Use Of Force Flashcards

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1
Q

what does international Law say about the use of force?

A

It links to the idea that there has been a fragmentation of international law, popular in the 1990s at the end of the cold war and the superpowers rivalry between western and eastern countries. And a shadow of the cold war past; nuclear confrontation between these two blocks of states – when this was lifted we see international law becoming more ambitions and trying to many more things; no longer was the primary aim being to stop a third world war: the growth of international law is prominent i.e. women’s rights, environment, cyber space, international criminal law.
Security Council has passed many more resolutions, and these are better quality; no longer was it trying to avoid east v. west confrontation – but it was much broader.
Branches of public international law becoming available; they have their own rules relating them. Find separate branches have separate features and develops differently in comparison. Regime interaction: how do they interact together – international crimes are usually a violation of international humanitarian law. These concepts being transposed into different legal regimes.

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2
Q

Two types of war names

A

Jus Ad Bellum - recourse to the use of force

Jus in Bello - how armed conflicts are fought; law in war

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3
Q

Jus Ad Bellum - effective?

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Argued that there is no effective jus ad bello because of the prevalence of war fair in our era, but there have been huge strides to making concrete boundaries around force and restrict and when one state can invade another.
This is because of the peace of Westphalia 1648. Before Westphalia, it seemed to be that communities/states would use force whenever they wanted, as it was more about power and realism – this wasn’t a very good way. It created a very realists world order. Even then it was looked at as a bad way to form international relations because of the uncertainty it had and created. Realism wasn’t a good way to bring about peace and security – history shows how violent the world order was.
Peace of Westphalia made the states do things differently. States creating rules and created state sovereignty; giving states a right to regulate their own internal affairs free from external intervention. Not because of your power, but because each state is equal (not so true now North Korea is a good example).

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4
Q

Principle of non-intervention

A

Peace of Westphalia created the principle of non-intervention. the essence of intervention is coercion– yes it was a European devise; Europe was strong and powerful and it diffused this principle of sovereignty to the world order and created a world order of states. It is crucial to the use of force; states not being able to intervene in other state affairs politically, economically, and in particular it indefinitely protects against military intervention. Sovereignty is huge. Prohibition of military force in international force (very narrow exceptions) – but it is much more than that. Coercion is difficult define - coercion is intervention but not interference.

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5
Q

Example of non-intervention.

A

International law tribunals said in the Nicaragua case yes, the US had used military force in violation, clear that use of force also violated the non-intervention rule. – use of force is a particular expression of the non-intervention principle –intervention more broadly and use of force is a particular manifestation of it.

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6
Q

Non-intervention - customary international law.

A

Non-intervention rule is more of a customary international law. Dates back much more broadly from Westphalia and then the customary international laws after that. ICJ gave article 2(4) pride of place in the UN charter; as said in the Nicaragua case. It is also bound to states that emerged which aren’t part of the UN because it is such a strong customary international law. It attracts wide State practice and has opinio juris.

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7
Q

Jus Ad Bellum - the prohibition

A
Article 2(4) UN Charter ‘[States] shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN’
Key concepts in this article - what is force? This changes all the time. 
Important prohibition that is pregnant with ambiguity and demands international law to define these concepts.  Have to look at what states have said and what the ICJ have said – not many cases on the use of force; the reason that it does not come in the international tribunals is that they operate on the basis on consent - if the state has not consented to the court’s/tribunal’s jurisdiction then the use of force matter will never be heard. This gives reason to why there are so many cases and evidence of the force being used but not much international precedent or jurisdiction on the matter. 
Use of force is very sensitive – states very rarely give their consent to these courts and tribunals. Really important prohibition but has loads of ambiguity – we have to then define this.
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8
Q

Jus Ad Bellum - the extent of prohibition.

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A lot of controversy in the use of force What does force mean – can it include a cyber-attack? It should not really be about the means but the effects. A cyber-attack does not cause physical damage as such but can be quite harmful and destroying to a state which has a lot of dependency on cyber. But what about a cyber-attack on Estonia, no physical effect, but take away all the online means – online feature is a huge part of Estonia and the attack takes out the dependency.
Can read the last line of article 2.4 ‘in any other manner’ as being an evolutionary part of the article. The framing of this article is very board – yes it was drafted in a way that did not include cyber-attacks because cyber-attacks did not exist. For example in the cases of nuclear weapons – the full extent of the full extent of biological chemical weapons were not really full known until the end of the cold war. States quickly identified that nuclear weapons were included in this because to use nuclear weapons is against the core principles of the UN, that being peace and security.

