Trust Models Flashcards

1
Q

Web of Trust

A
  • Decentralized trust model
  • To establish the authenticity of the binding public key <-> user
  • Used in PGP, GnuPG, and other OpenPGP-compatible systems
  • Each party = end-user & CA at the same time (all users distribute their own public keys, and certify those of other users)
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2
Q

Key validity vs. owner trust

A
  • Key validity: Is the key owner who they claim to be?
  • Owner trust: Is the key owner reliable (in respect to signing keys of others)?
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3
Q

Assigning key validity and owner trust

A
  • Key validity:
    -> manually set (key signing)
    -> computed from the trust in the corresponding signers, only considering signers with key validity “complete”
  • Owner trust: manually set (trust setting)
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4
Q

Owner trust levels

A
  • unknown
  • none: The owner is known to improperly sign keys
  • marginal: The owner is known to properly sign keys
  • complete: The owner is known to put great care in key signing
  • ultimate: The owner is known to put great care in keys signing, and is allowed to make trust decisions for you
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5
Q

Key validity levels

A
  • unknown
  • marginal: The key probably belongs to the name
  • complete: The key definitely belongs to the name
  • ultimate: own keys
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6
Q

Key validity computation: complete

A
  • Key is signed by at least one user with owner trust complete
  • Key is signed by at least x names with owner trust marginal
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7
Q

Key validity computation: marginal

A
  • If the key is signed by less than x names with owner trust marginal
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8
Q

Key validity computation: unknown

A

If the key is signed by no name with at least owner trust marginal

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9
Q

Trust signatures & trusted introducers

A
  • trust signature is a special type of signature: The signer asserts that the key is not only valid but also trustworthy at the specified level
  • Allows trust delegation along a chain of signatures
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10
Q

PGP Disadvantages

A
  • PGP lacks forward secrecy
  • No supervision regarding upgrading algorithms and parameters
  • Bad scalability
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11
Q

Hierarchical trust

A
  • Model with trust anchor and certification path (and intermediate CAs)
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12
Q

Trust models in multiple hierarchies: Methods

A
  • Trusted list
  • Common root
  • Cross-certification
  • Bridge
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13
Q

Trusted list

A
  • Every participant has a list of trusted CAs
  • Every user maintains their own list
  • Used in web browsers (preinstalled + user defined)
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14
Q

Common root

A
  • Every user who trusts root accepts every other end-user certificate
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15
Q

Cross-certification

A

Root CA 1 issues certificate for CA 2 (can be bilateral) or for intermediate CAs

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16
Q

Bridge

A
  • Idea: Bridge CA has cross-verifications with CA 1 and CA 2
  • Is not subordinate to a third CA
17
Q

X.509 certificate extension: Basic Constraints

A
  • Identifies whether the subject of the certificate is a CA and the maximum number of non-self-issued intermediate certificates that may follow this certificate in a valid certification path
  • Must be included in CA certificates
  • Critical
  • If pathlength is not present -> no limit
18
Q

Problems with CAs

A
  • huge number
  • governmental access
  • no globally standardized mechanism to ensure a CAs trustworthiness
  • Any CA ultimately fallible