

Later that month, Story advised appellant that the
pictures did not come out and that he had destroyed
them. Instead, Story circulated these photographs among
the personnel of the Chino police department. In April,
1960, two other officers of that police department, appellee Louis Moreno and defendant Henry Grote, acting under color of their authority as such, and using police photographic equipment located at the police station,
made additional prints of the photographs taken by Story. Moreno and Grote then circulated these prints among the personnel of the Chino police department.

Question 45

The Debate over Utilitarianism

Are Consequences All That Matter?

• rebuttal 2: rights
  Utilitarian justification for circulating photos

Answer 45

Utilitarianism says that actions are defensible if they produce a favorable balance of happiness
over unhappiness. This suggests that we compare the amount of unhappiness caused to York with the amount of pleasure the
photographs gave to Officer Story and the others. And it is at
least possible that more happiness than unhappiness was created. In that case, the utilitarian conclusion would be that their actions were morally acceptable. But this seems perverse. Why should the pleasure of Story and his friends matter at all? They
had no right to treat York in this way, and the fact that they enjoyed doing so hardly seems relevant.

Question 46

The Debate over Utilitarianism

Are Consequences All That Matter?

• rebuttal 2: rights
  second scenario - peeping Tom

Answer 46

a Peeping Tom spied
on a woman through her bedroom window and secretly took
pictures of her undressed. Suppose he is never caught, and he
never shows the pictures to anyone. Under these circumstances,
the only consequence of his action seems to be an increase
in his own happiness. No one else, including the woman, is
caused any unhappiness at all. How, then, could a utilitarian
deny that the Peeping Tom’s actions are right? Utilitarianism
again appears to be unacceptable

Question 47

The Debate over Utilitarianism

Are Consequences All That Matter?

• rebuttal 2: rights

Answer 47

key point is that Utilitarianism is at odds with the idea
that people have rights that may not be trampled on merely because one anticipates good results. In these examples, the
woman’s right to privacy is violated. But we could think of similar cases in which other rights are at issue—the right to worship freely, the right to speak one’s mind, or even the right
to live. On Utilitarianism, an individual’s rights may always be trampled upon if enough people benefit from the trampling.
Utilitarianism has thus been accused of supporting the “tyranny
of the majority”: if the majority of people would take pleasure
in someone’s rights being abused, then those rights should be
abused, because the pleasure of the majority outweighs the suffering of the one. However, we do not think that our individual
rights should mean so little, morally. The notion of an individual right is not a utilitarian notion. Quite the opposite: It is
a notion that places limits on how an individual may be treated,
regardless of the good that might be accomplished.

Question 48

The Debate over Utilitarianism

• rebuttal 3: backward-looking reasoning
  example of friend staying home

Answer 48

Suppose you have promised to
do something—say, you promised to meet your friend at a coffee shop this afternoon. But when the time comes to go, you
don’t want to do it; you need to catch up on some work and you
would rather stay home. You try to call her up to cancel, but she
isn’t answering her cell phone. What should you do?

Suppose you judge that the utility of getting your work done slightly outweighs the irritation your friend would experience from being
stood up. Applying the utilitarian standard, you might conclude that staying home is better than keeping your promise.
However, this does not seem correct. The fact that you promised
imposes an obligation on you that you cannot escape so easily.

Of course, if a great deal were at stake—if, for example, you
had to rush your mother to the hospital—you would be justified in breaking the promise. But a small gain in happiness cannot
overcome the obligation created by your promise; the obligation should mean something, morally.

Thus, Utilitarianism
once again seems mistaken

criticism is possible because Utilitarianism cares only
about the consequences of our actions. However, we normally think that considerations about the past are important, too.
e.g. someone does crime so we punish, friend did favour last week so do favour this week etc.

Question 49

The Debate over Utilitarianism

Should we be equally concerned for everyone?

The argument

Answer 49

The last part of Utilitarianism says that we must treat each
person’s happiness as equally important—or as Mill put it, we
must be “as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent
spectator.”

Stated abstractly, this sounds plausible, but it has
troubling implications. One problem is that the requirement of “equal concern” places too great a demand on us; another
problem is that it disrupts our personal relationships.

Question 50

The Debate over Utilitarianism

Should we be equally concerned for everyone?

Charge that U is too demanding

Answer 50

Suppose you are on your way to the movies when someone points out
that the money you are about to spend could be used to feed the starving or to provide inoculations for third-world children.

Surely, those people need food and medicine more than you need to see Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie. So you forgo your entertainment and donate your money to charity. But that is not the
end of it. By the same reasoning, you cannot buy new clothes,
a car, an iPhone, or a PlayStation. Probably you should move into a cheaper apartment. After all, what’s more important—
that you have these luxuries, or that children have food?

In fact, faithful adherence to the utilitarian standard
would require you to give away your wealth until you’ve made
yourself as poor as the people you’re helping. Or rather, you’d need to leave yourself just enough to maintain your job, so that
you can keep on giving. Although we would admire someone who did this, we would not think that such a person was merely
“doing his duty.” Rather, we would regard him as a saint, as someone whose generosity went beyond the call of duty. Philosophers call such actions supererogatory. But Utilitarianism seems
unable to recognize this moral category.