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9
Q

Features of Art.2(4)

A

Not mechanically applied; quite complex to apply
it prohibits the threat or use of force. Therefore, it is not just the physical but also the hypothetical use; the hypothetical use can be most evidence in the US.
it is a jus cogens norm due to the serious consequences that flow from it.
It is important as it is broad and covers both threats and use of force. The effectiveness of the article suffers if the threat concept is not included – most states would just threat the use of force if it was allowed, because they are more political controversial. The key question is what does force mean; it is left ill defined –there have been many different types of attempts at defining it – important to identity the proper scope of it.

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10
Q

What does force mean?

A

There was a debate in San Francisco on how we constitute article 2.4: Brazil said that it should include economic coercion but this was rejected and this is evidenced in the fact that it was not placed in the article. Many have read that because it was rejected and therefore not included in the article, then it does not constitute force; therefore it must be the intention of the framers that economic or political coercion is not included in the article.– this is supported by other articles and prohibitions in the charter which seems to support the suggestion that article 2(4) is literally about armed forced.

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11
Q

Vienna Convention Art.31

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Interpretation of treaty law - We have to interpret article 2(4) in light of the preamble that says it is about war. It is a straight forward application of the Vienna convention here.

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12
Q

How should Art.2(4) be interpreted?

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Article 2.4 should be interpreted with armed forces in mind. only armed forces and military forces between states. State practice after the signing of a treaty forms our understanding of the treaty – how it has been applied and interpreted. Still difficulties in what is use of force to new fact scenarios
2007 – Estonia cyber-attacks, no direct deaths but screwed them up for about 3 weeks Question about force.
2011 – Stuxnet – virus without knowing you have a virus. Effects the operating systems. Here there was physical damages – does article 2.4 apply
We need to interpret article 2(4) progressively other say that article 2(4) needs to apply just to physical events. Perhaps non-intervention applies. Article 2.4 is a particular important intervention and should be reserved for matters of such importance. If article 2.4 has been violated maybe you could use self-defence back – cannot use military force as self-defence.

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13
Q

Who killed Art.2(4) - Tom Frank

A

The article evoked an interesting debate; whether or not article 2(4) had been violated sufficiently frequently to kill it – norms of international law could fall into destitute because they are violated so frequently. Never say that the rule that we are to drive down the road at 30MPH and people drive down it at 40MPH, we don’t say that this rule has fallen into destitute. But it works for International law because it is not about a unity system where the sovereignty imposes obligations upon us, but about a network; states make law as a community – if enough say they aren’t doing it the normative law depresses.

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14
Q

Henkin response to Tom Frank?

A

The death of article 2(4) has been exaggerated in the article; almost all rules are almost always complied with almost all of the time. Henkin argues that Frank ignored the areas where article 2(4) was effective.

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15
Q

Exceptions to Art.2(4).

A

Very important – they are very narrow exceptions in which states can use force permissibly.
•Article 51 UN Charter
•Collective Security
These are the definite exceptions because they are built within the UN charter – there are other exceptions but they are not drawn upon.
Article 2(4) is a comprehensive prohibition. States accept a prima facie prohibition of article 2(4) and then go to the exceptions.
Battle lines are drawn around the exceptions rather than article 2(4) in practice – and in particular around the notion of article 51 of the UN charter and collective security. There are other exceptions i.e. humanitarian intervention; not contained in the UN charter, but since these terrible events UK gov have said that we can use force in these extreme conditions. The status of this is disputed.

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16
Q

Exception 1 - self defence: Article 51 of the UN Charter.

A

‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security …’

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17
Q

Definition of Art. 51

A
  • Article 2(4) prohibits ‘use of force’ and article 51 concerns ‘armed attack’. Is there a gap here?
  • An ‘armed attack’ will include use of force of sufficient ‘scale and effects’ i.e. ‘not a mere frontier incident’. A de minimis test: the ‘pin prick’ approach therefore seems to be covered (Nicaragua).
  • The State relying on self-defence must prove that an ‘armed attack’ has occurred (Iranian Platform case).
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18
Q

Is there a gap between Art. 2(4) and Art. 51?

