Torts 2 - Illustrations Flashcards
Pleasant Valley Insurance Company provides worker’s compensation insurance to Green Acres Rest Home. Pleasant Valley periodically inspects Green Acres to identify risks to Green Acres’ employees. During an inspection, Pleasant Valley’s employee neglects to inspect Green Acres’ heating system and, therefore, fails to identify a faulty valve that emitted carbon monoxide. Later, Colleen, a Green Acre employee, is overcome by leaking carbon monoxide
Because Pleasant Valley’s conduct did not create a risk of harm to Colleen, whether Pleasant Valley has a duty of care to Colleen is governed by the provisions of § 37, not § 7.
Pleasant Valley Insurance Company provides worker’s compensation insurance to Green Acres Rest Home. Pleasant Valley periodically inspects Green Acres to identify risks to Green Acres’ employees. During an inspection, Pleasant Valley’s employee removes and inspects a valve in Green Acres’ heating system. The employee neglects to replace the valve, which permits carbon monoxide to leak from the heating system. Colleen is overcome by the leaking gas.
Because the conduct of Pleasant Valley’s employee created a risk of harm, whether Pleasant Valley had a duty of care to Colleen is governed by § 7, not by § 37, even though the specific claim of negligence is that Pleasant Valley’s employee omitted to replace the valve.
Steven rents an apartment from Garber Realty. After he moves in, the lock on the rear door of the apartment breaks, and despite several requests from Steven, Gerber does not repair the lock. One night when Steven is away, a burglar enters Steven’s apartment through the rear door and steals a substantial amount of Steven’s personal property. Steven sues Gerber for the value of the stolen property, asserting negligence in failing to keep the apartment locks operational. A municipal ordinance requires landlords to provide and maintain locks on all rental properties but states nothing about any private rights that might exist for violations of the ordinance.
A court in a jurisdiction that has not previously recognized a common-law duty of landlords to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its tenants should take the ordinance into account in determining whether Garber has a common-law duty of reasonable care to maintain locks on its apartments.
A statute requires all public schools to test all students for scoliosis, an abnormal curvature of the spine. The Spartan school district neglects to comply with this requirement, and the diagnosis of scoliosis in Elizabeth, a student in the Spartan school district is delayed. Elizabeth sues Spartan for her enhanced harm due to the delayed diagnosis, and Spartan responds that it owed Elizabeth no duty. The statute does not explicitly provide a private right of action for persons who suffer from violations of the statute nor is there any indication that the legislature thought such a claim under the statute should exists. A provision in the statute providing for administrative enforcement makes plain that the legislature sought to minimize the expense incurred by school districts, including school districts that did not comply with their statutory obligations.
Based on this analysis, the court decides that no implied right of action exists under the statute. The legislature’s concern about preserving school districts’ financial resources counsels against the court finding that Spartan had an affirmative duty to Elizabeth with regard to scoliosis testing.
Randall, while on a bridge spanning a river, decides to jump from the bridge into the water, an action barred by no law. Randall carefully canvasses the area below before jumping but does not realize that Cheri is treading water directly under the bridge. As Randall jumps, Cheri swims out from under the bridge. Randall lands on top of Cheri, knocking her unconscious
While not subject to liability for her initial injuries, Randall has a duty of reasonable care to Cheri to mitigate the extent of the harm she suffers.
Vince, while motoring on an isolated mountain road, nonnegligently drives into Jane, who was hiking on the side of the road. Jane is injured but remains lucid. Jane, who does not have a cell phone, asks Vince to use his cell phone to call for aid. Vince refuses and drives off
Vince owes a duty to Jane to use reasonable care to mitigate further harm and is subject to liability for any enhanced harm suffered by Jane due to delay caused by Vince’s negligent failure to use his cell phone to summon assistance for Jane.
Caryn and David purchase a new natural-gas furnace for their home. They hire Jillian to install the furnace, and she does so. She does not follow the manufacturer’s minimum requirements for venting the furnace, and as a results, both Caryn and David suffer carbon-monoxide poisoning. Danielle, their friend, finds them unconscious in their home due to the carbon-monoxide poisoning. Danielle drags them to another room but does not call for help. Cary and David suffer harm that could have been avoided if Danielle had summoned help
Whether Danielle is subject to a duty to Caryn and David for harm that could have been avoided is governed by this Section, not § 7, because Danielle’s conduct did not itself create the risk that caused the harm.
