Unit 2 Module 2 Flashcards
Singh (1985), the Supreme Court concluded
Singh (1985), the Supreme Court concluded that notwithstanding the Charter, the Bill of Rights would continue to offer overlapping but distinct protections. By the same token, administrative law provides overlapping but distinct protections as those contained in the Charter which have continued to develop alongside Charter rights
In Baker (1999) a case involving the discretion of humanitarian and compassionate leave officers, the Supreme Court concluded that
For example, in Baker (1999) a case involving the discretion of humanitarian and compassionate leave officers, the Supreme Court concluded that since the rights of the affected person could be resolved under administrative law, it would be inappropriate to determine whether the Charter was breached although the Charter issues, in that case, were argued extensively at trial. In Suresh (2002), the Supreme Court confirmed that the procedural fairness protection contained in s.7 of the Charter would follow the same contextual approach as the Court had set out in Baker for determining administrative law procedural fairness protections.
In Slaight(1989), the Court for the first time attempted to
In Slaight(1989), the Court for the first time attempted to reconcile the Charter and Administrative Law protections where they overlap. With respect to exercises of discretion in particular, the Court reasoned that no legislature could grant discretionary authority to act in violation of Charter rights – therefore, all such authority should be interpreted by Courts in a manner consistent with Charter protections unless the wording of the statute itself is inconsistent with a Charter right, in which case, if it could not be justified under s.1 of the Charter, that provision would have to be struck down. In effect, the Supreme Court decided that when reviewing an exercise of discretion, Courts should look to the Charter if necessary, but not necessarily the Charter.
broader implications of Justice Abella’s reasons suggest a new way of
The broader implications of Justice Abella’s reasons suggest a new way of understanding the relationship between the Charter and administrative law. Rather than an oppositional approach under which the Charter and administrative law are two entirely distinct legal pathways, Abella J. highlight the similar rationale of deference underlying the administrative law standard of review and the proportionality approach to the Oakes test. More significantly, the Abella J. emphasizes that a more “robust” approach to administrative law incorporates the same fundamental rights as those animating the Charter. While characterized as a “completely revised” approach, she also observes that the focus on Charter values builds on the trend in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence:
These cases emphasize that administrative bodies are empowered, and indeed required, to consider Charter values within their scope of expertise. Integrating Charter values into the administrative approach, and recognizing the expertise of these decision-makers, opens “an institutional dialogue about the appropriate use and control of discretion, rather than the older command-and-control relationship” (Liston, at p. 100).
relationship between the Charter and administrative law,
While Doré represents a major step forward for the relationship between the Charter and administrative law, important unsettled questions remain, including whether tribunal statutory remedies also should be informed by Charter values, and who has the onus in determining whether a breach of Charter values is “reasonable.” These specific questions speak to a broader one – how can the core principles of the Charter, and the fundamental rights that the Charter embodies, be adapted to the diversity and practical dynamics of discretionary administrative decision-making? If the principles of Doré continue to be expanded and developed, the Charter may become far more relevant in the lives of far more people as a result.
purpose of administrative law
is to prevent administrators from abusing their powers and from acting unfairly. It accomplishes this by controlling the power of the executive both to make regulations and bylaws, and to implement and enforce laws.
Although administrative law generally does not apply to the statute-making power of legislatures or the decision-making powers of courts, the rights and freedoms found in the Charter limit the law-making power of the legislative branch, and, in some cases, the procedures and decision-making powers of the courts. In addition, the Charter can be used to prevent abuse and unfairness in administrative actions and delegated lawmaking. In this respect, its requirements supplement those of administrative law.
reach of administrative law is limited to
While the reach of administrative law is limited to striking down the unfair or unauthorized actions of administrators, unfair policies or procedures, and unauthorized delegated legislation, the Charter can be used to strike down or amend statutes themselves if they violate Charter rights.
Who Is Bound by the Charter?
Section 32 of the Charter states that the Charter applies to the Parliament and government of Canada as well as to the legislature and government of each province. This means that it also applies to the ministries and departments of government, as well as to the agencies, boards, and commissions (ABCs) created (by statutes passed by Parliament and the provincial legislatures) to carry out delegated government functions such as regulation and adjudication.
To decide whether the Charter applies to a body, the courts must determine
- the extent to which the government exercises control over the body; and
- the extent to which the body is carrying out functions that are essentially governmental in nature.
If a body is carrying out a public policy or program, 2 it will be considered part of the government for Charter purposes, even if it is a private body, and the Charter will, therefore, apply to it.
