Threats to Democracy, Democratic Breakdown and the Prevention of Democratic Breakdown

Question 1

What are the five sets of corruption that US citizens fear according to De Bruin and Brooks, 2021?

Answer 1

1) limited participation in election

2) biased voting administration

3) legitimizing and mobilizing population to turn against election outcome

4) using political violence to further that end

5) politicizing armed forces

Question 2

What are the three mainstream notions of populism according to Fukuyama, 2018?

Answer 2

1. A regime that pursues policies that are popular in the short run but unsustainable in the long run, usually in the realm of social policies.
2. The definition of the “people” that are the basis for legitimacy: Many populist regimes do not include the whole population, but rather a certain ethnic or racial group that are said to be the “true” people.
3. The style of leadership. Populist leaders tend to develop a cult of personality around themselves, claiming the mantle of charismatic authority that exists independently of institutions like political parties.

Question 3

Why is the personalist approach endangering liberal institutions? (Fukuyama, 2018)

Answer 3

1. All of these institutions are potential roadblocks to the populist leader’s ability to achieve his or her goals, and therefore become direct targets of attack
2. The personalistic nature of populism thus makes it a threat to liberal institutions

Question 4

What to categories of populist movements does Fukuyama propose (2018)?

Answer 4

1. Latin America and in Southern Europe, populists have tended to be on the Left, having a constituency among the poor and advocating redistributionist social programs that seek to remedy economic inequality. They do not however emphasize ethnic identity or take a strong stance against immigration.
2. 2. In northern Europe, however, populists are based less on the poor than on a declining middle or working class, and takes a more right-wing ethnic and anti-immigrant turn.
   3. They want to protect existing welfare states but do not emphasize rapid expansion of social services or subsidies

Nonetheless, there are groups or movements that don’t really fit either category. (Italy)

Question 5

What are the three characteristics that can lead to democratic breakdown, according to Philip 1992?

Answer 5

Calss conflict
demokratik brakdown occourse because of a conflict between classes….see the soviet union and marx
International Influences
international coups, pressures or involvement leads to democratic breakdown…see chille
Policy failiur
mostly talks about economic factors here

Question 6

When are democracies established enough to not die according to Vanhanen 1997?

Answer 6

Once democracys cross a certain threshhold of power, influence and recouses they are hard or nearly impossible to break down and are “here to stay”

Question 7

What are the two distinctive modes by which democracies become nondemocracies, defined by Ko Maeda 2012?

Answer 7

one is when a democratic government is toppled by a force outside of the
government, such as a military coup, - exogenous

and the other is when a democratically elected leader suspends the democratic
process - endogenous

Question 8

How can the framework governing executive-legislative relationships influence democratic survival, according to Ko Maeda 2012?

Answer 8

Some argue that presidential systems are inherently more prone to breakdown (Linz 1994; Stepan and Skach 1993) while
others maintain that presidential democracies face increased risks of termination only when combined with other characteristics such as fragmented party systems, nonconcurrent electoral cycles, strong presidential powers, and opposing legislatures (e.g., Jones
1995; Mainwaring 1993).

Question 9

When is it more likely that democracies die from internal or from external factors, according to Ko Maeda 2012?

Answer 9

analysis of the duration of 135
democratic periods, between 1950 and 2004, provides evidence that lower levels of economic development and
economic growth rates increase the risk of military coups and that incumbent democratic leaders are more likely to end the democratic process themselves in a presidential system than in a parliamentary system

Question 10

Schedler (1998) introduces the concept of ‘‘democratic erosion’’ in contrast to ‘‘democratic breakdown,’’ arguing that it is important to recognize them as two different ways that democracies could end. What is the difference between these two concepts?

Answer 10

Although Schedler’s distinction may seem similar to the concepts of exogenous and endogenous terminations, they are conceptually quite different. In Schedler’s discussion, ‘‘breakdown’’ is quick, sudden, and visible while ‘‘erosion’’ is slow, incremental, and less transparent. Thus,
military coups and Fujimori-style self-coups are both classified as ‘‘breakdown.’’

Question 11

Democratic breakdowns can be classified into two main groups according to Ko Maeda 2012. What are they?

Answer 11

Maeda 2012 labels these two types of democratic breakdowns as ‘‘exogenous termination’’ and ‘‘endogenous termination,’’ depending on the source of the event. Breakdowns are exogenous when the source of the event comes from outside the government, and endogenous when the event springs from within the government.

Question 12

How are the likelihood of military coups and economic development are connected?(exogenous termination)

Answer 12

Londregan and Poole note that ‘‘economic backwardness is close to being a necessary condition for coups’’ (1990, 151), and their empirical analysis confirms that both a high level of economic development and a high economic growth rate inhibit military coups. e perceived probability of a military coup being successful should decrease with higher levels of government legitimacy that comes with economic prosperity. Thus, a well-performing economy is expected to decrease the probability of an exogenous termination.

Higher levels of economic development and growth lower the risk of exogenous termination but have no significant impact on the risk of endogenous termination.

Question 12

Linz’s (1994) claim that presidentialism leads to higher rates of democratic breakdown has stood as a harbinger in the debate. Linz’s main
criticisms of presidentialism can be summarized in three interrelated issues,what are they?

Answer 12

(1) Dual Legitimacy and deadlock.

Separate elections for the president and the legislature create dual legitimacy and conflict (e.g., the legislature blocks the president’s agenda). This is especially problematic because nonparty or antiparty candidates sometimes win the presidency in presidential systems. Since both institutions claim legitimacy, he confrontation can become serious and prolonged. Unlike parliamentary systems where the symbolic head of state can be a neutral and supra-
political moderator, the president in a presidential system is always on one side of partisan conflicts.