Caryn and David purchase a new natural-gas furnace for their home. They hire Jillian to install the furnace, and she does so. She does not follow the manufacturer’s minimum requirements for venting the furnace, and as a results, both Caryn and David suffer carbon-monoxide poisoning. Danielle, their friend, finds them unconscious in their home due to the carbon-monoxide poisoning. Danielle drags them to another room but does not call for help. Cary and David suffer harm that could have been avoided if Danielle had summoned help
Jillian owes a duty of reasonable care as provided in § 7 to Caryn and David for the harm due to carbon-monoxide poisoning, without reference to this Section, because Jillian’s conduct in installing the furnace created the risk that caused harm to Caryn and David.
Ahmed’s neighbor, Meena, agrees to make daily visits to Ahmed’s house to care for Ahmed’s cat and dog while he is out of town. Meena forgets to do so
Meena owes a duty of reasonable care to Ahmed because he relied on Meena to attend to his pets. Meena is subject to liability for harm caused by her negligent failure to visit Ahmed’s home and attend to his pets.
Lindsay hires Margaret to fix a leaking plumbing fixture in a second floor apartment. Margaret repairs the leak in a nonnegligent manner. After completing the repairs. Margaret realizes that water that had leaked earlier from the fixture then had run from the apartment onto an adjacent alley. When returning home that evening, Lindsay slips and falls on ice that formed in the alley from the runoff. Lindsay sues Margaret, claiming that she had a duty of reasonable care with regard to the water that leaked out of the fixture
The risks posed by the water that had previously escaped from the fixture are beyond the scope of Margaret’s undertaking to repair the fixture as a matter of law, and Margaret is not subject to liability for Lindsay’s harm.
The River City School District provides school crossing guards at the three most dangerous intersections for each school in the district. While walking to school and crossing one of those intersections, Alphonso, a seven-year-old boy, is hit by an automobile and injured because no crossing guard is present. Alphonso’s guardian sues the School District, claiming that its negligence caused Alphonso’s harm.
The duty of the School District encompasses reasonable care at the intersection at which Alphonso was injured, as a matter of law, and the School District is subject to liability for Alphonso’s harm.
Rick, while piloting a small plane with his spouse, Steve, as a passenger, detects smoke in the cockpit. Rick radios the Pleasant Flying service located at one of several nearby airports to determine if firefighting equipment is available. Upon being told that it is, Rick informs Pleasant that he is going to land at the airport because of a suspected fire and will need emergency firefighting equipment. Sheila, an employee of Pleasant, promises to provide such equipment and proceeds to retrieve the airport fire truck and move it to the runway. In her haste, Sheila negligently fails to unlock the garage door before actuating the motor for the door opener, jamming the door and preventing her from moving the truck out of the garage and onto the runway. After Rick lands, a fire breaks out that burns Steve.
Pleasant owes a duty of reasonable care to Steve based on its undertaking to provide firefighting equipment and on Rick’s reliance on Pleasant’s undertaking.
Phillips’ Ribs, a restaurant, hires Lyndsey an independent contractor, to keep its sidewalks clear of ice and snow. After a particularly bad storm, Lyndsey fails to clear the restaurant’s sidewalks. Luther, a customer of Phillip’s, falls on the sidewalk and suffers injury.
Lyndsey has a duty of reasonable care to Luther because Lyndsey undertook a duty owed by Phillip’s to Luther.
While eating lunch alone at the Walkalong restaurant, Joe suddenly suffers a severe asthma attack. Several waiters at the restaurant recognize that Joe is suffering an asthma attack. All of them ignore Joe, and another 10 minutes pass before another patron observes Joe and summons medical care. The delay results in Joe suffering more serious injury than if he had received medical attention promptly after the waiters observed his plight
The Walkalong restaurant is subject to liability to Joe for his enhanced injury due to the delay in his receiving medical care.
Joe suffers an asthma attack after finishing his meal at Walkalong and departing. Rich, a waiter at Walkalong, sees Joe through a window and appreciates that he is suffering an asthma attack but does nothing, thereby delaying appropriate medical care for Joe.
Walkalong is not subject to liability for any enhanced injury to Joe due to the delay in his receiving medical care because Joe’s asthma attack occurred outside the scope of the relationship he had with Walkalong.