The problem is not merely that Utilitarianism would
require us to give away most of our things. It would also prevent us from carrying on our lives. We all have goals and projects that make our lives meaningful. But an ethic that requires
us to promote the general welfare would force us to abandon those endeavors. Suppose you are a Web designer, not getting
rich but making a decent living; you have two children whom you love; and on weekends, you like to perform with an amateur theater group. In addition, you enjoy reading history. How could there be anything wrong with this? But judged by the
utilitarian standard, you are leading an immoral life. After all, you could be doing a lot more good if you spent your time in other ways.

Question 51

The Debate over Utilitarianism

Should we be equally concerned for everyone?

Charge that U disrupts our personal relationships

Answer 51

In practice, none of us is willing to treat everyone
equally, because that would require giving up our special ties to friends and family. We are all deeply partial where our family
and friends are concerned. We love them, and we go to great lengths to help them. To us, they are not just members of the
great crowd of humanity—they are special. But all this is inconsistent with impartiality. When you are impartial, you miss out
on intimacy, love, affection, and friendship.

At this point, Utilitarianism seems to have lost all touch
with reality. What would it be like to care about one’s spouse no more than one cares about complete strangers? The very
idea is absurd; not only is it profoundly contrary to normal human emotions, but loving relationships could not even exist
apart from special responsibilities and obligations. Again, what
would it be like to treat one’s children with no greater love than
one has for strangers?

As John Cottingham puts it, “A parent who leaves his child to burn” because “the building contains
someone else whose future contribution to the general welfare promises to be greater, is not a hero; he is (rightly) an object of
moral contempt, a moral leper.

Question 52

The Debate over Utilitarianism

The Defence of Utilitarianism

Summary of criticisms of U

Answer 52

Together, these objections appear to be decisive. Utilitarianism seems unconcerned with both justice and individual rights.
Moreover, it cannot account for backward-looking reasons. If
we lived by the theory, we would become poor, and we would
have to stop loving our family and our friends.

Question 53

The Debate over Utilitarianism

The Defence of Utilitarianism

Defence 1: contesting the consequences

Answer 53

Most of the arguments against Utilitarianism go like this: a situation is
described; then it is said that some particular (vile!) action would have the best consequences under those circumstances; then
Utilitarianism is faulted for advocating that action.

These arguments, however, succeed only if the actions they describe really
would have the best consequences. Would they?

According to the first defense, they would not.
Consider, for example, McClosky’s argument, in which Utilitarianism is supposed to support framing an innocent man
in order to stop a race riot. In the real world, would bearing false witness in this way actually have good consequences? Probably not. The liar might be discovered, and then the situation would be worse than before. And even if the lie succeeded, the
real culprit would remain at large and might commit more crimes, to be followed by more riots. Moreover, if the guilty party were later caught, which is always possible, the liar would
be in deep trouble, and confidence in the criminal justice system would erode. The moral is that although one might think that one can bring about the best consequences by such behavior, experience in fact teaches the opposite: Utility is not served by framing innocent people.

Unfortunately, it is not very
effective. While it is true that most acts of false witness and the like have bad consequences, it cannot be said that all such acts
have bad consequences. At least once in a while, one can bring about a good result by doing something repugnant to moral
common sense. Therefore, in at least some real-life cases, Utilitarianism will conflict with common sense. Moreover, even if
the anti-utilitarian arguments had to rely on fictitious examples, those arguments would retain their power. Theories like
Utilitarianism are supposed to apply to all situations, including situations that are merely hypothetical. Thus, showing that Utilitarianism has unacceptable implications in made-up cases is a valid way of critiquing it. The first defense, then, is weak.

Question 54

The Debate over Utilitarianism

The Defence of Utilitarianism

Defence 2: The Principle of Utility Is a Guide for
Choosing Rules, Not Acts

Answer 54

Revising a theory is a two-step process: first, you identify which feature of the theory needs work;
second, you change only that feature, leaving the rest of the theory intact. What feature of Classical Utilitarianism is causing
the trouble?

The troublesome assumption is that each individual action
should be judged by the utilitarian standard. Whether it would be wrong to tell a particular lie depends on the consequences of telling that particular lie; whether you should keep a particular
promise depends on the consequences of keeping that particular promise; and so on for each of the examples we have considered. If what we care about is the consequences of particular
actions, then we can always dream up circumstances in which a horrific action will have the best consequences.

Therefore, the new version of Utilitarianism modifies the
theory so that individual actions are no longer judged by the Principle of Utility. Instead, we first ask what set of rules is optimal,
from a utilitarian viewpoint. In other words, what rules should we follow in order to maximize happiness? Individual acts are
then assessed according to whether they abide by these rules. This new version of the theory is called “Rule-Utilitarianism,” to distinguish it from the original theory, now commonly called
“Act-Utilitarianism.”

Rule-Utilitarianism has an easy answer to the anti-utilitarian arguments. An act-utilitarian would incriminate the innocent man in McCloskey’s example because the consequences of that particular act would be good. But the rule-utilitarian would
not reason in that way. She would first ask, What rules of conduct tend to promote the most happiness? And one good rule is “Don’t bear false witness against the innocent.” That rule
is simple and easy to remember, and following it will almost always increase happiness. By appealing to it, the rule-utilitarian
can conclude that in McCloskey’s example we should not testify against the innocent man.
Similar reasoning can be used to establish rules against violating people’s rights, breaking promises, lying, betraying one’s friends, and so on. We should accept such rules because following them, as a regular practice, promotes the general happiness.
Thus, Rule-Utilitarianism cannot be convicted
of violating our moral common sense. In shifting emphasis from the justification of acts to the justification of rules, Utilitarianism has been brought into line with our intuitive judgments.

