Tort Cases Flashcards
1
Q
Vosburg v. Putney
A
Eggshell Skull Rule
2
Q
Garratt v. Dailey
A
Child removing P’s chair. “Substantial certainty” on intent
3
Q
Shaw v. Brown & Williamson
A
Second hand smoke. Not aimed at particular victim or small class of victim within localized area
4
Q
Wagner v. State
A
Mentally disabled pushing someone at supermarket. Single intent is enough (depend on jurisdiction).
5
Q
Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel
A
Black Mathematician and plate case. Contact with an object closely identified with body is enough.
6
Q
I. de S. and Wife v. W. de S.
A
Husband throws hatchet. Apprehension is enough for assault.
7
Q
Speicher v. Rajtora
A
Two miles too far for imminent threat
8
Q
Whittaker v. Sandford
A
The boat is the key. Ocean is confinement
9
Q
Barrett v. Watkins
A
Plaintiff did not reasonably know there is a way out of the wooded area. Confinement is complete
10
Q
Zavala v. Walmart
A
Locked in supermarket. Emergency exit is reasonable means to escape even though the workers don’t know English.
11
Q
GTE Southwest
A
IIED in employment. Continuous actions. Profanity, charging, shouting, humiliating
12
Q
Jones v. Clinton
A
Single unwelcomed sexual advance not enough for IIED.
13
Q
Morgan v. Anthony
A
IIED found when D followed P and made sexual comments and did not let P close door.
14
Q
Dougherty v. Stepp
A
Intent to move is enough for trespass, even though there’s a mistake about who owns it.
15
Q
Mohr v. Williams
A
Consent to have surgery for one ear is not enough for the other year. Hypothetical “would have” consented is not enough since it’s not emergency.
16
Q
Courvoisier
A
Store owner shoots police. Reasonably believe others about to inflict death or serious bodily harm
17
Q
Katco v. Briney
A
Spring gun in home. Liable to thief.
18
Q
Ploof v. Putnam
A
Private necessity. Owner of dock must allow usage (no trespass).
19
Q
Vincent v. Lake Erie
A
Private necessity but still need to pay damage for the destroyed dock.
20
Q
Brown v. Kendall
A
Dog fight case. Not liable if using reasonable care
21
Q
Vaughan v. Menlove
A
Hay catching fire case. Subpar intelligence is not considered
22
Q
Smith v. Sneller
A
Blind person no cane falls into trench. Blind person requires higher precaution. The conduct of an actor with a physical disability is negligent only if the conduct does not conform to that of a reasonably careful person with the same disability.
23
Q
Davis v. Feinstein
A
Blind person with cane): Using cane may be reasonable care (leave to jury). Blind person not expected to discover everything a person of normal vision would. Law asks reasonable effort to compensate.
24
Q
Lehman v. Hayman
A
Sudden and unforeseeable unconsciousness is relevant to determining whether DF is negligent.
25
Dellwo v. Pearson
12 year boy driving motorboat. Child exception does not apply when the engaging in a dangerous activity that is characteristically undertaken by adults.
25
Bolton v. Stone
Cricket case: likelihood of injury and potential severity too low to justify precaution (similar to BPL)
25
U.S. v. Carroll Towing
Ship drifted downstream and PL’s bargee was absent when accident happened, Hand did BPL and concluded negligence.
25
Breunig v. American Family Insurance
Driver thinks she is batman: no general adjustment for people with mental illness, unless there is no prior notice or forewarning. In this case PL did have warning.
26
TJ Hooper
Shipwreck because no radio: negligence not because of custom, but using radio is reasonable. Custom is not the ultimate standard.
27
Trimarco v. Klein
Failure to use shatterproof bathroom glass: failing to follow custom can be good evidence but not determinative ; also consider BPL etc.
28
Brune v. Belinkoff
Negligence because doctor’s conduct fell below community standard, despite local custom (close to Boston). Availability of resources and can be taken into consideration.
29
Canterbury v. Spence
Medical duty to disclose is not set by custom.
Standard: disclose all material risks.
(risk that would affect a reasonable person’s decision making)
30
Martin v. Herzog
Wrong lane crashes against no headlight: Both violated statutes. Cardozo: PL’s violation is negligence per se.
31
Gorris v. Scott
Drowning sheep.
Restatement:
An actor is negligent if, without excuse, the actor violates a statute that is designed to protect against the type of accident the actor's conduct causes, and if the accident victim is within the class of persons the statute is designed to protect.
32
Tedla v. Ellman
PL did not face traffic, and violated statute designed for safety. However, walking on the other side would be more dangerous. No per se negligence.
33
Grajales-Romero v. American Airlines
Check-in counter. Res Ipsa Loquitour.
(1) [same as RST] The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur without someone’s negligence.
(2) Accident must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within exclusive control of DF.
a. Use flexibly as in Ybarra.