Welch Repair Service knows that its employee Don had several episodes of assault in his previous employment. Don goes to Traci’s residence, where he had previously been dispatched by Welch to perform repairs, and misrepresents to Traci that he is there on Welch business to check those repairs. After Traci admits Don to her home, he assaults her
Welch is subject to a duty under this Subsection with regard to Don’s assault on Traci.
Steve, a 14-year-old having adolescent adjustment difficulties, is referred to Dr. Cress, a psychologist. Dr. Cress treats Steve for several months, concluding that Steve suffers from mild depression and deficits in peer social skills. Steve occasionally expresses generalized anger at his circumstances in life but never blames others or gives any other indication that he might act violently, and Dr. Cress has no reason to think that Steve poses a risk of harm to others. Steve hacks his parents to death with a scythe.
Dr. Cress had no duty to Steve’s parents and is not subject to liability to the administrators of their estates.
Dr. Strand, a clinical psychologist, becomes aware, during the course of counseling, that a patient, Lester, is sexually abusing his eight-year-old stepdaughter, Kelly. Dr. Strand does not communicate this information to Kelly’s mother or to appropriate officials of the state Department of Social Services, or take any other steps to prevent Lester from continuing his sexual assaults on Kelly.
Dr. Strand owes a duty of reasonable care to Kelly and is subject to liability for the harm due to Lester’s continuing abuse of her.
Kyle is a guest in Meeren’s home and, after some prompting by other guests, agrees to demonstrate magic tricks. While demonstrating a trick involving an open flame, he ignites the clothing of Sarah, another guest, burning her
Kyle owes Sarah a duty of reasonable care pursuant to § 7; this Chapter is inapplicable to the duty owed by Kyle, because he is not in possession of the premises (Premises Liability).
Ed and Margaret carpool together to work. Unable to find a place on the street to park, Margaret pulled into a parking lot owned by the Viner Hospital that is restricted to hospital visitors. After parking, Ed decides to go into the hospital to visit his brother, while Margaret, who has no business at the hospital, walks toward her office in a nearby building. Both Ed and Margaret slip and fall on an accumulation of ice while walking across the sloping parking lot
Under applicable law, Margaret is a trespasser while Ed, having decided to visit his brother, is an invitee. Viner Hospital owes both Ed and Margaret a duty of reasonable care for the condition of the parking lot. Under the circumstances provided in this Illustration, determination as to whether the duty was breached is for the factfinder.
Marc owns a home and stores anhydrous ammonia in a garden shed on the property. Anhydrous ammonia, which can cause severe chemical burns if handled improperly, is used as a fertilizer. It is also used as an ingredient in methamphetamine, an illegal drug. Betty, a police officer investigating a report of a strong chemical smell in the neighborhood, obtains Marc’s permission to search the premises. During the search, Betty enters the shed and examines a container. Its lid pops off, and the contents, under pressure, spray onto her and burn her.
Marc, who is aware of the possibility of the sudden and unintended escape of the chemical, is subject to liability for failing to warn Betty that anhydrous ammonia was kept under pressure in the shed.
Marc owns a home and stores anhydrous ammonia in a garden shed on the property. Anhydrous ammonia, which can cause severe chemical burns if handled improperly, is used as a fertilizer. It is also used as an ingredient in methamphetamine, an illegal drug. Betty is a police officer investigating a report of a strong chemical smell in the neighborhood. Marc is not present when Betty comes to investigate. Upon realizing that no one is home, Betty searches the land and the shed, which is unlocked, and she is injured in the same fashion (Container’s lid pops off, and the contents, under pressure, spray onto her and burn her)
Marc is not subject to liability for failing to warn Betty. Marc, however, may be subject to liability to Betty for failing to take precautions to more securely store the chemicals in the shed.
Virginia and her daughter, Jeanne, a two-year-old, temporarily reside with a friend, Euclid, and her young daughter, because Virginia lost her job and can no longer afford her apartment’s rent. Euclid’s lease specifies that she cannot have anyone but herself and related family residing in her apartment, making Virginia and Jeanne trespassers. The balcony of Euclid’s apartment is missing several of the vertical posts required to make the railing safe. Hoover, Euclid’s lessor, has been notified of the condition, but has failed over a two-month time period to repair the railing.
Hoover is subject to liability for the physical harm Jeanne suffers when she falls through the opening in the railing.
