Topic 4 (Injunctions II): Case Law Flashcards
Collins v Griffiths [2017] IEHC 658
Perpetual Injunctions - do not last forever, only the length of time of the wrong
Case concerned the appeal of an injunction that was granted to prevent the defendant from door stepping/assaulting the plaintiff;
Grounds for appeal – defendant claimed he had mended his ways and that no further incidents had occurred after the grant of the injunction;
Appeal was successful and injunction was dissolved;
In dissolving the injunction, Justice Noonan cited the case of Szabo v ESAT Digifone Limited [1998] 2 ILRM 102 (which concerned a quia timet injunction) as being the leading authority on what the onus of proof is for the grant of a perpetual injunction;
Onus of proof rests on an applicant to show a “proven substantial risk of danger” that ones rights have/will be infringed and that such an infringement will be continuous;
Case also applied the principle of “clean hands” in lifting the injunction in question.
Perpetual injunctions do not last forever, just as long as the issue is going to continue
McKeever v Hay and Others [2008] IEHC 145:
Example of a Mandatory Injunction
Case involving a deliberate and continued trespass to land;
Examples of mandatory relief sought were:
A mandatory injunction requiring the defendants to take up and remove piping from the land in question;
A mandatory injunction requiring the defendants to restore the lands to their original condition.
Both forms could be sought here, mandatory or prohibitory
Shepherd Homes Ltd v Sandham [1971] Ch 340:
Standard for mandatory injunctions: high degree of assurance that at the trial it will appear that the injunction was rightly granted
“On motion, as contrasted with the trial, the court is far more reluctant to grant a mandatory injunction than it would be to grant a comparable prohibitory injunction. In a normal case the court must, inter alia, feel a high degree of assurance that at the trial it will appear that the injunction was rightly granted; and this is a higher standard than is required for a prohibitory injunction.”
Campus Oil Ltd v Minister for Industry and Energy (no. 2) [1983] IR 88
mandatory injunction standard - exception due to the facts of the case
Case covering the test for interlocutory relief also involved the grant of a mandatory interlocutory injunction;
The defendants sought an order compelling the plaintiff to comply with an order of the Minister to purchase oil from a particular provider MANDATORY INJUNCTION;
Facts surrounding Campus Oil were found to be distinguished from a normal case where a “high degree of assurance” would be required before granting mandatory interlocutory relief;
Interlocutory injunctions and mandatory interlocutory injunctions
SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES - higher standard
References the difficulty of acquiring a mandatory injunction
Lesser standard being applied here as an exception to the rule, the court has discretion and took into consideration the facts of the case
Charleton v Scriven [2019] IESC 28
Distinction between Perpetual and Interlocutory
Injunction sought in this case in essence related to interlocutory relief being sought by a receiver to allow for the receiver to take over properties that were the subject of a mortgage;
Clarke J – “The reason why a higher standard is applied [to the grant of mandatory interlocutory relief] is not because of some technicality but because of the greater risk of injustice…”
Changing of the status quo - there is a risk of injustice
Shepards Holmes principle higher standard applied, too risky
Attorney General (Boswell) v Rathmines and Pembroke Joint Hospital Board [1904] 1 IR 161;
The classic test for Quia Timet Injunctions was set down
Injunction sought to restrain the defendant from erecting a smallpox hospital on lands beside a village in county Dublin;
Conflicting expert evidence existed as to the suitability of the selected site;
Injunctive relief was refused
No damage has happened in this case yet
Want the hospital to be stopped
There was no strong probability, almost to the point of moral certainty
Divergence in the spread of small-pox, could not prove it would lead to the spread of the disease
Could not prove certainty
Must have expert evidence with no divergence
Szabo v Esat Digifone Ltd [1998] 2 ILRM 102:
Quia Timet - current test
Plaintiff schoolchildren seeking a variety of perpetual and interlocutory injunctions to prevent the intended development and operation of a mobile phone base in a Garda station next to their school;
To obtain a quia timet injunction, one needs to demonstrate “a proven substantial risk of danger”; lower standard than Boswell but still high
On when an interlocutory quia timet injunction will be granted, Justice Geoghegan held there is no difference applied to the grant of an interlocutory quia timet injunction and any other form of interlocutory injunction;
HOWEVER the lack of any breach of an applicant’s rights makes it difficult to establish, as a matter of evidence, that there is a sufficient risk to one’s rights;
In exercising it’s discretion at the interlocutory stage, the Court can balance “the magnitude of evil against the chances of its occurrence”.
Walker v Leonach [2012] IEHC 24
Quia Timet Injunctions - no evidence/ guarantee of future trespass
Plaintiff sought a declaration that his lands were not subject to a right of way (declaration sought in rem as opposed to in personam);
A declaration was granted simpliciter (only AG could act in the public interest) to the plaintiff against the defendant but refused injunctive relief;
Injunctive relief refused as there was insufficient evidence to justify a quia timet injunction as there was no evidence of any proven risk of substantial danger or of repeated trespass;
No evidence that this trespass was going to continue into the future
Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] Ch 55
Anton Piller Injunction
Case concerned an application by the plaintiff to restrain the defendant from infringing their copyright and disclosing confidential information relating to frequency converters for computers in addition to an order granting them permission to enter the defendant’s premises, inspect all such documentation and remover them into the plaintiffs’ solicitors’ custody;
Must be evidence that there is a great danger that the documents will be destroyed
Lord Denning also set down the following “essential pre-conditions” that must be present for the grant of an Anton Piller order:
o“There are three essential pre-conditions for the making of such an order, in my judgment. First, there must be an extremely strong prima facie case. Secondly, the damage, potential or actual, must be very serious for the applicant. Thirdly, there must be clear evidence that the defendants have in their possession incriminating documents or things, and that there is a real possibility that they may destroy such material before any application inter partes can be made.”
Microsoft Corporation & Symantec Corporation v Brightpoint Ireland Ltd [2001] 1 ILRM 540
Endorsed Anton Piller case
Irish authority for the grant of an Anton Piller order within this jurisdiction;
Case concerned relief sought by the defendant following the grant of an Anton Piller order;
Although no explicit threshold test was set out for the grant of an Anton Piller order, Justice Smyth endorsed the reasoning behind the Anton Piller decision as follows:
o“In my judgment there was such full and proper disclosure as the circumstances of the case warranted to seek and obtain an Anton Piller Order, which was to the purpose and not unduly wide in its teams. I am satisfied that there was strong prima facie evidence of dishonest conduct by the Defendants which indicated a strong probability that they would be likely to destroy the records …”
A persistent issue with Anton Piller orders is that they are seen as a form of relief that can be abused;
Bayer AG v Winter [1986] 1 WLR 497
Bayer Injunctions
Plaintiff company became aware that the defendant was selling a counterfeit insecticide that the plaintiff marketed in other countries;
At the initial hearing, a series of Bayer orders were granted, but an order restraining the defendant from leaving the jurisdiction was refused;
On appeal, the Court granted such an order where it was necessary to protect the plaintiff’s rights pending the hearing of the action;
“Therefore it seems to me that the court is faced with a situation in which there is a risk to the plaintiffs that they may not obtain the information ordered to be disclosed, unless the order which is now sought is granted; while, at the same time, any risk of hardship to the first defendant is dealt with by his capacity to apply to a judge to vary or discharge the order.”