A

Art 2(4) enables force in self-defence, but it can only be committed in response to an armed attack or use of force only. In article 51 it admittedly says an armed attacked; article 51 and article 2(4) is very different in normative ways. There is a gap between the two articles – a state can be a victim of use of force but cannot use force in self-defence unless that use of force qualifies as an armed attack. There are some instances where a state will be a victim of use of force but the international law will say that it is not that severe to use force back. But use of force in self-defence is what a state wants because counter measures are pretty bad anyway. States, therefore, want to activate article 51 because then they can use force unilaterally in self-defence. The US has long maintained that there is no gap between the two articles – they have said that they are well within their rights to use force against any attacks made to them in defence – many states do agree with this. – a state can only use in self-defence where an armed attack occurs.

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19
Q

Nicaragua ICJ definition of ‘armed attack’.

A

Armed attack is more serious then use of force, as seen in Nicaragua case. ICJ in this case said that there was a gap between the two articles. In order to trigger an armed attack and self-defence, the use of force committed to that state has to be grave and have sufficient effects. It cannot be a mere frontier.

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20
Q

Bruno Zimmer’s opinion in Congo v Uganda

A

He said that there is a gap between the two articles, however, you can use defences armed reprisals as a response, important to establish whether something is just an intervention or a use of force. Intervention is an internationally wrongful act, article 2.4 you can use defensive armed reprisals less than full self-defence. If you see states going through use of force historically, they just do it back – bomb me and I bomb you. The victim state will just do a reprisal as a punishment – it causes a lot of controversy. It is a balance between US and Nicaragua views. Reprisal – broader scope to protect yourself.

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21
Q

Bush Doctrine on Use of Force.

A

all force is force; The Bush Doctrine in which the US can use force anyway because there is always a threat of violence or force against the US so their self-defence of force is legitimate. US wants to be able to maximise the potential to protect itself.

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22
Q

Pin Pricking

A

Might do something called pin pricking; keep pricking at the same point. Each prick is technically independent but there is a rationale connection, together it amounts to a use of force or an armed attack. This is discussed in the Nicaragua case. The case has already said that a mere frontier of force may be a use of force and maybe not an armed attack. They also said that if it happens frequently it may amount up to an armed attack. Aggregation of events, has to have a rational connection.
This is important in recent years due to the asymmetric in warfare and dependency on force being used.

23
Q

Burden of Proof

A

– Iranian Platform case, the obligation is on the state advocating the right to demonstrate that an armed attack occurred. Because it is an exceptional right.

24
Q

Irregulars/Terrorists

A

1945 marks the birth of modern international law which is primarily concerned with states. This is not unsurprising due to the time the UN was drafted; after the second world war, states wanted protection of their sovereignty and do the UN Charter is drafted in a way that places state sovereignty as the core.
However, non-state actors have a prominent role in today’s world. They have the equivalent power of a state especially in the use of force. Establishing the interstate relationship v. force being classed as force in the international realm. Many suggest that the latter now constitutes that a state can respond to force no matter who has dealt with it even though traditionally force as a defence, or exception, can only be aimed at a state.

25
Q

Can article 51 be used on non-state actors?

A

Crucial issues in many years, whether or not a state can use force in response to an armed attack against a non state actor like terrorist groups. Terrorist groups have increased; they have the power to make destruction in the same as another state. The problem – when international historically looks down, international law was all states and didn’t see any other type of actors, due to the principle of sovereignty. However, companies have grown in provenance and have an international status and terrorist groups have a bigger military capacity than Chad. The UN charter has never been changed, and it is almost impossible to do so. It should be to accommodate non-state actors.
Article 51 has always been defined as a state using force against another state. If the attacked state is subject to an attack from a non-state actor, international law has said to that state occupying the non-state actor to sort them out – but it does not help the attacked state.
Terrorist groups have become much more powerful – 9/11 in 2001 shows this. It matters who is attacking the state – UN charter only applies to states.
Non-state actors have to be in the effective control of the host attack thus attributing the attack to the host state – has to prove effective control though (Nicaragua); Article 8 ARSIWA; very high standard. Bosnian Genocide – overall control test was disputed.

