Topic 2 - Maxims Flashcards
Lyelle v Kennedy
The case established an equitable principle which grants the court power to order a discovery of document, and the failure of the party to produced the ordered document leads to a presumption against him.
This rule does not apply in Action for forfeiture cases (Seddon Case)
Seddon v Commercial Salt Co. Ltd
By a lease agreement, the 1st defendant acquired a lease interest in a land for twenty-one years minus a day. The agreement provides that where the defendant assigns or alienate or transfer the land without the consent of the leasor, the lease becomes determined.
The plaintiff, who had a reversionary interest in the leased land brought an action of forfeiture against the first, second and third defendant upon the above mentioned clause. He requested the court for an order for discovery of document against the defendant.
While the order was grated at the trial court, it was reversed upon appeal on the ground that there cannot be an order for discovery of document in an action for forfeiture. The court relied on the ruling in Earl of Mexborough v Withwood
Adecentro v OAU
Equity were developed to supplement and not to override common law rules, and in fact, equity would not have existed without common law
Trans Bridge v Survey international
Eso JSC obitered that “equity should not be threaded as a tyrannous phenomenon threatening the law… it is not a warlord determined to do battle with the law”
Archibong v Duke
Principle: specific performance will not be granted where damages are adequate. But the provision for liquidated damages in a contract does not necessarily bar the grant of specific performance
Fact:
The plaintiff agreed to convey to the defendant certain property and the defendant was to pay a fixed sum of money in consideration thereof. A clause in the agreement provided that …if either of the parties hereto rescinds this contract for whatever cause, such party shall incur and become liable to the other for £500 damages.” The defendant defaulted in the payment of the purchase price and the plaintiff thereupon sued him claiming specific performance of the agreement or in the alternative £500 damages for breach of the agreement. Held:
Webber, J. granted specific performance and directed that the defendant carry out the terms of the contract within three months otherwise, he (the defendant) should pay to the plaintiff the sum of £500 as liquidated damages for the breach.
Comment
It is submitted that the clause in this contract is capable of two interpretations. It may be argued on the one hand, that the clause enables the defendant to choose either to perform the contract or pay the specified sum of money; and on the other hand, that the defendant is bound to perform the contract, the money clause being added by way of security.
If the first interpretation is applicable, specific performance cannot be decreed because the parties have agreed that damages will be an adequate remedy and thus exclude the basis for the decree of specific performance. If the second interpretation is applicable, the court will readily grant specific performance. The approach of Webber, J. in the above case is questionable. It is submitted that, instead of finding the easy way out, the judge should have made up his mind having regard to the evidence adduced whether to grant specific performance or award damages.
Chidiak v Coker
Principle: Equity follows the law
Fact:
The question in this case was whether a sub-lessee of Crown land was liable on the covenant to repair when the Crown Lands Ordinance(No. 45) of Nigeria in section 7 provided that in all leases of Crown Lands shall be implied a covenant not to assign, sub-let or otherwise part with the possession of the land without the previous consent of the Governor in writing.
The appellant had before then been the sub-lessee of the respondent who was himself the lessee of Crown Lands in question. The initial term having come to an end, the appellant had negotiated and executed a fresh sub-lease which was not executed by the respondent before some year and a half had passed. In any case the Governor’s consent even though backdated to the commencement of the fresh sub-lease was not forthcoming before the year and a half had run out. Meanwhile, the appellant continued in possession.
While in possession but before the Governor’s consent, the house burnt down.The respondent sued the appellant on the covenant to repair in the sub-lease.
Held:
Without the prior consent of the Governor, the sub-lease could not be granted; that consent could not have been assumed. Therefore at the time of the fire, there was on sub-lease. The court expressed the view that it could not be presumed on the facts of that case that the Governor gave the necessary consent to a lease transaction, and that the onus was on the plaintiff relying on the instrument to prove the consent.
Savannah bank v Ajilo
PRINCIPLE: A contract may be made illegal by statute. The court will never lend its aid to enforce an illegal contract. Ex turpi causa oritur non actio confirms the proposition that the court will not enforce a contract that is predicated on illegality.
