Trade mark short answer questions Flashcards

1
Q

Describe the test for passing off established in Warnink v Townend [1979] A.C. 731, HL (the “Advocaat” decision).

A

Lord Diplock:

It is essential for the plaintiff in a successful passing off action to show at least the following five facts:

  1. A misrepresentation
  2. Made in the course of trade
  3. To a prospective customer of his or ultimate consumer of the goods or services supplied to him
  4. Which is calculated to injure the business or goodwill of another trader (in the sense that this is a reasonably foreseeable consequence); and
  5. Which causes actual damage to the business or goodwill of the trader by whom the action is bought or (in a quia timet action) will probably do so.
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2
Q

To what extent does the U.K. law of passing off protect well-known personalities? Explain briefly your answer, using case authority by way of illustration.

A

Unlike the position in many continental jurisdictions, UK law does not recognise a general right of publicity or personality. Instead, a celebrity seeking to control their image should use breach of contract, breach of confidence, or infringement of copyright.

However, in principle, there is no reason why good will might not arise through use or a celebrity’s image, likeness or voice (i.e. Personality merchandising). If there is also a misrepresentation and damage (i.e. the JIF trinity) there is not reason why passing off cannot be used to protect the personality. This will always be a question of fact and, in particular, will depend on the public believe that there is a relevant connection between the personality and the goods or services. Importantly, passing off cannot be used to protect a person against fair competition.

For example, in Elvis Presley trade marks, it was suggested that the use of the word ‘official’ on goods bearing a personalities name or likeness ‘may’ infer such an association.

Edmund Irvine v Talksport (expanded passing off to include false endorsement claims, therefore rejecting the need for a common field of activity).

Fenty v Arcadia (Rihanna successfully brought a passing off action against Topshop, which sold T-shirts bearing here photo without her approval. This was the first instance in the UK of a celebrity successfully using passing off against 3rd parties to prevent unauthorised merchandising. The key to this case was that the image was associated with her much publicised new album, Topshop is known for celebrity collaborations, and Rihanna’s status as a style icon).

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3
Q

Describe the meaning and the purpose of the “sign” requirement, as established in Dyson Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Case C-321/03.

A

Dyson sought to register the trademark of: “a transparent bin or collection chamber forming part of the external surface of a vacuum cleaner as shown in the representation”.

The CJEU answered the question: did the subject matter of Dyson’s application meet the requirements of Art 2 of the Directive (i.e. capable of being graphically represented, particularly words, including personal names, designs, letters, numerals, the shape of the goods or their packaging, provided that such shapes are capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of another)?

The CJEU held that the transparent bin was not a sign, because:
1. Subject matter of case is not a particular type of transparent bin or collection chamber. Instead it is, in actual fact, a mere property of the product concerned. As pointed out by the Advocate General in point 51 of his
Opinion, the shape, the dimensions, the presentation and composition of that subject-matter depend both on the vacuum cleaner models developed and on technological innovations. Likewise, transparency allows for the use of
various colours.
2. Thus, the application is for all the conceivable shapes of such a bin or collection chamber (i.e. a general and abstract idea).
3. Thus the sign sought to be registered is a mere property of product concerned
4. Hence does not constitute a ‘sign’ for purposes of Article 2.

Purpose:
As the Court has held previously, the purpose of that requirement is in particular to prevent the abuse of trade mark law in order to obtain an unfair competitive advantage (Heidelberger Bauchemie, paragraph 24).

In this case, the trade mark holder would be entitled to prevent its competitors from marketing vacuum cleaners
having any kind of transparent collecting bin on their external surface, irrespective of its shape.

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4
Q

Are interior designs of retail outlets registrable in the UK? Explain your answer.

A

In Apple Inc, the court recalled that, in order to be capable of constituting a trade mark for the purpose of Art 2 of Directive 2008/95, the subject matter of any application for registration must satisfy three conditions: must be a sign, must be capable of graphic representation, and the sign must be capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of another. These are the same three criteria set out in section 1(1) TMA 1994.

It is absolutely plain from the wording of Article 2 of Directive 2008/95 that designs are among the categories of signs capable of graphic representation. It follows that a representation, which depicts the layout of a retail store by means of an integral collection of lines, curves and shapes, may constitute a trade mark provided that it is capable of distinguishing the products or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings.

Consequently, such a representation satisfies the first and second conditions. In this case, the exact dimensions, precision and clarity are not issues. Uniformity may be enough to constitute a trade mark.

The fact that a sign is, in abstract capable of constituting a trade mark within the meaning of Article 2 of Directive 2008/95 does not mean, however, that the sign necessarily has a distinctive character for the purposes of
Article 3(1)(b) of the directive in relation to the products or services for which registration is sought. 

The distinctive character of the sign must be assessed in concreto by reference to, first, the goods or services in question and, second, the perception of the relevant public, namely the average consumer of the category of goods or services in question, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect

This should be the case when the depicted layout departs significantly from the norm or customs of the economic sector concerned (i.e. in respect to the specific products for the purposes of Art 3(1)(b) of the Directive).

In Apple Inc, the Court held that representation, by a design, of the layout of a retail store is capable of distinguishing the products or services of one undertaking from those of another, and hence satisfying the third criteria (when viewed in abstract for the purposes of Art 2 of the Directive).

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5
Q

What is the public interest underlying the exclusion from registration of descriptive terms?

A

Distinguishing function = excludes signs that the average consumer does not identify as reliably indicating the commercial origin of the goods.

Protective function = minimise the negative impact that the grant of trade marks may have upon traders working in the same or related field. ECJ refers to this as the requirement of availability. This public interest requires that all signs or indications which may serve to designate characteristics of the goods or services in respect of
which registration is sought remain freely available to all undertakings in order that they may use them when describing the same characteristics of their own goods (Konicklijke).

Thus, the test under Article 3(1)(c) of the Directive is to determine whether a trade mark for which registration is sought currently represents, in the mind of the relevant class of persons, a description of the characteristics of the goods or services concerned or whether it is reasonable to assume that that might be the case in the future. It is irrelevant whether there are other, more usual, signs or indications for designating the same characteristics of the goods or services referred to in the application for registration than those of which the mark
concerned consists. 

The public interest underlying Article 7(1)(b) [3(1)(b) TMD] of the regulation is, manifestly, indissociable from the
essential function of a trade mark.

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6
Q

What factors indicate, according to the case law of the CJEU, that a mark has been registered in bad faith?

A

Test set by the Court of Appeal is the same test used for ‘knowing assistance’ in breach of trust.
What did the applicant know
Asses whether a reasonable person would regard the applicant’s behaviour, given that knowledge, as conduct falling short of acceptable commercial behaviour.
This assessment is judged ‘by the ordinary standards of honest people’.

The CJ has yet to indicate whether this test is appropriate. In fact, they have also declined to define the term ‘bad faith’, but merely endorse the close analysis of all facts. In many respects, this is a broad test in which cases are placed into three categories:

The ECJ in Lindt & Sprüngli vs Hauswirth stated that bad faith is to be assessed in its entirety considering all of the factors of significance in each individual case. The relevant factors include:

No intention to use the mark
The General Court has also recognised that registering repeatedly to avoid the consequences of revocation for non use could well be bad faith.
Intention to sell (or traffic) the registered right.
Registration of ghost marks
Knowingly abusing a relationship with a third party (e.g. breach of trust or contract).
May be treated as in bad faith where the abuse falls short of a breach of a legal relationship, for example, where the parties were in a pre-contractual negotiations.
Knowledge of third party claims (i.e. applicant knows that a third party has some better claim to the reputation or goodwill attached to the sign).
This may include seeking to appropriate for themselves the goodwill of a trader who has stopped trading (Jules Rimet cup)
For example, noticing that a foreign business is expanding and racing to register the trade mark first.
e.g. Lindt & Sprüngli vs Hauswirth, the proprietor of the trademark had knowledge that the prior user was already using an identical or similar sign for identical or similar goods. Therefore the conduct was intended to prevent the prior user from continuing to use its sign.

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7
Q

Describe briefly the test applied by the CJEU for determining identity between signs.

A

It is necessary to compare representation of the earlier trade mark contained in the registration certificate with the trade mark that has been applied for (or in the case of infringement, that being used by the defendant).

In Societe LTJ Diffusion, the CJ stated that the test for identity should be interpreted narrowly.

Article 5(1)(a) of the directive must be interpreted as meaning that a sign is identical with the trade mark where it reproduces, without any modification or addition, all the elements constituting the trade mark or where, viewed as a whole, it contains differences so insignificant that they
may go unnoticed by an average consumer.

Additionally, common conventions should be born in mind. Including the idea that a word mark represents that word in any form, and that matter disclaimed in the registration will be ignored.

The court has provided little further guidance, taking the view that this is a matter of factual appraisal for national courts.

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8
Q

Describe briefly the test applied by the CJEU for determining similarity between products.

A

In Canon, the CJEU pointed out that, in assessing the similarity of the goods or services concerned, as the
French and United Kingdom Governments and the Commission have previously pointed out, all the relevant factors relating to those goods or services
themselves should be taken into account. Those factors include, inter alia:
their nature,
their end users [should read ‘intended purpose’] and
their method of use and
whether they are in competition with each other or are
complementary

See British Sugar v Robertson, Canon
Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc, and Balmoral Trade Mark

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9
Q

Describe briefly the test applied by the CJEU for determining similarity between marks.