26
Q

2003 Wall Opinion Case

A

court said that Israel could not use force in self-defence to a non-state actor.

27
Q

ISIS

A

Iraq invited UK and US to get rid of ISIS in their territory. This was okay because Iraq consented. But the UK and the US were only allowed to remove ISIS from Iraq and not completely (as ISIS was on the board of Syria and Iraq, therefore occupying two jurisdictions). Issues were brought to the fore in this case on the use of force in self-defence and many suggested that the force could be used against anyone that evokes force.
Terrorism has become important in the contemporary era.

28
Q

Afghanistan

A

•Justified as self-defence (SC resolution 1368, 2001)
•Taliban were responsible for armed attack committed by Al Qaeda. Sufficient control and direction to impute the actions of Al Qaeda to ‘the state’.
•But note that Bush said ‘harbouring’. Spurious interpretation of international law?
Catalysis for the discussion on the use of force.

29
Q

Could the US use the use of force against Al Qaeda directly?

A

The US could bring it back to efficient control due to the close relationship between Al Qaeda and the Afghan Government, the Taliban. It was a classic case of non-state actor committing an attack but due to the close relationship between the Al Q and the Taliban, it was effective control.

30
Q

President Bush on Terrorism?

A

Bush, when President, said that the use of force was a military doctrine under self-defence can could be used against any state that is harbouring terrorists. In his fight against terrorism. Bush wanted to lower the rate of attribution in the context of use of force – lower effective control.

31
Q

Syria and ISIS

A

when ISIS was using its violence and claiming responsibility for quite significant levels of violence against not just the states it was based in but also transnationally, those states wanted to use force in self defence not only to the state but also to the root of the problem. States progressively interpret their definitions of self defence – due away with this idea of effective control and move to the idea that force is force no matter who commits it. Certain states, western military powerful states, are quite confident in determining that article 51 can be used against non state actors regardless of article 51 interpretation.

32
Q

Can self-defence only be exercised against an attack that has already been committed?

A

No, as article 51 uses the word ‘occurs’ not ‘occurred’.

So, the question becomes how mature must the threat of an armed attack be in order to exercise self-defence?

33
Q

Prof. Dinstein - interceptive self defence

A

When a state intercepts an armed attack that has been ‘committed in an ostensibly irrevocable way’ i.e. ‘practically unavoidable’.
He propounded an interpretation of article 51 that has stuck very well. He said that of course a state does not have to wait for the bomb to drop, instead he prefers the word interoceptively; can only use it where the armed attack has manifested, the physical effects have not occurred yet, but they are inevitable; it was fate. It was practically unavoidable; the use of force as a defence had been committed because it was ostensibly irrevocable.

34
Q

Bush Doctrine: Pre-emptive Self-defence

A

Threat posed by ‘terrorist organizations of global reach and any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction’
Claim to ‘exercise our right of self-defence by acting pre-emptively against terrorists to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country’
There was ambiguity over whether it would gain traction. Broader view on when use of force is acceptable. But this theory can be used against less mature threat.

35
Q

Iraq 2003

A

Here, the Bush doctrine really came into vogue. UK relied upon implied authorisation in chapter 7 of the SC. Many claim that the Bush doctrine is too thin – they are too immature aims and threats made at the US to constitute force being used as self-defence.
Many say Iraq was an example more of interceptive force in self defence. This is lawful. But it is a factual investigation. Use of force needs have significantly mature threats.

36
Q

Is there a Customary International Law that recognises an inherent right to pre-emptive self-defence?

