Trespass to the Person

Question 1

Iqbal v Prison Officers Association [2010]

Answer 1

When we look at false imprisonment we will come back to this case. But Smith LJ said there quite clearly that if a defendant foresees a risk and goes on regardless, then that can be treated as intention for these purposes.

So, if you have that situation where you are not quite sure, then just ask yourself: well, is there risk and should the defendant have known that, and did they go on regardless? That will equate to subjective recklessness.

The example in Iqbal v Prison Officers Association [2010] was false imprisonment. So, suspecting strongly that there is someone in a room which you are about to lock, and locking it regardless. So, that would be subjectively reckless as to someone’s restraint of movement.

Another example would be shooting an arrow into a crowd. It is clear that there is a risk that someone is going to get hit by that arrow; if you carry on regardless, then according to Iqbal v Prison Officers Association [2010] that might well equate to subjective recklessness.

Question 2

Letang v Cooper [1965]

Answer 2

This is a lady. She was sunbathing on a grass verge in a hotel car park. Accidentally, the defendant drove over her legs. He was manoeuvring around the car park and not paying attention, and squished her.

For technical reasons, at that time, you had longer to bring a claim in trespass than in negligence. So, this case was about limitations of actions. Remember, we talked about that last semester – how long you have to bring a claim. Well, in 1965 you had three years longer to bring a claim in trespass than in negligence. So, the claimant sought to say that it should not matter; this is still a trespass even though it is careless. Lord Denning said: “No” – negligence does not suffice to bring an action in trespass to the person.

Question 3

Gibbon v Pepper (1695)

Answer 3

This is an example of where there is no intention, and therefore no trespass to the person. This was a defendant who is riding a horse; an unknown third party slapped the horse on its backside, the horse bolted, and was in collision with the claimant. What the court said there was that the defendant had no control over the horses actions, and therefore the hitting of the horse into the claimant was not intentional. There was no voluntary conduct; there was no desire to bring that about.

It would be different had he written the horse into the claimant, but he didn’t. The third party intervened by slapping the horse on its rump.

Now, this is an important point, and it is often missed in exams – it is the application of force for which intention relates, not the consequences which follow from that force.

So, you need only intend the slap on the arm – the fact that the person then falls over and breaks their arm is irrelevant. You don’t need to intend that.

There are many cases, and these are just three listed here which illustrate that. I will quickly run through all of them.

Question 4

Williams v Humphrey [1975]

Answer 4

This was about a shove. The defendant shoved the claimant forcefully into a swimming pool. The claimant slipped and broke his ankle as he was falling in. As in all of the cases, it was the push that needed to be intended, not the break to the ankle. You intend the application of force, not the consequences.

Question 5

Wilson v Pringle [1986]

Answer 5

This was about two schoolboys. The defendant schoolboy yanked on the shoulder bag which was on the shoulder of the claimant; that was the application of force. As a result, the claimant fell and seriously damaged his hip. Again, you only need the force applied to the bag which needed to be intended, not the injury.

Question 6

Nash v Sheen [1986]

Answer 6

This was a claimant who went into a hairdresser to have a perm. She consented to the perm, but what the hairdresser did was apply some toning lotion after the perm to her head. So, what you have got there is the application of force to the scalp through the toning lotion – the liquid. There was no consent; the lady had not said she wanted the lotion, and she had only consented to the perm. There was an allergic reaction that followed. She was allergic to the toning lotion, but it didn’t matter that the consequences were unintended; the application of the toning lotion was.

Question 7

Fagan v Met Police Commissioner [1969]

Answer 7

What happened here was the defendant accidentally drove his car onto the claimant’s, a police officer, foot which trapped the police officer. When he realized he had done this he refused to move the car off. So, what started as accidental became intentional by the decision not to remove the car from the police officer’s foot.

And another point which I know you will have met in criminal law…

When that transferred malice… Transferred malice, remember, is when you intend to apply force to one person for some sort of reason… Either you miss-timed you blow, or that person moves out of the way, and you manage to make contact with another party… So, perhaps your intended victim ducks you are punching, and you punch the person standing behind them.

What about transferred malice? Now, in crime that is sufficient to amount to intention.

Question 8

Livingstone v MOD [1984]

Answer 8

Now, this case is not authoritative, because this is a Northern Irish case and the law there is slightly different, but it is persuasive. This was an army soldier who fired a rubber bullet intending to hit a rioter, but the bullet went astray and instead it hit another member of the military. This was a friendly fire incident.