A

The European Courts have formulated a “global appreciation” test (first developed in Puma v Sabel) in which likelihood of confusion is assessed on the basis of an overall consideration of the similarities (and
dissimilarities) between the respective marks and goods/services. The essence of the test is the principle of interdependency between these contributing factors.

The familiar concepts of :

  • ƒfirst impressions (attention should be paid particularly to the dominant and distinctive components of the mark)
  • ƒmarks to be compared as a whole, disregarding matters common to the trade (i.e. in the way the average consumer would see them)
  • ƒaural as well as visual comparison (in doing so, taking account of the inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark).
  • ƒdoctrine of “imperfect” or “sequential recollection”
  • importance of first syllable
  • ƒparticularly with device or composite marks, the “idea of the mark” or conceptual similarity (i.e. does use of the later mark immediately summon up the first mark, BETTY BOOP)
  • In the case of composite marks, there is also a tendency to emphasise the textual elements.
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10
Q

Describe the “average consumer” as defined by the CJEU in Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH v Klijsen Handel BV, Case C-342/97.

A

For the purposes of that global appreciation, the average consumer of the category of products concerned is deemed to be reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. However, account should be taken of the fact that the average consumer only rarely has the chance to make a direct comparison between the different marks but must place his trust in the imperfect picture of them that he has kept in his mind. It should also be borne in mind that the average consumer’s level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question.

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11
Q

Describe the test devised by the CJEU for establishing that a trade mark enjoys reputation.

A

Public policy = advertising function

Section 5(3) encompasses

  1. erosion of a marks distinctiveness by use on the goods of another (blurring)
  2. tainting the repute or goodwill associated with a mark (tarnishment)
  3. prevention of free-riding

In General Motors v Yplon, the CJ stated that reputation involved some sort of knowledge threshold so that ‘a mark would have a reputation where it is known by a significant part of the public concerned by the product or serviced covered by the trade mark.

This is only the case where there is a sufficient degree of knowledge of the mark that the public, when confronted with the later trade mark may possibly make an association between the two trade marks, even when used for non-similar products or services, and that the trade mark may consequently be damaged.

A realistic assessment of whether a mark has a reputation should be determined on the basis of a number of different criteria. These include the market sharehold by the trade mark, the intensity, geographical extent, duration of its use, and the size of the investment made in advertising.

In Yplon, the Court said that the threshold for reputation was a relatively low one.

In the case of Community trade marks, the reputation must exist in a substantial part of the Community.

In conclusion, in Yplon the court stated that in order to enjoy protection extending to non-similar products or services, a registered trade mark must be known by a significant part of the public concerned by the products or services.

*Also see PAGO

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12
Q

Describe the test devised by the CJEU for establishing that a trade mark enjoys reputation.

A

Public policy = advertising function

In General Motors v Yplon, the CJ stated that reputation involved some sort of knowledge threshold so that ‘a mark would have a reputation where it is known by a significant part of the public concerned by the product or serviced covered by the trade mark.

This is only the case where there is a sufficient degree of knowledge of the mark that the public, when confronted with the later trade mark may possibly make an association between the two trade marks, even when used for non-similar products or services, and that the trade mark may consequently be damaged.

A realistic assessment of whether a mark has a reputation should be determined on the basis of a number of different criteria. These include the market share-hold by the trade mark, the intensity, geographical extent, duration of its use, and the size of the investment made in advertising.

In Yplon, the Court said that the threshold for reputation was a relatively low one.

In the case of Community trade marks, the reputation must exist in a substantial part of the Community.

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13
Q

Discuss briefly the importance of the decision of the CJEU in Intel Corporation Inc. v CPM UK Ltd, Case C-252/07.

A

Article 5(2) of the Directive, entitled ‘Rights conferred by a trade mark’, provides:

‘Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade any sign which is identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, where the latter has a reputation in the Member State and where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.’

In Adidas-Salomon the court stated that, the infringements referred to in Article 5(2) of [Directive 89/104], are the consequence of a certain degree of similarity between the mark and the sign, by virtue of which the relevant section of the public makes a connection between the sign and the mark (i.e. establishes a link between them even though it does not confuse them.

The existence of such a link must, just like a likelihood of confusion in the context of Article 5(1)(b) of Directive [89/104], be appreciated globally, taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case.

To fall within section 5(3), it must be shown that use of the later mark relates to unfair advantage or detriment to the distinctive character or reputation of an earlier mark.

Intel relates to detriment to the distinctive character of the earlier mark (blurring).

INTELMARK for marketing services v INTEL for microprocessor chips.

CJ defined ‘detriment to distinctive character’ s dilution, whittling away, or blurring, which occurs when there is a weakening of a mark’s ability to identify the goods or services for which it is registered and used, because the use of the later mark leads to ‘dispersion’ of the earlier mark’s ‘identity and hold upon the public mind’.

The Court referred to the impact of such blurring on the length of time that the consumer would take to associate the mark with the goods.

The CJ stated that Article 4(4)(a) of the Directive must be interpreted as meaning that whether there is a link, within the meaning of Adidas, between the earlier mark with a reputation and the later mark must be assessed globally, taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case. The fact that for the average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and
reasonably observant and circumspect, the later mark calls the earlier mark with a reputation to mind is tantamount to the existence of such a link, within the
meaning of Adidas-Salomon and Adidas Benelux, between the conflicting marks.

The fact that:
- the earlier mark has a huge reputation for certain specific types of goods or services, and
– those goods or services and the goods or services for which the later mark is registered are dissimilar or dissimilar to a substantial degree, and
– the earlier mark is unique in respect of any goods or services,
does not necessarily imply that there is a link, within the meaning of Adidas, between the conflicting marks.

The more immediately and strongly the earlier mark is brought to mind by the later mark, the greater the likelihood that the current or future use of the later
mark is taking unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier mark.

The assessment of injury must also be a global assessment.

The Court the went on to establish a test for when such detriment would occur:

  1. mark need not be unique
  2. any mark with a reputation, and thus acquired distinctive character could have that character damaged.
  3. If the earlier mark was unique, then the later use of an identical or similar mark would be more likely to damage the distinctive character.
  4. first use on an identical or similar mark could damage distinctiveness (do not need to rely on death by 1000 cuts).
  5. proof that use of the later mark would be detrimental to the distinctive character of the first requires evidence of a change in the economic behaviour of the average consumer of the goods or services in question, or a serious likelihood that such a change will occur in the future.

It is immaterial, however, for the purposes of assessing whether the use of the later mark is or would be detrimental to the distinctive character of the earlier
mark, whether or not the proprietor of the later mark draws real commercial benefit from the distinctive character of the earlier mark.

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14
Q

Explain briefly the concept of dilution by tarnishment.

A

Damage to reputation (tarnishment) occurs when: the goods/services for which the identical or similar mark is used may be perceived in a way that reduces the mark’s power of attraction.

The likelihood of such detriment may arise in particular where the goods or services offered by the third party possess a characteristic or a quality which is liable to have a negative impact on the image of the mark.

There are two obvious ways tarnishment can occur:

  1. proposed use would reflect badly (e.g. antagonism between goods)
  2. Later mark modifies the earlier sign in a denigratory way.
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15
Q

Discuss briefly the importance of the decision of the CJEU in L’Oreal SA v Bellure NV, Case C-487/07 in relation to the concept of taking ‘unfair advantage’.

A

Facts: claimant manufactured expensive perfumes under registered trade marks and sold them through exclusive outlets. The defendants manufactured and distributed perfumes with a ‘smell-alike’ relationship. The packaging was also designed to call to mind the claimant’s packaging.

In this particular situation:
1. the guarantee of origin was not impaired or put at risk
2. there was not tarnishing or blurring
3. the trademarks owner’s sales were not impaired
the trademark owner was not deprived of any reward for promotion of the mark
However
5. the trader did get a commercial advantage from use of the sign.

Jacob LJ thought that taking advantage need not be unfair. Nevertheless, he asked the CJEU to address the question of when taking advantage was unfair.

The CJEU first set out what it understood ‘unfair advantage’ to mean:

  • parasitism or free-riding
  • doesn’t relate to the detriment of the mark but the advantage taken by the third party.
  • clear exploitation on the coat-tails of a mark with a reputation.

identified the circumstances in which taking unfair advantage could be proved:

  • global assessment
  • strength of the marks reputation
  • degree of distinctiveness
  • degree of similarity between the marks
    proximity of the goods or services
    the stronger the mark’s distinctive character and reputation, the easier it will be to accept that detriment has been caused.
  • the more immediately and strongly the mark is brought to mind by the sign, the greater the likelihood that the sign is taking unfair advantage.

Concluded: the link between the claimant and the defendants marks confers a commercial advantage to the defendants, intended to benefit from the reputation and prestige of the earlier mark, and to exploit, without paying any financial compensation, the marketing effort expended by the proprietor.

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16
Q

Describe briefly the functions of trade marks that enjoy legal protection according to the case law of the CJEU.

A

The essential/origin function
to guarantee the identity of origin of the marked goods or services to the consumer or end user by enabling him, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the goods or services from others which have another origin.

The quality function
For a trade mark to be able to fulfil its role, it must offer a guarantee that all good bearing it have been produced under the control of a single undertaking which is accountable for their quality.