Fact: As a consequence of the failure of the respondent to repay a loan, the bank sold the land used as security but did not obtain the governor ‘s consent required under s. 22 of the Land Use Act. Held:
The sale of the land as illegal, null and void being in breach of the statutory provision.
Comment “ The main issue before the court was the legality of the sale of land without governors consent as required by statute. The question as to the statute being used as an instrument of fraud was not raised before the court otherwise, the judgement would have been totally different, as in Solanke v Abed, [1962] NRNLR 92
Solanke v Abed
Principle: the law will not allow the law to be used as an engine of fraud
Fact: The respondent, who held a lease of crown land, sublet it to the appellant without the governor ‘s consent as required by a statute. On realising that he had faltered the respondent ejected the appellant sued for trespass.
Held
The sublease was only illegal as performed by the respondent. The appellant retained all his rights under the sublease also because the statute did not provide any penalty for its breach .The respondent couldn ‘t take advantage of his own wrong as against the appellant.
Pilcher V Rawlins
Principle: Where the equities are equal the law prevails
Fact: A father settled real estate on trust for his children. One of the trustees, P, was the uncle of the beneficiaries. The trustees advanced money to R on the security of a mortgage (the mortgage deed explained the existence of the trust). Two of the trustees died leaving P as the sole trustee. P and R devised a fraud whereby the property would be mortgaged to S and L, who had no notice of the trust or the existence of the beneficiaries’ equitable interest. The fraud was revealed and the beneficiaries sought a declaration that S and L took legal title subject to their equitable proprietary rights in the property and an order that it be reconveyed to the trust. This case called for a consideration of how the competing interests of innocent parties ought to be balanced, where it was not possible to give effect to one without unduly prejudicing an equally blameless party. Moreover, the court were required to address the extent of the defence available to a bona fide purchaser for value, without notice of any pre-existing equitable interests.
Held:
The court found in favour of S and L, whom thus took their charge free of B’s equitable rights. S and L had acted diligently and reasonably believed they had taken good title, they had ‘neither knowledge nor means of knowledge’ of the trust; where the equities were equal, as was the case here, the law must prevail.
Joseph V Lyon
A assigned for valuable consideration, his after acquired stock-in-trade to the plaintiff, subject to a proviso for redemption. Before the plaintiff took possession of the after acquired stock, a pledged part of it with the defendant who had no notice of the assignment
Held:
The court held that the plaintiff’s interest in the after acquired stock-in trade was equitable and that since the defendant’s interest was legal and since he had no notice of the plaintiff’s earlier equitable interest, he had priority over the plaintiff. The consideration of the doctrine of notice and statutory enactments affecting it is very essential to the application of this maxim - where the equities are equal the law prevails.
Cave v Cave
X, a sole trustee used trust money to purchase a parcel of land and conveyed the land to Y, his brother. Y then mortgaged the land to A by way of legal mortgage and then to B by way of equitable mortgage. Both A and B were unaware of the trust.
Held:
It was held that A’s legal mortgage had priority over the beneficiary’s interest whilst B’s equitable mortgage must be postponed to the beneficiary’s interest, being later in time i.e The interests of the beneficiaries had priority over B’s mortgage, since they were earlier in time
Rice V Rice
FACT: A conveyance on which a receipt clause for the purchase price was endorsed was handed over to the purchaser, without the vendor actually receiving the purchase money. The vendor therefore had an equitable lien for the unpaid purchase money. Subsequently, the purchaser deposited the conveyance with Y, who had no notice of the vendor’s equitable lien. The question for determination was who of the two was entitled to priority. Held:
It was held that Y had priority over the vendor; that though the vendor’s equity was earlier in point in time, nevertheless the equities were not equal since his conduct had facilitated the creation of the later equity. Under the rule in Dearle v Hall a subsequent equitable encumbrancer can have priority over an earlier equitable encumbrancer.