Question 55

The Debate over Utilitarianism

The Defence of Utilitarianism

Defence 2: The Principle of Utility Is a Guide for
Choosing Rules, Not Acts

• rebuttal

Answer 55

a serious problem with Rule-Utilitarianism arises when we ask whether the ideal rules have exceptions. Must
the rules be followed no matter what? What if a “forbidden” act would greatly increase the overall good? The rule-utilitarian
might give any one of three answers. First, if she says that in such cases we may violate the rules,
then it looks like she wants to assess actions on a case-by-case basis. This is Act-Utilitarianism, not Rule-Utilitarianism.

Second, she might suggest that we formulate the rules so that violating them never will increase happiness. For example, instead of using the rule “Don’t bear false witness against
the innocent,” we might use the rule “Don’t bear false witness against the innocent, unless doing so would achieve some
great good.” If we change all of the rules in this way, then Rule Utilitarianism will be exactly like Act-Utilitarianism in practice; the rules we follow will always tell us to choose the act that
promotes the most happiness. But now Rule-Utilitarianism does not provide a response to the anti-utilitarian arguments;
like Act-Utilitarianism, Rule-Utilitarianism tells us to incriminate the innocent, break our promises, spy on people in their
homes, and so on.

Finally, the rule-utilitarian might stand her ground and
say that we should never break the rules, even to promote happiness. J. J. C. Smart (1920–) says that such a person suffers from an irrational “rule worship.” Whatever one thinks of
that, this version of Rule-Utilitarianism is not really a utilitarian theory. Utilitarians care solely about happiness and about consequences; but this theory, in addition, cares about following
rules. The theory is thus a mix of Utilitarianism and something else entirely. To paraphrase one writer, this type of Rule Utilitarianism is like a rubber duck: just as a rubber duck is not
a kind of duck, this type of Rule-Utilitarianism is not a kind of Utilitarianism. And so, we cannot defend Utilitarianism by appealing to it.

Question 56

The Debate over Utilitarianism

The Defence of Utilitarianism

Defence 3: common sense is wrong

Answer 56

Finally, some
utilitarians have offered a very different response to the objections. Upon being told that Utilitarianism conflicts with common sense, they respond, “So what?” Looking back at his own defense of Utilitarianism, J. J. C. Smart writes:

Admittedly utilitarianism does have consequences which are incompatible with the common moral consciousness, but I tended to take the view “so much the worse for the
common moral consciousness.” That is, I was inclined to
reject the common methodology of testing general ethical
principles by seeing how they square with our feelings in particular instances.

This breed of utilitarian—hard-nosed and unapologetic—
can offer three responses to the anti-utilitarian arguments.

Question 57

The Debate over Utilitarianism

The Defence of Utilitarianism

Defence 3: common sense is wrong

The First Response: All Values Have a Utilitarian Basis.

Answer 57

Critics of Utilitarianism say that the theory can’t make sense of some of
our most important values—such as the value we attach to truth telling, promise keeping, respecting others’ privacy, and loving
our children. Consider, for example, lying. The main reason not to lie, the critics say, has nothing to do with bad consequences. The reason is that lying is dishonest; it betrays people’s trust. That fact has nothing to do with the utilitarian calculation
of benefits. Honesty has a value over and above any value that the utilitarian can acknowledge. And the same is true of promise keeping, respecting others’ privacy, and loving our children.

But according to philosophers such as Smart, we should think about these values one at a time and consider why they’re
important. When people lie, the lies are often discovered, and those betrayed feel hurt and angry. When people break
their promises, they irritate their neighbors and alienate their friends. Someone whose privacy is violated may feel humiliated
and want to withdraw from others. When people don’t care more about their own children than they do about strangers, their children feel unloved, and one day they too may become
unloving parents. All these things reduce happiness. Far from being at odds with the idea that we should be honest, dependable, respectful, and loving to our children, Utilitarianism
explains why those things are good.

Moreover, apart from the utilitarian explanation, these
duties would seem inexplicable. What could be stranger than saying that lying is wrong “in itself,” apart from any harm it
causes? And how could people have a “right to privacy” unless
respecting that right brought them some benefit? On this way of thinking, Utilitarianism is not incompatible with common
sense; on the contrary, Utilitarianism justifies the common sense values we have.

Question 58

The Debate over Utilitarianism

The Defence of Utilitarianism

Defence 3: common sense is wrong

The Second Response: Our Gut Reactions Can’t be Trusted when cases are exceptional

Answer 58

Although some cases of injustice serve the common good, those cases are exceptions. Lying,
promise breaking, and violations of privacy usually lead to unhappiness, not happiness. This observation forms the basis
of another utilitarian response.

Consider again McCloskey’s example of the person tempted
to bear false witness. Why do we immediately and instinctively
believe it to be wrong to bear false witness against an innocent
person? The reason, some say, is that throughout our lives we have seen lies lead to misery and misfortune. Thus, we instinctively
condemn all lies. But when we condemn lies that are beneficial, our intuitive faculties are misfiring. Experience has taught us to
condemn lies because they reduce happiness. Now, however, we are condemning lies that increase happiness. When confronting unusual cases, such as McCloskey’s, perhaps we should trust the
Principle of Utility more than our gut instincts.