On a dark night, John goes for a walk in a city park that winds along the coastline on a bluff above the water. While walking on a path adjacent to a stone wall marking the edge of the bluff, the ground gives way, and John falls to the bottom of the bluff, suffering physical harm. A city ordinance prohibits entry into the park from dusk until dawn, allowing entry only during daylight, but no physical barrier prevents entry during that time
John is an ordinary trespasser in the park, and the city owes him a duty of reasonable care.
Herman engages in a late-night burglary of the Jacob liquor store after it has closed. While leaving the store after taking cash from the store’s register, Herman slips on a slick spot on the floor, falls, and breaks his arm
Herman is a flagrant trespasser, and Jacob’s duties to Herman are provided by this Section.
§ 52 – Duty of Land Possessors to Flagrant Trespassers:
(a) The only duty a land possessor owes to flagrant trespassers is the duty not to act in an intentional, willful, or wanton manner to cause physical harm.
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (a), a land possessor has a duty to flagrant trespassers to exercise reasonable care if the trespasser reasonably appears to be imperiled and
(1) Helpless; or
(2) Unable to protect him- or herself.
Late one night, Rick climbs over a low decorative fence surrounding Rachel’s Bed and Breakfast. He lies in wait until a guest returns and then assaults the guest and snatches her purse. While escaping from the property, Rick is injured by an uninsulated electrical wire providing high-intensity lighting on the grounds
Rick’s criminal assault of a customer of Rachel’s on the premises is important (and sufficient) to support the determination that he is a flagrant trespasser.
Rick assaults Sasha on a public street and snatches her purse. After running several blocks and making his escape, he stops at a local bar for a drink. On his way home, he climbs over a low decorative fence at Rachel’s Bed and Breakfast and is injured by the uninsulated electrical wire providing high-intensity lighting on the grounds
Rick’s commission of a crime is not relevant to the determination of whether his trespass on Rachel’s land is flagrant.
Garnett, Inc., owns a large tract of unimproved land and takes significant measures to keep trespassers away. Nevertheless, Willy and friends drive on the land at night to go mudding – an activity that involves driving off-road in soft, wet ground. Willy drives up a steep embankment and the car falls and strikes a tree. Willy is trapped in his car and bleeding profusely. A security guard employed by Garnett finds Willy in his car, ignores his plight, and leaves the scene to take a coffee break. Willy dies.
Garnett is subject to liability for any enhanced harm Willy suffered that could have been prevented by the security guard taking reasonable measures on behalf of Willy, such as calling 911 or providing immediate first aid.
Kaidan, who owns an apartment building, negligently repairs the screen door on one of the apartments; consequently, the door-closing apparatus that prevents the door from slamming shut sometimes malfunctions. Kaidan knows of this problem but decides not to fix it. Kaidan rents the apartment to Ramona without telling her of the door’s condition. Soon after, she is injured when the door slams shut behind her, its kickplate cutting her heel and severing her Achilles tendon
Kaidan is subject to liability under both Subsections (b) and (c).
Except as provided in § 52, a lessor owes to the lessee and all other entrants on the leased premises the following duties:
(a) A duty of reasonable care under § 51 for those portions of the leased premises over which the lessor retains control;
(b) A duty of reasonable under § 7 for any risks that are created by the lessor in the condition of the leased premises;
(c) A duty to disclose to the lessee any dangerous condition that satisfies all of the following:
(1) It poses a risk to entrants on the leased premises;
(2) It exists on the leased premises when the lessee takes possession;
(3) It is latent and unknown to the lessee; and
(4) It is known or should be known to the lessor;
Sharon, driving a car, approaches Dan’s car, and properly steps on the brakes. For reasons unrelated to any negligence on Sharon’s part, the brakes fail to function. Sharon’s car continues forward. In this emergency, Sharon chooses to step on the brakes again, and they fail again, causing Sharon’s car to strike Dan’s car, injuring Dan.
A claim assessment of the choices facing Sharon indicates that all things considered, a better choice would have been for her to turn the car quickly to the right. Still, the jury can conclude that, in light of the emergency circumstances, Sharon behaved as a reasonably careful person
Sharon, driving a car, approaches Dan’s car, and properly steps on the brakes. The brakes fail to function. The failure of the brakes is due to Sharon’s negligence in inadequately maintaining the brakes. Sharon’s car continues forward. In this emergency, Sharon chooses to step on the brakes again, and they fail again, causing Sharon’s car to strike Dan’s car, injuring Dan
This negligence renders Sharon liable for the harm Dan suffers in the eventual collision, regardless of how a jury evaluates Sharon’s decision to reapply the brake
Clyde was a guest at the Hilgard Hotel. At nine in the evening, there was a power outage that deprived the hotel of electricity. In his dark room, Clyde fell and injured himself. There was no form of emergency lighting within the hotel room, although flashlights were available at the hotel front desk. At trial, Clyde identified an inexpensive battery-powered lighting fixture that a hotel could install in guest rooms. Had Clyde’s room had such a fixture, he would have avoided injury. However, expert testimony makes clear that no hotels provide in-room emergency lighting of this sort.
