TURNING POINTS

Question 1

what were the major probs for Japan by 1942

Answer 1

• needed to beat B & US, maintain supply lines & rule conquered territories of 140+ M ppl (+300k POWs)
• lack of internal military coop - most army dedicated to China
• no plan to consolidate gains made - seized opportunities

Question 2

strategy of Coral Sea

Answer 2

• Yam reasoned US carrier would be prob - wasnt destroyed @ PH
• planned to move against Hawaiian islands but CS came first
• PUSPOE: isolate Aus from US who was supplying them w troops & materials
• opted for seaborne invasion as only means to cross from northern coastal area to Port Moresby was via Formidable Stanley Mtn range by Kokoda trail

Question 3

main consequences as turning point for Coral Sea

Answer 3

• Jap advance southwards halted = morale boost for US
• J failed to take Port Moresby = aircraft cant attack Aus ports & airfields from there
• Comms between Aus & Pacific theatres of war maintained
• impact on naval/aerial balance of power
• opened up opportunites for island hopping
• entire face of naval warfare changed - carrier forces considered true offensive weapons. attack would now center on carriers

Question 4

losses from Coral Sea

Answer 4

JAP:
- 77 aircraft, 1074 killed, 1 light carrier
US
- 66 aircraft, 543 killed, 1 fleet carrier,

Question 5

what were key errors by Jap from Coral Sea

Answer 5

• Japs didnt secure seed crop of experienced pilots to provide for training/equpping future fliers VS US realised danger of depleting their experienced aviator stockpile
• Yamamoto didnt have key carrier ready for Midway unlike US (Nimitz hastened Yorktown repair to 72hrs instead of 92 days & sent to midway)
• faulty intellgience

Question 6

some reasons why Japan lost Coral Sea & US won

Answer 6

JAPAN

• failure of naval intelligence - underestimated the strength of the forces available to the US = did not assign to the invasion the full strength available
• tactical errors -wasted valuable searching hours attacking unimportant target (tanker)

US

• advantage of knowing plan - intercept & decoding
• Had radar to detect incoming enemy aircraft

Question 7

Yamamoto Strategy for midway

Answer 7

• mirror success of PH - suprise attack
• Set up diversionary force under Vice Adm Hoshiro - attack Dutch Harbour in Aleutians by air before assault onMidway + small force of midget subs penetrate Port Darwin anticipating this will divert US fleet = attact attetion away from Midway Attoll

Question 8

3 phase plan midway

Answer 8

1. Jap first carrier striking force attack midway by air - Vice Nagumo (built around first line carriers Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu)
2. Bring in Midway invasion force (Vice Adm Kondo) - land 5k soldiers on island
3. Yam expect US reinforcements = Nagumo force attack them along w Yam own feet of battleships, carriers & destroyers
   aim = shock & overwhelm

Question 9

Nimitz plan midway

Answer 9

• aware of jap strength - knew they intended to destroy remaining naval strength = determined to strike jap carriers b4 midway invaded
• by march 1942 Commander Rochefort & team decipher JN-25 fleet code - able to make counter-plan
  PLAN:
• fight battle mainly in air - keeping carriers out of striking distance
• 3 carriers: USS Yorktown, Enterprise, Hornet

Question 10

rundown of battle of midway

Answer 10

• attack on aleutian islands June 3 - US B-17 Flying Fortress bombers attack Kondo invasion force
• second attack - both fail
• Nagumo launches 1st phase of plan - send 108 Jap warplanes = inflicts damage to US base
• 2nd wave of US carrier-launched bombers hit Akagi, Kaga, Soryu
• US dive-bombers from all carriers return to attack Hiryu
  June 6: Yam orders ships to retreat

Question 11

main takeaways from BOM

Answer 11

• Jap now on permanent defensive stance
• turned tide deciseivly in favour of allies
• crushed J hopes of neutralising the US as naval power
• Jap expansionist phase ended & allies could begin to plan for advance towards home islands

Question 12

summary of losses midway

Answer 12

JAPAN
- 4 carriers, heavy cruiser, almost 300 aircraft, 200+ pilots, 3k+ men

US:
- aircraft carrier Yorktown, destoyer Hammann, 145 aircraft, 350+ men

Question 13

main failures of Japan midway

Answer 13

• crack-man policy = didnt ensure an increased flow of new pilots for a protracted conflict
• failed to ancipate US would penetrate fleet code
• failure to search properly for US fleet w sig no of planes at outset
• victory disease
• dispersion of Jap forces instead of concentration like US
• poor location of Yam command centre

Question 14

Fuchida says the crack-man policy was

Answer 14

“the foremost single & immediate cause of defeat”

Question 15

what does nimitz say ab midway

Answer 15

“Essentially a victroy of intelligence’

Question 16

Fuchida says victory disease resulted in

Answer 16

“an arrogant underestimation of the enemy”

Question 17

Combined Fleet chose to scatter its forces, reducing them thereby to..

Answer 17

“comparative feebleness”

Question 18

jap navy tradition - commander’s place at the front in warfare. what does fuchida say

Answer 18

“outward notion has no place in modern warfare”

Question 19

Guadalcanal objectives

Answer 19

• US intelligence found Jap building airstrip @ Lunga Pt - north of G
• J forces arrived in June to begin construction = prompt US to invade
• Jap presense in islands was threat to US-Au comms
• Allied control of G would make possible attack on Jap base @ Rabaul

Question 20

summary of Guad battle

Answer 20

• US troops quickly capture small islands of Tulagi & florida of G, captured airfield (renamed Henderson)
• jap resistence - assisted in success @ battle of Savo island
• Nov: US destroy 10/11 transport ships bringing in troops
• jap attack mid-Nov w over 10k troops halted - forced back & never recovered
• US claim control 9 Feb 1943

Question 21

losses @ guad

Answer 21

JAPS

• up to 30k troops (75% bc of disease + starvation)
• 38 naval vessels, hundreds aircraft

US
- 1.6k men, 4.2k wounded
- 29 naval vessels, 600+ aircraft
despite heavy losses they were able to replace them unlike J

Question 22

consequences of Guad as turning pnt

Answer 22

• as much as turning point as midway
• J lost multitude of pilots & aircraft
• US marines now surmounted first obstacle in reconquest of Solomons chain
• validated japs on defensive = morale boost
  strategic importance:
• shipping lanes between US-Au remained open
• made possible attack on Rabaul
• attrition warfare weakaned japs
• US could more easily attack J positions to north

Question 23

what was J aim for New Guinea

Answer 23

• gain control of Port Moresby = give them ability to dominate coral sea, northern coast of Aus & prevent comms

Question 24

Macarthur plan for NG

Answer 24

convinced Curtin & Gen Blamey to abandon Bris Line, instead:

• defense of Aus should be in NG where US & au troops would be stationed
• MC command aus units

Question 25

what was the difficulty @ NG

Answer 25

jungles extremely dense & impenetrable, Kokoda trail hardly passable

Question 26

key failures of japan @ NG

Answer 26

• attempt Kokoda & proceed to Port Moresby w/o aid of navy
• Aus built airfields around PM & supplied w aircraft to cut J supply lines & interdict advance = crucial as J proceeded w/p standard air cover
• nonexistence of an equiv to Army Corps of Engineers ensured all construction projects would be slow, inefficient & poor quality

Question 27

consequences of NG as turning point

Answer 27

• solidified US position
• by ending J control of NG, J attempts to extend its defence perimeter in SWP was ended
• saved aus-US comms
• ended any possibility of Au invasion
• helped promote Gen Mac push thru SWP, island hopping & return to Phil