The advertising function
The Google France case, examined the use by internet advertisers of someone else’s trade marked words as
keywords to trigger ads in a search engine like Google.

Here, the ECJ held there that “the proprietor of a trade mark is entitled to prohibit a third party from using, without the proprietor’s consent, a sign identical with its trade mark in relation to goods or services which are identical with those for which that trade mark is registered, in the case where that use adversely affects the proprietor’s use of its mark as a factor in sales promotion or as an instrument of commercial
strategy.”

This might include situations where the mark of a luxury good is associated with down market goods This description is remarkably broad and arguably liable to increase legal uncertainty, particularly taking into account that it is not required that the third party use affects in any way the function of indicating origin.

The investment function
The investment function of a trademark was analysed by the ECJ in Interflora, again a case dealing with the use of a third-party trademark as a keyword for triggering the display of Google ads. The court defined the “investment function” as the use of the mark by its proprietor “to acquire or preserve a reputation capable of attracting consumers and retaining their loyalty”.

The court noted that while this investment function “may overlap with the advertising function, it is none the less distinct from the latter.

Communication function
So far the CJ has said nothing about the communication function. However, in L’Oreal, the Advocate General observed that a trade mark can convey numerous messages to consumers. He treated the communication function as encompassing informative advertising and communication that cultivates an image of the product.

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17
Q

Discuss briefly the importance of the decision of the CJEU in Ansul BV v Ajax Brandbeveiliging BV, Case C-40/01.

A

Ansul registered the mark MINIMAX in the Benelux countries in 1971 for fire-extinguishers and related products. It had not sold any fire extinguishers since 1989. However, it had component parts for fire extinguishers, and services and maintained them.

A German company who also sold fire extinguishers registered the mark MINIMAX in Germany. Ajax, a subsidiary of the German company, started to use the mark in the Netherlands and applied for revocation on the grounds of non-use.

CJ adopted a largely subjective test for genuine use.

CJ said that:

  • token use, serving solely to attempt to preserve rights was not genuine use.
  • must be consistent with the essential function of a trade mark, to guarantee the identity of the origin of the goods or services.
  • should not be internal use
  • must be related to goods or services currently on, or about to be put on, the market.
  • used to secure customers, such as in advertising campaigns.
  • use of the mark need not be quantitatively significant
  • use in relation to components or after-sales services could be use that ‘related to’ goods, even though the goods for which the mark was registered were no longer being sold.
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18
Q

What does a trade mark proprietor need to demonstrate in order to establish that there are ‘proper reasons for non-use’ within the meaning of Section 46(1)(a)-(b) Trade Marks Act 1994 and Article 51(1)(a) EUTMR respectively? (Armin Häupl v. Lidl Stiftung & Co. KG, Case C-246/05.

A

CJ interpreted the notion of ‘proper use’ in light of Art 19 TRIPS

  1. obstacles arose independently of the will of the proprietor
    - must be wholly outside the proprietor’s control
    - classic examples are import restrictions or government regulations
    - lack of resources, financial problems, lack of staff, marketing problems or difficulties perfecting technology are likely to be considered situations that are not independent of the proprietor’s will, because they are matters within a businessman’s control.
  2. there is a direct relationship between the obstacles and failure to use the mark
    - bureaucratic obstacles such as gaining building permission is not sufficiently directly related to use of the trademark on the foodstuff.
    - use of a particular name may be dependant on marketing authorisation.
  3. the obstacle would make use of the mark impossible or unreasonable
    - these cases will be rare
    - tribunal should examine the existing corporate strategy, any good will already achieved, alternative strategies (such as licensing).
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19
Q

List four defences that are available to the infringement of a trade mark registered under the Trade Marks Act 1994.1

A
  1. use of a name or address, in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters
  2. descriptive use use of a name or address, in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters
  3. use to indicate the intended purpose, use of a name or address, in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters
  4. comparative advertising, if the advertisement satisfies the eight conditions specified in Art 4 of the Directive on Misleading and Comparative Advertising (MCAD)
  5. local use of an earlier right
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20
Q

Explain briefly the circumstances in which a trade mark owner may oppose further dealings in goods which he/she has put on the market in the European Economic Area?

A

There must be legitimate reasons to do so…

  1. Altering the goods
    Where the condition of the goods has changed or been impaired
    for example, an adaptor is of a different standard from that which the trader would supply in the authorised package, or where changing the characteristics of the goods would affect the reputation.
  2. depackaging
    For example, eBay,.
    A legitimate reason on this ground may include the removal of essential information, or damage to reputation.
  3. repackaging
    Bristol-Myers v Paranova
    cannot rely on this right to prevent importing or marketing in another member state, unless repackaging jeopardised the guarantee of origin.
  4. rebranding
  5. advertising the goods
    damage to reputation
    detracting from the allure and prestigious image of the goods.
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21
Q

Describe the effects of invalidity and revocation under the UK Trade Marks Act 1994.

A

Invalidity
• Section 47(6) Trade Marks Act 1994: Where the registration of a trade mark is declared invalid to any extent, the registration shall to that extent be deemed never to have been made: Provided that this shall not affect transactions past and closed.

An application may seek to invalidate the entire
registration, or only invalidate the registration of the mark for some of the registered goods or services.

Revocation
• Section 46(6) Trade Marks Act 1994: Where the registration of a trade mark is revoked to any extent, the rights of the proprietor shall be deemed to have ceased to that extent as from— (a) the date of the application for revocation, or (b) if the registrar or court is satisfied that the grounds for revocation existed at an earlier date, that date.

If a party wants revocation to take effect from a date earlier than the date of application for revocation, it should explicitly allege that the grounds for revocation existed at the earlier date.

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22
Q

Describe the effect of a successful central attack under the Madrid Agreement and the Madrid Protocol.

A

For a period of five years from the date of the international registration, the protection resulting from the international registration remains dependent on the
mark registered or whose registration has been applied for with the Office of origin.

This dependence is absolute, and is effective regardless of the reasons why the basic application is rejected or is withdrawn or the basic registration ceases to enjoy, in whole or in part, legal protection.

If during that time the basic application is refused or withdrawn or the basic registration or the registration resulting from the basic application is canceled or has lapsed, the holder of the international registration may no longer invoke the protection of that registration.

Similarly, if the basic registration is canceled after the five years as a result of an action that began during the five-year period, the international registration will likewise be canceled.

The Madrid Protocol provides that the holder of an international registration that is canceled through a “central attack” may apply for registration of the same mark with all Offices of designated Contracting Parties where the international registration had effect and whose designation is governed by the Protocol, as long as such
application is made within three months after the international registration is canceled.

The national applications that result from this procedure,
known as “transformation,” are given the date of the original international registration. Other than the extraordinary priority, these applications become ordinary national applications that must be filed with the Office of
the Contracting Party directly. Note that transformation is not available where the holder has itself opted to cancel the registration.

Where the EU designation is refused or liable to fall away as a result of central attack, it can be transformed either:
Into national applications in one or more EU member states under the EUTM legislation.
Under the Protocol “opting-back” provision, into national applications in those EU countries party to the Protocol, as long as those countries are members of the Protocol as at the date of transformation.

Under the Madrid Agreement, an International application cannot transform into a bundle of national applications.

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23
Q

Explain the principle of coexistence in the context of the European Union Trade Mark system.

A

The flexibility of the trade mark system enables different businesses to use the same trade marks without problem. It lets them own marks just within the own commercial sectors in which they trade. That is how, for example, the same word POLO could be reserved for quite unrelated businesses that sold confectionery, clothing and cars at the same time.

The system is just as flexible in that it allows businesses to register and use similar trade marks even for goods and services in the same commercial sector. This is so for as long as that similarity does not confuse consumers into being unable to identify which goods or services are which, while at the same time protecting them against later businesses that want to use similar trade marks if confusion is likely to result.

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24
Q

Explain the principle of seniority in the context of the European Union Trade Mark system.

A

A company that has identical registrations of its marks in one or more EU member states may consolidate those national registrations and record them as part of an EUTM registration. In doing so, the owner not only preserves the original national filing dates in the EUTM record (this is known as “seniority”), but also saves money on renewal fees, as there will only be one fee to pay instead of multiple fees (one for each national registration). However, the EUTM holder cannot take advantage of the seniority claims unless and until it allows its national registrations to lapse.

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25
Q

Describe the test for passing off established in Reckitt & Colman Ltd v Borden Inc [1990] R.P.C. 340, HL (the “Jif Lemon” decision).

A

The classic trinity identified in ‘JIF LEMON’ as necessary for a passing off action are:

i. Goodwill
ii. Reputation
iii. Damage or, in a quia timet action, the likelihood of damage

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26
Q

Describe briefly the importance of the decision of the CJEU in Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys v Registrar of Trade Marks, Case C-307/10, 19.6.2012, (IP translator).

A

The IP TRANSLATOR case concerned the scope of protection conferred by trade mark registrations which use ‘class headings’ in their specifications of goods and services.

The goods and services for which the protection of a trade mark is sought must be identified by the applicant with sufficient clarity and precision to enable the competent authorities and economic operators, on that basis alone, to determine the extent of the protection conferred by the trade mark.

It is permissible to use the wording of the class headings of the Nice Classification to identify the goods and services for which the protection of a trade mark is sought, provided that such identification is sufficiently clear and precise.