Question 59

The Debate over Utilitarianism

The Defence of Utilitarianism

Defence 3: common sense is wrong

The Third Response: We Should Focus on All the Consequences.

Answer 59

When we’re asked to consider a “despicable” action that maximizes happiness, the action is often presented in a way
that encourages us to focus on its bad effects, rather than its good effects. If instead we focus on all the effects of the act,
Utilitarianism seems more plausible.

Consider yet again the McCloskey example. McCloskey says it would be wrong to convict an innocent man because that
would be unjust. But what about the other innocent people who will be hurt if the rioting and lynchings continue? What about
the pain that will be endured by those who are beaten and tormented by the mob? What about the deaths that will occur if
the man doesn’t lie? Children will lose their parents, and parents will lose their children. Of course, we never want to face a situation like this. But if we must choose between securing the conviction of one innocent person and allowing the deaths of several innocent people, is it so unreasonable to think that the first option is preferable?

And consider again the objection that Utilitarianism is too demanding because it tells us to use our resources to feed starving children instead of using those resources on ourselves. If we
focus our thoughts on those who would starve, do the demands of Utilitarianism seem so unreasonable? Isn’t it self-serving of us to say that Utilitarianism is “too demanding,” rather than
saying that we should do more to help?

This strategy works better for some cases than for others. Consider the Peeping Tom. The unapologetic utilitarian will
tell us to consider the pleasure he gets from spying on unsuspecting women. If he gets away with it, what harm has been
done? Why should his action be condemned? Most people will condemn his behavior, despite the utilitarian arguments. Utilitarianism, as Smart suggests, cannot be fully reconciled with
common sense. Whether the theory needs to be reconciled with common sense remains an open question

Question 60

The Debate over Utilitarianism

Concluding thoughts

Answer 60

If we consult what Smart calls our “common moral consciousness,” many considerations other than utility seem morally
important. But Smart is right to warn us that “common sense” cannot be trusted. That may turn out to be Utilitarianism’s greatest contribution. The deficiencies of moral common sense become obvious if we think about it. Many white people once felt that there was an important difference between
whites and blacks, so that the interests of whites were somehow more important. Trusting the “common sense” of their day,
they might have insisted that an adequate moral theory should accommodate this “fact.” Today, no one worth listening to would say such a thing, but who knows how many other irrational prejudices are still part of our moral common sense?

At the end of his classic study of race relations, An American Dilemma,
Nobel Laureate Gunnar Myrdal (1898–1987) reminds us:

There must be still other countless errors of the same sort that no living man can yet detect, because of the fog within which our type of Western culture envelops us. Cultural influences have set up the assumptions about the mind, the body, and the universe with which we begin; pose the questions we ask; influence the facts we seek; determine the interpretation we give these facts; and direct our reaction to these interpretations and conclusions.

Could it be, for example, that future generations will look back in disgust at the way affluent people in the 21st century enjoyed their comfortable lives while third-world children died
of easily preventable diseases? Or at the way we confined and slaughtered helpless animals? If so, they might note that utilitarian philosophers were ahead of their time in condemning
such things.

Question 61

Motive utilitarianism

Answer 61

One indirect version of consequentialism is motive consequentialism, which claims that the moral qualities of an act depend on the consequences of the motive of that act

Question 62

Other indirect version of consequentialism

Answer 62

Another indirect version is virtue consequentialism, which holds that whether an act is morally right depends on whether it stems from or expresses a state of character that maximizes good consequences and, hence, is a virtue.

The most common indirect consequentialism is rule consequentialism, which makes the moral rightness of an act depend on the consequences of a rule (Singer 1961). Since a rule is an abstract entity, a rule by itself strictly has no consequences.

Question 63

What gap does motive utilitarianism fill?

Answer 63

Classical act utilitarianism is typically construed as holding that motives are
themselves irrelevant for the deontic evaluation of actions. Intuition
suggests that motives are morally relevant, and motive utilitarianism
addresses this potential gap by providing utilitarian resources to evaluate
motives.

Question 64

Is motive utilitarianism strictly speaking deontic?

Answer 64

not, strictly
speaking, a deontic view about the moral rightness or wrongness of actions,
but instead a view about the goodness or badness of motives. The view holds
that the best motives are those that yield optimal utility

Question 65

Different configurations of motive utilitarianism

Answer 65

possible motives could be construed as those motives that are humanly
possible, or as those motives that are possible for the agent in question.

Once the relevant motives have been established, the conditions in which utility is
evaluated need to be set:

utility could be calculated supposing that all
agents, universally, have these motives, or it could be calculated supposing
that only the agent in question has the motives, holding all other features of
the world constant.

Further, one must consider whether transition costs are
also relevant: presumably if one does not currently have motives that would
be optimal to have, there may be some disutility in cultivating these motives.
Should this be counted against the overall utility of the motives, or not? An
extension of the view could take a cue from rule utilitarianism, and indirectly
generate a deontic theory from motive utilitarianism, according to which
right actions are those that an agent would do were he to have the optimal
motives

Question 66

central debate re motive utilitarianism?

what does Adams argue?

Answer 66

whether motive utilitarianism is
compatible with act utilitarianism.

