Unit 6: The Firm Flashcards

1
Q

what is a firm

A

business organisation which employs people, purchases inputs to produce market goods & services and sets prices greater than the cost of production

in capitalist economy, division of labour is split between firms and markets

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2
Q

how firms differ from markets in terms of coordination

A

concentration of economic power in the hands of the owners/managers allows them to issue commands to workers

power is decentralised in markets, so decisions are autonomous and voluntary

relationships in a firm may extend over time such as creation of network of colleagues and acquisition of skills necessary for the job

these skills, networks etc are firm-specific aspects

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3
Q

Contracts

A

legal documents or understandings that specifies a set of actions that parties to the contract must undertake

contracts for products sold in markets permanently transfer ownership of the good from the seller to the buyer

contracts for labour temporarily transfer authority over a person’s activities from the employee to the manager or owner

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4
Q

Conflict of interest within a firm

A

firm’s profits legally belong to those who own the firm’s assets

managers actions have impact on profits

but if profits increase thanks to managers work they will not automatically benefit

could be solved by linking managers pay to the performance of the company’s share price and monitor managers performance

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5
Q

An employees incomplete contract

A

contract between firm and employees is incomplete as

some tasks depend on future events

some aspects of the job are difficult to measure and base wages on e.g effort

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6
Q

Piece-rate pay

A

a type of employment in which the worker is paid a fixed amount for each product made

gives incentive for effort
difficult to measure output in modern jobs
often work as a team

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7
Q

why would workers work hard if firm can’t measure effort?

A

work ethic

feeling of responsibility to reciprocate good working conditions

benefits for measurable output

promotions

fear of being fired

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8
Q

Employment rent

A

employees fear getting fired when they are paid more than their reservation option

= cost of job loss which includes:

  • lost income while job searching
  • costs required to start a new job e.g relocation
  • loss of non-wage benefits e.g medical insurance
  • social costs (unemployment stigma)
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9
Q

Calculating employment rents

A

= wage - reservation wage - disutility of effort

reservation wage = value of next best option (other employment or unemployment benefits)

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10
Q

Labour discipline model

A

if there’s a large employment rent

there’s a large cost of job loss

so worker puts in more effort to reduce chance of getting fired

so firm could raise wages to increase cost of job loss

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11
Q

Graph of effort against wage

A

Slope = MRT

firms profit is the worker’s output - wage

as there’s a tradeoff between wages and effort, employer should find combination of effort and wage that minimises cost per unit effort

the cost of effort is the same along all points on an isocost line (slope = MRS)

profits maximised when MRS=MRS

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12
Q

Efficiency wage

A

wages set higher than the reservation wage so workers will care about losing the job and provide more effort

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13
Q

Best response function on wage, effort graph will shift to changes in

A
  • the utility of things the wage can buy
  • the disutility of effort for the reservation wage
  • the probability of getting fired at each effort level
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14
Q

Cooperative

A

a firm that is mostly or entirely owned by its workers who hire and fire managers

because profits are paid out to the workers, there is less need for supervision and monitoring

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15
Q

Incomplete contracts arise when

A

information isn’t verifiable

the relationship covers periods of time

there is uncertainty

there are difficulties with measurement

judiciary is absent

preferences for omitting some information exist

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16
Q

Principal agent model

A

captures interactions under incomplete contracts

firm is the principal, worker is the agent

agent takes action that is hidden from the principal so it can’t verify it

hidden action problem occurs when there is conflict of interest between principal and agent over an action that may be taken by the agent and this action can’t be subjected to a complete contract

the information about the action may be either asymmetric or unverifiable

17
Q

Contract Theory

A
  1. supervisors want to hire employees who work hard
  2. output of employee depends on their work ethic and luck
  3. supervisors can observe how hard an employee works through signals and noise (e.g clients attracted)
  4. best compensation scheme uses all; signals available to determine reward
  5. best scheme puts more weight on signals with least noise (e.g signals that don’t involve as much luck)
  6. best scheme compensates risk employees with a higher salary
  7. uses relative performance metrics (rankings) when employees have similar abilities and absolute metrics with dissimilar abilities