An applicant who uses all the general indications of a particular class heading must specify whether its application is intended to cover all of the goods or services included in the alphabetical list for that class or only some of them. If the latter, the applicant is required to specify which of the goods or services in that class are intended to be covered.

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27
Q

Are sounds registrable as trade marks in the U.K.? Explain your answer.

A

In Shield Mark v Joost Kist, the court considered the graphical representation of two sound marks; the first being the first nine notes of the melody to Beethoven’s “Fur Elise” represented in musical notation alongside a description stating that it was to be played on a piano, and the crowing of a cock as depicted by the onomatopoeia “Kukelekuuuuu”. The former mark was considered registerable, since musical notation is clear, precise, self-contained, easily accessible, intelligible, durable, and objective and thus satisfy the seven Seikmann criteria. Importantly, the fact that not everyone would immediately understand that the notes were in fact a representation of “Fur Elise” was not important; the requirement is intelligible, not immediately intelligible.

Onomatopoeic representation however, do not satisfy the above requirements. Importantly, different cultures will associate a particular sound, such as the crowing of a cock, or the bleeting of a sheep, with a different onomatopoetic representation. The interpretation of an onomatopoeia is also largely subjective.

Seemingly similar marks, such as the roaring of a lion (MGM Lion Corporation), have been successfully registered when represented as a digital recording or sonograpm depicting pitch, progression over time, and volume. Since a sonogram requires specialist equipment to be interpreted, this form of representation arguably does not satisfy all Seikmann criteria (particularly self-contained and intelligible).

Accordingly, application for the mark consisting of Tarzan’s yell and a spectrogram was rejected on the grounds that the spectrogram was not a sufficient graphical representation.

28
Q

What is ‘honest use’ within the meaning of Article 6(1)(c) TMD, as established by the CJEU in Gillette v LA-Laboratories Ltd, 17.3.2005, Case C-228/03, ECR I-2337?

A

Gillette marketed razors and replaceable razor blades in Finland under the Gillette and Sensor mark.

LA also manufactured razors and replaceable blades similar to Gillettes under a different mark (Parson Flexor)

LA fixed a sticker to their packaging stating that “all Parson Flexor and Gillette Sensor handles are compatible with this blade”.

Gillette sued for infringement, claiming that the sticker would lead the public to assume that there was a link between the two companies.

LA claimed a defence under Art 6(1)(c) TMD (i.e. necessary to indicate the intended purpose).

CJEU was asked to consider weather a trader may only refer to a third parties mark if it is strictly necessary.

They stated that use will not comply with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters where:

  1. it is done in such a manner that it may give the impression that there is a commercial connection between the re-seller and the trade mark proprietor.
  2. it will affect the value of the trade mark by taking unfair advantage of its distinctive character or repute.
  3. use will not comply with honest practices if it discredits or denigrates the mark.
  4. where the third party presents its product as an imitation or replica of the product bearing the trade mark of which it is not the owner.
  5. Account should be taken of the overall presentation of the product marketed by the third party, the circumstances in which the mark of which a distinction is made between that mark and the mark or sign of the third party, and the effort made by the third party to ensure that consumers distinguish its products from those of which it is not the trade mark owner.
29
Q

Explain the requirement in Trade Mark law that an infringing use must be use “in the course of trade” in the UK.

A

CJ: A sign is used during the course of trade where it is used ‘in the context of a commercial activity with a view to economic advantage and not as a private matter’. It is not clear whether these two criteria are cumulative requirements. (Arsenal v Reed)

L’Oreal v eBay: In relation to sales on an online market place, generally sales do not take place in the context of a commercial activity, unless the volume and frequency of sales go beyond the realms of private activity.

Quite where this line will be drawn is unclear.

30
Q

Is Section 11(2) Trade Marks Act 1994 (the defence of descriptive use that allows third parties to use descriptive terms) also applicable if a third party uses a descriptive indication as a trade mark? (Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co v. Putsch GmbH, Case C-100/02, 7.1.2004, [2004] ECR I-691).

A

Yes

In this case the CJ was asked whether bottled water bearing the mark KERRY SPRING could rely on the defence to an action brought by the owner of the registration GERRI for mineral water.

The court accepted that the sign was also an indication of geographical origin within Art 6(1)(b). The fact that the sign was used additionally as a mark is a factor pertinent to the assessment of whether the use was in accordance with honest practice, rather than whether the sign indicated geographical origin.

The Court observed that a certain amount of confusion might need to be tolerated in an economic union the size of the EU. They stated that given the great linguistic diversity, ‘the chance that there exists some phonetic similarity between a trade mark registered in one state and an indication of geographical origin from another state is substantial’.

Such confusion was not conclusive evidence that a defendant was not acting in accordance with honest practices.

31
Q

What is the legal test for assessing whether a sign may serve in trade to designate the kind, quality, […], or other characteristics of the goods or services?

A

Public policy issue: protect the public by keeping descriptive signs or indications free of use by all traders. section 3(1)(c)/ Art 7(1)(c) such signs and indications from being reserved to one undertaking alone because they have been registered as trade marks.

In order to determine whether a trade mark is excluded from registration under Article 7(1)(c) it is necessary to
ascertain whether the sign at issue is capable of being used by other economic operators to describe a characteristic of their goods and services.

Windsurfing Chiemsee: The court said that the relevant tribunal should ask whether there was an association int he mind of the relevant class of persons between the [geographic name] and the category of good in question, or where there was none at the relevant date, whetherit is reasonable to assume that such an association may be established in the future.

Following the decision in DoubleMint, the test is NOT whether the mark is exclusively descriptive; it
is sufficient if one of the meanings of the mark designates a characteristic of the goods/
services.

It is not necessary for a sign to be in current use as a
description before it is susceptible to an objection under Article 7(1)(c). It is sufficient that the sign is capable of being used as a designation of the goods/services (Windsurfing Chiemsee, confirmed in DoubleMint).

When examining marks consisting of unusually juxtaposed words and marks which consist of only part of a natural description for the goods/services, the court’s judgement in Baby-Dry (C-383/99 P) provides guidance.
In this case, the test was based around ‘common parlance’

In determining whether a trade mark consists exclusively of a designation of the goods/services, differences of a kind which may go unnoticed by an average consumer, will be discounted entirely. The presentation of a
descriptive trade mark in a graphical form which corresponds to common forms of presenting descriptions in trade, such as the use of a colour or a simple border, is unlikely of itself to be sufficient to resist an objection
under section 3(1)(c).

32
Q

Describe briefly the importance of the decision of the CJEU in Hauck v Stokke, Case C- 205/13, 18.9.2014 (Tripp Trapp children’s chair).

A

The Dutch Court sought clarification on the breadth of the first and third limbs of art 3(1)(e).

Previously there was some debate about whether the ground only applied when no alternative shapes are available for the products covered by the trade mark application. This was resolved by the CJEU in the Hauck v Stokke case (C-205/13), in which the protection of the famous Tripp-Trapp kid’s chair was at issue. The Court confirmed that the ground of objection can apply even if the shape is not indispensable to the function of the goods, and so would bite on shapes having essential characteristics which are inherent to the generic function of products of the same category. This has raised the threshold for overcoming this ground of objection.

Further, the presumed perception of the sign by the average consumer was not decisive in considering this ground, but was one of a number of factors which had to be considered. As indicated by the Advocate General, other criteria could include the category of goods concerned, the artistic value of the shape in question, its dissimilarity from other shapes in common use on the market, a substantial price difference in relation to similar products, and the development of a promotion strategy focusing on the aesthetic characteristics of the product.

The third issue was whether the provisions of Articles 3(1)(e)(i) and (iii) could be applied in combination. Noting that the three provisions of Article 3(1)(e) were set out successively, and that the word ‘exclusively’ was used, the CJEU concluded that they should be applied independently of each other. Accordingly, even if only one of the three provisions fully applied to a sign, the court stated that a sign consisting exclusively of the shape of a product could not be registered.

33
Q

Describe briefly the public interest underlying the absolute ground for refusal contained in Section 3(2)(b) Trade Marks Act 1994 (non-registrability of signs consisting exclusively of the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result).

A

In Philips v Remmington and Lego, the CJ offered two explanations:

  1. prevent the protection conferred by the trade mark right from being extended, beyond signs which serve to distinguish a product or service, so as to form an obstacle that prevents competitors from freely offering for sale products incorporating technical solutions, or functional characteristics that a user or consumer might want.
  2. Exclusion intended to prevent individuals from using registeration to ‘acquire or perpetuate exclusive rights relating to technical solutions’.
34
Q

Explain the priority system for trade mark applications under the Paris Convention.

A

On the basis of a regular first application filed in one of the Contracting States, the applicant may within 6 months apply for protection in any of the other Contracting States.

These subsequent applications will be regarded as if they had been filed on the same day as the first application.

In other words, they will have priority over applications filed in the interim. These subsequent applications, being based on the first application, will not be affected by any event that takes place in the interval, such as the sale of articles bearing a mark or incorporating an industrial design.

One of the great practical advantages of this provision is that applicants seeking protection in several countries are not required to present all of their applications at the same time but have 6 months to decide in which countries they wish to seek protection, and to organize with due care the steps necessary for securing protection.

35
Q

Describe briefly the main obstacles to the registrability of colours as trade marks.