Dearle V Hall
where the equitable owner of an asset purports to dispose of his equitable interest on two or more occasions, and the equities are equal between claimants, the claimant who first notifies the trustee or legal owner of the asset shall have a first priority claim
Adebajob V Brown
Principle: He who seeks equity must do equity
Fact: The appellant in building his house encroached on the respondent’s land. The respondent condoned this trespass by agreeing that the appellant compensate him monetarily. The appellant failed to pay the agreed compensation whereupon the respondent brought an action against the defendant for trespass
Held:
If there is a mistaken entry and when the mistake is discovered, and the person in possession is approached and he consents to the encroachment, then, the right to claim in trespass is lost, as his consent relates back to the initial entry without permission. The respondent was therefore estopped from suing the appellant
Lodge V National Union Investment
if the plaintiff seeks an equitable remedy or wishes to obtain any equitable relief, he must be prepared to act fairly towards the defendant
Case Summary
X borrowed money from Y, a moneylender and mortgaged certain securities to him. The contract was illegal and void since the moneylender was not registered under the English Moneylenders Act 1900. When X sued Y to recover the securities.
Held:
it was held that an order for delivery up would only be made if X were prepared to “do equity” by repaying the amount of the loan.
Kasumo b Baba-Egbe
Principles
If the plaintiff seeks an equitable remedy or wishes to obtain any equitable relief, he must be prepared to act fairly towards the defendant. He Who Seeks Equity Must Do Equity
Case Summary
The respondent mortgaged some property with the appellant money-lender as security for a loan. The moneylender contrary to statutory requirement (s. 19 of Money-lenders Ordinarice) kept no record of the loan thus making the loan statutorily unenforceable. The respondent without repaying the loan instituted an action in the lower court for the repossession of the properly and its tille deed.
Held:
The Court held that the principle in Lodge v National Union Investment Limited was not applicable to a transaction declared unenforceable by statute. It would be wrong for a money-lender in default of statutory provisions to be allowed to defend himself in court by calling for the imposition of terms of repayment, for by doing so he would be enforcing, directly or indirectly, a claim in respect of the unenforceable transaction. in other words, the mortgage was unenforceable and the lender could recover neither the interest nor the loan capital. The security was therefore re-transferred to the borrower.
Craig v Craig
Case Summary
The petitioner, a wife, brought a case to the court seeking the dissolution of her marriage on the grounds that her husband had committed adultery. She claimed that her husband’s infidelity was the reason their marriage should end. However, during the proceedings, it came to light that the wife had also engaged in adultery in the past, with another man. She had not disclosed this fact to her husband before bringing the case. This revelation significantly affected the outcome of the case.
Held:
The court ruled against the wife and denied her the relief she sought. The court’s decision was based on the principle that anyone seeking justice must come with “clean hands.” This means that a person cannot seek legal protection or relief if they have acted wrongly or in bad faith in the matter at hand. Since the wife herself had committed adultery in the past and had hidden it from her husband, the court found that she was not in a position to accuse her husband of the same wrong.
Viatonu V Odunayo
Viatonu (the mortgagor) upon receiving notice of foreclosure went to Odutayo (the mortgagee) who agreed to grant an extension of two months, within that period Viatonu tendered the money in full but Odutayo refused to accept it on the grounds that it was too late. Odutayo exercising his power of sale, sold the property for £600 by private treaty to kuyero. Thẹ mortgagee, the auctioneer and the purchaser were members of the firm of the auctioneers which sold the property though the purchaser alleged that he had resigned from the firm. Further, the mortgage debt was £250, while the market value of the mortgaged property was £1,500. Held:
The sale of mortgaged property was set aside because the mortgagee, in exercising his power of sale did not act Bonafide; the purchaser could not claim protection of S. 27(2) of the Conveyance Act 1881 and could not recover possession, the sale being void against the mortgagor. But a purchaser of the legal estate who has not been fraudulent or negligent is preferred to the equitable mortgagee, even though the mortgagor in conveying the legal estate to the purchaser of the legal estate was acting fraudulently, having previously created an equitable mortgage over the land which he failed to disclose to the purchaser
Gill V Lewis
A tenant whose lease has been forfeited for non payment of rent cannot expect an equitable remedy against forfeiture where he has been using the premise for immoral purpose
Overto V Bannister
An infant received money from a trustee, having fraudulently misrepresented his age
Held:
The infant having fraudulently misrepresented his age was not entitled to be repaid on reaching the age of 21.