(3) Accident must not be due to voluntary act of PL.
a. Court: not whether PL took a voluntary action, but whether the action can be blamed for the accident.
34
Ybarra v. Spangard
Unconscious patient, multiple doctors. Res Ipsa Loquitur used as information forcing device.
35
Howard v. Wal-mart
Soap spilled in Walmart. Res Ipsa applies. Pure stastitistics is not enough, but unlike Posner's bus hypo, PL is doing her best.
36
Byrne v. Boadle
Flour barrel hit man. Res Ipsa.
37
Butterfield v. Forrester
Horse tripped on pole while PL is riding too fast: If PL is contributorily negligent, DF is not liable.
38
Li v. Yellow Cab
DF ran yellow light and hit PL’s car, but PL was taking a U turn despite the traffic. Court decides to use comparative negligence in the pure form.
39
Coleman v. Soccer assn
Soccer player injured by crossbar of goal. Court refused to adopt comparative negligence (Jurisdictions differ on this issue)
40
Murphy v. Steeplechase
Resort flopper case. Cardozo: “Volenti non fit injuria.” To a willing person, it is not a wrong. The risks (falling on a speedy and jerky flopper) were obvious, and not unreasonably high.
41
Maddox v. NYC
Yankee player case. He knew the field was muddy but did not complain or refuse to play. No evidence that he was compelled to play.
42
Landings Ass’n v. Williams
Alligator case. PL either knowingly assumed the risks or failed to exercise ordinary care. Court maybe should have considered comparative neg.
43
Dalury v. S-K-I Ltd.
Skier collided with pole: PL signed exculpatory agreement. Against public policy
Public policy factors (Tunkl):
(1) Type of business suitable for public regulation;
(2) Service is of great importance to the public, practical necessity for some people;
(3) Party holds itself out as willing to perform service to the general public or at least people coming within certain standards;
(4) Decisive disparity of bargaining power;
(5) Standard cohesion contract with no provision for purchaser to obtain extra protection;
(6) Purchaser or her property is placed under control of the seller.
44
New York Central R.R. v. Grimstad
Not enough evidence that but for the lack of buoy, the man would have been saved. No factual cause.
45
Zuchowicz v. US
Drug overdose, circumstantial evidence for causation. When
negligence raised risk of a particular type of accident and it happened, we have a rebuttable presumption of causation.
46
Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.
Two fires. DF is liable for the entire damages. DF would not be liable if the other cause was natural, but DF has burden of proof.
See § 27 Multiple Sufficient Causes:
If multiple acts occur, each of which would have been a factual cause of the physical harm at the same time in the absence of the other act(s), each act is regarded as a factual cause of the harm.
47
Summers v. Tice
Two shooters shot at plaintiff. Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious [both negligent], and it is proved that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the harm.
48
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories
Market share liabilities for drugs.
49
Skipworth v. Lead Inds. Ass'n
Distinguishes Sindell. Time period for producing the product is over 100 years—many companies entered/left the industry during the period. Also, the companies did not have identical formulae for the products (not a “fungible” product).
50
Herskovitz v. Group Health Cooperative
Lung cancer. Lost chance leads to causation.
51
Matsuyama
Recognize a right in the chance of survival. PL wins if she, by preponderance of evidence, proves that DF caused (but for cause) the loss of chances of survival. Loss chance is the harm (use in exam).
52
Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough
Tree fell on overspeed car. PL neg is factual but not proximate cause.
53
In re Polemis
Plank dropping caused ship explosion; Direct result. no longer good law
54
Wagon Mound
Foreseeability. Oil on water burning is not foreseeable.
55
Doughty v. Turner Manufacturing Co
Asbestos cement cover inadvertently slid into a cauldron of boiling sodium cyanide. No immediate harm but later exploded and harmed employee. Held that splashes are in “quite a different category”
than the unforeseeable explosion.
56
Hughes v. Lord Advocate
DF works on manhole, site not well covered, child enters and plays with lamp, causing explosion. Held that burning is obviously foreseeable, and explosion and burning are of the same type.
57
Smith v. Brain
Leech & Co.
Metal burn on lip eventually caused PL’s cancer. The PL was especially susceptible to cancer. If the type of harm (burning) is foreseeable, then DF is liable for all consequences that follow from the harm.
58
Steinhauser v. Hertz
Car accident caused schizophrenia.
If DF can show that the harm was bound to worsen without DF’s negligence, then damages should be discounted accordingly.
59
Brower v. New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co.,
Train crashes guy with wagon, third party thieves stole PL’s property.
Ruling: Thieves were not superseding cause. The theft was a natural and probable result of DF’s negligence. (Evidence: DF hired guards to protect their own goods.)
60
Wagner v. International R. Co
Train rescue. Danger invites rescue.
§ 449
If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent [is created by DF’s conduct], such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.