A

In Philips v Remington, the CJEU stated that “there is no class of marks having a distinctive character by their nature or by the use made of them which is not capable of distinguishing goods or services within the meaning of Article 2 of the Directive.” Thus, there is no a priori exclusion of signs from protection.

First, the mark must be capable of distinguishing the
goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings (in abstract, i.e. irrespective of the goods or services for which protection is sought).

Abstract assessment

  1. Must be a sign. There is no statutory definition of this term. Although it is clear that the concept is broad, it it not without limits. In Heidelberger Bauchemie, the court held that, whilst colour could be a sign, it is not necessarily so. In many situations, colour is simply a property or characteristic of a thing. Similarly, in Libertel, colours were said to possess little inherent capacity for communicating specific information, especially since they are commonly and widely used, because of their appeal, in order to advertise and market goods or services, without any specific message.

Similarly, combinations of colours are generally used for their attractive or decorative powers, and do not
convey any meaning.

Nevertheless, it is possible that colours or combinations of colours may be capable, when used in relation to a product or a service, of being a sign.

In Dyson v Registrar, the court said that protection that was unspecific would provide an unfair advantage to the trade mark proprietor.

  1. The second general hurdle that must be met is that the sign must be capable of graphic representation (under the pre-2015 Directive).

Here the representation must fulfil the seven Sieckmann criteria. Following Libertel, colour samples on paper are no longer treated as graphic representations. A written description coupled with a relevant code from an internationally recognised colour identification system would be regarded as acceptable.

In relation to colour combinations, a graphic representation would be sufficiently clear and precise only if the application specified that the colours would be arranged in a predetermined and uniform way. The mere juxtaposition in every conceivable way does not exhibit the qualities of precision and uniformity.

Concrete assessment

  1. The mark must also be distinctive (inherently or acquired through use) to be perceived as a bade of trade origin.

Simple colour marks are likely to be treated as being devoid of distinctive character. This is because the consumers are not in the habit of assuming the origin of the good merely based on the colour of the packaging.

Consequences, in the case of a colour per se, distinctiveness without any prior use is inconceivable save in exceptional circumstances.

The test for distinctiveness = will the sign enable the consumer to identify the origin of the goods.

Public policy:
A strong public interest in favour of keeping colours free for all traders to use, and to prevent abuse of trade mark law enabling a trader to gain an unfair competitive advantage (colour depletion theory).

36
Q

Describe briefly the main obstacles to the registrability of colours as trade marks.

A

Abstract assessment

  1. Must be a sign. There is no statutory definition of this term. Although it is clear that the concept is broad, it it not without limits. In Heidelberger Bauchemie, the court held that, whilst colour could be a sign, it is not necessarily so. In many situations, colour is simply a property or characteristic of a thing.

In Dyson v Registrar, the court said that protection that was unspecific would provide an unfair advantage to the trade mark proprietor.

  1. The second general hurdle that must be met is that the sign must be capable of graphic representation.

Here the representation must fulfil the seven Sieckmann criteria. Following Libertel, colour samples on paper are no longer treated as graphic representations. A written description coupled with a relevant code from an internationally recognised colour identification system would be regarded as acceptable.

In relation to colour combinations, a graphic representation would be sufficiently clear and precise only if the application specified that the colours would be arranged in a predetermined and uniform way. The mere juxtaposition in every conceivable way does not exhibit the qualities of precision and uniformity.

Concrete assessment

  1. The mark must also be distinctive (inherently or acquired through use) to be perceived as a bade of trade origin.

Simple colour marks are likely to be treated as being devoid of distinctive character. This is because the consumers are not in the habit of assuming the origin of the good merely based on the colour of the packaging. There is also a strong public interest in favour of keeping colours free for all traders to use (colour depletion theory).

Consequences, in the case of a colour per se, distinctiveness without any prior use is inconceivable save in exceptional circumstances.

The test for distinctiveness = will the sign enable the consumer to identify the origin of the goods.

37
Q

Are sounds registrable as trade marks in the U.K.? Explain your answer.

A

Abstract assessment

  1. Must be a sign. There is no statutory definition of this term. Although it is clear that the concept is broad, it it not without limits.
  2. The second general hurdle that must be met is that the sign must be capable of graphic representation.

In Shield Mark v Joost Kist, the court considered the graphical representation of two sound marks; the first being the first nine notes of the melody to Beethoven’s “Fur Elise” represented in musical notation alongside a description stating that it was to be played on a piano, and the crowing of a cock as depicted by the onomatopoeia “Kukelekuuuuu”. The former mark was considered registerable, since musical notation is clear, precise, self-contained, easily accessible, intelligible, durable, and objective and thus satisfy the seven Seikmann criteria. Importantly, the fact that not everyone would immediately understand that the notes were in fact a representation of “Fur Elise” was not important; the requirement is intelligible, not immediately intelligible.

Onomatopoeic representation however, do not satisfy the above requirements. Importantly, different cultures will associate a particular sound, such as the crowing of a cock, or the bleeting of a sheep, with a different onomatopoetic representation. The interpretation of an onomatopoeia is also largely subjective.

Seemingly similar marks, such as the roaring of a lion (MGM Lion Corporation), have been successfully registered when represented as a digital recording or sonograpm depicting pitch, progression over time, and volume. Since a sonogram requires specialist equipment to be interpreted, this form of representation arguably does not satisfy all Seikmann criteria (particularly self-contained and intelligible).

Accordingly, application for the mark consisting of Tarzan’s yell and a spectrogram was rejected on the grounds that the spectrogram was not a sufficient graphical representation.

Concrete assessment

  1. The mark must also be distinctive (inherently or acquired through use) to be perceived as a bade of trade origin.

The test for distinctiveness = will the sign enable the consumer to identify the origin of the goods. Because consumers are not in the habit of understanding sounds as identifying commercial origin, these marks should differ significantly from the norm of the sector concerned.

38
Q

Describe the effect of a registration obtained under the Madrid Agreement.

A

A Contracting Party may be designated only if it is party to the same treaty as the Contracting Party whose office is the office of origin.

An international registration is equivalent to a bundle of national registrations. Although it is a single registration, protection may be refused by some of the designated Contracting Parties, or the protection may be limited
or renounced with respect to only some of the designated Contracting Parties.

Likewise an international registration may be transferred to a new owner with respect to only some of the designated Contracting Parties.

The effects of an international registration in each designated Contracting Party are, from the date of the international registration, the same as if the mark had been deposited directly with the office of that Contracting Party. If no refusal is issued within the applicable time limit, or if a refusal originally notified by a Contracting Party is subsequently withdrawn, the protection of the mark is, from the date of the international registration, the same as if it had been registered by the office of that Contracting Party.

An international registration is effective for 10 years. It may be renewed for further periods of 10 years on payment of the prescribed fees.

Protection may be limited with regard to some or all of the goods or services or may be renounced with regard to some only of the designated Contracting Parties. An international registration may be transferred in relation to all or some of the designated Contracting Parties and all or some of the goods or services indicated.

This is in contrast to a unitary regional right such as the European Union trade mark.

39
Q

Describe the meaning and the purpose of the “sign” requirement, as established in Dyson Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Case C-321/03, 14.9.2006, [2007] ECR I – 687.

A

Art 2 of the TMD described which signs may be registered. They must be capable of graphical representation and they must be distinctive, that is they must be capable of acting as a badge of origin. The wording of the directive appears to leave open the possibility that any sign may be registered, so long as it is distinctive and capable of graphical representation.

In Dyson v Registrar, the CJEU held that the common ground in the main proceedings was not a particular type of collecting bin forming part of the external surface of the vacuum cleaner, but rather, in a general and abstract manner, all the conceivable shapes of such a collecting bin.

Given the inherent exclusivity in a trademark right, the holder of such a non-specific mark would obtain an unfair competitive advantage contrary to the purpose pursued by Art 2 TMD.

The subject matter of the application at issue is, in fact, a mere property of the product concerned and does not therefore constitute a sign within the meaning of Art 2 of the directive.

40
Q

Explain the principle of coexistence in the context of the European Union Trade Mark system.

A

The relationship between the EUTM system and national law is characterised by the principle of coexistence.

This means that both the EUTM system and the national laws exist and operate side by side.

The same sign can be protected by the same proprietor as an EUTM and as a national trade mark in one (or all) of the Member States.

The principle of coexistence further implies that the EUTM system actively acknowledges the relevance of national rights and their scope of protection.

Where conflicts arise between EUTMs and national trade marks or other national rights, there is no hierarchy determining that one system prevails over the other; instead, these conflicts apply the principle of priority.

If the respective requirements are met, earlier national trade marks or other earlier national rights can prevent registration of, or invalidate a later EUTM.

An agreement - also sometimes known as a “partition agreement” or “consent agreement” - between two parties in which they agree that each may continue to use its own trade marks without interference from the other, subject to restrictions.

Such coexistence may be based on a division of the territories in which each holder may operate, or on a delimitation of their respective fields of use, i.e. regarding the goods or services on which they are used.

41
Q

Explain the principle of coexistence in the context of the European Union Trade Mark system.

A

The relationship between the EUTM system and national law is characterised by the principle of coexistence.

This means that both the EUTM system and the national laws exist and operate side by side.

The same sign can be protected by the same proprietor as an EUTM and as a national trade mark in one (or all) of the Member States.