Lindsay Petroleum v Hurd
Lord Selborne held that “It will be practically unjust to grant an equitable remedy where the party has conducted himself as waiving such right”
Fagbemi v Aluko
Principle: Delay defeats equity
for the maxim to apply, three things must be proved. 1) Laches or 2) Acquiesence 3) Change in position of the defendant
Ephraim v Asuquo
Principles
There will be laches where the plaintiff has so acted as to induce the defendant to alter his position in the reasonable belief that the claim has been abandoned, or where the delay amounts to evidence of an agreement by the plaintiff to abandon his right.
Case Summary
The plaintiff sought to have a grant of letters of administration set aside. Held:
It was held that as nearly two years had elapsed since the grant, and the administrator had in all probability completed distribution of the estate, there had been laches, and the plaintiff’s claim failed.
Aganran v Olushi
The head of the family sold family property without the consent of other members of the family and the court held that the sale of family property by the head of the family without the consent of principal members of the family was voidable and not void. The sale was therefore voidable by the plaintiff. The plaintiff took no steps to set aside the sale until 1905, when he commenced the present action. The plaintiff had demanded and received €5 out of the proceeds of the sale, and it was held that this amounted to ratification by conduct (though he subsequently resiled from his promise). The court also found that the defendants had at one stage sued as owners of the land to eject trespassers, and the plaintiff knew of this but did not interfere; and that the defendants had erected houses on the land and the plaintiff did nothing to stop them.
Held:
It was held that all these circumstances, coupled with the three-year delay in bringing the action, amounted to lashes, and the plaintiff had lost his right to set aside the sale. Winkfield J. said: ‘I think that the actions of the plaintiff amounted to an expression of intention or a promise not to exercise the right which he possessed.’
Lake V Craddock
Five people bought land It was conveyed to them as joint tenants in fee, but they contributed rateably. Some died, and one took no part for thirty years. Held: The absent owner was re-admitted. They were held to be tenants in common in equity
Ipaye V Aribisala
The mother of the plaintiff executed a voluntary settlement of her property in favour of the plaintiff and his brother, X, who later died intestate. The plaintiff learnt after the death of X that X had deposited the deed of settlement during his life with the defendant. The plaintiff sued the defendant to recover the deed of settlement. The defendant alleged that X borrowed money from him and deposited the deed of voluntary settlement as security. The defendant alleged that he insisted that the other party to the deed must be brought whereupon X brought someone. A promissory note was prepared which was signed by X and the person he brought who claimed to be the other party to the deed of settlement. The term of the promissory note was that the deed of settlement was pledged as security for the loan. No fraud was alleged.
Held:
It was held that the mortgage by deposit of title deeds has the effect of severing the joint tenancy and that the appellant is entitled to the custody of the deed of settlement.
Re Bower’s Settlement Trusts Ch. 197
Where there is a settlement including a direction (a) that the fund shall be held on trust for certain persons in unequal shares and (b) that any share which fails to vest shall accrue to the other shares by way of addition, the accrue will be in equal shares and not in the proportions laid down for the original shares
Jones v Maynard, [1951] Ch. 572
A husband and his wife operated a joint account with a bank into which both of them paid their earnings. From this account, the expenses of the household were dawn. The husband invested the surplus from the account. There were substantial differences in the amount paid into the account by the husband and his wife. There was no special agreement governing the account.
Held:
It was held that on the dissolution of the marriage, the wife was entitled to one half of the balance and one half of the investments in accordance with the maxim, “equality is equity”. Thus, half of the investment should be held in trust for the wife. The courts have applied the presumption of advancement where the relationship of husband and wife existed, notwithstanding that the marriage was subsequently dissolved 60 Where the wife purchases or transfer property in the name of her husband or into the joint names of her husband and herself, and there is no presumption of advancement, the husband will hold on a resulting trust for the wife.
Where a joint account is opened between husband and wife, both of them having power to draw cheques on the account not only for their joint benefit but also for his/her own benefit and one of them draws money and invests it in his or her own name, he or she is the sole owner of that investment but if the investment is in their joint name, they will be joint tenants.
Where a joint account is opened by husband and wife, evidence may establish that the joint account is held beneficially for the husband.