61
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R
DF has no duty to PL. [Alternatively, one may argue no proximate cause.] “The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.”
62
Farwell v. Keaton
Guy leaving bleeding friend.
DF assumed the duty: he has a special relationship to PL for they are “companions on a social venture”.
63
Harper v. Herman
No special relationship. PL is merely a guest on the boat. He is not particularly vulnerable, and does not lack ability of self protection; DF has no considerable power over him
64
§ 324: Duty of One Who Takes Charge of Another
One who, being under no duty to do so, takes charge of another who is helpless adequately to aid or protect himself is subject to liability to the other for any bodily harm caused to him by
(a) the failure of the actor to exercise reasonable care to secure the safety of the other while within the actor’s charge, or
(b) the actor’s discontinuing his aid or protection, if by so doing he leaves the other in a worse position than when the actor took charge of him.
65
§ 327: Negligently Preventing Assistance
One who knows or has reason to know that a third person is giving or is ready to give to another aid necessary to prevent physical harm to him, and negligently prevents or disables the third person from giving such aid, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the other by the absence of the aid which he has prevented the third person from giving.
66
§ 39: Prior Conduct Creating a Risk
When an actor's prior conduct, even though not tortious, creates a continuing risk of physical harm of a type characteristic of the conduct, the actor has a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent or minimize the harm.
67
United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt
Applies traditional tripartite approach. Holmes: the children are trespassers, and landowner is not liable.
68
Rowland v. Christian
Broken faucet hurt guest.
Exam: use the Rowland factors + traditional tripartite framework as additional consideration
Test: Whether in the management of property, the landowner has acted as a reasonable person regarding the probability of injury to others.
1. Foreseeability of harm to PL’s class of people
2. Certainty that PL suffered injury
3. Closeness of connection between DF’s conduct and the injury
4. Moral blame
5. Policy of preventing future harm
6. Burden to DF
7. Influence on larger community
8. Availability/cost/prevalence of insurance
69
Kline v 1500 Mass Avenue
Landlord’s duty to protect tenants
70
Tarasoff
Therapist duty to warn
71
Nguyen v. MIT
No duty because no sign that the student was suicidal.
72
Rhodes v. McHugh
Ram case. Strict liability only for wild or abnormally dangerous animals.
73
Spano v. Perini
Blasting is obviously ultrahazardous.
§519: General Principle
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.
74
Mink farm hypo.
* DF would argue: no. Should instead ask negligence.
* PL would argue: Of course an explosion scares people/animals.
* Characterizing kind of harm, analogous to proximate cause.
75
Indiana Harbor R.R. v. American Cynamid
Ultrahazardness concerns activities, not substances. Chemical itself is dangerous, but shipping it can be safe.
Is shipping ultrahazardous? RST 520 balancing test.
76
Ira v. US
Drunken sailor.
Respondeat superior: An employer is liable for an employee’s damage when it was foreseeable that the damage could have been caused in the scope of employment, even if the employee was not performing a duty for the employer.
77
McPherson v. Buick
A manufacturer of non-inherently dangerous articles may owe a duty of care to people beyond the immediate purchaser.
Extinguishes the privity rule.
78
Escola v. Coca Cola
Exploding coke, circumstantial evidence. Manufacturer is better-equipped to bear the costs than the individual purchaser.
79
Speller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co
fridge fire, circumstantial evidence
Two prongs:
(a) accident was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect; and
* looking for situations in which the product fails to perform its manifestly intended function.
(b) [exclude all other causes] accident was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes other than product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution.
80
Speller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co
Fridge fire, circumstantial evidence can be enough to infer defect.
81
Barker v. Lull Engineering
Loader injury. PL: no seat belt, no stabilizer etc. DF: seat belt would make loader more dangerous
Use risk-utility test in exam with consumer expectation as relevant factor.
82
Liriano v. Hobart
Meat grinder, safety guard removed. Duty to warn. As a matter of law, is the danger so obvious that warning is not required?
83
Hood v. Ryobi
Removes saw blade guard. Clear warning and detaching guard is extremely rare. Encyclopedic warning is not required.
84
Daly v. General Motors
Car crash, no use seat belt/lock. Comparative negligence applies to strict products liability.
85
Stoleson v. United States
Tort claim against the federal government for negligently failing to protect employees at the plant from overexposure to nitroglycerine. Posner noted that Stoleson would have had a good claim if she could have shown the hypochondriacal symptoms to have been caused by the treatment (even non-negligent).
86
Pridham v. Cash & Carry Building Center
PL injured when ceiling fell. Died when ambulance driver had heart attack and crashed. Liable.
87
Wagner v. Mittendorf
PL broke leg because of DF's negligence. Doctors removed the cast and encouraged him to walk, but he slipped and rebroke the leg. Liable (many criticism).
