UNIT 3 AOS 2 REVISION Flashcards
National security (factor that shapes national interests)
A significant factor influencing China’s national interests is its historical links, particularly the Age of Humiliation from 1839 to 1949, when China faced semi-colonization by foreign powers. This period is widely recognized in China and drives the country’s commitment to uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity. By doing so, China aims to prevent a repeat of this “national shame,” as noted by political scientist John Mearsheimer in 2019.
Economic prosperity (factor that shapes national interests)
A significant factor in China’s national interests is its historical links, particularly the Age of Humiliation (1839-1949). During this period, China was exploited and semi-colonized by foreign powers. This painful history drives China’s desire for the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” and aims for economic prosperity on the global stage. By achieving this, China seeks to restore its international respect and dignity.
Regional relationships (factor that shapes national interests)
A key factor in China’s national interests is its historical links, especially the Age of Humiliation from 1839 to 1949. During this time, China was semi-colonized and exploited by foreign powers, including Japan. This painful history drives China’s desire to build friendly relationships with its neighbouring countries to prevent a repeat of this “national shame,” as noted by John Mearsheimer in 2019. By fostering these relationships, China aims to enhance its security and stability in the region.
International standing (factor that shapes national interests)
One factor is historical links, particularly the Age of Humiliation (1839-1949), when China was exploited and weakened by foreign powers. This period of semi-colonization drives China’s current goal to achieve the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” China aims to restore its status as a respected global leader in international affairs, motivated by the desire to prevent a repeat of this national humiliation.
National security (differing interpretations of national interests)
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) believes that militarizing the South China Sea (SCS) is necessary to protect its territorial integrity and sovereignty. For example, in 2020, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that China’s 27 military outposts in the SCS “safeguard” its interests by strengthening control over the nine-dash line. However, other countries with claims in the SCS, like the Philippines, see China’s actions as violating international law. In 2020, Philippine Foreign Secretary Ted Locsin said China’s military expansion in the Scarborough Shoal was a “violation of international law” and their sovereignty, showing conflicting views on China’s national security efforts.
Economic prosperity (differing interpretations of national interests)
The CCP views China’s militarization of the South China Sea as necessary to support its economic growth. By 2020, China had established 27 military outposts in the region to strengthen its control over the nine-dash line claim. A 2018 Chinese position paper stated that one goal of this military expansion is to support oil and gas exploration, contributing to China’s economic prosperity. However, other countries with claims in the area, like the Philippines, see China’s actions as violating international law. In 2020, Philippine Foreign Secretary Ted Locsin said China’s military presence in the Scarborough Shoal was a “violation of international law and Philippine sovereignty.”
Regional relationships (differing interpretations of national interests)
China views its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a way to strengthen regional relationships. In 2018, President Xi Jinping described the BRI as a plan to boost regional connections and promote “harmonious coexistence.” This was seen in 2016 when China offered the Philippines $24 billion in credit and loans to support President Duterte’s “build, build, build” infrastructure project. On the other hand, the USA sees the BRI as harmful. In 2018, Vice President Mike Pence called it “debt trap diplomacy,” accusing China of using the initiative to further its own goals while harming the economies of recipient countries.
International standing (differing interpretations of national interests)
China views its Confucius Institutes (CIs) as a way to improve its international reputation. By 2020, there were nearly 550 CIs worldwide, promoting Chinese language and culture. In 2018, President Xi Jinping stated that the CIs help China be seen as a “recognised builder of world peace” and highlight its long civilizational history, enhancing its global image. However, others see the CIs as harmful to academic freedom. In 2019, FBI director Chris Wray testified that the CIs spread “CCP propaganda” and raised concerns about restricting free speech, showing a different view of China’s pursuit of international standing.
Military power (national security)
China unveiled several new military weaponry at the 70th anniversary of the funding of the people’s liberation army, in Beijing on the 1st of October 2019. New hypersonic missiles (DF-17) were showcased for the first time at the parade. China aims to assert its military capabilities and deter potential adversaries from challenging its sovereignty or territorial integrity. This display of military strength serves to bolster China’s defensive posture and signal its readiness to defend its national interests against external threats.