In this case the court accepted that transferred malice would be sufficient.

Question 9

Nash v Sheen [1986]

Answer 9

Now the second requirement. This is one of those comment requirements.

It has to be a direct application of force.

I have already touched on the fact that it does not need to be forceful.

It also does not need to be body to body contact, as cases such as Nash v Sheen [1986] show.
So, with application of force, it needs to be direct but that does not mean it has to be a body to body contact. So, weapons are often used. In some of the criminal cases, and you may not have thought of this, but if someone picks up a gun and fires a bullet at another person, then the weapon is the bullet – it comes directly from your actions and pulling the trigger; but you could be standing quite some distance away from the perpetrator. That does not matter; that will not prevent this from being direct.

Question 10

DPP v K [1990]

Answer 10

What happened here was that the defendant put sulphuric acid in the nozzle of a hand dryer. When the claimant came along and press the button, literally half a minute later, the sulphuric acid blew out into the claimant’s face. So, that was the weapon used.

Direct also does not require hostility. I’ve already dealt with the forceful point. But direct application of force does not require the actions to be hostile in any way. Now, I mention this specifically because some of the older cases have suggested that hostility was required.

So, when you are doing your reading, just be a little bit careful of any cases which mention hostility that come before 1990.

There was about a minute gap between intervening sulphuric acid going into the hand dryer and the claimant pressing the button. The court said that that was still sufficient for this to be directly linked back to the defendant.

Question 11

F v West Berks [1990]

Answer 11

The House of Lords in F v West Berks [1990] said very strongly that hostility was not a requirement. You have a direct application of force even though it was not hostile.

It could be that tap on the bum whether it is male or female that is not warranted or wanted; a sexual-harassment type of conduct. It could also be a peck on the cheek. It could be something fairly innocuous. It doesn’t need to be hostile or forceful.

Now, there are some exceptions where you do come into contact with people in everyday life, but the case of F v West Berks [1990] deals with those in a slightly different way.

F v West Berks [1990] which we briefly mentioned before. Lord Goff also said that every day contact is not unlawful. He defined that with reference to anything that is generally acceptable in everyday life.
Some of the examples he gave are jostling in a queue; so, if you are in the queue for the tube you can’t help but make contact with other people’s bodies.

Sometimes you may be waiting for some coffee and you tap somebody on the shoulder to say can you pass me the sugar?”, and that sort of thing.

Question 12

Haystead v DPP [2000]

Answer 12

In this case, the defendant, Haystead, punched a woman twice very hard in the face. The woman was holding the baby, and as a result of the punching, she dropped her baby and the baby fell on the floor landed on its head. The two punches caused the woman instinctively to drop her baby. The court said here that the baby’s falling and contacting the floor was the application of force; so, head in relation to floor. That flowed directly from the defendant’s actions in punching the woman.

Question 13

Scott v Shepherd (1773)

Answer 13

Was about a man who threw a firework into a crowd. The firework was caught instinctively by one person who threw it on, and then it was caught by another person who threw it on, and then the firework exploded in the claimant’s face. Despite the fact that you had two people who instinctively through this firework on, the court still said there was a direct link back to the claimant.

Question 14

Bici v Ministry of Defence [2004]

Answer 14

Assault:

his is one case to show this first point — the meaning of intention.

Which therefore means, because the intention relates to the other person’s apprehension, it is actually irrelevant that the defendant himself didn’t intend to carry the threat through. As long as the claimant doesn’t know that – as long as they believe it is a genuine threat and that the defendant intended them so to believe, it is irrelevant that they didn’t intend to carry the threat through.

Question 15

R v St George (1840)

Answer 15

is a case on the same point, but an old one. This was a defendant who pointed an unloaded gun at the claimant. The claimant did not know that the gun was unloaded; the defendant did intend the claimant to believe that he was about to be shot. So, there was intention as to the apprehension.
So, that is the first element – what the defendant needs to intend. But, assault requires apprehension by the claimant, and that needs to be reasonable.

Question 16

Stephens v Myers (1840)

Answer 16

there was a means of carrying the threat through. It is an old case; it concerned a parish council meeting. There was a disagreement between two people at this parish council meeting, and the defendant went toward the chairman of the meeting in a very aggressive manner with his fists clenched, etc. he was restrained, but he was struggling and wiggling, and there was always a reasonable chance that he could break through and carry on and strike a blow to the chairperson. What the court said there was that although the defendant was currently restrained, which was essentially just someone holding onto his arms to hold him back, it was therefore reasonable to appreciate that he could get through and carry on the threat. So, there it was a reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery.

