Universals Flashcards
example of universals
an apple is red - redness is a way that the apple is
property
the way something is
question on whether properties actually exist
- in the way we talk, there definitely is, they seem to exist in everyday objects, like tables and persons
But our normal way of speaking could be confused
properties can do some explanatory work
such explanatory work can give us good reasons to believe something
Universal and properties
a property that may be had by many
different objects is a universal
Argument for the existence of universals
consider two apples, A1 and A2
A1 is red
A2 is red
Therefore there is some property (redness) that A1 and A2 have in common
Therefore, there is atleast one universal, redness
If there are properties, there would seem to be plenty of properties that objects share, and so plenty of universals exist
Why should we postulate the existence of properties
Properties can account for genuine similarities
it is a fact that things that share the same properties are similar in a way that things that don’t share properties are not
the way to account for this similarity is universals
One over the many argument
While there are many things, it also seems that certain things are united in an objective manner
By postulating universals we can account for how it is that a plurality of things may be objectively
united
Meanings of predicates argument
Consider a simple subject-predicate sentence`Umrao is tall’
We know what the name `Umrao’ contributes to the meaning of this sentence: It denotes an individual
Umrao
But what about the predicate `is tall’?
It’s a property: tallness
By postulating properties we have entities that can play the role of the meanings of predicates, just as
objects can play the role of the meanings of names
strange properties of universals
where is it that universals are located?
Answer to where universals are located (1)
It’s nowhere
Problems:
If redness is not in space, then how is it that we are able to see the redness of the apple. - The most natural story here is a causal one—the redness of the apple causes us to have certain
experiences - But it would seem that the redness must have a location for it to be a cause of our experiences
Answer to where universals are located (2)
the universals are part of the object and are located at the object in which the object has that property
Problem: But if redness is to literally be a part of an apple, then it would seem that redness must have a
spatial location
Answer to where universals are located (3)
Redness is wholly present wherever it is instantiated
According to the alternative, redness is partially located wherever it is instantiated by having a part that is wholly located at that location
However, on the view under consideration A1 and A2 do not literally have a single thing in common. Instead A1 has one thing (a part of redness) and A2 has another thing (a distinct part of redness)
A weird feature that universals have
they can be multiply located
normal everyday objects can’t be multiply located
wholly located
To be wholly located in region R1 is to be located there and to be such that all of one’s parts are located there
solely located
To be solely located at region R1 is to be such that one is located at R1 and one is not located at some disjoint region R2
one might worry: If universals can behave like this (wholly located) but objects can’t, there should be some
account of why this is so
Answer: One may simply say that universals are just fundamentally different kinds of things from
individual objects - and different things can show different behaviours
relation
is a way that things may be related
We would seem to have the same reasons for postulating relations as we do for postulating properties
- First, it would seem that there are genuine objective similarities in how things are related
(example: Thus, it would seem that there is a genuine similarity in the way that I stand to my brother Chris
as you stand to your brother Saul)
- this relation can give the meaning of the binary predicate
is the brother of’, in a sentence such as:
I am the brother of Chris’
Worry about using relation in universals
seems to lead to a regress
red apple, A1, we postulate the existence of a property redness - the apple and redness are related - the apple instantiates redness
in addition to apple and redness, we have another relation: instantiation
and by this in addition to the apple, redness and instantation, we also have the relation of relation present
leads to a regress
What led to this regress was the principle that whenever we have a predication, we should postulate a thing
A general principle
Whenever there is a true predication of the form a is F’, or
a Rs b’, then
there is a property, or relation, that is denote by the predicate
this principle actually leads to a contradiction
assume that whenever you have a meaningful predicate there is a corresponding property or relation
one can derive a contradiction just given this assumption
given our assumption, some properties have the interesting feature of instantiating themselves
- eg. being a property has the property of being a property - or the property of being self-identical - everything has this property
given our assumption, there is a property of being self-identical it itself has the property of being self-identical
- but lots of properties don’t have this feature - eg. the property of being muddy is not muddy
predicates that are not-self-instantiating
Since there are true predications involving this predicate our assumption tells us that there must
be a property corresponding to this predicate
let’s name this property: UN
the existence of UN leads to a contradiction
UN must BOTH instantiate itself and not instantiate itself
Since it cannot be the case that something both obtains and does not obtain, it follows that UN cannot exist
To this end assume, for reductio, that UN instantiates UN
Now to instantiate UN just is to not instantiate your self. In general if P instantiates UN, then P does not
instantiate P
So, it follows that UN does not instantiate UN
But UN Still instantiates UN
To this end, let us assume, for the purpose of reductio, that UN does not instantiate UN
Well, in general, if P does not instantiate P—that is does not instantiate itself—then P instantiates UN
For UN just is the property of non-self-instantiating
So it follows, on our assumption that UN does not instantiate UN, that UN does instantiate UN
Since nothing can both have and lack a single property, it follows that UN cannot exist.
So, it turns out that we need to reject the idea that for every predicate that can be truly applied to something, there is a property that it picks out
reductio ad absurdem
This inference works as follows: We can show that not-P holds by assuming P and deducing not-P
The idea is that if the assumption of P leads to a contradiction, then it must be false, and so not-P must be true
This form of inference also lets us show that P holds by assuming not-P and deducing P from it