Adams argues that it is not: he presents
a case in which the motivation to enjoy visiting Chartres results in more
overall utility than a motivation to maximize utility (1976). In Adams’s
example, the motivation to appreciate the splendor of the cathedral generates
an action that is suboptimal: the tourist lingers too long over one minor
artwork and thus makes himself late and causes considerable inconvenience
to himself – a wrong action, by act utilitarian standards. Adams takes the example to show that motive utilitarianism advocates actions that are wrong
by act utilitarian standards. That is, having optimal motives can generate
sub-optimal actions. As a result, act utilitarianism and motive utilitarianism
are incompatible.

Question 67

What does Feldman argue about Adams’ example?

Answer 67

proves too much:

even straightforward act utilitarianism is subject to similar incompatibilities – an optimal action can necessitate a subsequent action at a later time, which by itself is suboptimal and therefore wrong by act
utilitarian standards, yet the overall set of acts is indeed optimal (1993).

This argument leads Feldman to reject the notion of privileging any
particular evaluative focal point as central to utilitarianism. Indeed, several
assessments of the putative evaluative conflict between motives and acts have led to notions of a more global utilitarianism, which aims to avoid the evaluative conflict among focal points by assessing overall lives as opposed to privileging any single evaluative
focal point

Question 68

An alternative assessment of the moral relevance of motives is
proposed by Sverdlik

Answer 68

argues that the best approach to capturing the
moral relevance of motives is strictly extrinsic: the motives of actions is
morally relevant by consequentialist or utilitarian standards by having
instrumental implications for consequences (2011).

Question 69

Mill Chapter 4: Of what sort of Proof the Principle of Utility is Susceptible

Summary

Answer 69

Mill begins this chapter by saying that it is not possible to prove any first principles by reasoning. How, then, can we know that utility is a foundational principle? The purpose of this chapter is to explore what should be required of utilitarianism in order for it to be believed as valid. Mill argues that the only proof that something is desirable is that people actually desire it. It is a fact that happiness is a good, because all people desire their own happiness. Thus, it is clear that happiness is at least one end, and one criterion, of morality.

However, in order to show that happiness is the sole criterion for morality, it is necessary to show that people never desire anything but happiness. Mill says that people do desire things like virtue, which in common language is distinguished from happiness. However, Mill states that people love virtue only because it constitutes a part of happiness. Mill argues that happiness is not an abstract idea, but a whole with component parts. Because virtue is a part of happiness, and promotes the general happiness, utilitarianism encourages the development of virtue.

Anything that is desired beyond being a means to happiness is desired because it is part of happiness. Thus, Mill explains that proving utilitarianism is a psychological question. The real issue is whether it is true that people only desire things that are part of happiness or a means to happiness. This can only be answered by self-reflection and observation of others. Mill contends that utilitarianism is true, and that impartial reflection will show that desiring something is the same thing as thinking it pleasant. He argues that this is so obvious that he doubts it could be disputed. The only possible refutation that could legitimately be made is that the moral will is something different than physical or emotional desire; virtuous people carry out actions without thought of such pleasures. Mill admits that will is different than desire, and often becomes an end in itself. However, all will originates in desire; if we will a thing that we now no longer desire, it is only by force of habit. This does not change the fact that things are good to people only insofar as they lead to pleasure. Mill then says that it leaves it to the “thoughtful reader” whether what he has said is true

Question 70

Mill Chapter 4: Of what sort of Proof the Principle of Utility is Susceptible

Commentary

Answer 70

Mill further expands his discussion of happiness in this chapter. Recall that in Chapter 2, Mill argued that pleasures that were based on one’s higher faculties were of a higher quality, and should be weighted accordingly. In this way, he tried to expand the meaning of happiness to allow for different kinds of pleasure. In Chapter 4 Mill expands the meaning of happiness again. A possible objection to utilitarianism is that certain experiences could be integral parts of a compound happiness, not merely a means to a pure, elemental happiness. Correspondingly, Mill argues now that utilitarianism can leave room for the fact that happiness consists of the other experiences that people value. This idea of happiness as having “component parts” is an important expansion of the meaning of happiness by Mill.

The other major argument in this chapter is that the motivation for all action is based on the fulfillment of desire. However, he probably rightly contends that whether he is correct is an empirical question, a question answered by observing oneself and others. This brings up an important question about the lines between psychology and philosophy. If utilitarianism is based on the psychological make-up of human beings, then to what degree is it merely descriptive? We tend to want philosophy to provide reasons why we should behave in a particular manner. However, to note that we do behave in a certain manner is not necessarily to prove that we ought to behave that way. One should consider at which points in the text Mill is observing how humans view the world, and at which points he is advocating a certain worldview. What does his theory lose and gain from relying on psychological arguments? To what degree is it even possible to avoid a dependence upon description?

Question 71

Mill Chapter 2: What Utilitarianism Is (Part 2)

Summary

Answer 71

Having responded to the objection that utilitarianism glorifies base pleasures, Mill spends the rest of this chapter presenting and responding to other criticisms of utilitarianism.

One such objection is that happiness couldn’t be the rational aim of human life, because it is unattainable. Furthermore, people can exist without happiness, and all virtuous people have become virtuous by renouncing happiness.

First, Mill replies that it is an exaggeration to state that people cannot be happy. He contends that happiness, when defined as moments of rapture occurring in a life troubled by few pains, is indeed possible, and would be possible for almost everybody if educational and social arrangements were different. The major sources of unhappiness are selfishness and a lack of mental cultivation. Thus, it is fully within most people’s capabilities to be happy, if their education nurtures the appropriate values. Furthermore, most of the evils of the world, including poverty and disease, can be alleviated by a wise and energetic society devoted to their elimination.