(2) Rigidity.

Since the president and legislature both
have fixed terms, the system has inherent rigidity. In parliamentary systems, the legislature can dismiss the prime minister by a vote of no confidence, and the prime minister can call for an early election. Such deadlock-breaking devices are not available in presidential systems, and thus it is difficult to dissolve a political deadlock, which may tempt politicians into seeking extra-legal solutions. Because of fixed terms, the political process becomes discontinuous, and the system is unable to readjust itself in the case of drastic political and social change.

(3) Winner Takes All.

Because presidents are directly elected, the competition for the presidency tends to be an excessively heated zero-sum game where the winner takes all. Elected presidents can feel a
sense of personal mandate, leading them into a plebiscitary leadership style. At the same time, the president may become unaccountable because of term limits that exists in most presidential systems. Term limits also give presidents a sense of urgency that leads to ‘‘ill-designed policies, rapid implementation, and impatience
with the opposition’’ (17).

Question 13

Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. (2013) came to the conclusion that democracies are more likely to survive if they do….

Answer 13

Democracies are more likely to survive when political actors have a strong normative preference for democracy and when they avoid radical policy positions. Moreover, democratic regimes are stronger when the regional environment facilitates the spread of democratic values and political moderation domestically

Question 14

Does the presence of powerful radical actors make it harder to sustain a competitive regime? According to Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. (2013)

Answer 14

We believe the answer is yes. The more extreme and more powerful the radical players become, the more threatened by democratic politics some other actors will feel. In order to protect their interests in cases of considerable radicalization—on the part either of the government and its allies or of opposition actors—some powerful actors may try to subvert a competitive regime.

Question 15

What does having a normative preference for democracy mean according to Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. (2013) and why does having it make a competitive system more resilient?

Answer 15

Such an actor is ideologically committed to democracy
as the best kind of political regime. This commitment is expressed in his or her willingness to incur policy costs in order to defend the competitive regime. A normative preference for democracy is different from situational or opportunistic behavior in which an actor’s support for the regime is contingent on policy results—in other words, on instrumental rationality.

Such a preference limits how far actors will go in pursuit of their policy goals. When democracy holds intrinsic value for the actors, they are more willing to endure policies that hurt their interests because they perceive such policies as based upon legitimate, binding decisions. For the same reason, actors may be willing to reject beneficial policies if those policies have not been adopted by a legitimate regime.

Question 16

What are the three key findings of Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. (2013) when studying the democratic survival in Latin america?

Answer 16

First, the level of development neither raised nor lowered the likelihood of competitive regimes breaking down in Latin America between 1945 and 2005. This generally confirms O’Donnell’s analysis in Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism.

Second, policy radicalism makes it more difficult to sustain competitive political regimes. When strong radical forces compete for political power, the chance grows that some actors will find the cost of tolerating democratic politics too high. Radical threats encourage defection from competitive regimes. Conversely, pervasive policy moderation lowers the stakes of democratic politics.

Third, actors’ normative attitudes about the political regime have a significant impact on whether competitive regimes endure or break down. Some actors intrinsically value democracy far more than others. Democracy can withstand severe crises and protracted bad performance if most actors are normatively committed to democracy as a regime. Conversely, competitive regimes are highly vulnerable to breakdown if the most powerful actors are indifferent to liberal democracy’s intrinsic value.
These normative preferences about the regime are not reducible to structural factors or to broad sociocultural patterns

Question 17

What does Runciman (2018) argue?

Answer 17

He says that we must not allow historical analogies to blind us to the unique features of today’s political landscape

Question 18

What are Runciman (2018) four central themes?

Answer 18

Coup!, Catastrophe, Technological Takeover, something better

Question 19

What are some strengths to Runciman’s (2018) argument?

Answer 19

Looks at climate change and nuclear conflict and how they foster inertia and apathy.

Looks at the role of technology and warns of the hollowing-out of democratic institutions and the manipulation of information.

Question 20

Weaknesses of Runciman’s (2018) argument

Answer 20

He does look at economic factors

Neglects neo-liberal policies

Contemporary democracies are susceptible to coups - myanmar, west africa nations, sudan

Question 21

What do levitsky and ziblatt (2018) say about democratic breakdown?

Answer 21

they argue that it is not inevitable and can be averted by learning from other countries

Question 22

What do levitsky and ziblatt (2018) say poses a significant threat to deocracy?

Answer 22

The unwritten democratic norms have been eroding, due to extreme partisan polarisation

Question 23

How long have the guardrails of democracy been eroding?

Answer 23

Since the 1970s and 80s

Question 24

Critiques of levitsky and ziblatt (2018)

Answer 24

Christofs critiques
Treatment of polarisation is too simplistic and too one dimensional

They say racial inequality is the cause for polarisation and downplay other factors

They just want to depolarise the issue instead of coming up with a solution

Democracy is not the end of the world

ChatGPT
overemphasis on the US

focused exclusively on the elites and their behaviour

they draw on historical analogies that may be appropriate/applicable in modern circumstances

Oversimplifies the complex dynamics of political polarisation and institutional decay

Question 25

What is the cause for polarisation according to levitsky and ziblatt (2018)?

Answer 25

Racial inequality

Question 26

What factors led to breakdown in Venezuela?

Answer 26

Combination of economic difficulties, institutional shortcomings, and class conflict

Question 27

What factors led to breakdown in Venezuela?

Answer 27

Economic decline, political tensions and international influence