Clearly, the circumstances of the case are important.

Question 17

Thomas v NUM [1985]

Answer 17

Assault:

It involved a group of minors who were breaking the strike. If anyone is ever seen either on stage or in film Billy Elliot, then you will know that those miners who were breaking the strike were known as ‘scabs’. They were known as traitors to the mining cause, and they were generally bussed into work because the route to work was far too dangerous at that time. Now, on this bus going into work, in breach of the general minor strike that was going on, the bus had bricks, stones, bottles etc. thrown at it. As it approached the gates to the mine there was verbal abuse thrown at the men on the bus; it was really unpleasant and a very threatening environment. What the court said was was that the claimants were all on the bus – they were inside this bus which was moving. The bus had a police escort as well. So, at no time could any of these threats be carried through. So, although it was an unpleasant situation there was no reasonable apprehension of any immediate battery. There was no reasonable apprehension that these threats could be carried through, or that the sticks or stones could get through to them because the glass on the bus was reinforced with barricades.

Question 18

R v Ireland [1997]

Answer 18

Assault:

This involved a threat by telephone. The claimant was subject to a series of abusive telephone calls involving threats to kill her, including some silent telephone calls where she could hear somebody breathing on the line but not saying anything. So, it really was incredibly unpleasant. They were from a person known to the claimant. She believed what the person on the phone was saying to her.

Now, what Lord Steyn said was that “a thing said is a thing done”. He went on to say that he felt that there was no reason he felt why something said should not be capable of causing apprehension of immediate personal violence. So, anything said is a thing done. He felt something said could cause apprehension of immediate personal violence.

What he went on to say, which is on the slide, was that you had to look at the words in the context of the case. So, in the context of the case, words can give rise to this threat of immediate personal violence.

So, on the facts of the case, the telephone calls were made from immediately outside this woman’s home. They were threats to immediately come in and kill her, and they were clearly capable of being carried out. Had the phone calls come from a different country, and you knew that, then clearly those circumstances would have led to a different result.

But, the thing about words is they can also take away an intention. So, watch out for words generally in an exam. They can on their own be enough to amount to an assault, but they can also negate an intention.

Question 19

Turberville v Savage (1669)

Answer 19

Assault:

***The thing about words is they can also take away an intention. So, watch out for words generally in an exam. They can on their own be enough to amount to an assault, but they can also negate an intention.

This involved two men and was at a time when the carrying of short swords was common; the two men were having an altercation, and one of them drew his short sword which she brandished in front of the others face, and he said “if it were not assize time I would run you through with my sword”. A size time was when the courts used to sit in a particular area. Effectively, the legal system is very different in the 1600s. Judges used to travel from place to place, and the police went along with them. So, when a court was in a town it was known as “the assizes”. Obviously at that time, the town would be filled with justices of the peace, judges, and police. So, he said “if it were not assize time I’d run you through”. But, it was assize time which took away the threat.

Question 20

Iqbal v Prison Officer’s Association [2010]

Answer 20

False Imprisonment:

about locking someone in a room, if you lock a room knowing someone is in there, and clearly you are voluntary and you desire to restrain their movement… So, if you lock a room knowing someone is in it, then clearly that is voluntariness.

If you strongly suspect that someone is in the room and you carry on regardless, then you would be subjectively reckless as to their restraint of movement.

But if you lock the door without any reason to know or suspect someone is in it, then you would lack intention.

So, think about that locked door example – if you lock a door and you don’t know anyone is there, and you have no reason to suspect someone is there, then there would be no intention.

Now, even though “unlawful” is part of the definition, you do not need to intend the restriction to be unlawful.

So, you need to intend the restriction on movement, but not the unlawful part. Intention relates to the restraint on movement, but it does not relate to the unlawful element.

Now, this actually was the main point of law from the case Iqbal v Prison Officer’s Association [2010] we have referred to a couple of times.

So, it has to be direct. They give you the facts of the case you will then be able to see the point which the court made here.

In this case, the Prison Officer’s Association were on strike; some of the prison officers went into work, but they weren’t doing their job under normal circumstances; they were on strike. What happened, as a result of the strike, is that prisoners in this particular prison were not released from their cells for their six hours of exercise which they would normally have expected.