Where conflicts arise between EUTMs and national trade marks or other national rights, there is no hierarchy determining that one system prevails over the other; instead, these conflicts apply the principle of priority.

An agreement - also sometimes known as a “partition agreement” or “consent agreement” - between two parties in which they agree that each may continue to use its own trade marks without interference from the other, subject to restrictions.

Such coexistence may be based on a division of the territories in which each holder may operate, or on a delimitation of their respective fields of use, i.e. regarding the goods or services on which they are used.

42
Q

Are advertising slogans registrable in the UK? Explain your answer.

A

In principle, advertising slogans can be protected by trade mark law as they consist of words, which are acceptable for trade mark registration, and can also be examined owing to the distinctiveness and the function as an indicator of the source tests.

However, in many jurisdictions, owing to the unconventional character of slogans, they are not listed explicitly among signs likely to constitute a trade mark.

At the European level, the EUIPO has a strict approach to assessing the distinctiveness of slogans, while at the international level, the Madrid system allows such marks to obtain protection in several countries. The system also includes the possibility of registering advertising slogans.

The English courts have tended to take the view that slogans lack distinctive character and the General Courts have agreed. However, the CJ has allowed the registration of slogans on a number of occasions.

43
Q

Are advertising slogans registrable in the UK? Explain your answer.

A

In principle, advertising slogans can be protected by trade mark law as they consist of words, which are acceptable for trade mark registration, and can also be examined owing to the distinctiveness and the function as an indicator of the source tests.

However, in many jurisdictions, owing to the unconventional character of slogans, they are not listed explicitly among signs likely to constitute a trade mark.

At the European level, the EUIPO has a strict approach to assessing the distinctiveness of slogans, while at the international level, the Madrid system allows such marks to obtain protection in several countries. The system also includes the possibility of registering advertising slogans.

The English courts have tended to take the view that slogans lack distinctive character and the General Courts have agreed. However, the CJ has allowed the registration of slogans on a number of occasions. In these cases, the CJ has reiterated that there are no special requirements for slogans. In Erpo Mobelwerk, for example, it was stated that the case‑law of the Court of Justice that, as far as assessing distinctiveness is concerned, every trade mark, of whatever category, must be capable of identifying the product as originating from a particular undertaking, and thus distinguishing it from those of other undertakings.

The Court of Justice has also held that, although the criteria for assessing distinctiveness are the same for the various categories of marks, it may become apparent, in applying those criteria, that the relevant public’s perception is not necessarily the same for each of those categories and that, therefore, it may prove more difficult to establish distinctiveness for some categories of mark than for others.

For example, the authorities may take account of the fact that average consumers are not in the habit of making assumptions about the origin of products on the basis
of such slogans, particularly it served a promotional
function consisting, for example, of commending the quality of the product in question and that the importance of that function was not manifestly secondary to its purported function as a trade mark.

According to the Board of Appeal in Audi, a combination of words which limits itself to that banal objective message is, in principle, devoid of any inherently distinctive character and cannot therefore be registered unless it is shown that the public has come to perceive it as a trade mark. The mere fact that a mark is perceived by the relevent public as a promotional formula is not sufficient in itself to support the conclusion that the mark is devoid of distinctive character.

However, case law of the CJ demonstrates a reluctance to offer any concrete indications of what will make a slogan inherently registerable.

44
Q

Assessment of the likelihood of confusion

A

(a) the likelihood of confusion must be appreciated globally, taking account of all relevant factors;

(b) the matter must be judged through the eyes of the average consumer of the goods or services in question, who is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably circumspect and observant, but who
rarely has the chance to make direct comparisons between marks and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of them he has kept in his mind, and whose attention varies according to the category of goods or
services in question;

(c) the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details;

(d) the visual, aural and conceptual similarities of the marks must normally be assessed by reference to the overall impressions created by the marks bearing in mind their distinctive and dominant components, but it is only when all other components of a complex mark are
negligible that it is permissible to make the comparison solely on the basis of the dominant elements;

(e) nevertheless, the overall impression conveyed to the public by a composite trade mark may, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components;

(f) and beyond the usual case, where the overall impression created by a mark depends heavily on the dominant features of the mark, it is quite possible that in a particular case an element corresponding to an earlier
trade mark may retain an independent distinctive role in a composite mark, without necessarily constituting a dominant element of that mark;

(g) a lesser degree of similarity between the goods or services may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa;
(h) there is a greater likelihood of confusion where the earlier mark has a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of the use that has been made of it;
(i) mere association, in the strict sense that the later mark brings the earlier mark to mind, is not sufficient;
(j) the reputation of a mark does not give grounds for presuming a likelihood of confusion simply because of a likelihood of association in the strict sense;
(k) if the association between the marks causes the public to wrongly believe that the respective goods [or services] come from the same or economically-linked undertakings, there is a likelihood of confusion.

45
Q

Are shapes registrable as trade marks in the UK? Explain your answer.

A

There is no per se exclusion on the registration of shapes. However, since consumers are less likely to see a shape as indicating the commercial origin of the goods than a word or composite mark, it is necessary to appraise whether the shape ‘significantly departs from the norm or customs of the sector’ in order to avoid a finding of lack of distinctive character.

Since monopoly rights over shapes could potentially have negative impacts on competition and consumer welfare, the shape must not signs consisting exclusively of
a. shapes which result from the nature of the goods
b. shapes which are necessary to obtain a technical result.
c. shape which gives substantial value to the goods
cannot be registered according to section 3(2) TMA 1994.

These provisions are identical to those in Art 3(1)(e) of the current directive. Art 4 of the new (i.e. 2015) directive expands these exclusions to included shapes or any other characteristic.

In Hauck v Stokke, the Court reiterated that the rationale of the grounds for refusal of registration laid down in Article 3(1)(e) of the trade marks directive is to prevent trade mark protection from granting its proprietor a monopoly on technical solutions or functional characteristics of a product which a user is likely to seek in the products of competitors [citing Philips and Lego]

The prohibition on registering shapes which give substantial value to the goods set out in the third indent of that provision is to prevent the exclusive and permanent right which a trade mark confers from
serving to extend indefinitely the life of other rights which the EU legislature has sought to make subject to limited periods [citing Lego].

The ground for refusal of registration set out in the first indent of Article 3(1)(e) of the trade marks directive cannot be applicable where the trade mark application relates to
a shape of goods in which another element, such as a decorative or imaginative element, which is not inherent to the generic function of the goods, plays an important or essential role.

46
Q
  1. Describe the test devised by the CJEU for establishing that a trade mark has acquired a distinctive character.
A

Article 3(3) of the Directive provides that a sign may, through use, acquire a distinctive character which it initially lacked and thus be registered as a trade mark. It is therefore through the use made of it that the sign acquires the distinctive character which is a prerequisite for its registration.

In Windsurfing Chiemsee, the CJ held that a geographical name may be registered as a trade mark if, following the use which has been made of it, it has come to identify the
product in respect of which registration is applied for as originating from a particular undertaking and thus to distinguish that product from goods of other undertakings. Where that is the case, the geographical designation has gained a new significance and its connotation, no longer purely descriptive, justifies its registration as a trade mark.

In determining whether a trade mark has acquired distinctive character following the use which has been made of it, the competent authority must make an overall assessment of the evidence that the mark has come to identify the product concerned as originating from a particular undertaking and thus to distinguish that product from goods of other undertakings;

if the competent authority finds that a significant proportion of the relevant class of persons identify goods as originating from a particular undertaking because of the trade mark, it must hold the requirement for registering the mark to be satisfied;

The circumstances in which that requirement may be regarded as satisfied cannot be shown to exist solely by reference to general, abstract data such as predetermined percentages.

where the competent authority has particular difficulty in assessing the distinctive character of a mark in respect of which registration is applied for, Community law does not preclude it from having recourse, under the conditions laid down by its own national law, to an opinion poll as guidance for its judgment.

47
Q

Compare and contrast the decisions of the CJEU in C-383/99 Procter & Gamble v. Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (the ‘BABY-DRY’ case) and in C – 191/01 OHIM v Wrigley (the ‘DOUBLEMINT’ case).

A

Baby Dry
Appeared to lower the high barrier to registering descriptive marks which had been set in Windsurfing.

Sought to register BABY-DRY as a CTM for nappies without evidence of acquired distinctiveness.

The CJEU concluded that only purely descriptive signs should not be registered. It defined such signs as those which, because they are no different to the usual way of designating goods or services, cannot by definition be distinctive. It followed that in the case of word mars, ‘any perceptible difference between the combination of words submitted for registration and the terms used in the common parlance of the relevant class of consumers is apt to confer distinctive character on the combination.’

In this case, the ‘syntactically unusual juxtaposition is not a familiar expression in the English language”. Thus the combination was not descriptive.

Doublemint
The CJEU followed its earlier approach to descriptive signs set out in Windsurfing.

They indicated that it is not necessary that the signs be in use in a way that is descriptive of the goods or services. It is sufficient that such signs and indications could be used for such purposes. A sign must therefore be refused registration when at least one of its possible meanings designates a characteristic of the goods or services concerned.

The test applied by the Court of First Instance (whether the mark is exclusively descriptive) is incorrect and is not laid down in Art 7(1)(c). The CFI failed to ascertain whether the word at issue was capable of being used by other economic operators to designate a characteristic of their goods or services.