Parkin v Thorold, (1852) 22 LJ Ch 170
On a contract for the sale of land, the time originally set for completion is not, in equity, of the essence. Either party may however give notice to the other insisting on completion within a reasonable time.
Romilly MR “Courts of equity made a distinction in all cases between that which is a matter of substance and that which is a matter of form; and if it finds, that by insisting on the form, the substance will be defeated, it holds it to be inequitable to allow a person to insist on such form, and thereby defeat the substance.”
Mazin Eng. Ltd v Tower Aluminium, [1993] 5 NWLR (Pt. 295) 526
Principles
According to the implied theory, a contract which is based on the continued existence of a subject-matter is frustrated, if due to no fault of either party, the subject-matter ceases to exist. When time is of the essence, failure to perform the contract within the time limit amounts to a breach of contract.
Case Summary
The respondent was to import a special aluminium sheet from Belgium to the appellant in Nigeria within four month. Unfortunately this was not possible due to CBN’s delay in approving the application for foreign exchange. The appellants sued the respondent.
Held:
There was an implied term that the delivery of the sheets would be subject to the approval of the foreign exchange by the CBN, thus the none approval was a supervening event that frustrated the contract and discharged the parties. It was also held that the time of the performance was not of essence since;
1) The parties did not expressly stipulate it to be so
2) None of the parties notified the other that unless the performance was completed within reasonable time, the contract will be regarded as breached
3) By the nature of the surrounding circumstances it is not necessary that the agreed date be strictly adhered to.
Ben Warri V Onwuchekwa
Principles
Equity looks on the intent rather than the form
Case Summary
The question was whether a document was a promissory note or mortgage. The defendant had borrowed money from the plaintiff and had signed a document in which the plaintiff is authorized herein to sell the house pledged and secured to him” in the event of the defendant’s failure to repay the loan at the stipulated time. The defendant failed to pay, and the plaintiff sued him for the amount and obtained judgment. The defendant appealed on the ground that the document was a mortgage or a pledge and not a promissory note, that it was not receivable in evidence as it had not been registered under the Lands Registration Ordinance. Allowing the appeal, Held:
it was held that the document was not a promissory note and could not be sued upon. The learned judge did not express an opinion on whether or not a mortgage was thereby created.
Walsh v Lonsdale, (1882) 21 Ch D 562*
*
Principle: An agreement for a lease is as good as a lease (Equity look on that as done that which ought to be done)
Walsh v. Lonsdale is a key case illustrating the impact of equity on common law, particularly concerning agreements for leases. Here’s a summary:
- The Situation: Lonsdale agreed in writing to lease a mill to Walsh for seven years, with rent payable in advance if demanded. Walsh took possession and paid rent, but no formal lease was executed. Lonsdale later demanded a year’s rent in advance, and when Walsh refused, Lonsdale distrained (seized goods for unpaid rent). Walsh sued, arguing the distress was unlawful because he was a yearly tenant at law, and rent was not payable in advance.
- The Issue: Could Lonsdale lawfully distrain when there was no formal lease, but only an agreement for one?
- The Ruling (Jessel MR): Since the Judicature Acts, equity and common law are fused. Because the agreement for the lease was one that equity would specifically enforce (meaning the court would order Lonsdale to grant the lease), Walsh was treated as if the lease had been formally granted. Therefore, Lonsdale had the right to distrain, just as he would have had with a formal lease.
- The Principle: An agreement for a lease, where specific performance is available, is treated in equity as equivalent to a formal lease. This means the parties have the same rights and obligations as if the lease had been executed. This case effectively blurred the distinction between legal and equitable leases in situations where specific performance would be granted. “Equity sees as done that which ought to be done.”
Savage v Sarrough, (1937) 13 NLR 141
Principles
The principle is that when the rules of equity are in conflict with the rules of common law in reference to the same matter, the rules of equity will prevail.
Case Summary
The plaintiff leased a property to the defendant for five years under an agreement in writing but not under seal. On receiving a higher offer, the plaintiff brought an action to set aside the prior agreement as it was not under seal. Adopting the rule in Walsh v Lonsdale, the court held the prior agreement valid.