So, that was the scenario – the prison officers were on strike. As a result, prisoners were kept in their cells and were not released further exercise periods of up to six hours each day.

What the court found was that for false imprisonment the restraint had to be by positive action. So, locking someone in as opposed to omitting to opening the door.

To restrain someone’s movement, direct positive action is required as opposed to an omission to act.
In this case, on this day, the prison officers had omitted to open the doors.

When the prisoners had been locked in the previous night that was lawful. The thing that was arguably unlawful was this not letting them out ordeal; but that was an omission, and that was not direct.

Neither is a potential deprivation in the future. ‘Immediacy’ is part of the definition of this tort. Effectively, this is a similar point.

A potential deprivation or restraint on someone’s movement in the future is not direct and will not be false imprisonment.

Question 21

R v Governor of Brockhill Prison (ex parte Evans) (No 2) [2000]

Answer 21

False Imprisonment:

he facts of the prison cases are all quite complicated, but in short, this case involved a miscalculation of a prisoner’s release date. The prison, which is run by the Governor, thought the prisoner should be released on day 10; in fact, the prisoner should have been released on day five. So, he was kept five days when he should have been released.

Now, this was a genuine miscalculation. The prison said that there was no intention to unlawfully detain, but the court said that that was irrelevant. There was an intentional restraint on movement and it was unlawful. It was irrelevant that the unlawfulness was not intended.

So, you don’t need to intend the unlawful part of the definition.

Question 22

R v Bournewood Community & Mental NHS Trust (ex parte L) [1998]

Answer 22

False Imprisonment:

This concerned a mental health institution in an NHS trust that cared for the mentally unwell. Not getting bogged down too much in the detail, the facts concerned a young man who was both autistic and mentally retarded — that’s L. He was being held voluntarily by the Bournewood Community Mental Health Trust; he was quite happy with the situation. So, he was in the care of this NHS mental health trust. He was there voluntarily and he was quite happy with the situation. But, what the NHS Trust said was that if he ever decided to leave he would be stopped from doing so – if in the future he tried to leave they would not let him.

Domestically, this case went all the way up to the House of Lords. The House of Lords said, overturning the Court of Appeal, that this was a potential future restraint on his movement. At the moment, it was all happy and consensual and he was going along with it. It was within the confines of the law relating to mental health. So, at the moment, it was okay and was with in the confines of the Mental Health Act 1983. The fact that something in the future could change was not sufficient for the law of false imprisonment.

A lot of people disagreed with that. This is one of the cases where various mental health pressure groups were involved in. This case didn’t stop there. L, or his carers on his behalf, then took the case to the European Court of Human Rights. What the ECHR said was that future confirmation that he wouldn’t be released if he tried to leave and that he would be restrained was de facto imprisonment. The fact that at the moment everything was okay within the law was irrelevant to Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Future confirmation that he would be stopped from leaving meant he was de facto imprisoned, and this was a breach to his right to liberty under Article 5.

So, it was okay in our common law, but it was not okay under European Convention law.

Question 23

Bird v Jones [1845]

Answer 23

False Imprisonment:

Obviously, in1845 there would not be cars on Hammersmith Bridge. What actually happened was the defendant put banks of chairs across Hammersmith Bridge in order to enable people to watch a rowing regatta which was taking place on the Thames. Because these chairs were across the bridge it meant that they blocked the foot paths. The claimant claimed that he was being falsely imprisoned because he could not walk across the bridge. The claimant’s argument was that because he could not walk across the footbridge because of the obstacles (chairs) in his way he was falsely imprisoned. The court told him not to be daft; you just turn around, walk across the bridge in the other direction, walk down the river and find the next bridge along, and you walk across.

So, effectively this confirmed that for false imprisonment it cannot just be an inconvenience; you must be totally restrained in all geographical directions. If you can go a different way you are not falsely imprisoned, even if it is an inconvenient way.

A similar point, but with a slightly different emphasis… You are not also totally restrained if there is a reasonable means of escape available to you.

Question 24

Robinson v Balmain Ferry [1910]

Answer 24

False Imprisonment:

The defendant, Balmain Ferry Co., ran a wharf/jetty in which passenger ships pulled up along side. People got off the boats and they got onto the wharf only to find that to get from the wharf onto the street they needed to pay a one penny exit fee. The claimant took offence to this. He did not feel that he should be charged to exit, so he said that he was falsely imprisoned on the wharf because there was no reasonable means of escape. The court disagreed and said that they felt payment of this small amount was reasonable, and he therefore could escape, and so he was not restrained.