Next, Mill addresses the argument that the most virtuous people in history are those who have renounced happiness. He admits this is true, and he admits that there are martyrs who give up their happiness. However, Mill argues that martyrs must sacrifice happiness for some greater end–and what else could this be but the happiness of other people? The sacrifice is made so that others will not have to make similar sacrifices; implicit in the sacrifice is the value of others’ happiness. Mill admits that the willingness to sacrifice one’s happiness for that of others is the highest virtue. Furthermore, he says that to maintain an attitude of such willingness is actually the best chance of gaining happiness, because it will lead a person to be tranquil about his life and prospects. He specifies, however, that while utilitarians value sacrificing one’s good for the good of others, they do not think that the sacrifice is in itself a good. It is a good insofar as it promotes happiness, but is not a good if it does not promote happiness.

Mill observes that the utilitarian’s standard for judging an act is the happiness of all people, not of the agent alone. Thus, a person must not value his own happiness over the happiness of others; and law and education help to instill this generosity in individuals. However, this does not mean that people’s motives must only be to serve the greatest good; indeed, utilitarianism is not concerned with the motives behind an action; the morality of an action depends on the goodness of its result only. Moreover, in most aspects of everyday life, a person will not be affecting large numbers of other people, and thus need not consider his or her actions in relation to the good of all, but only to the good of those involved. It is only the people who work in the public sphere and affect many other people who must think about public utility on a regular basis.

Another criticism of utilitarianism is that it leaves people “cold and unsympathizing,” as it is concerned solely with the consequences of people’s actions, and not on the individuals as moral or immoral in themselves. First, Mill replies that if the criticism is that utilitarianism does not let the rightness or wrongness of an action be affected by the kind of person who performs the action, then this is a criticism of all morality: All ethical standards judge actions in themselves, without considering the morality of those who performed them. However, he says that if the criticism is meant to imply that many utilitarians look on utilitarianism as an exclusive standard of morality, and fail to appreciate other desirable “beauties of character,” then this is a valid critique of many utilitarians. He says that it is a mistake to only cultivate moral feelings, to the exclusion of the sympathies or artistic understandings, a mistake moralists of all persuasions often make. However, he does say that if there is to be a mistake of priorities, it is preferable to err on the side of moral thinking.

Mill then presents a few more misunderstandings about utilitarian theory, which he declares are obviously wrong but which many people nonetheless believe. First, utilitarianism is often called a godless doctrine, because its moral foundation is the human happiness, and not the will of God. Mill replies that the criticism depends on what we see to be the moral character of God; for if God desires the happiness of all His creatures, then utilitarianism is more religious than any other doctrine. A utilitarian believes that God’s revealed truths about morality will fit with utilitarian principles. Furthermore, many moralists, not simply utilitarians, have believed that we need an ethical doctrine, carefully followed, in order to understand the will of God in the first place.

Secondly, utilitarianism is often conflated with Expediency, and therefore considered immoral. However, “expedient” usually refers to acting against what is right for the sake of personal interest or short-term goals. Thus, instead of being useful, this meaning of expediency is actually harmful. Mill would argue that hurting society is not truly expedient, and that to act against society’s interests is to be an enemy of morality.

Many critics hold that prior to taking action, there is often not enough time to weigh its effects on general utility. Mill dismisses this, saying that such a claim is akin to saying that we can’t guide our conduct by Christianity because we can’t read the Bible every time we had to act. He asserts that we have had the entire history of human existence within which to learn the tendencies of actions to lead to particular results. There is a great deal of consensus about what is useful, and we have the capacity to impart this knowledge to children too. This is not to say that received ethics are always correct, and there is still much to learn about the effects of actions on general happiness. However, people need not reapply the first principles to an action each time they perform it. All rational people go through life with their minds made up on certain basic questions of right and wrong.

Finally, utilitarianism is criticized as too allowing, as underestimating the immoral tendencies of human nature. For example, it is argued that a utilitarian will make his own case an exception to the rules, and will be tempted to justify breaking the rules by simply saying that a given action increases utility. However, Mill says this problem is not limited to utilitarian theories. All creeds must have exceptions, because the need for exceptions is part of the reality of human life. Having a standard of utility to invoke is better than having no standard at all.

Question 72

Mill Chapter 2: What Utilitarianism Is (Part 2)

Commentary

Answer 72

One of Mill’s most common replies to objections about utilitarianism is that the given critique is not unique to utilitarianism, that any ethical theory would have such limitations. What are the strengths and weaknesses of this tactic? Does it really satisfy Mill’s stated objective, to dispel misconceptions about his theory? Might such a reply undermine all ethical theories?

Mill makes some of his most controversial arguments in this section, and it is important to look closely at his arguments and assumptions. There is not an obvious right or wrong answer in this debate, but it may be helpful to think about some of the areas where Mill’s argument is most commonly attacked. Mill observes that utilitarianism is concerned with increasing the amount of general happiness, not with increasing any one person’s happiness. One common criticism of this concept is that by basing morality on the general good, utilitarianism fails to appreciate the importance of the individual. In dealing with this debate, it is useful to recognize a difference of perspective. Mill takes an impersonal perspective, where morality is impartial. One could, however, argue that morality should be subject-oriented, or interpeersonal. Another contentious point is Mill’s argument that individuals’ motives do not matter in morality. Is an action fundamentally different if it is performed for good or bad reasons? Mill would argue it is not. Finally, Mill argues that sacrificing happiness is only desirable if it will lead to more happiness generally. He rejects the value of sacrifice in itself. However, many people do see value in an ascetic life, independent of the consequences it produces. This leads back to the most basic question about utilitarianism: Is the greatest happiness principle the ultimate foundation of morality?