In this instance, the subtraction of the space left the sign as no more than a designation of the characteristic of it being mint flavoured.

48
Q

Describe the effect of a registration obtained under the Madrid Protocol.

A

An application for international registration must be presented to the International Bureau through the Office of origin. Where the international application complies with the applicable requirements, the mark is recorded in the International Register and published in the WIPO Gazette of International Marks.

The International Bureau notifies each Contracting Party in which protection has been requested, whether in the international application or subsequently. From the date of the international registration or subsequent designation, the protection of the mark in each of the designated Contracting Parties is the same as if the mark had been deposited directly with the Office of that Contracting Party. Each designated Contracting Party has the right to refuse protection, within the time limits specified in the Agreement or Protocol. Unless such a refusal is notified to the International Bureau within the applicable time limit, the protection of the mark in each designated Contracting Party is the same as if it had been registered by the Office of that Contracting Party. The time limit for a Contracting Party to notify a refusal is generally one year. Under the Protocol however, a Contracting Party may declare that this period is to be
18 months (or longer, in the case of a refusal based on an opposition).

For a period of five years from the date of its registration, an international registration remains dependent on the mark registered or applied for in the Office of origin. If, and to the extent that, the basic registration ceases to
have effect, whether through cancellation following a decision of the Office of origin or a court, through voluntary cancellation or through non-renewal, within
this five-year period, the international registration will no longer be protected. Similarly, where the international registration was based on an application in the
Office of origin, it will no longer be protected if, and to the extent that, that application is refused or withdrawn within the five-year period, or if, and to the extent that, the registration resulting from that application ceases to have effect within that period. In these cases, the International Bureau, upon request from the Office of origin, cancels the international registration. After the expiry of this
period of five years, the international registration becomes independent of the basic registration or basic application.

An international registration may be maintained in force indefinitely by the payment, every 10 years, of the prescribed fees.

49
Q

Explain the requirement that the use of a sign must be use “in the course of trade” in the UK to infringe a registered trade mark.

A

In Arsenal v Reed, the CJ stated that a sign is used in the course of trade where it is used ‘in the context of commercial activity with a view to economic advantage and not as a private matter’

In L’Oreal v eBay, the court gave guidance on how this would apply to sales on online market places. In general, they stated that such sales do not take place in the context of commercial activity. However, if as a result of their volume and frequency, the sales go beyond the realms of private activity, the seller will be regarded as acting in the course of trade.

50
Q

Explain briefly the ‘imperfect recollection’ aspect of the ‘average consumer’ as applied by the CJEU.

A

Although, the average consumer of the category of products concerned is deemed to be reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, account is taken of the fact that the average consumer only rarely has the chance to make a direct comparison between the different marks and must place trust in the imperfect picture of them that he or she has kept in mind. It should also be borne in mind that the average consumer’s level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question (judgment of 22/06/1999, C-342/97, ‘Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer’,
para. 26).

51
Q

Explain the concept of ‘Acquiescence’ under section 48 of the UK Trade Marks Act 1994.

A

Acquiescence means the failure to take action against infringing parties. The term also indicates, implicitly or explicitly, that nothing will be done about the infringing action. Acquiescence relates to inaction during the performance of an act. Acquiescing can lead to abandonment of trademark rights.

Section 48
Effect of acquiescence.
(1) Where the proprietor of an earlier trade mark or other earlier right has acquiesced for a continuous period of five years in the use of a registered trade mark in the United Kingdom, being aware of that use, there shall cease to be any entitlement on the basis of that earlier trade mark or other right—
(a) to apply for a declaration that the registration of the later trade mark is invalid, or
(b) to oppose the use of the later trade mark in relation to the goods or services in relation to which it has been so used, unless the registration of the later trade mark was applied for in bad faith.
(2) Where subsection (1) applies, the proprietor of the later trade mark is not entitled to oppose the use of the earlier trade mark or, as the case may be, the exploitation of the earlier right, notwithstanding that the earlier trade mark or right may no longer be invoked against his later trade mark.

In a recent Budweiser case, the CJ held that acquiescence, within the meaning of Article 9(1) of … Council Directive 89/104 … is:

  • a concept of European Union law [and isn’t just a matter for national legislation and courts to determine on the basis of their own preferences]; and
  • the proprietor of an earlier trade mark cannot be held to have acquiesced in the long and well-established honest use, of which he has long been aware, by a third party of a later trade mark which is identical with that of the proprietor if that proprietor was not in any position to oppose that use [i.e. no naughty tricks!].

Registration of the earlier trade mark in the Member
3. Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 89/104 must be interpreted as meaning that the proprietor of an earlier trade mark cannot obtain the cancellation of an identical later trade mark designating identical goods where there has been a long period of honest concurrent use of those two trade marks where, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, that use neither has nor is liable to have an adverse effect on the essential function of the trade mark which is to guarantee to consumers the origin of the goods or services”.

52
Q

Describe the test for passing off established in Reckitt & Colman Ltd v Borden Inc [1990] R.P.C. 340, HL (the “Jif Lemon” decision).

A

At the time the conduct the claimant objects to took place, the following elements must be existed.

The Classic trinity

  1. the claimant has goodwill attached to a badge or sign (i.e. the benefit and advantage of a good name, reputation, and connection of a business. It is the force that brings in custom. It is the one thing that distinguishes an old established business from a new business. There must be some causative link. [Muller and Co])
  2. Actionable misrepresentation - the defendant made a misrepresentation that is likely to deceive the public
    “Secondly, he must demonstrate a misrepresentation by the defendant to the public (whether or not intentional) leading or likely to lead the public to believe that goods or services offered by him are the goods or services of
    the plaintiff. Whether the public is aware of the plaintiff’s identity as the manufacturer or supplier of the goods or services is immaterial, as long as they are identified with a particular source which is in fact the plaintiff. For
    example, if the public is accustomed to rely upon a particular brand name in purchasing goods of a particular description, it matters not at all that there is little or no public awareness of the identity of the proprietor of the
    brand name.” (Reckitt)
  3. Misrepresentation must be operative - the misrepresentation damages the goodwill of the claimant.

“It is also a prerequisite that the misrepresentation has deceived or is likely to deceive and that the plaintiff is likely to suffer damage by such deception. Mere confusion which does not lead to a sale is not
sufficient. Thus, if a customer asks for a tin of black shoe polish without specifying any brand and is offered the product of A which he mistakenly believes to be that of B, he may be confused as to what he has got but he has not been deceived into getting it. Misrepresentation has played no part in his purchase.” (Reckitt)

*Consumer sophistication
“The essence of the action for passing off is a deceit practised upon the public and it can be no answer, in a case where it is demonstrable that the public has been or will be deceived, that they would not have been if they
had been more careful, more literate or more perspicacious. Customers have to be taken as they are found.” […] “It has, however, to be asked in every case against the background of the type of market in which the goods are sold, the manner in which they are sold, and the habits and characteristics of purchasers in that market. The law of passing off does not rest solely upon the deceit of those whom it is difficult to deceive.”

N.B. Consumers’ level of sophistication varies according to the type of product involved in a given purchase. Consumers might be less wary when it comes to
goods for everyday consumption. In other instances, such as the case of Elvis Presley trademarks, consumers might even not really care about the commercial
source or the endorsement of the goods sold.

53
Q

Describe briefly the importance of the decision of the CJEU in Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys v Registrar of Trade Marks, Case C-307/10, 19.6.2012, (IP translator).

A

The Nice classification system consists of broad categories good of services with class headings. Previously, if you registered a mark in relation to goods or services specified using the class heading you would be entitled to protection for all the subcategories, even if not specifically included in class heading.

The UK did not agree with this and would only provide protection for the goods or services specified in the class heading.

IP translation is included in class 41, the heading of which is cultural, entertainment and sporting activities. Clearly, most traders looking at the register would not expect IP translation services to be included in this catagory.

Following IP translator, if you put a class heading, you only get what the heading states. If you want anything wider, you must include a more precise description (i.e. copied form the more comprehensive list of classification).

54
Q

Explain briefly how the owner of a foreign mark which is well-known in the U.K. may protect his/her interests in the U.K.

A
  1. Evidence of business activity (i.e. a trading link)
    There is no need to . have a registered business in the UK
    cases: Sheraton hotels obtained an interim injunction against Sheraton Motels as bookings for hotels abroad were frequently made through an office that Sheraton maintained in London and through travel agencies.
  2. No business but customers
    law on this point is less clear
    A. Crazy horse - suggests that for a foreign trader to establish goodwill in the UK, they must show both that they have customers and that they carry on their businees in the UK. In this case, although they claimant distributed leaflets in the England advertising their establishment in Paris, there was no evidence of British customers. It was said that a trader cannot acquire goodwill in the UK without some sort of user in the UK.
    B1. If a foreign business can demonstrate that it has customers in the UK (other than foreign customers that have moved here), it is likely that the court will treat this as sufficient to establish goodwill.
    - not neccessary to establish that a business carries on in the UK in a formal sense, so long as they have customers in the UK
    - e.g. Athletes’s Foot Marketing Association - claimant unable to demonstrate that a single person in the UK had bought their shoes
    B2: Peter Waterman
  3. Mere reputation
    Through spillover advertising, a productv may become known through films, television, or the internet.
    Case law unclear
    Authority likely to be Budweiser, where the UK courts said that when a trader only has a reputation in the UK, they will not have the goodwill necessary to justify a passing off action.