Now, what is not clear, and there are no more recent cases on this particular point, is how you assess the reasonableness – is this objective or subjective?

It is an old case and it wasn’t really thought through.

Let’s just take a fire escape, for example. You have a room with a fire escape; it is a ground floor room, but outside the fire escape there are three steps. Now, for most people that fire escape would be a reasonable means of escape – you just push open the doors and you just leave the room. But, if you are in a wheelchair or if you have got mobility issues the fact that there are three steps leading down from that fire escape… Does that matter or not?

So, is this viewed subjectively or objectively? No idea, as there are no cases. If I were guessing, I would say would have to be subjective because this is all about protecting personal freedom.

But there is no case guidance on that.

Question 25

Heard v Weardale Steel [1915]

Answer 25

False Imprisonment:

This involved a mine. The claimant was down the mine, and for whatever reason he decided that he just couldn’t be bothered or didn’t want to finish his shift, and he demanded to be taken to the service. The defendant, the employer, set “no” and that the claimant would have to wait a couple of hours until the next time the lift operated. The lift was a big industrial lift and it only came down to collect men from the mine several times a day; they were not prepared to operate it just for the claimant. Again, the court felt that needing to wait still meant that this was a reasonable means of escape.

That case can also be disposed of in another way, I think, because it was an omission. It was an omission to operate the lift; so, either way there was no false imprisonment.

Question 26

Harnett v Bond [1925]

Answer 26

False Imprisonment:

A patient who was being released from a mental health asylum. On release he was told to wait in a particular room. The patient interpreted that as an instruction that he was not allowed to leave. In the context of him being institutionalized, and he was just being released, that is where he stayed. He did not move. He did not understand that he could have just walked out.

So, in that context, exceptionally, the psychological bonds were sufficient to restrict him in all directions.

Question 27

R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison (ex parte Hague) [1992]

Answer 27

False Imprisonment:

This was brought by a man who is kept in solitary confinement for a period of 28 days. Now, guidance suggested that solitary confinement should not be used for longer than 14 days. This man was kept for 28 days – double what the recommended length for solitary confinement was. But, on the facts, the guidance on solitary confinement was not statutory; it was guidance only. His actual fact of imprisonment was not unlawful. So, he was lawfully being detained. He could not complain that he spent too long in solitary confinement. It was non statutory guidances as regards to the length of time to be held in solitary.

Question 28

Roberts v Chief Constable of Cheshire Constabulary [1999]

Answer 28

False Imprisonment:

when you are held pending being charged for a crime, you are held in police custody. You are supposed to have your detention in custody reviewed every few hours. Those requirements to review detention are laid out in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act – these are statutory requirements. What happened in this case was the claimant was in police custody. His review of the tension was an hour and a a half late. His detention was reviewed; he was lawfully kept in custody for a bit longer, but the detention review was in our and a half late. The court said that although reviewing was a condition of detention, because it was statutory, breaching that condition was enough for false imprisonment.

Overall, this detention was okay. But this period of one and a half hours where the review was late was a breach of a statutory condition, which was enough for a false imprisonment claim.

Question 29

R (on application of Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Office [2011]

Answer 29

False Imprisonment:

his concerned powers which the Secretary of State has under the Immigration Act 1971. Under the Act, where foreign nationals have been detained in our prisons and are released, then the Secretary of State has the power to deport those persons and can detain them pending arrangements for deportation. So, it is all about foreign nationals – non-UK citizens – who have been in trouble in this country and they have been sent to prison; when they are released, under the Act, it can be deported and can be detained pending that deportation process.

What the Immigration Act 1971 says is that this is a power which needs to be exercised reasonably and responsibly. It should not be an automatic thing where a foreign national is detained and deported. It is a power to do so in appropriate cases.

Since the 1990s onwards there have been some celebrated cases, which we will not mention because there are too many, where people who are foreign nationals have been in our prisons, and upon release they have gone back into the community and they have committed further crimes. So, this became a bit of a political hot potato.