Charter does not regulate private activity by private persons, such as individuals and corporations, in a dispute between private individuals or organizations, the courts will not find a common law rule invalid on the basis that it violates the Charter
Charter does not regulate private activity by private persons, such as individuals and corporations, in a dispute between private individuals or organizations, the courts will not find a common law rule invalid on the basis that it violates the Charter. For example, the common law rule prohibiting defamation may restrict freedom of expression, which is a Charter right, but the courts can still apply the rule against defamation in a dispute between individuals because the Charter does not apply to such private disputes.
Rights and Freedoms Guaranteed by the Charter
The Charter protects several categories of rights and freedoms, including political rights, mobility rights, legal rights, language rights, and minority educational rights. In relation to administrative law, the most important of these rights and freedoms are the fundamental freedoms of religion, expression, peaceful assembly, and association found in section 2, as well as some of the legal rights set out in sections 1 to 14. The equality rights found in section 15 may also have some impact on administrative law.
The Charter provides for two classes of rights and freedoms pertaining to procedural fairness:
- In the first class are rights addressed by sections 9, 11, and 13. These rights are available primarily or only with respect to penal matters, which are usually decided by courts rather than by tribunals or agencies. They impose duties on courts to act fairly when dealing with criminal or regulatory offences subject to punishment. Generally, these provisions cannot be used to enhance common law or statutory fairness requirements for agencies (although sections 11 and 13 may apply in some circumstances).
- In the second class are rights addressed by sections 7, 8, and 14, which do not refer to the penal context. These are the principal provisions that may apply where administrative law principles apply—namely, where government conduct affects a person’s right to fair treatment, whether or not a punishment is involved.
Section 2 of the Charter guarantees
Section 2 of the Charter guarantees the freedoms of expression, religion, peaceful assembly, and association. The courts have given a particularly broad interpretation to the first of these—freedom of expression. In addition to the right to speak freely, this freedom guarantees individuals the right to receive information they need to form sound opinions. As a result, the Supreme Court of Canada has found that section 2 guarantees the traditional common law requirement that courts conduct their proceedings in public (known as the “open court” or “open justice” principle), except where a court order limiting access is necessary to prevent a serious risk of substantial harm to another right or interest that outweighs the public interest in open government. 7
“open court” or “open justice” principle),
section 2 guarantees the traditional common law requirement that courts conduct their proceedings in public
Section 7 has the potential to
Section 7 has the potential to add new procedural safeguards to the list of those that administrators and tribunals must follow under the common law principles of procedural fairness, and to expand existing procedural fairness requirements to new contexts.
Section 7 provides protection against government interference with individuals’ rights to life, liberty, and security of the person except in accordance with principles of “fundamental justice” (see below).
For a government action to be found invalid on the basis of section 7, two conditions must be met:
first, the action must violate principles of fundamental justice, and
second, the action must threaten the life, liberty, or security of the person affected by the action.
In R v Malmo-Levine, the Court explained that to be a basic tenet of the legal system, a rule must meet three tests:
first, it must be a “legal principle”;
second, there must be “a significant societal consensus that it is fundamental to the way in which the legal system ought fairly to operate”; and
third, the rule must be capable of being “identified with sufficient precision to yield a manageable standard.”
fundamental justice incorporates
fundamental justice incorporates the common law rules of procedural fairness. Therefore, to comply with the requirement to provide fundamental justice, the procedure followed by administrators and tribunals generally will, at the very least, have to conform to the requirements of common law procedural fairness.
However, fundamental justice is not limited to common law procedural fairness requirements. In cases where the life, liberty, or security of a person is at issue, fundamental justice may require protections beyond those traditionally required by procedural fairness, such as full disclosure of evidence or a decision without delay.
substantive fundamental justice is the rule that a person should not be convicted of any offence for doing things that he or she could not avoid.
it would offend fundamental justice to convict a person of illegal parking when a blizzard has buried his or her car in snow and it is not possible to move it due to the conditions. A law that is arbitrary, excessively vague, or “over-broad”—that is, broader than necessary to achieve its purpose—will offend the principles of fundamental justice.
whenever a government authority deprives a person of liberty or threatens a person’s security
section 7 is potentially available whenever a government authority deprives a person of liberty or threatens a person’s security. Although the Supreme Court has confirmed that section 7 can apply to tribunals and other government decision-makers, to date the courts generally have not extended the degree of fairness required by fundamental justice beyond what the common law doctrine of procedural fairness would require in a particular situation. However, the Supreme Court has established that section 7 provides a right to disclosure of evidence in certain administrative proceedings.