This evidence of Hilgard’s compliance with hotel custom is some evidence of its nonnegligence; yet if there is adequate evidence that emergency lighting in hotel rooms is a reasonable precaution with respect to the risk of guests injuring themselves during a power outage, Clyde’s claim of negligence can be considered by the jury.
Carl is a guest in the Finney Hotel. The bathroom in the hotel includes a shower, protected by a sliding door made of ordinary glass. Carl trips while taking a shower and falls on the door. Its glass shatters and lacerates Carl. It is a standard practice among hotels to use shatter-proof tempered safety glass rather than ordinary glass at hazardous locations, such as shower enclosures
Finney’s departure from this custom is some evidence of its negligence.
A state statute requires that the operator of a truck that becomes disabled on a highway promptly put out a warning sign at least 100 feet behind the truck. When a deflated tire disables Carl’s truck, he places a warning sign right next to the truck. Ann, approaching Carl’s truck from behind, does not see Carl’s warning sign until it is too late for her to stop. Her car strikes the rear of Carl’s truck, and she is injured in the collision. Ann would have been able to stop in time had the warning sign been set at the 100-foot distance
In the suit brought by Ann against Carl, Carl’s violation of the statute is negligence per se; the basic purpose of the statute is to prevent accidents of this type. In the absence of the statute, Carl’s failure to place a warning sign at least 100 feet away from the truck would merely raise a jury question as to Carl’s possible negligence.
A state administrative regulation requires railroad trains to avoid blocking highway crossings for more than 10 minutes. The Pacific Railway allows one of its trains to remain in a highway crossing for 30 minutes. Fifteen minutes into this 30-minute period, Arthur, driving on the highway, fails to notice the train until it is too late, and collides with it, suffering an injury. Arthur concedes that his absent-minded negligence should reduce his recovery under comparative negligence, but claims that Pacific is negligent per se for violating the regulation.
However, a review of the history of the regulation and of the agency’s findings that accompany the regulation shows that its only purpose is to encourage the free flow of traffic and prevent traffic delays. Because the prevention of personal injuries is not part of this purpose, Pacific is not negligent per se.
A state statute requires that all slow moving vehicles drive as far to the right on the highway as possible. One of this statute’s major purposes is to minimize the safety hazards posed by vehicles whose slow speed can interfere with the flow of highway traffic. Ellen is driving slowly on a highway heading north, yet is violating the statute by driving in the fast lane on the left. Bob is a passenger in Ellen’s car. A car coming south on the highway for some reason crosses the highway’s median line and strikes Ellen’s car, injuring Bob. Had Ellen been in the lane on the far right, her car would have avoided contact with the other car. Bob sues Ellen, and seeks to show her negligence by establishing her violation of the statute.
The purpose of the statute is to protect highway safety. However, the statute is designed to prevent accidents between cars moving in the same direction caused by one car’s slow speed, not to prevent accidents between cars moving in opposite directions. Accordingly, Ellen’s violation of the statute is not negligence per se.
A state statute fixes a speed limit of 55 miles per hour for a state highway. Linda is driving her car on that highway at a speed of 50 miles per hour. A teenager, Dave, unexpectedly darts from the sidewalk onto the highway. Despite a proper lookout, Linda is unable to stop in time, and strikes Dave, injuring him. Had Linda been driving at 40 miles per hour, she would have been able to avoid hitting Dave. In his lawsuit, Dave alleges that Linda was negligent in driving at a speed faster than 40 miles per hour. At the time the weather had been fine, the road and traffic conditions had been entirely ordinary, and no other circumstances suggested any special danger.
A court would be justified in ruling as a matter of law that Linda was not negligent in the speed at which she operated her car.