Question 73

Utilitarianism, Integrity, and Partiality
Elizabeth Ashford

I. A SUMMARY OF WILLIAMS’S INTEGRITY OBJECTION

Answer 73

directed at act utilitarianism, according to which the right action is the action that maximizes overall well-being. He claims that utilitarianism requires the agent to abandon his projects whenever doing so will enable him to promote the most overall well-being, and to regard his projects as merely “one set
of satisfactions among those which he may be able to assist from
where he happens to be” (ibid., p. 115).

Williams then argues that,
while it may be acceptable that morality requires the agent to abandon certain projects, it is unreasonable for morality to demand that
the agent abandons those projects “with which [he] is more deeply and extensively involved and identified,” and which he may “take seriously at the deepest level, as being what his life is about” (ibid., p. 116). These are projects adherence to which the agent sees as constitutive of who he is - Williams terms them ground projects. They
presumably bring together the agent’s narrative identity and provide him with a sense of coherence across time.

Williams argues that the demand that an agent be prepared to set aside such ground projects in order to promote greater overall utility is “in the most literal sense, an attack on his integrity” (ibid., p. 117).
By “integrity” in the literal sense, I take it that Williams is referring to its classical meaning of “wholeness,” and is using it to denote the agent’s unified sense of self. Giving up ground projects with which the agent is identified would result in a degree of psychological
fragmentation.

Question 74

Utilitarianism, Integrity, and Partiality
Elizabeth Ashford

I. A SUMMARY OF WILLIAMS’S INTEGRITY OBJECTION

as well as identity-conferring commitments are moral commitments

Answer 74

Williams points out that utilitarianism may ask the agent to act against his moral feelings even when they are central to his moral self-conception. Williams then argues that to regard such feelings “as happenings outside one’s moral self, is to lose a sense of one’s moral
identity; to lose, in the most literal way, one’s integrity” (ibid., p. 104).
Again, the argument rests on the importance of integrity conceived as
the agent’s sense of self, though it is here concerned specifically with the agent’s moral self-conception.

Question 75

Utilitarianism, Integrity, and Partiality
Elizabeth Ashford

I. A SUMMARY OF WILLIAMS’S INTEGRITY OBJECTION

his 2 examples

• utilitarians’ response

Answer 75

George, a chemist, is required to take a job in a chemical warfare
factory, despite his opposition to chemical warfare, to prevent a more
talented and less scrupulous chemist from taking the job instead and
pursuing it with more zeal. Jim is required to shoot one Indian in order that the lives of nineteen others will be spared.

• Williams seems to assume that George and Jim are not utilitarians.
  He argues that their performing the utilitarian right action will involve their acting against their conscience, as the result of which their moral identity will be threatened. A utilitarian response to the
  examples and George and Jim, however, is that they should change the moral beliefs that underlie their current moral self-conceptions; they should come to see the right action as the one that minimizes
  suffering or death. Performing the utilitarian right action would then
  no longer involve their acting against their conscience.

Question 76

Utilitarianism, Integrity, and Partiality
Elizabeth Ashford

I. A SUMMARY OF WILLIAMS’S INTEGRITY OBJECTION

what does Williams’ integrity theory suggest about such internal feelings?

Answer 76

One interpretation of Williams’s integrity objection is that it involves the claim that those moral feelings which are central to the
agent’s current moral self-conception should be taken as given, and as presenting constraints on what a moral theory can legitimately
demand. This precludes the possibility of a moral theory’s claiming
that these moral feelings are mistaken.

Williams’s objection, on this first interpretation, comprises two claims: first, the claim that it is a condition on the acceptability of a
moral theory that it does not require agents to act in a way that contravenes their present self-conception, whatever that self-conception should consist in; and, second, the claim that utilitarianism
undermines those commitments, moral and personal, adherence to
which the agent sees as constitutive of who he is. I shall discuss this interpretation in the following section

Question 77

Utilitarianism, Integrity, and Partiality
Elizabeth Ashford

II. FIRST INTERPRETATION: THE THREAT TO THE AGENT’S PRESENT
SELF-CONCEPTION

• what does Williams think?
• her response

Answer 77

On this first interpretation, then, Williams’s objection is that the cost to agents of the undermining of their integrity, conceived purely as their current unified self-conception, is unacceptably high, and that utilitarian requirements may impose such a cost.

I shall argue that integrity on this conception cannot plausibly outweigh moral obligations, and, moreover, that is not the kind of integrity that agents take
to be valuable. My argument will focus on the claim that agents’
moral self-conceptions provide base-line constraints on the accept-
ability of moral requirements. I shall argue that, conversely, moral
requirements provide constraints on the acceptability of agents’
moral self-conceptions.

