Traditional Employment Torts Flashcards
Physical and non-physical injuries
physical injuries are goverend by Worker’s Comp. employee’s receive broad coverage; dont ned to prove employer negligence, tort-based offenses not available.
Non-physical injuries are not covered under worker’s comp and need their own cause of action.
P must show:
(1) They were negligently placed win a zone of danger or physical injury;
* (2) They reasonably feared for their safety;
* (3) They suffered severe emotional distress;
* (4) With attendant physical manifestations.
- Tend to be brought as a supplemental claim.
4 General Categories of Employment Torts
Intentional interference w/ Employment Relationship (Tortious Interference)
Defamation
Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IED)
Fraud/fraudulent inducement.
Intentional Interference w/ the Employment Relationship
Basic Idea: protect one from unjustified third-party interference with contract or other relationship with another. ** Third-party interference is necessary for tortious interference; the employee cannot sue the employer.**
Elements:
* (1) existence of a valid contract or a relationship w/ the probability of future economic
benefit;
* (2) 3rd party has knowledge of that relationship;
* (3) 3rd party’s interference was intentional & improper;
(4) 3rd party’s interference caused harm.
* Courts split on whether an officer/director may be liable for causing the employer to fire someone. * Majority: depends on whether D is acting win the scope of their employment. o If w/n the scope of their employment, the officer/director is acting as the corp itself & therefore isn't a 3rd party -so no tort for intentional interference by a 3rd party. o Not w/n the scope of their employment if it's for some individual/private purpose not related to employer interests, or if it's in bad faith no biz justification. Another view: a supervisor isn't a 3 party since a supervisor has an absolute privilege to interfere w/ the employment relationship (i.e., it's within the scope of the supervisors employment). o But under this approach, a co-worker may be liable since their interference won't normally be win the scope of their employment.
- In most jurisdictions, the answer will turn on whether the defendant is acting within the scope of his employment -> Typically, a supervisor will be liable only where his actions are intended to further only some individual or private purpose not related to the interests of the employer.
Case for Tortious Interference
Kumpf:
allegation that supervisor was motivated by personal profit by restricting. Allegations was that supervisor did this to benefit himself, not the business.
o Anytime there’s a question of supervisor interference, there’s a question of privilege and what the supervisor can and cannot do.
o Court says here that this was NOT an improper motive.
a. Court gives deference to “business judgment” and say there is privilege with that. Privilege CAN BE lost if malice or bad faith predominately motivates the def’s actions.
b. Court also says that supervisors have privilege to act with profit motive (incentives often tied with company/manager)
* Majority says: Profit motivation is NOT private purpose BUT some courts might disagree
P needed to prove improper motive in order to convert to supervisor into a 3rd party
Mere Greed is not enough for improper motive.
Defamation
Cockram Factors:
* (1) a false and defamatory statment concerning another;
Defamatory harms rep w/n the community; makes others less likely to associates
Must be False. Again, absolute truth is a defense.
opinion can sometimes be actionable
* (2) unprivileged publication to a 3rd party
Dissemination of statement to any 3rd party;
also includes self-compelled publication;
* (3) fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher;
* (4) Actionability on the defamatory statement
If one’s ability to succeed in their profession is impaired, actionability is presumed.
Defense of Privilige:
Two kinds: Absolute or Qualified
Absolute Privilege (i.e. sworn testimony, judicial proceedings, etc.) = NO defamation claims. Don’t want fear of defamation claims to chill need for truthful information.
Qualified Privilege: If person has qualified privilege to make the statement -> complaining party needs to show actual malice (raises the bar from negligence to knowingly false & reckless disregard)
a. To have QUALIFIED privilege, the communication must be:
(1) Bona fide (genuine) communication
(2) Made BY a party who has an interest, or a duty to communicate the subject matter; and
(3) Made TO a party who has a corresponding interest or duty
ii. Defamatory information communicated in the ordinary course of the employment relationship frequently will be subject to a qualified privilege.
**Shannon v. Taylor AMC/Jeep **- Shannon fired; replacement told customers Shannon was
fired for theft. D argued the communication fell win the qualified privilege exception.
Court found no qualified privilege. No evidence stolen parts ever passed to customers; D had no duty to disclose that info; customers didn’t have corresponding duty to hear it.
Limits on qualified privilege:
“Excessive publication”-i.e., dissemination beyond the parties necessary.
Burden is on D to prove the circumstances that gave rise to qualified privilege.
If/when established, burden shifts to P to prove actual malice to overcome the qualified privilege.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)
4 elements of IIED:
(1) Intent to inflict, or knowledge/reckless disregard that emotional distress would follow;
(2) Conduct **extreme and outrageous **
* (i) Conduct must be so “extreme and outrageous beyond just offensive, must be beyond the bounds of decency.
* (ii) Usually the hardest element to satisfy
* (iii) Different courts have different interpretations of what constitutes “outrageousness” in the workplace.
* (iv) “Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”
* i. Racial or ethnic slurs ARE (usually) actionable under the tort.
(3) Must cause actual distress
(4) Distress is so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.
Elements 2 and 4 usually the hardest for employees to establish
**Subbe-Hirt v. Baccigalupi:
**“root canals” (yelling at a lot) from employer, given w/ hope P would quit, outrageous enough to raise a jury question. The specific targeting of an individual’s known weak point may be considered outrageous conduct.
Fraud/Misrepresentation
Fraud is most often used when an employee is discharged after being recently hired and typically after being recruited from another position and/or relocating to the new job. OR induced to stay, then terminated.
a. 4 Elements:
* False representation of fact or current intent.
(i) Must be misrepresentation AT THE TIME statement is made
So statement must “intend” to be fraudulent at time it is made
* Justifiable reliance produces action or forbearance
* Detriment or harm that results
* Fault amounting to at least negligence (intent is required in some jurisdictions)
o An employer is subject to liability for intentionally inducing an employee or prospective employee through knowingly false representation of fact, opinion, current intention, or law:
a. (1) to enter into, to maintain, or to leave an employment relationship with the employer, OR
b. (2) to refrain from entering into or maintaining an employment relationship with the employer or with another employer.
Sometimes fraud is pled along with PE
o Both based on reasonable detrimental reliance
o Some courts will reject in the at-will context (because not reasonable to rely in at-will context)
o Fraud must be falsity at time of representation. No promise needed.
o PE promise may have been truthful at time and simply never came to fruition.
o PE typically leads to reliance only damages BUT tort damages may be available in Fraud because it is a tort theory. Also, if fraudulent claim was intention, there is possibility for punitive damages.