A

there is a customary international law that allows it and this can be seen in in Caroline Incident – UK foreign sec said they attack the ship due to pre-emptive self defence right because the ship was sending weapons to the enemy. The respondents said that this is okay, however it is only where there was a necessity of self-defence. - ‘show a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation’

37
Q

Necessity and Proportionality

A
  • Is use of force necessary in the circumstances?
  • Self-defence must be proportionate to the armed attack.
  • Not retaliatory or punitive: the aim is to halt and repel the attack.
  • Not limited to the same weapons/forces or to action on their territory. But they must not be reprisals, which are unlawful. Look at:
  • Timing of the response – does not have to be straight after the attack but in a reasonable time. 9/11 is an example.
  • Nature of the target/link to armed attack (Iranian Platforms case)
38
Q

Collective Security definition

A

Collective security can be understood as a security arrangement, political, regional, or global, in which each state in the system accepts that the security of one is the concern of all, and therefore commits to a collective response to threats to, and breaches to peace. Collective security is more ambitious than systems of alliance security or collective defence in that it seeks to encompass the totality of states within a region or indeed globally, and to address a wide range of possible threats. While collective security is an idea with a long history, its implementation in practice has proved problematic. Several prerequisites have to be met for it to have a chance of working. It is the theory or practice of states pledging to defend one another in order to deter aggression or to punish transgressor if international order has been breached.
Collective security can be understood as a security arrangement in which all states cooperate collectively to provide security for all by the actions of all against any states within the groups which might challenge the existing order by using force. This contrasts with self-help strategies of engaging in war for purely immediate national interest. While collective security is possible, several prerequisites have to be met for it to work.

39
Q

UN Security Council

A

•15 members (P5 plus 10)
•Primary responsibility (Art.24)
•Right of veto for P5 (Art. 23(2))
•9 of the 15 must agree (Art. 27)
•Abstention/non-participation – it is considered to be approval.
•Enforcement powers (Ch.VII). Article 39:
o‘Threat to the peace’
o‘Breach of the peace’
o‘Act of aggression’
This represents another legal basis for using legal force. This is the dominate body, the central body.

40
Q

Art. 24 of the UN Charter

A

“1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.
2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.
3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.”
This shows that the Security Council have the primary responsibility for maintaining collective security.

41
Q

Problems of the Security Council

A
  • There are only few members of the Security Council and it seems disproportionate for only 5 of them to have the power of the veto.
  • Even if the permanent 5 agree, 4 other states need to also agree.
42
Q

Threat to Peace has moved from a negative route to a thicker concept which incorporates a internal element - examples:

A

•Non-forcible measures (Art.41)
- Economic sanctions
- International criminal tribunals
- Post-conflict governance (Kosovo)
- Legislation against terrorism (freezing assets-SC Res. 1373, 2001)
•Military measures (Art.42 allows use of force)
- ‘all necessary means’ (Iraq, 1991; Libya 2011)
The non-forcible measures can also be authorised and this indicates the range of things that the SC can do.

43
Q

Weaknesses to Collective Security

A

•Veto = paralysis. The veto becomes unreasonable because vetoing on matters of sheer importance goes against the normative function of the security council.
•No standing army; reliance on willing member states.
•Lack of UN command and control
•Vague open mandates (Libya?)
Collective security has always been weak. The conflict continues to go on no matter what the Security Council say; this can be seen in Syria.

44
Q

Invasion of Kuwait 1990

A

The Invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 was a 2-day operation conducted by Iraq against the neighbouring state of Kuwait, which resulted in the seven-month-long Iraqi occupation of the country. This invasion and Iraq’s subsequent refusal to withdraw from Kuwait by a deadline mandated by the United Nations led to military intervention by a United Nations-authorized coalition of forces led by the United States. These events came to be known as the first Gulf War and resulted in the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the Iraqis setting 600 Kuwaiti oil wells on fire during their retreat.
•2nd August 1990
•SC Res. 660, 661, 665 (1990)
•SC Res. 678 (1990) ‘to use all necessary means to uphold and implement SC Resolution 660 … and to restore international peace and security to the area’
•Coalition action
•Iraq surrendered 3 March 1991
The Iraq war is very relevant. It was the first time that the Security Council has worked properly in decades.

45
Q

Invasion of Iraq 2003: implied authorisation

A

•Iraqi non-compliance
•UN inspectors withdrawn in 1998
•US - pre-emptive strike
•UK - through the SC
•SC 1441, Nov.2002 – did not expressly authorise use of use, but it was implied.
The USA went down the Bush doctrine, suggesting that it was pre-emptive self defence. The UK went down the implied authorisation.