Dr NA Iragunima v Rivers State Housing and Property Development Authority, RSHPDA & Ors, [2003] 5 SCNJ 207
This case deals with the equitable doctrine established in Walsh v. Lonsdale (an agreement for a lease is as good as a lease in equity). Here’s a breakdown:
- Initial Situation: The Eastern Nigerian government leased land to Nwosu for seven years. Nwosu assigned the lease to Okoro, and this assignment was registered.
- Renewal Application: In 1973, Okoro applied for a 60-year renewal, which was granted. He paid the fees, but the formal lease document was never executed. Okoro then built a house on the land and sold it to the plaintiff in 1982, executing a deed of assignment and obtaining government consent for the assignment (using funds provided by the plaintiff). The plaintiff then paid ground rent and property rates.
- Dispute: In 1986, the plaintiff discovered the government (1st respondent) had sold the property to the appellant as abandoned property. The plaintiff sued, claiming ownership and challenging the sale to the appellant.
- Legal Proceedings: The trial court, Court of Appeal, and ultimately the Supreme Court all ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
- Supreme Court’s Reasoning: Even though the formal 60-year lease document was never executed, Okoro had done everything required of him. Applying the principle from Walsh v. Lonsdale, the Supreme Court held that in equity, Okoro was treated as if the lease had been granted. Therefore, Okoro had an equitable interest in the property, which he validly assigned to the plaintiff. This equitable interest gave the plaintiff a stronger claim than the appellant, who purchased the property under the “abandoned property” sale.
- Key takeaway: This case reinforces the principle that an agreement for a lease, where all conditions for its execution have been met, creates an equitable interest equivalent to a legal lease. This equitable interest can be assigned.
Fletcher v Ashburner, (1779) 1 Bro. C. C. 497
“Money directed to be employed in the purchase of land, and land directed to be sold and turned into money, are to be considered as that species of property into which they are directed to be converted; and this in whatever manner the direction is given; whether by will, by way of contract, marriage articles, settlement or otherwise, and whether the money is actually deposited, or only covenanted to be paid, whether the land is actually conveyed. The owner of the fund or the contracting parties may make land money, or money, land.
Penn v Baltimore, (1750) 1 Vessen 444
This case involved a boundary dispute between the Penn (Pennsylvania) and Calvert (Maryland) families, stemming from conflicting royal charters. The intended boundary, based on the 40th parallel and the Twelve-Mile Circle around New Castle, proved problematic because the two did not intersect, and Philadelphia was located south of the intended boundary. This led to escalating tensions and arrests.
The case eventually reached Lord Hardwicke in 1750. Despite the complexity and significance of the dispute (involving two colonial governments and three counties), the legal action sought was simply specific performance of a 1732 agreement between the families.
Lord Hardwicke made several key points:
- He acknowledged the case’s importance, comparing it to a matter for a “Roman senate.”
- He clarified that the delay in judgment was due to the case’s complexity, not any doubt about the correct outcome.
- He emphasized that specific performance was the appropriate remedy because monetary damages would be insufficient to resolve the boundary issue.
- He dismissed arguments that the court lacked jurisdiction over matters of Royal grant, explaining that equity acts in personam (against the individuals involved) and not against the King.
- He also dismissed arguments that the dispute was non-justiciable (unsuitable for judicial resolution) and that the rights of settlers in the disputed area would be affected without their being parties to the suit.
In essence, the key takeaway is that an English court of equity decreed specific performance of an agreement concerning land in America, demonstrating the court’s willingness to resolve disputes involving colonial boundaries despite their complexity and political significance.
Ayinule v Abimbola, (1957) LLR 41
Case Summary
A Nigerian court granted an injunction to restrain a defendant within its jurisdiction from doing an act outside its jurisdiction. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was making use of his (plaintiff’s) Registered trade name in Ghana. He sought an injunction to restrain the defendant from repeating this alleged unlawful act. The question was whether the court had jurisdiction to restrain a defendant who was within the jurisdiction from doing an act outside the jurisdiction. Held:
It was evident that the defendant’s action clearly threatened legal injury to the plaintiff’s business interests, and that an injunction would issue in terms of the plaintiff’s application if the acts complained of were committed in this country. The court held that an order is injunction is directed to th