Military power (economic prosperity)
China’s deployment of military hard power has been considerably effective pertaining to its pursuit of economic prosperity. This has been exemplified by its militarisation of the South China Sea in an effort to ultimately exploit its natural resources. The SCS is strategically important to China has it contains 10% of the world’s fisheries, 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. China’s establishment of its 27 military outposts in the SCS assists in asserting its nine-dash line sovereignty claim and thus exercise greater control over the region so as to eventually exploit its resources, in turn generating economic prosperity. However, these military operations have not been completely successful in achieving economic prosperity as it has brought about international denigration which undermine China’s maritime interests in the SCS. For example, not only has the other claimant states incessantly disapprove of China’s actions, but the PCA in 2016 formally ruled that China’s nine dash line has “no legal basis”. As a result, China’s ability to attain recognised control and sovereignty over the region has been hindered, thus constituting a limitation to its capacity to exploit its resources.
Military power (regional relationships)
China’s deployment of military power has been considerably effective in certain cases of improving its regional relationships. For example, in 2017 it provided Vanuatu with 14 military vehicles, which evidently strengthened its relationship with Vanuatu as its Prime Minister Charlot Salwai reciprocated and applauded China’s “continuous support for the development” of Vanuatu by agreeing to establish a Chinese military base. This illustrates how China has utilised its military power to not only improve its regional relationships, but also further its geostrategic objectives in the Pacific. However, China’s general use of its military power such as in the SCS has been particularly detrimental in its pursuit of regional relationships. For example, only recently in 2020 Philippine Foreign Secretary Ted Loscin denigrated China’s military operations in the SCS, characterising them as a “violation of international law and Philippine sovereignty”, thus hurting its relationship.
Military power (international standing)
China’s deployment of its military power has been considerably effective pertaining to its pursuit of international standing. That has been exemplified by its contributions to UN Peacekeeping Missions. For example, as of 2020, China is the 10th largest contributor to UN Peacekeeping operations, devoting almost 3,000 active soldiers and policemen. According to UN expert Richard Gowen, this allocation of military resources to the UN provides China with “good publicity”, improving its international reputation as a responsible global leader. However, its militarisation of the South China Sea has hindered its capacity in augmenting its international standing to a significant degree, which was further stained by the PCA 2016 ruling that China’s nine dash line has “no legal basis”.
Economic power (national security)
China’s employment of economic power has been considerably effective pertaining to its pursuit of national security. This has been exemplified by its use of ‘Cheque-book diplomacy’ to entice states into adhering to the One China policy. For example, in 2019 China and the Solomon Islands engaged in private diplomatic negotiations, resulting in China agreeing to give the Solomon Islands $500 million in financial aid in exchange for the cutting of the Solomon Island’s 36-year-old tie with Taiwan. Such actions undermine Taiwan’s pursuit to garner recognised sovereignty, thus assisting China in pursuing its own territorial integrity.
Economic power (economic prosperity)
China’s employment of economic power has been considerably effective pertaining to its pursuit of economic prosperity. This has been exemplified by its use of the BRI to improve relationships with other claimant states in the SCS in the hope of facilitating joint resource exploitation. For example, in 2016 China agreed to give the Philippines $24 billion in investment, credit and loan pledges, resulting in the initiation of negotiations regarding joint oil and gas exploration between the two states in the SCS. This demonstrates how China has used its vast economic power to facilitate resource exploitation and thus achieve economic prosperity. However, as of 2020 the negotiations have not resulted in the creation of any arrangement regarding resource exploitation.
Economic power (regional relationships)
- China’s use of economic power has been considerably effective in augmenting its regional relationships, which has been exemplified by its use of the BRI infrastructure and investment project to strengthen ties with the Philippines. For example, in 2016 China agreed to give the Philippines $24 billion in investment, credit and loan pledges so as to assist President Roderigo Duterte’s ambitious “build, build, build” infrastructure programme. Consequently, President Duterte has repeatedly confessed his “love” for Xi Jinping, demonstrating how China has bolstered its regional relationships through utilising its economic power. However, China has engaged in “economic coercion” as Marise Payne characterised it, against Australia as a result of the request for an independent inquiry into the origins of COVID-19, which has undoubtedly worsened its relationship with Australia.