Question 78

Utilitarianism, Integrity, and Partiality
Elizabeth Ashford

II. FIRST INTERPRETATION: THE THREAT TO THE AGENT’S PRESENT
SELF-CONCEPTION

example of slavery

Answer 78

The example of slavery demonstrates that agents’ moral self-conceptions can conflict with extremely strong moral obligations and, furthermore, that this conflict need not be confined to rare individuals, but may affect a whole society. When a form of immorality
involves living by accepted social norms, the moral defects and in-
consistencies of the way of life may not be apparent to members of
the society if they fail to question those norms. They are able to give
a coherent narrative to their life that enables them to retain a self-conception as morally upright. They are aided in this by the fact
that agents’ sense of identity is largely formed by the way they are
viewed by those with whom they interact. Slave owners, for example,
were able to retain their self-conception as morally decent despite
owning slaves, because they were inculcated with the view that slavery was morally justifiable and, in addition, because they could gain positive recognition in the society that condoned the practice. If, on
the other hand, an agent began to question the morality of owning
slaves, then even if he attempted to oppose it he might feel morally
compromised just by living in a society based on a slave-run economy.

Clearly, any plausible account of moral obligations must hold that slave owners should have questioned and opposed their way of life and the norms to which they subscribed, even at the cost of alienation
from what were previously deeply held commitments and moral self-conceptions. The example thus demonstrates that agents’ integrity in the sense of their current unified self-conception can be incompatible with undoubtedly overriding moral demands. It there-
fore cannot be a plausible demand on a moral theory that it be compatible with such integrity.

Question 79

Utilitarianism, Integrity, and Partiality
Elizabeth Ashford

II. FIRST INTERPRETATION: THE THREAT TO THE AGENT’S PRESENT
SELF-CONCEPTION

objective integrity

Answer 79

I conclude that in order to be forceful, the integrity objection cannot be grounded on the value of integrity conceived merely as the agent’s current unified self-conception. It must appeal to what I will
call objective integrity. For the agent to have objective integrity, her
self-conception must be grounded in reality: it must not be based on
her being seriously deceived either about empirical facts or about the moral obligations she actually has. In particular, her self-conception
as being morally decent must be grounded in her leading a genuinely
morally decent life.

By contrast, the mere possession of a coherent
self-conception, however mistaken, can be called subjective integrity.

A further reason why a forceful version of the integrity objection
should appeal to objective integrity is that it is a considerably more
plausible candidate than subjective integrity for what agents actually
take to be valuable. The integrity objection appeals to the value of integrity, and hence the immense cost to agents of losing it. Its cogency will therefore depend on its appealing to the kind of integrity that agents in fact value

Question 80

Utilitarianism, Integrity, and Partiality
Elizabeth Ashford

II. FIRST INTERPRETATION: THE THREAT TO THE AGENT’S PRESENT
SELF-CONCEPTION

Nozick’s experience machine

Answer 80

Williams emphasizes the role played by agents’ adherence to their
central projects in grounding their sense of meaning in their lives.
Robert Nozick’s experience-machine thought experiment indicates that the kind of sense of meaning we value is one grounded in reality,
through our actually accomplishing something with our lives; it is not
merely our having the subjective experience of leading a meaningful
life which we value. In order for the agent to achieve genuine
accomplishment, she must not be seriously deceived about the empirical facts relevant to her actions. But in addition, since a central component of genuine accomplishment is leading a life that is actually morally worthwhile, she must not be seriously deceived about her moral obligations. This indicates that we value having objective integrity, as opposed to merely having a self-conception according to
which we are leading a worthwhile life

Question 81

Utilitarianism, Integrity, and Partiality
Elizabeth Ashford

II. FIRST INTERPRETATION: THE THREAT TO THE AGENT’S PRESENT
SELF-CONCEPTION

Another related reason why we value objective integrity is that the
sense of self-worth which it confers is grounded in attributes the agent actually has.

Answer 81

By contrast, subjective integrity is grounded only
in the agent’s retaining the belief that she possesses such attributes. If her self-conception does not correspond to reality, then she will need to find external means of retaining it. One way of doing so is by gaining positive recognition from others. This will necessitate the
agent’s dependency on others for her sense of self.

Objective integrity may lead to inner turbulence, since it involves
an uncompromising concern for and pursuit of the truth about
matters of importance, especially morality, through autonomous moral appraisal of oneself and of one’s society’s standards. Nevertheless, the sense of identity which it grounds is genuine, stable, and
self-reliant.

I conclude that to be plausible the objection should be interpreted
as claiming that utilitarianism undermines agents’ objective integrity.
I shall consider two versions of this claim: first, that utilitarianism
undermines objective integrity in the current state of the world; second, that utilitarianism undermines objective integrity in any practically realizable state of the world.

Question 82

Utilitarianism, Integrity, and Partiality
Elizabeth Ashford

III. SECOND INTERPRETATION: THE THREAT TO OBJECTIVE INTEGRITY
IN THE CURRENT STATE OF THE WORLD

Answer 82

In order to assess the force of the objection that agents’ current
utilitarian moral obligations undermine their objective integrity, I
shall first discuss the circumstances in which objective integrity is
possible. I shall then argue that in the current state of the world, it is
plausible and appropriate to claim that agents’ objective integrity is
inevitably threatened.
A. The conditions for objective integrity. I have argued that in order for
us to have objective integrity, our moral self-conception must be
grounded in our actually leading a morally decent life. This requires
that we abide by our moral commitments and that these commit-
ments stem from the moral obligations we actually have.
Both subjective and objective integrity also require the agent’s
adhering to her personal commitments, since, as Williams argues,
these are centrally constitutive of any agent’s identity and sense of the
meaningfulness of her life. Personal commitments include pruden-
tial projects and commitments to particular individuals. Prudential