To deal with a problem of bleeding ulcers, Ronald agrees to surgery. Complications ensue in the course of surgery, which extends its duration from two hours to four hours. After surgery, Ronald ends up with only limited motion in his right arm. Ronald suspects negligence on the part of Dr. Jones, the anesthesiologist, but has no specific evidence of this. In his suit against Dr. Jones, Ronald seeks to rely on res ipsa loquitur in order to prove Dr. Jones’s negligence. Without expert testimony, Ronald’s res ipsa loquitur claim against Dr. Jones fails; jurors lack general knowledge as to the possible causes of palsy in the arm after an extended anesthetic of this sort
However, if Dr. Smith, an expert, testifies that such instances of palsy are usually the result of negligence of the anesthesiologist, Ronald’s res ipsa loquitur claim can be considered by the jury. Dr. Jones is of course free to cross-examine Dr. Smith, or to present his own expert to challenge Dr. Smith’s testimony.
Bruce parks his car at the top of a driveway, which is on an incline. Two minutes later, the car rolls down the incline and injures Janice, on the sidewalk. In suing Bruce, Janice seeks to rely on res ipsa loquitur in order to prove Bruce’s negligence.
Admittedly, mechanical failure or third-party tampering are at least possible explanations for why the car rolled. Still, the jury’s general knowledge can affirm that driver negligence is the usual cause when cars roll so quickly after being parked. Accordingly, the jury may infer that Bruce was negligent.
Paul, while moving his household goods, throws a heavy parcel out of his window onto the street, intending it to fall into a waiting cart. In doing so, he calls out, “Look out below.” He misses his target, and the parcel strikes Andrea, a pedestrian, who does not hear the warning because her attention is directed to other matters.
Despite his warning, Paul can be found negligent for dropping the parcel
Judy loans her car for the evening to her friend, Grant, who needs the car for social purposes. Judy knows that Grant’s driver’s license was suspended a moth previously on account of repeated instances of reckless driving. In the course of the evening, Grant drives the car negligently, and injures Eugene, a pedestrian
A jury can find that Judy was negligent in loaning or entrusting her car to Grant.
The Nelson Company hires Tom to serve as a janitor in its apartment building. Nelson knows that Tom has a record of inappropriate sexually aggressive conduct toward women. In his role as a janitor, Tom has frequent interactions with Carol, one of the building’s tenants. One evening, after his workday is over, Tom knocks on Carol’s door. Regarding Tom’s presence as an ordinary occurrence, Carol lets him in. Once in her apartment, Tom rapes Carol
A jury can find that Nelson was negligent in hiring Tom for a job in which Tom would have access to female tenants within their apartments.
Late one night, Richard places his loaded pistol on the coffee table in the family room of his home. The next afternoon, Richard’s 10-year-old son, Norm, is spending time in the family room with his friend, Judy. Norm picks up the gun and plays with it; it accidentally discharges and injures Judy
A jury can find that Richard was negligent in providing Norm access to the gun in circumstances in which Norm might use it improperly.
Ajax, a car rental agency, rents a car to Ron. Ajax has property inspected the car to make sure it is in sound operating condition. The car turns out to have a bomb in it at the time of rental; an hour later, the bomb explodes, injuring Ron
While obviously someone deliberately placed the bomb in the car, the circumstances for this remain unclear. Ajax would have discovered the bomb had Ajax conducted an inspection of the car specifically searching for explosive devices before renting the car to Ron. No one knows of any prior incidents in which rental cars have been criminally tampered with in this way. Ajax is not negligent in failing to search the car for explosive devices before renting it.
A negligently runs out of gasoline on the highway. B sees A’s automobile but negligently fails to avoid hitting it with his own automobile, injuring A
A is not forgiven his own negligence under the last-clear-chance rule. In assigning percentages of responsibility, the factfinder may take into account that B knew of A’s peril and was subsequently negligent.
A negligently runs out of gasoline on the highway. B sees A’s automobile but recklessly fails to avoid hitting it with his own automobile, injuring A
A is not forgiven his own negligence under the last-clear-chance rule. In assigning percentages of responsibility, the factfinder may take into account the fact that B knew of A’s peril and subsequently acted recklessly.
A negligently fails to wear a seat belt. B drives an automobile negligently, causing it to crash into A’s automobile. A is thrown through the windshield and severely injured.
Unless there is a statute precluding consideration of seat-belt use, A’s conduct in failing to wear a seat belt is relevant in determining whether A was negligent and, if so, in assigning percentages of responsibility for the portion of the plaintiff’s injuries caused by the failure to wear the seat belt.