Article 6bis Paris Convention
provides foreign traders who lack good will with a potential remedy
“the proprietor… of a well known mark is entitled to resrain by injunction the use n the UK f a trade mark, or the essential part of which, is identical or similar to his mark, in relation to identical or similar goods or sevrices, where use is likely to cause confusion.

Here, the key limitation is whether or not the mark is well known, not goodwill.
Evidence must point to a high level of recognition.
In General Motors v Yplon, the AG described the protection afforded to well known marks under the Paris Convention as exceptional.

Section 56, which gives effect to Art 6bis, has rarely been relied upon. Cipriani was one of the rare occasions in which the provision was used.

55
Q

Explain the concept of conversion in the context of an EUTM

A

Conversion is the process of turning a European Union trade mark (EUTM) application or registration into one or more national applications. If an EUTM ceases to exist it
can, depending on the precise reason for that, be converted into trade marks that are valid in certain Member States. Conversion is particularly useful for overcoming possible problems with the EUTM’s unitary character. For example, if the EUTM faces a registrability problem in only one or certain countries on absolute grounds or due to an opposition based on an earlier right valid in only one country or certain countries, the EUTM applicant can apply to convert the EUTM into individual, national trade mark applications in the other countries not affected by these grounds.

56
Q

Name the relevant period for non-use in the UK and state one possible defence against revocation

A

Public policy: there is no justification for protecting an earlier mark, unless that mark has actually been used. It is only through use that marks communicate information to consumers and thus operate in a way that merits legal protection.

There are two distinct types of non-use:

Section 46(1)(a)
within a period of 5 years from the date of completion of registration procedure, the mark has not been put to genuine use in the UK, by the proprietor or with his consent, in relation to the goods or services for which it was registered and there are no proper reasons for non-use. 
section 46(1)(b) 
use has been suspended for a period of 5 years and ther is no proper reason for non-use. 

Proper reasons for non-use

a. circumstances arise independently of the will of the proprietor
b. the is a sufficiently direct relationship between the obstacle and the non-use of the mark
c. the obstacle renders use of the mark impossible or unreasonable.

57
Q

3 grounds for invalidating a UK application under Section 47.

A

Registered in breach of one of the absolute or relative grounds for refusal.

Section 47
(2)The registration of a trade mark may be declared invalid on the ground—
(a)that there is an earlier trade mark in relation to which the conditions set out in section 5(1), (2) or (3) obtain, or
(b)that there is an earlier right in relation to which the condition set out in section 5(4) is satisfied,unless the proprietor of that earlier trade mark or other earlier right has consented to the registration.
[F1(2A)But the registration of a trade mark may not be declared invalid on the ground that there is an earlier trade mark unless—
(a)the registration procedure for the earlier trade mark was completed within the period of five years ending with the date of the application for the declaration,
(b)the registration procedure for the earlier trade mark was not completed before that date, or
(c)the use conditions are met.
( 2B )The use conditions are met if—
(a)within the period of five years ending with the date of the application for the declaration the earlier trade mark has been put to genuine use in the United Kingdom by the proprietor or with his consent in relation to the goods or services for which it is registered, or
(b)it has not been so used, but there are proper reasons for non-use.

58
Q

Art 5(2) Trade mark directive and the basis for infringement

A

5(2). Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade any sign which is identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, where the latter has a reputation in the Member State and where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.

59
Q

Under what circumstances will the “own name” defence to trade mark infringement apply to a company’s trading name?

A

Section 11(2)(a) of the 1994 Act provides that a trade mark is not infringed by the use by a person of their own name or address, subject to the proviso that use is in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters.

In Anhauser Busch, the CJ held that, based on the text of the directive, the defence was not confined to personal names. The English courts have since allowed slight variations from the formal registered company name (e.g dropping Ltd) but not more substantial abbreviations. In Cirpriani, the Court of Appeal signalled a more flexible approach, holding that there is no per se rule that a trading name is not a personal name, although substantial variations will not be permitted.

60
Q

Can the UK law of passing off be used to protect fictitious characters from imitation? Explain briefly your answer using case authority by way of illustration.

A
  • Mirage Studios v Counter-Feat Clothing Company [1991] FSR 145 (BrowneWilkinson
    V.C.)

Here, the outcome was dictated by the perception of the public. It seems that the fact that the cartoon characters were copyrighted was crucial in the sense that it
affected the perception of the public.

misrepresentation - The critical evidence in this case is that a substantial number of the buying public now expect and know that where a famous cartoon or television character is reproduced on goods, that reproduction
is the result of a licence granted by the owner of the copyright or owner of other rights in that character.

Damage - loss of licensing revenue
1. lost royalties in the sense that goods which would be or might be manufactured under licence from them will go elsewhere and also the amount of royalties that they can seek to get from those who do take licences from them is likely to be reduced since the market will not be an
exclusive one.”

Damage - reputation
loss of control over the quality of the garments on which reproductions of the Ninja Turtles and related pictures are used. The evidence is (and I think this is uncontroverted) that the value of a name or characters such as these is
linked to maintaining the quality of the goods to which it is attached. If the goods go down-market or are poorly made, that rubs off on the value of the copyright in the character and thereby reduces its value. The loss of
royalties head of damage, though possibly difficult to quantify, is certainly capable of quantification. The loss of reputation through bad quality products is more difficult. Certainly, I have been shown products which do not indicate that the Turtle characters licensed by the defendants are always being applied to very high class products. It is difficult to know how one would set about at the trial quantifying that.”
61
Q

Describe briefly the significance of the CJEU ruling in Google France v Louis Vuitton Malletier (Case C-237/0, 2010).

A

It was established at trial that (i) entering Louis Vuitton’s trade marks into Google’s search engine triggered the display of advertisements for sites offering counterfeit versions of that company’s products and that (ii) Google offered advertisers the possibility of selecting, to that end, not only keywords which corresponded to Louis Vuitton’s trade marks but also those keywords in combination with expressions denoting counterfeit such as ‘imitation’, ‘replica’ and ‘copy’. These facts led to Google being held liable trade mark infringement, a decision which was upheld on appeal.

An internet referencing service provider which stores, as a keyword, a sign identical with a trade mark and organises the display of advertisements on the basis of that keyword does not use that sign.

The CJ explained that use ‘implies at the very least, that that third party uses the sign in its own commercial communication.

62
Q

With reference to case law, explain the circumstances in which advertisements that make use of a competitor’s mark for the purpose of comparing the characteristics and prices of products, may be in breach of Article 3a(1) of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive (84/450 as amended).

A

The Directive on Misleading and Comparative Advertising (MCAD)

In princple, the directive required member stated to permit comparative advertising, but only if the advertising satisfies the eight conditions specified in Art 4.

  1. not misleading
  2. compared goods or services meeting the same needs or intended for the same purpose
  3. objectively compares one or more, material, relevant, verifiable, and representative feature (including price)
  4. does not discredit or denigrate the trade marks, trade names, other distinguishing marks, good, services, activities, or circumstances of a competitor.
  5. for products with designation or origin, it relates in each case to products with the same designation
  6. it doesn’t take unfair advantage of the reputation of a trademark, trade name, or other distinguishing mark of a competitor.
  7. does not present goods or services as immitations or replicas.
    does not create confusion among traders.
63
Q

Briefly explain the restrictions on signs of which a trade mark may consist as provided in the Trade Marks Directive 2015.

A

Main changes:

  1. Modernised TM definition through abandonment of graphic representability requirement (Art 3)
    - need for all types of trade marks to comply with Sieckmann criteria
    - signs must be representable on register in a manner enabling competent authorities/public to determine clear & precise subject matter of protection
  2. Codification of common rules for the designation & classification of goods/services (Art 39)
    - Follow principles established by CJEU in C-307/10 IP Translator;
    - “Means what it says approach”: no longer coverage of all possible goods/services falling into a certain class but only inclusion of those clearly covered by the literal meaning of the class heading/general term.
  3. New absolute and relative grounds of refusal on geographical indications in line with EUTMR, complemented by (only!) AGs on traditional terms for wine & specialities guaranteed.
  4. Reinforced protection for TMs with reputation in a Member State
64
Q

Following Specsavers International Healthcare Ltd v ASDA Stores Ltd [2014] EWCA, briefly explain the circumstances under which extensive use of a composite logo with words might constitute genuine use of a wordless registered trademark.

A

In Specsavers, the court held that a registered trade mark comprising two back intersecting ovals was used, even though the only use was of the mark with the words SPECSAVERS superimposed.

Even though the word mark is in itself distinctive, both marks were regarded as retaining their distinctive character to consumers who view the combination as the use of two individual marks.

65
Q

Explain briefly the significance of the decision of the CJEU in ONEL (Leno Merken BV v Hagelkruis Beheer BV Case C-149/11, 2012) with respect to ‘genuine use in the Community’ (CTMR Art. 15).

A

CJ rejected the one state solution - the view that use in one state is necessarily sufficient.

Hagelkruis applied to the Benelux trade mark office to register OMEL for advertising and marketing services.

Application was opposed by LENO Merken on the basis of a Community trade mark registration for ONEL for services in the same category.

It was accepted that there was a likelihood of confusion, but the opponent had only demonstrated use in the Netherlands.

Thus the question arose as to whether this was sufficient use to maintain the community trade mark.