At the time of Lumba’s release from prison, it came to light that the Home Office had both an official policy about its use of the Immigration Act 1971 powers, but also a “secret policy”. The official line from the Home Office was in accordance with the Act itself – each case would be looked at individually and deportation powers would be used only when appropriate. The secret policy, when it came to light, was that all foreign nationals would automatically come upon release, would be detained and deported. By 2011 the official policy and the secret policy were at odds with each other. The secret policy was that everyone, without consideration, on release from prison would be detained and deported. That is what happened to Mr. Lumba – on his release he was immediately detained pending his deportation.

This case was funded by a pressure group. This case went all the way to the House of Lords. In this case, Lord Dyson said the only thing that the claimant needed to prove in a false imprisonment case was the fact of their detention.

The burden of proof was on the claimant to prove that they had in fact being detained. It was then for the defendant, in this case the Home Office, to justify that detention.

On the facts, the defendant could not justify Lumba’s detention. The secret policy was found to be an abuse of power.

On the facts, the defendant, the Home Office, could not justify the detention; the secret policy was an abuse of state power. It fell outside the power of the 1971 Act.

Interestingly, however, Mr. Lumba got awarded £1 in damages. He was awarded a nominal amount because he would have been deported and in fact was deported under the official policy in any event.

Question 30

Meering v Grahame-White Aviation [1920]

Answer 30

False Imprisonment:

Now, this has been proved in a more recent case from 1988. In this case, the case involved an employee who was being questioned about some theft from his employer. He was in a room and he was being questioned about the theft of some materials from his employer. Unbeknownst to him there were some security guards/private police officers who were stationed outside the door and would have stopped him leaving if he had attempted to leave. They were there currently – it was not a future restraint – and they were going to stop him. He was effectively being detained. What this case said, and which was later approved by Murray v MOD [1988], was that you can be imprisoned without your knowledge whilst you are unconscious, and whilst you are a lunatic (you do not need to have the mental capacity). But, what the court went on to say is that if you do not know, or cannot appreciate what is happening to you, then any compensation might be reduced.

So, lack of knowledge affects the amount of your compensation. Lack of knowledge, however, no longer precludes the claim.

Lord Atkin in Murray v MOD [1988]: “… a person could be imprisoned without his knowing… while unconscious,… while a lunatic [but] the damages might be diminished…”

Question 31

Murray v MOD [1988]

Answer 31

False Imprisonment:

Now, this has been proved in a more recent case from 1988. In this case, the case involved an employee who was being questioned about some theft from his employer. He was in a room and he was being questioned about the theft of some materials from his employer. Unbeknownst to him there were some security guards/private police officers who were stationed outside the door and would have stopped him leaving if he had attempted to leave. They were there currently – it was not a future restraint – and they were going to stop him. He was effectively being detained. What this case said, and which was later approved by Murray v MOD [1988], was that you can be imprisoned without your knowledge whilst you are unconscious, and whilst you are a lunatic (you do not need to have the mental capacity). But, what the court went on to say is that if you do not know, or cannot appreciate what is happening to you, then any compensation might be reduced.

So, lack of knowledge affects the amount of your compensation. Lack of knowledge, however, no longer precludes the claim.

Lord Atkin in Murray v MOD [1988]: “… a person could be imprisoned without his knowing… while unconscious,… while a lunatic [but] the damages might be diminished…”

Question 32

Collins v Wilcock

Answer 32

Definition of assault, battery, and false imprisonment

Lord Goff in that case effectively said that there was three ways in which things might not be a battery which in principle you think could be.

1) Lawful Excuses - positive permission to do something, like police powers of arrest.
2) Everyday conduct - does not fall within trespass.
3) Defences - consent, self-defence, necessity.

A constable/policewoman held a prostitute that refused to answer questions, just to keep her attention. She grabbed hold to stop the woman leaving, but she was not exercising formal powers of arrest. She just wanted to ask her a couple of questions grab hold of her arm.

It was an interesting case because it starts off as criminal, and this tort issue comes up because clearly if she was touched in an unlawful sense then there was a battery there, and that disposed of the other case.

But that was outside of the acceptable general level of conduct, which perhaps in a way is quite surprising, because you think: how else could I have got her attention?

Question 33

R v Johnson

Answer 33

This is a rugby case where one player bit another player’s earlobe off.

Question 34

McNamara v Duncan (1979)

Answer 34

this is a footballer who deliberately felled an opposing player completely away from the play. This is an Australian case, so that would be illustrative rather than authoritative.

There are some other sporting cases as examples out there.

Just to show that is what, in theory, keeps sport within the parameters of the spirit of the game.