46
Q

SC Res. 1441 2002

A

•recalls SC Res. 687 and 678
•Iraq in material breach of 687
•Final opportunity to comply with inspectors
•‘Serious consequences’ if not full compliance – what does this mean?
•No ‘authorisation’ to use force or to take ‘necessary measures’
•US and UK assured no ‘hidden triggers’ nor ‘automaticity’
The Security Council did not authorise the UK and the US to use force but it did record previous resolutions that noted the force being used in Iraq because of the Iraqi war. It noted that Iraq had breached resolution 687 which states that the cease fire would be withdrawn from Iraq if Iraq got rid of all of its weapons of mass destruction.

47
Q

Invasion of Iraq March 2003

A

•UN inspectors have some success
•no second resolution
•Material breach of 687 (cease fire agreement) triggers 678 (UK AG)
•Implied authorisation 1441 sufficient (US and UK)
•Self-defence and humanitarian intervention (US only)
If we are to accept implied authorisation this then gets rid of the normative ideology in collective security. Implied authorisation was new in this case, but it is oxymoronic. Haven’t seen it since. This shows a hostile relationship to it.
The use of force is used sparingly.

48
Q

Third exception - Humanitarian intervention

A

In modern times, inter-state interventions manifest themselves in terms of human suffering rather than as an expression of classic power politics.
Unilateral humanitarian intervention
•Tanzania in Uganda 1978
•Vietnam in Cambodia 1978
•Kosovo 1999 (the most important) – arguably an ‘unfortunate precedent’
This idea of humanitarian intervention starts at the end of the cold war when the notion of sovereignty loses its dominance. It removes the notion of states as black boxes. Sovereignty is no longer a shield.
The UK justify their invasions on the basis of humanitarian intervention most of the time.
Humanitarian intervention boils down to a question of customary international law. It becomes a doctrinal question.

49
Q

Analysis of Kosovo

A
  • Ethnic cleansing of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.
  • Independent human rights NGOs reporting humanitarian catastrophe. This was affirmed by SC Resolution 1199 (1998).
  • Security Council refused to engage Chapter VII (Russian veto)
  • NATO bombing campaign to protect Albanians. Violation of article 2(4)?
50
Q

New Customary International Law

A

•New CIL that modifies the prohibition on the threat or use of force against all sovereign states?
•A state is only sovereign if it protects human rights. If it fails to protect rights, it is no longer sovereign and so intervention is permissible, even required?
Nicaragua 1986 ICJ - ‘The conduct of States should in general be consistent with’ the rule
‘Instances of State conduct inconsistent with [the] rule should generally be treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule’

51
Q

Subsequent Developments

A

Human security: ‘emerging norm that there is a collective responsibility to protect… in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing …’ (High Level Panel Report, 2004)
Indeed, is there a responsibility to protect (R2P).
Libya: SC Res 1970 and 1973.

52
Q

Responsibility to Protect

A

is a global political commitment which was endorsed by all member states of the United Nations at the 2005 World Summit to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The principle of the Responsibility to Protect is based upon the underlying premise that sovereignty entails a responsibility to protect all populations from mass atrocity crimes and human rights violations. The principle is based on a respect for the norms and principles of international law, especially the underlying principles of law relating to sovereignty, peace and security, human rights, and armed conflict.
The Responsibility to Protect provides a framework for employing measures that already exist (i.e., mediation, early warning mechanisms, economic sanctions, and chapter VII powers) to prevent atrocity crimes and to protect civilians from their occurrence. The authority to employ the use of force under the framework of the Responsibility to Protect rests solely with United Nations Security Council and is considered a measure of last resort. The United Nations Secretary-General has published annual reports on the Responsibility to Protect since 2009 that expand on the measures available to governments, intergovernmental organizations, and civil society, as well as the private sector, to prevent atrocity crimes.

53
Q

Debate on Responsibility to Protect

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The Responsibility to Protect has been the subject of considerable debate, particularly regarding the implementation of the principle by various actors in the context of country-specific situations, such as Libya, Syria, Sudan and Kenya, for example. It has also been argued that commensurate with the responsibility to protect, international law should also recognize a right for populations to offer militarily organized resistance to protect themselves against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes on a massive scale.