A negligently breaks B’s leg. B negligently (or deliberately) fails to follow his doctor’s orders about taking anti-inflammatory medication. This failure causes B’s leg to heal more slowly, which in turn causes B to miss two extra weeks of work
B’s failure to take his medicine affects his percentage of responsibility for and thereby reduces his recovery of damages caused by the two-week delay. It does not, however, bar him entirely from recovering those damages or cause them to be excluded from the damage finding.
A negligently breaks B’s leg. B negligently goes skiing on the broken leg one week after it is set. This reinjures B’s leg, delaying B’s return to work by two weeks
B’s conduct in skiing on the broken leg affects his percentage of responsibility for the damages related to the two-week delay. Damages caused by B’s decision to ski on the broken leg are not, however, excluded in their entirety from B’s damages. A factfinder may find that B’s decision to ski on a broken leg was unforeseeable and beyond the scope of the risk created by A’s negligence.
A attends a baseball game at B’s ballpark. A sits in a portion of the stands beyond the point where the screen prevents balls from entering the seats. A is aware that balls occasionally are hit into the stands
The fact that A knew balls are occasionally hit into the stands does not constitute assumption of risk. The fact that A knew balls occasionally are hit into the stands is relevant in evaluating whether A acted reasonably by engaging in particular types of conduct while sitting in the stands (sitting in the stands would not itself constitute unreasonable conduct). If the factfinder concludes that A did not act reasonably under the circumstances, A’s knowledge of the risk is relevant to the percentage of responsibility the factfinder assigns to A. If B could reasonably assume that A and other fans are aware that balls are occasionally hit into the stands, this fact is also relevant to whether B acted reasonably in relying on A to watch out for balls instead of constructing a screen or providing warnings.
A trespasses on B’s land without B’s knowledge and damages B’s flowers. In a suit by B against A, A argues that B failed to use reasonable care because he did not protect his flowers
B’s recovery against A is not diminished by B’s conduct if the substantive rule of law does not require B to exercise reasonable care to protect an undiscovered trespasser from a condition on the land.
A injures B in an automobile accident. B requires medical treatment but refuses a blood transfusion on religious grounds
Whether B must exercise reasonable care with respect to permitting the transfusion and whether B’s refusal is outside the scope of the risk created by A’s negligence are determined by the applicable substantive law, not by the rule stated in this Section
§ 3 – Ameliorative Doctrines for Defining Plaintiff’s Negligence Abolished:
Plaintiff’s negligence is defined by the applicable standard for a defendant’s negligence. Special ameliorative doctrines for defining plaintiff’s negligence are abolished
A, who is driving an automobile, hits B, who is a pedestrian, in a parking lot. B sues A for negligently failing to keep a lookout and for speeding. A claims that B’s damages should be reduced because B failed to use reasonable care in watching for automobiles
B has the burden to prove that A failed to use reasonable care and that this failure was a legal cause of B’s damages. A has the burden to prove that B failed to use reasonable care and that this failure was a legal cause of B’s damages. If A and B meet their burdens of proof on these issues, they do not have any further burden to produce particular evidence about the precise percentage of responsibility the factfinder should assign to A.
A, who is driving while intoxicated, is stopped at a red light. B negligently fails to stop and hits A’s car in a rear-end collision. A sues B for personal injuries suffered in the collision.
A’s own negligence of being intoxicated does not affect A’s recovery, because it did not cause A’s injuries.
A sues B. The factfinder assigns 40 percent responsibility to A and 60 percent responsibility to B. The factfinder finds that A’s damages are $100,000
A’s recovery is reduced from $100,000 to $60,000, which constitute the plaintiff’s “recoverable damages.”
A negligently injures himself in an automobile accident. A seeks medical treatment from B, who negligently aggravates A’s injury.
In a suit in which A seeks to recover from B for the art of A’s injuries caused by B’s medical malpractice, the factfinder does not consider A’s negligence in causing the accident. A’s negligence produced the very condition B undertook to treat
A seeks medical treatment from B. B aggravates A’s condition because B negligently fails to properly diagnose A’s problem. B’s failure to diagnose A’s condition was due in part to A’s negligent failure to provide accurate answers to B’s questions.
In a suit in which A seeks to recover from B the part of A’s injuries caused by B’s negligence, the factfinder does consider A’s negligence in failing to accurately answer B’s questions. That conduct was not a cause of the condition B undertook to treat